HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY

30 Years of Participatory Budgeting Worldwide

Nelson Dias (ORG.)

Articles
HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY

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HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY
30 Years of Participatory Budgeting Worldwide

Articles
For Deise Martins, builder of networks, for the legacy that she left us
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Introductory Note

Five years after the first edition, “Hope for Democracy” returns with new and updated perspectives of participatory budgeting worldwide. The following pages are a result of the commitment of more than sixty authors, coming from all continents. The main objective of this collective effort is to provide a wide and comprehensive view of these processes. This publication proposes an open and ongoing reflection on how participatory budgeting processes have developed over the last thirty years. The following articles are an invitation to travel around the world, through unknown paths to the "great public".

To guide the reading, articles are divided into four large blocks. The first, called "global dynamics," is composed of contributions of authors who have dedicated themselves to the analysis of the main trends in the different continents. These texts are an excellent "starting point" for understanding the phenomenon of participatory budgeting, existing methodological and institutional designs, as well as the challenges they face. The second block, referring to the "regional dynamics," reunites texts aimed at understanding the particularities of these processes in each of the territorial contexts here depicted. From North America to Asia, Oceania to Europe, Latin America to Africa, the reader will find many reasons to be astonished by the scope of the ongoing initiatives.

The third block is an innovation when compared to the first edition of the book, by bringing together articles dedicated to understanding the growth dynamics of institutional and territorial scales of participatory budgeting. This is probably the main advance of the last few years, and this is why it is particularly important in this publication. The fourth and final block integrates focused contributions to understand the relationship between participatory budgeting and other themes, such as the participation of children and youth, technologies usage and democracy crisis.
1. Global Dynamics
The next thirty years of participatory budgeting in the world start today

Nelson Dias & Simone Júlio

Hope between crises
A whirlwind of events that happened over the past 30 years has significantly transformed the world, international relations, nation-state policies, how the market operates and people’s lives.
The 1990’s were unquestionably marked by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, by the German unification, the fall of the socialist republics in Eastern Europe. All these events created grounds for the expansion of democratic regimes, globalization and global capitalism. Many consider this decade as one of “prosperous times” for the progression of peace, democracy, economic growth, the popularization of the personal computer and the Internet. However, it is not possible to generalise everything.
During the period under review, there were also some tragic events, such as the first Gulf War, the Balkan wars, the genocide in Rwanda, and the Battle of Mogadishu.
At the dawn of the new century, more precisely in 2001, there were the gloomy 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, led by nineteen suicide bombers who hijacked four commercial passenger airplanes, three of which intentionally collided against the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center complex in New York City, and against the Pentagon, the headquarters of the United States Department of Defence, in Arlington County, Virginia, just outside of Washington, DC. The fourth plane crashed into an open field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. No one survived these flights. Since that day, a fanatic terrorism, aided by unconventional weapons, has triggered in different parts of the planet, changing the way we live in our cities and how we look at each other.
In many countries, raising security standards has entailed clear restrictions on individual and collective freedom.
The financial crisis of 2008, triggered by an announced “property bubble” and by the breakdown of several financial groups, led to a sharp drop in eco-
nomic activity, an exponential increase in unemployment, the inequity of public accounts in many countries, and led thousands of people to conditions of poverty and exclusion. Wages fell and the labour market became even more precarious. Several States rushed to save banks in danger of bankruptcy, using taxpayers’ money. Several of these financial institutions have made their way to recovery, while many families are still struggling to recover what they lost with the crisis.

By the end of 2010, there was a wave of protests that became known worldwide as the Arab Spring, which caused revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, civil wars in Libya and Syria, as well as major popular mobilizations in Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Oman, and Yemen, among others. The root of these movements was the absence of democracy in these territories, the worsening of the economic crisis, and the deterioration of the populations’ living conditions.

In Syria, positions went from the extreme of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorial regime to the extreme of the different armed militias – from revolutionary forces to Islamist groups, including the self-proclaimed Islamic state – leading the country to a civil war that has already killed many thousands of innocent victims and forced many millions to flee to unknown destinations. With no relevant precedent in this regard, Syria tops the list of countries of origin for refugee populations, followed by Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan, among others. Refugee camps and makeshift boats, loaded with people trying to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe, are now included in the “brand images” of modern times.

Despite the progress over the last decade in the fight against world hunger led by the United Nations, the number of people suffering from this problem has dramatically increased, having reached 11% of the world’s population by 2016, or about 815 million of human beings. The research on food security says that the worsening of these situations is largely due “to the proliferation of violent conflicts, high food prices, and abnormal weather patterns.”

The current global context also demonstrates the existence of an unprecedented global environmental crisis. This is the message that the United Nations Environment Agency wished to pass on to the 2017 report Towards a Pollution Free Planet, in which it recalls that the main challenges of the present are, namely: climate change; demographic expansion; degradation of ecosystems, and biological diver-
sity; desertification by intensive farming practices; deforestation, soil erosion, and silting of rivers; contamination and depletion of water resources; contamination/pollution of soils, air, rivers, and oceans; forest fires; natural disasters.

According to Manuel Castells (2017,12), the blue planet is facing a deeper crisis, with devastating consequences due to its (non)ability to deal with the multiple crises that affect modern societies, namely: the rupture of relations between those who rule and those who are ruled. According to the author, distrust in institutions, almost everywhere in the world, de-legitimizes political representation and, therefore, “leaves us orphans of a shelter that protects us in the name of common interest.”

It has become a commonplace to address the weaknesses of democracy, using arguments such as the progressive loss of society’s confidence in political actors, the way they operate, their ability to care for the common good and to answer the needs and expectations of the people. This “falling out of love with democracy” is also reflected on the elections, the moment par excellence of making conscious choices about the future of a society. On the one hand, there are high rates of voting abstention in some countries. On the other hand, voting is starting to be used as a “throwing weapon” against political parties and elites traditionally in power.

This historic right to a free political choice, which has given rise to broad social and political struggles, has undergone such a wide and accelerated de-valuation that it must impress the most enlightened minds. Why is the act par excellence of the exercise of citizenship so unmotivating for such a large section of the population? The answer to this question seems to lie in the conviction that part of the society has that voting is a false power and doing so is irrelevant or will change nothing. According to this perspective, abstention is the result of a thought-out action and not a result of lack of interest or negligence.

There is another group of unsatisfied people, who are mobilised by populist campaigns, and who have been exercising their right to vote as a form of protest or reprisal against the parties traditionally in power and ruling elites, as happened with the referendum that dictated the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union – better known as Brexit – and the consequent resignation of the Prime Minister, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, and that of Macron as the President of France, among other examples. These situations are a consequence of the citizens’ choices and of the actions of the institutions, which is why it is possible to state that “democracy is working”. This, however, is not enough to disguise the enormous discomfort this causes on the political class and on society. They represent a wearing away of the democratic systems. In a context such as the one we have hitherto described, populism and demagogies find fertile ground for progress, alongside a polarization of political space and a growth of extremism. In the light of the foregoing, it is more
or less evident that the elections are no longer enough to make democracy credible. It is not enough to have a democratically elected government to meet the requirements of the regime. This understanding is all the more emphatic when one realizes that the exercise of democracy has been confined to political places of lesser importance for people's daily lives. The major decisions that influence life in society are often made in spheres where democracy has not yet arrived, as is the case with some international organizations.

According to the Democracy Index of 2017, only less than 5% of the world's population currently lives in a “full democracy” and almost a third lies in the domain of dictatorships. According to Larry Diamond, quoted in this paper, the data reveals a context of “democratic recession” on a global scale. This expression is supported by the lowering of the 89 countries in the index, against the 27 that have improved their performance. The author points to the decline of popular participation in politics and elections, the weakening of how governments operate, the withdrawal of political elites from the electorate and the decline of confidence in institutions and freedom of press, among other reasons.

We are living a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, there is a high level of popular support for democracies and, on the other, a “deep discontentment” with how it operates and with the political representation system.

The brief historical exercise over the past 30 years and on the behaviour of democracies aims to understand the context in which participatory budgeting (PB) have developed, which, as understood, comprises two sides: i) a more positive one, based on events that were decisive to allow the entry of participatory processes territories which were less open to the inclusion of practices from abroad, namely from the West, as is the case of the unification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the socialist block formed by Eastern European countries, not to mention the Arab spring, and the advancement of the Internet; (ii) a less favourable one, based on a multiplicity of crises and conflicts, which, as is understood, are little ‘friendly’ to the creation of participatory initiatives whose nature entails the strengthening of social dialogue, territorial solidarity, trust between the people and the institutions, deepening democracy, among many other aspects.

Many of the relevant facts that have affected the world over the last three decades are of a structural nature, with very direct impacts on the forms of social and political organization, while PBs, due to their local and experimental character, have reached high levels of dissemination, despite their circumstantial answers to larger problems.

In view of the above, it is necessary to produce three essential conclusions to understand these processes and the management of expectations. Thus, participatory budgeting processes:
emerged and developed in contexts of multiple crises and, in some cases, as a response to these crises (lack of trust in institutions and political elites, conflicts of various kinds, disasters, etc.), demonstrating their countercyclical character;
• have a capacity for action and production of impacts proportional to their own dimension, which, in most cases, is limited or circumstantial;
• have a “methodological and conceptual elasticity” that has allowed their adaptation to different contexts and for different purposes, residing in this particular one of the main success factors for a territorial extension as vast as the one recorded so far.

It is but fair to consider participatory budgeting as a ray of hope between crises; as an embryo of other forms of living in democracy, more participatory, more effective, and closer to people. These prove that, in addition to being necessary, it is possible to explore new thresholds for the exercise of participation and the construction of citizenship rights. In a figurative sense, it is as if representative democracy were pregnant. Within it lies another heartbeat, one of a power to become what it is, one of the search for what is new, one of creation that seeks to help reinforce and perpetuate the democratic regime itself, albeit in a framework of improvement and development, defects, and deviations of the past.

A hope with many advances and some setbacks
The process of disseminating participatory budgeting is unprecedented. It should be borne in mind that this is a local practice that started in the end of the 1980’s of the 20th century, in the south of Brazil. It gained notoriety and visibility at home and abroad, infecting other municipal, regional, and national governments, as well as international organizations, cooperation agencies, universities, non-governmental organizations, among other agents worldwide. The participatory budgeting has undergone changes in terms of method, procedures, and standards, in some cases significant ones. From experimental and localized practices, to its institutionalization as a public policy in some countries, to the creation of national and international networks, this has become part of a social and political movement in defence of participatory democracy. Based on the data collected through the different articles in this book and other sources of information, it is estimated that there are more than 7.059 to 7.671 participatory budgeting in the world. The situations are very different and the numbers are just that, because they do not allow analysing the methods, the results, or the intensity and depth of the citizens’ participation in each reality.
This is a reality that has significantly changed in recent years. The main drawback of these processes is in Brazil, the cradle of participatory budgeting. Numerous corruption scandals, attacks on the rule of law and democracy, a severe political, institutional, economic, and social crisis have plunged the country into a very complex and fragile situation. Highly politicized and partisan Participatory Budgeting have fallen in the last two years, following the Labour Party's strong electoral defeat in the last municipal elections. Also, the Porto Alegre case was not immune to the context and, for the first time in its history, it was suspended by decision of the Municipality. In Argentina, in dawn of this century, PBs were disclosed as an instrument of public policy by several local governments. However, it was only after 2007, with the implementation of the National Program...
of Participatory Budgeting that it registered a strong growth. Despite some political changes in 2015, the number of cases remained stable and close to 50.

In Colombia, about 280 municipalities have already implemented a PB, that is, 25% of the national territory. This process is part of the final agreement to establish peace between the Government and the FARC, insofar as the active participation of citizens is regarded as vital to guarantee the transparency of local governments.

In Peru, shortly after the creation of a national law that obliged subnational governments to develop this practice, the sturdy success of participatory budgeting has given way to a procedure or mere formality, lacking content and transformation ability.

As for the US and Canada, despite PBs having existed for about one and two decades, respectively, they have remained incipi-
However, over the last two years, evidence seems to have emerged of a possible increase in its implementation, especially in the United States, mostly because it is being considered as an effective means in the fight against xenophobia and racism.

Mexico is one of the countries with no significant tradition in participatory budgeting. However, the implementation of a pilot project in the Municipality of Cananea, in 2017, within the framework of the Mine Fund seems to have created the basic conditions for extending this initiative in the coming years to several of the territories benefiting from this fund. A pioneer process that involves three levels of government – federal, state, and municipal.

The growth of participatory budgeting in African countries has been exponential. It is estimated that the continent will register approximately 500 processes by the end of 2018. This number embodies undeniable democratic gains for society and the consequent emergence of movements to strengthen the democratization of public institutions.

In Europe, the Mediterranean countries continue to gain prominence, although they are joined by new focuses of interest in the old continent. Portugal is now recognised as a "participatory budgeting lab". Since 2002, when the first experiences began, and in just 15 years, about 46% of the municipalities have experienced or are developing this type of practice. The country is still a pioneer in the implementation of national processes, as will be seen later.

Spain has a winding road to pace. From 2001 to 2010 it was one of the territories with the greatest growth of experiences in Europe. The crisis of 2011, the excessive partisanization of participatory budgeting and the conservative Popular Party victory, have dictated the premature death of many initiatives in the country. However, since 2015 there has been a resurgence of these practices, once again a new electoral turnaround and the emergence of parties like Podemos and Ciudadanos.

Italy is debating the rebirth of these initiatives. Since 2013, due to a new political landscape, marked by the emergence of the M5S (Movement 5 Stelle), the inclusion of technological tools and social networks into political activist groups...
and citizens is boosting the growth of PB and its geographical and methodological diversification.

In France, there is a third wave of participatory budgeting. After the implementation of the Paris case in 2014, many other municipalities followed suit. Thus, before the elections that year, there were only 4 active initiatives. By 2018, more than 100 experiences are prospected across the country.

Only recently has there been a spread of participatory budgeting in Scotland. This trend is intertwined with social, political, and institutional factors, as well as with the need for political reforms and democratic renewal. The emergent cases seem to correspond to an appeal for improvement in governance, the qualification of public services and the strengthening of local democracy.

The Asian panorama has also significantly changed in recent years. Participatory budgeting were introduced in China in 2005, in the context of a combination of local experiences and international models. These practices have contributed to the implementation of various reforms, especially at the level of budgetary and local governments being open to public participation.

In South Korea participatory budgeting are required by law. This relation is closely linked to the reform of decentralization and the strengthening of civil society organizations, which has transformed the map of participatory budgeting in this Asian country.

The major cities in Taiwan have been adopting participatory budgeting since 2015. However, the capital Taipei is unique in that it has sought to institutionalize this process throughout the city. The others seem to adopt a subcontracting approach, i.e.: local governments subcontract private sector entities (companies, NGOs, ...) to implement these practices, with minimal involvement in all dynamics.

In the Russian Federation, after an experimental start-up in 2006–2007, about half of the country's regions are now engaged in the introduction of this mechanism, which is one of the main surprises in the world of participatory budgeting, as will be seen later.

The Australian cases are still not well known and are quite
different from the rest of the world. Despite a limited number of experiences, the reports point to initiatives where citizens are invited to decide on the total public investment of their municipality, although this decision is made by a People’s Panel composed of 20 to 50 citizens, selected randomly (with an effort to mirror the specificities of the city’s population).

**A territorial and institutional scaling up**

In view of the above, and without neglecting other important changes in recent years, the "territorial and institutional scaling up" is perhaps the most significant and surprising. In this context, there are cases that are paradigmatic: as is the case of State of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil), which started in 2014 but was suspended in the meantime; some regions of countries such as Chile and Malaysia that are involved in these dynamics; the 30 regions of the Russian Federation that completed their cycles of participation in 2018; the three national cases promoted by the Government of Portugal in 2017; the national cultural initiatives promoted in Taiwan and the environmental and energy initiatives promoted in France, both with different designations of the Participatory Budgeting.

The chosen examples, among others worldwide, pose new challenges to the design, development, and evaluation of these processes. To understand them, new reading keys and new analytical references are necessary. Consider the following cases carried out in the Russian Federation and in Portugal.

**Local Initiatives Support Program in Russian Federation**

The participatory budgeting in the Russian Federation, launched in 2005 and based on a model drawn up by specialists of the World Bank, directed specifically to the Russian regions, aimed at combining traditional principles of these processes with logics of community development, having been designated as Local Initiatives Support Program (LISP). These are based on an annual cycle which provides for: i) methodology design and regional program preparation; ii) qualification of municipal teams for

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1 Shulga, Ivan et all (2017) Initiative Budgeting – Russian Experience of Citizens’ Participation in Addressing Local Issues, Alex, Moscow.
the development of the different phases; iii) the organization of meetings to present, debate, and vote on priority projects in each municipality/agglomeration; iv) preparation and detailing of winning projects in each territory; v) preliminary analysis of the projects prioritized on each site; vi) regional competition for project hierarchization and selection of winners; (vii) implementation of investments; viii) delivery ceremony to the population.

Sakhalin Participatory Budgeting – Russia
This process initiated by the Government of Sakhalin in 2017, comprises the following phases: i) submission of proposals at public meetings to be held in each area of urban districts with a population of at least 100 people. During each meeting, there is a winning proposal and three delegates are elected to represent it in the following phase; ii) municipal meeting of delegates for the presentation of the proposals of the set and for selecting the two most voted ones; iii) feasibility study of proposals considered as priority in each municipality; iv) public voting of finalist projects open to the population of the whole region; v) implementation of the winning projects.

Participatory Budgeting Portugal (PBP) and Youth Participatory Budgeting Portugal (YPBP)
Initiatives of national scope, initiated by the Portuguese Government in 2017, whose structures are based on the following stages: i) submission of proposals by citizens through face-to-face meetings held in all regions of the country and online; ii) technical analysis of the proposals received, being in charge of the different services of the ministries involved. A period of complaints about the results is planned; iii) public voting of finalist projects; iv) implementation of the winning investments. The PBP envisages the creation of sub regions and the distribution of money in an equitable way for each one, also leaving equivalent amounts for national projects. The PYBP developed without a division of territory.

Participatory Budgeting of Schools
It’s a national process, launched by the Portuguese Ministry of Education in 2017, for which a legislation was created to oblige the
more than one thousand public schools in the third cycle of basic and secondary education to develop PB within each establishment. The Government annually transfers to each school an additional amount, equivalent to 1 euro per student, with a minimum of 500 euros per school, to finance the projects chosen by the students. The methodology defined includes the following phases: i) preparation and dissemination of each edition; ii) presentation of proposals by students; iii) dissemination and discussion of the proposals presented; iv) voting on the proposals; v) presentation of results; vi) planning and implementation of the winning projects.

In general, the cases presented tend to follow, with due adaptations, the two cycles of participatory budgeting implementation: the decision and the implementation of the projects. There are, however, differences resulting from the institutional models that support them, the underlying technical and political options, and the context in which they are carried out. An essential difference between the experiences presented is based on the fact that participatory budgeting promoted by the Portuguese government have emerged after a wide dissemination of cases at the local level, with national models assuming the particularity of not overlapping or conflicting with existing municipal initiatives.

By comparison, participatory budgeting in the Russian Federation have started at the regional level and without any tradition or experience in local terms. Some 3,000 municipalities, with the exception of large cities, are thus integrated into regional initiatives, from top to bottom. This means that, unlike the rest of the world, the regional process has taken the place of local participatory budgeting, copying their more classic types of material investment. The following matrix can help understand the most substantial differences of the models in comparison.
### Table 1 Comparison of scaling up models for PB.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management model</th>
<th>Territorial organization</th>
<th>Decision Levels</th>
<th>Typologies of projects</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Initiatives Support Program</strong></td>
<td>Shared management. Regional coordination of the process and analysis of projects. Coordination of meetings held by municipalities. Shared allocation of project financing (region, municipalities, enterprises and population).</td>
<td>Territorially competitive PB. It assures the distribution of money through the territory in light of the results of the &quot;regional competition&quot;, conducted by a verification of a set of technical criteria.</td>
<td>Shared decision. Local – citizens decide the projects of their locality to enter the “regional competition”. Regional – government manages the platform that determines the winning projects based on criteria and algorithms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PB Sakhalin</strong></td>
<td>Shared management. Regional coordination of the process, analysis of projects and voting. Organization of preliminary and municipal meetings held by municipalities. Local voting of projects. Shared allocation of project financing (region and municipalities)</td>
<td>Territorially competitive PB. Ensures the distribution of money across the territory on the basis of the public votes’ results.</td>
<td>Citizens' decision. Local – citizens elect projects at local and municipal level. Regional – Citizens vote for finalist projects throughout the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PBP</strong></td>
<td>Centralised management. National coordination of the whole process. This calls for support to municipalities for the hosting of participation meetings.</td>
<td>Territorially equitable PB. A priori distribution of resources by the different sub regions of the process and existence of a similar value to each region to support projects of national scope.</td>
<td>Citizens' decision. National – public voting of finalist projects at the level of each region and at national level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YPBP</strong></td>
<td>Centralised management. National coordination of the whole process. This calls for support to municipalities for the hosting of participation meetings.</td>
<td>Territorially competitive PB. It assures the distribution of money by the territory in function of the results of public voting. In the second edition it introduced the limit of 1/3 of the budget by region, independently of the result of the public voting.</td>
<td>Citizens' decision. National – public voting of finalist projects at national level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PB Schools</strong></td>
<td>Shared management. Government – legislates, finances, supervises and evaluates the process. Schools – implement their PB according to established standards.</td>
<td>Territorially equitable PB. It assures the distribution of resources to schools according to the number of students.</td>
<td>Citizens’ decision. At each school, students can submit proposals and vote on finalist projects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Own
In all cases of wider territorial and institutional scope, there are new challenges, including:

• The management model, which can be a simple centralized coordination of the process or a link between different levels of government – national, regional, and local. Albeit more complex, this second option seems to combine advantageous structural conditions for the allocation of larger resources to projects, enhances the capacity of proximity communication (essential to the mobilization of citizens), ensures a more permanent presence of the process in society, creates ties and political commitments and produces more structural impacts on the territories;

• The model of territorial organization, which can favour a more equitable distribution of resources or a competition that rewards the more populous sub-regions or that are more mobilized for participation. The bet on processes that can reconcile fairness with healthy competition can produce more interesting social impacts on the territories;

• The investment models, which can roughly differentiate between the most conventional (public works) and immaterial actions. The typologies of eligible projects and the way the territory is prepared to host the process can dictate the appeal to different forms of citizens' identity with priorities. In most situations, the call for participation, when submitting proposals and voting on projects, is done in relation to territorial identity. This is what often mobilizes people. The PBP and partially the YPBP introduce a novelty when betting on typologies of immaterial projects that can be national. In these cases, the call for participation is based on thematic identity, mobilizing social groups more linked to certain areas of public policies, such as culture, environment, science, etc.
Contributions to building a participatory budgeting agenda for the next 30 years

Everything indicates that the world, as we know it today, will undergo significant changes in the next three decades. Some of these will be motivated by factors such as technological advancements, international geopolitics, cycles of capitalist economy, population growth, and the impacts of climate change, among others. Democracy will face two essential challenges: (i) to take measures to qualify the system to regain lost confidence in institutions and political agents, preventing the crisis of the system of representation from degenerating into a crisis of legitimacy; ii) reinventing their processes and procedures in a world marked by the "dictatorship of technology", where physical networks will give way to invisible intelligence networks, changing the way public resources are managed, how wealth is produced, and life in society.

Participatory budgeting will not be immune to the incoming changes and may also have to undergo processes of re-creation and adaptation to the contexts that are perceived. In order for them to continue on their path and reach higher levels of territorial and institutional dissemination as well as more consolidated degrees of sustainability, it is necessary to face some key challenges. Without pretensions of completeness, we mention the following:

Placing participatory budgeting on the international political agenda

The theme of citizen participation needs to gain space in the priorities of international organizations, decisive instances in the management of the challenges facing the planet. Whatever the focus and the arguments to be used, certainly of variable geometry, it is important to work with forums such as the United Nations, the G20, the European Union and the BRICS, among others, to stabilize levels of understanding and agents committed to this theme and the institutional representatives who lead the international agendas. This is a key challenge in achieving a "leap of scale" in the importance and political visibility of participatory budgeting.
Articulating Participatory Budgeting with Sustainable Development Goals

The year 2015 marked the approval of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), set at a UN summit in New York, which brought together world leaders to adopt an ambitious agenda in the fight against poverty and in promoting economic development, social, and environmental issues on a global scale until 2030, known as Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development. This is the fruit of the joint work of governments, social organizations and citizens and must mobilize participatory budgeting around the world to align their priorities with SDG, naturally focusing on the most demanding in each reality. This is a bet that strengthens the relationship between participatory processes and the sustainable development of territories and which, if properly designed and communicated, can increase the visibility and credibility of participatory budgeting with governments and the United Nations itself.

Establishing relationship bridges with other social and political movements

Participatory budgeting, at the level of their territories, should establish bridges and strengthen cooperation relations with other relevant movements, groups or networks, focusing on issues such as transparency and open data, human rights, environmental protection, social currencies, urban agriculture, cultural heritage and social protection, among others. These articulations will certainly help to focus more participatory budgeting on the SDG, broaden the base of support for these initiatives and give greater social support to the political action that promotes them.

Reinforcing the territorial and institutional scaling up

In such an adverse international context, as outlined in the first point of this article, the success of participatory budgeting derives largely from its local character. It was this characteristic that allowed such a wide dissemination of these initiatives in a period of three decades, circumventing or escaping the less favourable dynamics registered in the world. This localism, understood as a starting advantage, essential to experimen-
tation and multiplication, may today be insufficient or even a limitation to the growth and affirmation of these processes, so reinforcing the territorial and institutional "scaling up" is essential to reach higher levels of visibility, social and political affirmation, as well as sustainability.

**Strengthening the system of participation**

The benefits of participation and its positive impacts on the credibility of institutions and on the rebuilding of trust will be all the greater when the policy of involving citizens in the management of resources and the definition of public policies is more comprehensive and integrated.

In other words, participatory budgeting have proven their success in many parts of the world, but they are fragile and insufficient to meet the challenges of a high-quality democracy. As a result, it is necessary to complement them with other tools and practices of citizen participation, so that it is essential, in the coming years, to move towards the construction of integrated systems of territorial participation.

**Building legal frameworks that reinforce the sustainability of participatory budgeting**

With some exceptions in the world, such as Peru, the Dominican Republic, South Korea, Indonesia and Poland, participatory budgeting depend on the political will of the elected to implement and develop. This will, however, has shown its weaknesses, sometimes causing significant oscillations in some territories. The balance between "birth rate" and "mortality" of participatory budgeting is positive, but still insufficient to affirm them more robustly in the world.

The next few years will be decisive in order to find ways of establishing a legal framework – by obligation or incentive – to help consolidate these processes. The main challenge is to create legal frameworks that do not transform participatory budgeting into routine procedures, but instead require continuous monitoring and appeal to the creativity and innovative capacity of these initiatives.
Living with the new forms of artificial intelligence (AI)

According to many futurologists, the current moment is the beginning of a new revolution, brought about by the exponential advance of technology, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and nanotechnology. Humanity is expected to change more in the next three decades than in the last three centuries. The consequences are unpredictable, yet it is not difficult to imagine that significant impacts will be felt in life, in society, in professional activities, in international relations, in the functioning of markets, in the way people interact with each other and with institutions, posing challenges to democracy and participation.

Artificial Intelligence is an accelerating construction reality and will pose very serious ethical challenges to humanity. The pressure on personal data protection should increase. Cases such as the "Social Credit System" in China, Cambridge Analytica's role in Donald Trump's election, "Fake News", the power of Facebook and Google algorithms in information search, "smart cameras" in public places are some of the most current examples of the path taken by modern societies.

Artificial intelligence technologies will take part in the political game by allowing mass customization of content and anticipation of trends and behaviours. Through the massive reading of data, in a few moments, the candidates for the elections and the rulers will be able to map hundreds of groups of people, shaping and segmenting the speeches to meet the desires, fears and feelings of each one, without them being effectively heard and without their opinions having even shaped political priorities. If this is one of the ways forward, it is certain that the negative impact on democracy and the credibility of institutions will be even more serious.

It is necessary to establish very clear ethical boundaries and to imagine how the new intelligent forms can effectively serve to increase the transparency of institutions, strengthen the dialogue between those who govern and those who are governed, and expand the spaces of participation.

With the massive production of technology and the creation of affordable prices for consumers, a local government may, in a few years, come to contact us in a customised way, through "personal assistants" (i.e.: robots or other intelligent machines) of a district to participate in a public meeting or consultation on the discussion of a territorial plan or the accomplishment of a work for reformulation of a square.

Whether for the risks or for the potential of this technological revolution, participatory budgeting must be attentive and anticipate the reality that is approaching.
Note from the authors

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Winding around money issues. What’s new in PB and which windows of opportunity are being opened?

Giovanni Allegretti & Kalinca Copello

What is the “essence” of participatory budgeting (PB) that made it different from other processes aimed at involving citizens in decision-making on public policies and projects? What is still innovative about PB, after almost thirty years of existence and more than 3,500 experiments around the world?

Money is probably the most comprehensive keyword to describe the specificity of participatory budgeting in relation to other democratic innovations (Smith, 2009). This keyword, possibly, also constitutes the pivotal standpoint from which we could look to the future of PB, imagining the direction where the present and next experiences ought to be addressed. Traditionally, in the majority of participatory processes, issues around funds remain hidden until the end of negotiations among the different stakeholders. Funds are often treated as a behind-the-scenes subject, and rarely made explicit. As if a magician was pulling a rabbit out of a hat, issues about money usually emerge at the end of participatory processes, frequently causing distortions and diminished results. This often means that, even if the ideas produced are innovative under a qualitative and creative point of view, and provide solutions to main problems highlighted during the process, they can be judged as ‘unfeasible’ and ‘unrealistic’ because they are ‘over-budget’.

Thus characterised, the argument about money becomes a dangerous “gatekeeper” to reject the shared conclusions and solutions that emerged through the participatory process, re-transferring power into the hands
of representative authorities, or of technocrats at their service. If issues about existing and achievable resources are not clearly stated in the agenda, and raised at the beginning of the timeline of a participatory process, they might be used by institutional players (unwilling to share decision-making powers) as an excuse to deny a substantive participation. Placing the “money issue” discussion at the end of a line of any participatory process risks making citizens feel that the declaration that they are “at the core of the process” is just a discursive and rhetoric artefact. Possibly, there is no worst feeling for citizens (who invest energies, passion, time, and skills in participating in debates and formulating planning ideas related to issues of public interest) than realizing that there is still an “inequality of voices” and that participation actually is not interested to favour a “redistribution of powers”. If participation intends to contribute to recreate trust in institutions, then revealing issues related to resources at the end of a participatory process can only generate frustration and further political disenchantment.

As such, participatory budgeting – when it took shape at the end of the ‘80s in Latin America – was a real child of its times. PB, and in particular in its first experimental outing in Porto Alegre (Brazil), was not only understood as an important leverage to shift from discursive to substantive participatory practices, but also as a crucial way to attract citizens’ interest and engagement. By placing the decision over funds to be spent in the hands of citizens, PB communicated something at the same time highly important both under a concrete and a symbolic point of view. Something which appeared “revolutionary”; thus, more radical and bold than the “reformist” way in which PB processes tend to proceed (slowly, gradually and step-by-step) while offering a contribution to the reform of the State and of governance mechanisms which are necessary to be able to manage territories in an era of uncertainty (Stoker, & Chhotray, 2009).

Sharing with people the decision about resources through PB, helped many local institutions to re-think the process for reconstructing the State and its perceived legitimation. In this perspective, PB became something more than just a new participatory tool for governance. PB was perceived as the initiator of a movement, which had the potential to instigate and change civic and political cultures (Baiocchi, 2005). This explains why PB gained strong approval within both social movements interested in the redistribution of powers in society, and by part of neoliberal institutions mainly interested in the efficacy of governance structures (what Dagnino, 2007, described as a “perverse” confluence between actors with too different agendas to be compatible).

While fostering such diverse goals, PB had to invert the priority given to money issues, putting it at the start of any negotiation process with citizens. Consequently, in participatory budgeting, money abandons the role of a final “gatekeeper” and
becomes the explicit explanation of constraints and potentials around which public projects and policies could arise and be shaped. Somehow, it sets the boundaries in which agreements between different actors, and their conflictive goals, could be shaped and nuanced. While doing that, PB underpins three interlinked features: (1) creates an engine to attract the engagement of individuals (especially those who do not believe in social representation); (2) fosters a higher degree of self-responsibility by all participants; 3) moves people from a self-referential “competition for scarce resources” to a new framework which can foster the creation of common wealth, protection of public goods, solidarity and collaborations and alliances about very different social players. That is why PB must be described as a space which put “money in the first stage” of its procedural organization, but not necessary “in the first place” of its mission and interests. Under this perspective, competition could be seen as the “seasoning” for a participatory process, which promotes solidity and attractiveness, but does not overshadow its participatory nature: an opportunity for “reverting priorities” and bring marginalized groups and individuals to the centre of the decision making process. Such inversion of roles, and definition of funds, constitute the core of PB as a specific tool to refresh democracy and fulfil its unrealized promises (Bobbio, 1984), as well as an example to other families of participatory processes. The benefits that PB experiments have to offer to other typologies of participatory processes mainly belong to this domain: introducing a new explicit series of economic and political dimensions into a social dialogue, on issues related to the transformation of spaces and services which affect the quality of people’s life. An example of such potential contribution of PB to other democratic innovations comes from the experience of Lazio Region (Italy). From 2005 to 2009, the regional Ministry of Participation and Financial Affairs of Lazio invested in a large programme to support citizens’ involvement in decision-making in its boroughs and municipalities, through biannual calls for projects where the local governments could propose formats of participatory processes to be co-funded by the regional government. Among the mandatory dimension that proposals had to accomplish, there was the obligation of providing explicit inputs on financial-budgetary issues to citizens involved in the decision-making about policies and projects. Such an obligation aimed at introducing several features typical of partici-
ipatory budgeting into other types of municipal participatory processes of planning and management. The new dimensions increased the overall transparency of the proposed processes, as well as their “substantiality,” because they induced local authorities to anchor the transformations of local policies and projects to concrete budgetary issues and to a shared reflection on how to increase the resources for participation. As an example, the small city of Borbona – during its PB edition of 2006 – took the decision to use the small municipal budget in order to substitute the electricity of public lightening with a photovoltaic systems, in order to be able to add the savings to the resources of participatory budgeting for 2007 (Allegretti, 2011).

Optimizing a political-pedagogical nature
The quality and attractiveness of a PB experience depend on its capacity to establish meaningful correlations between numbers (resources and budget entries) and narratives (proposals to be-funded). Yet, while “budget” is always a filter and a sort of “litmus test” for any narrative – by setting clear financial boundaries and determining which proposals and projects are going to become reality and which ones will merely remain part of a wishing list – a PB ends up also having a political-pedagogical nature. This nature is supported by the “learning by doing” environments created by PB. Within these, both citizens and institutional actors can better deal with the complexity of governing through mutual appraisal, while sharing deliberation and visions on priorities to be implemented. Under such a perspective, PB should be framed as a space that – starting from an emphasis on competition among citizens with different ideas – aims at reaching broader goals of community-building, and the creation of new social bonds and mutual trust relations among participants. From this perspective, PB can no longer be seen as an object, but rather as an “enabling environment” which can influence the transformation of other policies aimed to improve the general quality of a territory. Hence, PB becomes a “political pedagogical channel” to transform society and policies, from a civic-engaged (and engaging) perspective.

Yet, the political pedagogical nature of PB was not easily understood and ambiguously taken into consideration when it was implemented beyond South America. Namely, the positive correlation between the amount of resources put under discussion and their capacity to
act as a driver for learning, was generally ignored. Many of the first North-Western PBs either ignored this potential as “learning-by-doing” tool, or over-emphasized it, considering that investing limited resources in participation would not have negative influence on its pedagogic capacity. So, minimalist PBs took shape and spread around the world, as is the case of many “Youth” or “School PBs” (i.e. those type of processes mainly conceived with the hope of contributing to increase the civic awareness and foster active citizenship behaviours in young generations).

At the beginning of the millennium, when PB examples from the global south started to be noticed and discussed by European self-referential political cultures of urban management, many local authorities tended to dismiss their innovative potentials saying “they were not a new idea”. Indeed, the idea of gathering people around a discussion on public resources was not new. Since the Sixties, especially in many North-Western countries, there have been many local or regional experiences of citizen budget consultation. These budget consultations usually consisted of the creation of spaces were administrative institutions exposed their plans to citizens or some of their representative organizations. The majority of these previous experiences were merely advisory, had a short duration – occurring any time between 2 months and few days preceding the budget approval – and were mainly engaging in a dialogue with organized stakeholders. In this context, PB was frequently dismissed as a “déjà vu” by elected officials who did not understand its political pedagogical nature and simply declared that “they had been already doing it for long” (i.e. presenting pre-moulded budgets just before their official approval). These wide spread “budget consultation” experiences, consequently, could not claim to have reached collective decisions resulting from legitimate participatory processes – but rather by representative institutions through lightly participative methodologies and short time-frames totally inadequate to allow people to reflect on the data presented, and eventually formulate counterproposals. The novelty about several of the first experiences of PB was mainly in the organizational modes and in the timing that characterized them. Brazilian PBs (which started in a period of consolidation of democracy after decades of dictatorship) were thought and structured to reflect the new social and economic environment, resulting from the institutional changes of the re-democratization period. Since the 1990s, Brazilian Participatory Budgeting were shaped as spaces for redressing the clash of powers within society, and between society and institutions. They were conceived as spaces where citizens, who were traditionally marginal in public policy decision-making processes, gained an opportunity to express their voices and vote (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018). The concept of “decision-makers” changed: from referring to elected officials and powerful bureau-
critics who make decisions in a traditional administrative structure (shaped around representative democracy), to a mixed structure of governance in which citizens have a central place. It soon became clear that – in order to create new political spaces to enable the redistribution of voices and power – many other things needed to change: both in the organization of public administrations as well as in the way political and institutional communication was being provided. In Brazil, for instance, considerable efforts were undertaken to deconstruct and reconstruct budget narratives, as well as to reorganize financial departments around the need of producing more understandable and transparent budget documents. These reforms required imagining new places and techniques to provide “outreach” and meeting people in the places where they live, work, and study. A flexible structure of meeting spaces, as well as creative and new opportunities for dialogue and deliberation, encountered internal reforms of the administrative organization. These included efforts to discover and test new languages and forms of transparency and accountability, that took advantage of multimedia support, artistic techniques, oversight committees, lotteries, experiments of random selection, and so on. The city of Arezzo (in its 2009 PB edition) was one of the first (and few) municipalities in Europe to prove able to replicate some of these novelties. In fact, its consultants (Sociolab) suggested the creation of small focus groups to test the information to be displayed to citizens in budgetary documents, and such an experiment determined a complete reformulation of the graphics and the type of data chosen for public release, with the aim of “answering first” to people anxieties and concerns, and only after to add elements of knowledge that municipal government considered relevant to present. In addition, tables of average costs of urban equipment and maintenance actions where created and published online and in small booklets, so that citizens could have access to a clearer information on resource-related issues, when formulating their proposals during the first part of PB cycle. Indeed, the new PB experiments coming from Brazil in the late 1980s (even before the well-known case of Porto Alegre), had been shaped around three basic principles that showed greater understanding about the paradigmatic change that was taking place in the civic and political cultures:
1. They were essentially co-decisional spaces, because they recognized that the shrinking trust in institutions prevent the possibility of attracting people to advisory processes, which are still solidly in the hands of traditional decision-makers, who do not accept to reduce their discretionarily-exerted decisional power;
2. They were shaped in order to be attractive for individuals, recognizing that our present societies mistrust every form of self-declared “representativeness”. Hence, individuals focus on arenas where they can directly (if they so decide) invest their time in participating in those spaces of dialogue;
3. They were articulated as cycles in order to allow people to reflect, digest information, elaborate proposals and think before expressing their positions. Such cycles started well before institutional deadlines, in which budgets are refined and approved, to allow time and space to reshape programmes.

These participatory budgeting experiments in Latin America were mostly implemented by joint-ventures between civil society organizations and new institutional actors, interested to explore new ways of communicating with society and implement structural reforms that could improve their administrative action.

Experiences from these first examples of participatory budgeting, their specific organizational models and the creation of “enabling environments” improved their effectiveness and ultimately increased citizens’ satisfaction with the process. However, in many cases, the awareness of the inclusive and collaborative roots of such processes did not translate into other contexts, when PBs started expanding to Europe, Africa, North America and then – gradually – Asia and Oceania. In many of these regions, PB started to be implemented by top-down decisions, and in a timid and merely experimental way: with limited funding, in small and confined areas, or single policy sectors that could change year-by-year through rotation mechanisms. Often, little attention has been given to the proper implementation of co-decisional mechanisms and – in specific contexts (e.g. Germany) – the experience were conceived as merely consultative, thus limiting their political-pedagogic potential.

It is not clear if the risks, and the resulting institutional harm, of PBs growing light and almost ineffective were recognised, as observed for many of the Brazilian PBs in the second decade of their existence. In
short, many lessons of first PBs were not learned, or at least, totally transferred in other contexts. However, at least a key element, the centrality of the discussion around clear and pre-defined resources, remained central in the new experiences worldwide. Thus, it was maintained the intrinsic nature of participatory budgeting as a form of social dialogue centred in the open discussion around resource of public interest and how to spend them in the most effective way in relation to the problems of every specific territory.

**The impact of “after”: from failed implementation of results to active monitoring**

Today, undoubtedly, the worldwide diffusion of participatory budgeting is happening with a clear awareness of the risk of undervaluing the so-called “second cycle” of PB. The second cycle can be defined as the cycle of actions necessary to guarantee (and oversee) the implementation of successful proposals which have been chosen for funding during the “deliberation cycle” of PB. The risk of undervaluing the second cycle is felt strongly especially where procurement procedures (as is the case of Italy) are slow and over-bureaucratized, and citizens’ trust is eroded. To accommodate implementation, some PB cycles are run only every other year in order to give time to the implementation of previously co-decided projects, so that PB cycles – from start to finish – do not overlap each other, which would compound a perception of ineffectiveness. Naturally, running a PB every two years can create a lot of other problems: (1) the first is that the participatory process – instead of being regarded as a stimulus to a better administrative performance – ends up dragged by the slowness and inertia of bureaucratic procedures, which partially set up its agenda; and (2) there is also a concrete risk that the inhabitants loose perception of the cyclical nature of PB as a repeated commitment of the government in involving citizens in decision-making, because “deliberative” events are separated by a time-distance which is felt too long. In several other PB cases, to reduce the risk of participatory budgeting proving ineffective in quickly transforming policies and projects, budgets have been reduced (e.g. Lisbon and Milan) in order to guarantee a smaller gap between expectations created by the PB process and capacity of public authorities to deliver and implement the priorities established with citizens (Porto De Oliveira, 2017). Also such a strategy has collateral effects,
being that it gives to citizens the clear perception of a reduced investment in participation and of a shrinking commitment of local governments in improving their own performance.

Yet, in Brazil, especially at the beginning of the new millennium, there was a visible reduction of attention to the fast implementation of policy and project proposals approved through many PBs (including in the once efficient city of Porto Alegre). This has been one of the main factors negatively affecting PB continuation in once successful Latin American cities, being – in some cases – responsible for political defeats of the party coalitions which have started and consolidated participatory budgeting in the previous years (Langelier, 2015).

Enabling citizens’ active role in the monitoring of implementation phases, proved to be an important solution to the risk of diminishing trust in participatory processes. Inspired by previously rare experiences (as the “Conforças” monitoring committees in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, or the Observatory of Morsang sur Orge, in France), several cities – in different parts of the globe – started to multiply the number of spaces created to value citizens’ oversight and social control of institutional performance, related to the delivery of services and implementation of works agreed during the “deliberative” cycle of PBs.

Some cities – as Malaga, Lisbon, and Milan – started to provide specific online tools to guarantee more transparency and information about implementation of results. In Cameroon, “observatories of electoral promises” were established, with the coordination of the NGO ASSOAL and the contribution of the National Networks of Inhabitants. In Mozambique, the cities of Nampula, Maputo and Quelimane, established new clauses in procurement contracts for the delivery of PB projects, enforcing developers to actively collaborate with Local Groups of Participatory Monitoring – mainly composed by inhabitants of the areas where public works had to be implemented (Dias, 2015). In Cascais (Portugal), the construction of the “Park of Generations” in 2013 (a large skate-park with mixed functions) was the spark that triggered a new trend of “social oversight” of PB implementation.

In this case, young citizens who had proposed the park construction, demanded the installation of cameras with footage being made available online on social media in order to control the progress of the building-site. Cascais mayor attended this demand in order to feed their trust in the municipal administration. This experience led the City Hall to gradually institutionalize methods that directly involve proponents and other local inhabitants in the monitoring of the implementation of PB projects. The main result of such a choice has been that of extending the centrality of citizens to the entire supply-chain of participatory budgeting, stating their right to be protagonists of new phases of PB cycles (as the construction of rules, the evaluation of proposals’ feasibility, and the evaluation of the overall performance of PB)
that before were just the prerogative of institutional actors and their consultants. Such stories tell us that complexities and problems are rarely related to the single object (the budget), but require a greater understanding and planning of PBs capacity to resonate with the structure of different public institutions and their statutory goals and missions. The relation between PB and the administrative machine is fundamental to guarantee results that live up to expectations created by the process in its participants and the population in general. PBs also need to coordinate their features with other processes of social dialogue, that can happen in the same territory, to avoid negative conflicts and duplications. Hence, complexity of PBs is mainly related to their diverse goals and to the framing between them and the tools needed to concretely implement them; but it refers as well as to the capacity of integration and hybridization of PB with other participatory processes, which could have overlapping, complementary or integrative scopes.

Today, finding a PB which is unaffected by other parallel or overlapped forms of participation and consultation in the same territory, is almost impossible. Usually, the presence of participatory budgeting is a signal of a new “style of government” that in several different occasions consult citizens in order to favour better-informed and more consensual choices. In these cases, the risk is that different channels for dialogue could act as separate “feuds” in the hands of single councillors, instead of obey to a coordinated direction located close to the heart of the local political power. Under this perspective, citizens monitoring of the whole performance of participatory processes taking place in their territory, could constitute an important preventive measure against the existence of uncoordinated and conflicting participatory channels.

The case of Mozambique, once again, could offer an interesting reflection on the issue. Yet, in Mozambican cities that opened a streamline of participatory budgeting, often traditional so-called “participatory planning” sessions survived. They generally consist of mass-assemblies at neighbourhood level, with a merely advisory, and often only informational, role. The co-existence of the two processes in the same city (and their different nature: co-decisional in the case of PB and merely consultative in the case of the “participatory planning” tool) has brought confusion and frustration (Dias, 2015). In that country, only few cities, as for example Dondo, have been able to positively introduce, in the pre-existing participatory planning system, several progressive instances coming from PB experiments (Cabannes & Delgado, 2015).

Scaling down and shrinking of funds: which counter-trends?
The last Report on the expansion of democracy worldwide (Freedom House, 2018) clearly points out how the diffusion of formal democratic models goes hand-in-hand with disempowerment
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and reduction of their own democratic intensity. Something similar (a phenomenon that Fung, 2015, describes as “decaffeination”) seems to be happening with the expansion of participatory budgeting around the world. When looking at the more than 3,500 Participatory Budgeting existing today around the world, there seems to be a negative correlation between the increase in numbers and ubiquitous diffusion of PBs and a shrinking level of financial investment (Baiocchi & Gauza, 2017). This has become a growing trend despite two facts:

1. that large cities having joined the experimenting group, as happened in Europe with Paris, Grenoble, Madrid, Milan, Bologna, Lisbon, Reykjavík; in the US with New York, or in Asia with Seoul and Chengdu;
2. that intermittent experiments of institutional scaling-up of PB has been conducted in different countries, as in the case of the Lazio and Poitou Charentes Region in Europe, the Rio Grande do Sul State and the Federal District of Mexico in Latin America, and the recent national experiment started in 2017 by the National Government of Portugal.

As well documented by scholars such as Yves Cabannes (2015, 2002; or Cabanne & Lipietz, 2018), while, at the beginning of the millennium, it was possible to find examples of PB investing from 380 to 400 US per inhabitant every year (and percentages of the investment budget that ranged from 20% to 58%, and even to 100%), today the majority of PBs allocate less than 10% of the investment budget, and fewer cases (as Cascais, Paris or Madrid, for example) reach values per person between 27.5 and 47 US.

The new and diverse organizational arrangements of PB around the globe suggest that we are going in the direction of its scaling-up in quality and quantity. This is especially true in cases like Portugal or the new wave of PBs in France, where less than a dozen cases in 2016 grew to almost 100 in the early 2018 (see the chapters by Nelson Dias and Gilles Pradeau in this same book). However, in terms of financial commitment, PBs are scaling-down, with the risk of becoming less effective and targeted in terms of outputs and impacts.

Reasons for such differences change from context to context, but they seem to be mainly related to a geographical shift – from a prevalence concentrated in South America, until 2010, to Europe and North America, in 2018. In this new contexts, the majority of PBs are concentrated in rural or small cities (e.g. Poland), while urban experiments are still based on pilots in single parishes or infra-municipal districts (as it is also the case in African capitals such as Dakar, Yaoundé, or Antananarivo).
Some typologies of participatory budgeting are especially weak in terms of financial coverage, as is the case of Youth PB (spread across the Iberian peninsula and in Scandinavia). Within these processes – which are politically easier to implement, precisely because of their reduced commitment in terms of resources – there is a diffuse conviction that their pedagogic value is guaranteed despite the reduced volume of resources at stake, and there is no need to include their participants in more structured decision-making about the city. Indeed, budget constraints vary from country to country and often require local governments to perform creative manoeuvres to find diversified sources to guarantee annual continuity (if not a progressive growth). Bologna (in Italy) is an interesting example of this. In 2017, it allocated almost 41 million of euros to PB, put together from different sources such as the funding dedicated to decentralization and maintenance of municipal districts, and the PON metropolitan funding scheme. This meant that the allocated funds were earmarked and constrained to where and how they should be applied. In this case, the funds were earmarked mainly for under-used buildings that needed a reclam-ation process to be transformed into new public facilities. With such a peculiar structure of mixed funding, the participatory budgeting of Bologna might face difficulties in the future to maintain its levels of financial commitment. These difficulties risk causing anger and frustration among its inhabitants, making participatory budgeting appear more as a one-off experiment than a continuous policy, as PB normally aims to be.

The complexity and differences between national and regional financial structures can explain some phenomena, which blur the traditional image of a PB as a continuous commitment of political authorities during their mandate. For example, in Italy the abolition of the Municipal Property Tax (ICI) in 2008, seriously undermined the financial autonomy of many local governments, leading to an apparently justified closure of many PB experiments. A similar explanation can be applied to many African and Asian local authorities engaged with PB, which are still highly dependent on complicated mechanisms of national transfers, or external funding link to aid-to-development. Their lack of financial autonomy explains why PBs of several cities in developing countries appear to be “intermittent,” or implemented through annual rotation mechanisms, changing the contemplated urban districts every year. In such cases, rotation of areas where PB happens is understandable, and is often linked to pro-poor policies where every year a different marginalized area should be contemplated with PB investments (as seen in several Mozambican cities). However, such a mechanism of rotation might increase the risk of frustration among inhabitants, as well as a shrinking of the pedagogic nature of
PB. From one year to the other, the social and cultural capital created through the “learning by doing” spaces that PB guarantees can easily disappear, and risks the rise of disenchantment among citizens who do not see PB repeating its cycles in their territory.

Difficulties as those experienced in several African territories, as well as in many rural areas in Europe, do not help to explain – or even justify – the “constrained nature” that characterize Participatory Budgeting in Scandinavian countries (i.e. Sweden, Norway and Denmark), where the financial and political autonomy of local authorities is granted.

The slow pace of expansion of PBs in these countries, puts in jeopardy the pedagogic aim of PBs. The hyper-timid investment of resources limits the visibility of their policies. Moreover, the timidity in spending substantial resources on PB communicates that PB is not very significant for the political class, rather than being a pivotal mechanism for strengthening relations among participants (Sintomer et al., 2013). The main risk of such a perception is that it contributes little to the reconstruction of trust in public institutions. In the PB processes that dared to invest more of central resources in participatory processes citizens were more exigent, and unwilling to tolerate the slow pace of expansion of resources dedicated to joint-decision making.

Today, unfortunately, counter-trends are still limited. Small experiments have been carried out in cities like Caminha (Portugal), Santa Cristina de Aro (Spain), Grottammare (Italy), Canoas (Brazil), and in some Mexican cities governed by the party called Morena, in order to link PB with public discussions on both expenditures and revenues. These discussions include sectors covered by municipal taxes or funds coming from public-private partnerships and planning compensations for building permits. Despite appearing as limited and scattered, these examples reflect an important common trend: the need to struggle against the common tendency of suffocating traditional budgets of local institutions, and the will of applying PB techniques also to the definition of incoming resources. In this same direction, more recently, some wider national programmes in Madagascar and in Mexico (where the important pilot of Cananea, described in this book, took place) were created. In these cases, the aim is of creating a double-threaded tie between the resources that are being allocated by new mining funding schemes (linked to recent legal framework that improve the control on the payment of royalties by part of the mining companies) and the potential benefit that PB can generate in terms of redistribution of resources on territories which are often socially polarized.

Furthermore, today there are some examples of thematic PBs which use special sectorial funds, applying it to a variety of sectors, producing policies of public interest which could be managed directly by municipalities or outsourced to special agencies. The case of the PBs in the housing sector (promoted in Canada by the
Toronto Community Housing Corporation, and in France by the Logiparc agency of Poitier and the Paris Agency for Social Housing) are interesting examples of how several managers consider PB as an effective method to improve the efficiency and efficacy of their administration, and promote them within their autonomous margin of manoeuvre and specific resources. The same is happening with some public as well as private schools, and university departments, especially in Argentina, France, Italy and the United States. These examples suggest that PB can be imagined as a fractal device, whose methodologies can benefit different institutions of public interest, disregarding the origin and nature of their funding.

An opportunity for enriching PB allocated resources, which is still under-developed, could come from the interaction between different administrative levels, by the means of a hybridization of models and tools used by participatory budgeting (usually confined at local level) and other methodologies for engaging citizens in mid-long term planning. Until 2005, the main inter-scalar relations referred to PB between municipal institutions and other administrative levels, was that of imposed participatory duties to local authorities by part of institutions in the upper level. This was the case of Peru (McNulty, 2012) and the Dominican Republic (Allegretti et al. 2012), where national laws set the obligation of other administrative levels to dedicate part of their resources to PB experiments. In 2005, the Lazio Region (in Italy) was the first institution to change such one-direction obligation, creating a policy framework of collaboration based on incentives (in terms of funding and training opportunities) given to local authorities committed to experiment participatory innovations. With this goal, the Region not only promoted a culture of expansion of PB experiments, by offering training and financial support to local authorities which wanted to involve citizens in budgetary decision-making, but also created a specific annual fund of 10 million € to support small municipalities in implementing the first priorities co-decided with citizens (Allegretti, 2011). In this case, the Regional Office for Participation of Lazio and the Regional Ministry of Financial and Economic Affair and Participation also set-up a procedure for public voting on PB that – through the registering of health electronic card – allowed citizens to vote at the same time for regional priorities as well as to municipal ones.

In 2009 (as described by Karol Mojkowski in this book), the Polish National Government created a similar inter-scalar funding schemes (the so-called “Solecki Fund”) for supporting local rural municipalities in creating their own experiments of citizens participation in budgetary issues. The trend remained limited until the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation (together with the World Bank) started steering a wide multi-scale experiment for co-funding and co-organizing the development of PBs in several regions and municipalities (as described in another chapter of this book). In 2015 Scotland Government started an important investment
for fuelling PB experiences in its 32 municipalities. Finally, in 2017, the three separate experiments of PB promoted by the National Government of Portugal (also described elsewhere in this book) opened up a new opportunity for an inter-scalar collaboration between local institutions (e.g. schools, universities, municipalities, and social organizations) and national policies in different policy sectors. Other minor forms of inter-scalar collaboration (which could potentially have positive effects on local resources to be discussed through PB) appeared here and there in different areas of the world. For example, between 2009 and 2013, the Regional Authority for Participation of Tuscany (Italy) co-funded some experiments of inter-municipal PBs, while since 2017 – the French city of Grenoble is experimenting with a double track of PB, both at municipal as well as at the metropolitan level, a recently-created administrative institution to which the French decentralization framework has transferred some competences once managed alone by municipalities.

It is likely that, in the future, such multi-scale experiments will grow in numbers and complexity, as far as the decentralization framework will evolve and increasingly require greater capacity of governments and citizens to engage simultaneously on more than one space. Since 2017, the Ministry of Education of Portugal runs PB workshops in schools, as established by the Governmental Decree n.º 436-A/2017. This experiment could play an important role in gradually connecting a top-down PB (with a higher institutional level focus) with the local level. Technologies are already in place to help such developments: for example, the communities of practices born around the Platform called EMPATIA (based in Portugal) and Decidim (based in Catalonia) have already elaborated so-called “multi-tenant” tools directed to these type of multilevel articulations of multichannel participatory practices.

**Inspiring transparency?**

A last important issue related to PB expansion refers to its withering impact on transparency of public accounts. Currently – despite the large movements related to Open Government and Open Budgets – PBs seem to have a limited effect on fostering new levels of transparency of official budgetary documents, and on improving citizen understanding of how they work. PBs are often conceived as “special pots of resources” or “special policies” whose funding schemes are separated from (or cut out of) the general budget. As such, PBs are inaccurately seen as a separate entry of the budget and not as a series of decisions strictly connected to the mainstream budget of a local or regional authority. In this perspective, transparency applied to PB procedures appears to be a small “target,” putting a smaller amount of resources and its management under the spotlight, but leaving in obscurity all the rest of the (city/ state) budget.

Several municipalities today have open-data policies on their budgets, and many more are obliged by national laws to publish their entire budget documents online. However, these obligations or self-ob-
ligations rarely translate into a virtuous process for making budgetary and financial documents of public authorities more clear or understandable. A lack of capacity building dedicated to increase financial literacy and budgetary understanding further disables citizens’ capacity for oversight and monitoring. Only few cases (as that of Taiwan) go in a different direction, where transparency and participation jointly produce improvements in the governance system of a territory.

The above mentioned problem is often visible in many Youth PBs. Despite loudly claiming their pedagogic angle, they often fail to provide their participants with new skills for reading and translating some key-elements of budgetary documents they are implicitly working on. Moreover, PBs have not joined forces with recognized grassroots watchdog organizations that monitor budgetary and financial State documents. These projects, for instance, have created clearly readable reports and are creating momentum to pressure for more transparency. Two counter-stream and virtuous examples of these include the annual policy briefings on budget choices prepared by Social Justice Ireland or the “Sbilanciamoci!” campaign in Italy.

Nonetheless, there are some tentative initiatives on influencing budget transparency through PB. One particular case started in 2014 in Portugal, when the Portuguese branch of Transparency International (TIAC) created the first pioneer Index of Municipal Transparency (ITM) (Tavares et al., 2015). The first edition of ITM gave high scores to only a few Portuguese cities with ongoing PBs, stating that PB was just a mechanical commitment of local authorities to transparency but was not really affecting it (Allegretti, 2018). Only in 2016, in the third edition of the ITM, the ranking of cities with PB improved, but mainly because the ITM instigated a debate in the media. Negative publicity motivated discussions on PB and brought them inside the work of practices called “Portugal Participa”. The discussions were an explicit attempt to push PB as an ‘enabling environment’ initiating other reforms to improve performance of local authorities’ in terms of transparency. Since 2017, during the capacity building training sessions organized by the Network of Participatory Municipalities (RAP), the discussions on the ITM became a regular occurrence, and the collaboration between TIAC and Portuguese municipal governments improved to the point that many local authorities promoting PBs decided to dedicate part of their teams to analyse and improve the policy areas targeted by the ITM. Some concrete changes that came as a result of this cooperation are the improvement of several municipal websites (starting from the city of Valongo) in order to increase their transparency and accountability performance; but still much can be done for improving public understanding of documents published online and connect them to civic campaigns of financial and budgetary literacy.
Looking to the future: an open conclusion

The above mentioned reflections converge into concluding that while structuring participatory budgeting often more attention is given to the topic of participation, than to the fundamental budgetary issues, so that many experiences deal with the two aspects in uneven and unbalanced ways. Hence, much attention is needed, in the next years, to guarantee a real “scaling-up” of Participatory Budgeting in quality and quantity through a more careful and critical approach to budgetary issues. This is not only to avoid the risk of PBs loosing their attractiveness, as well as their pedagogic potential (let alone their impact upon structural public policies). To secure a way for PB to develop its full potential, as powerful tool of public management, more needs to be done.

First, to fulfil the large potential of participatory budgeting, it is necessary to leave the “experimental logics” that – up to now – had limited many PBs to a sort of “pilot mode”. PB has 30 years of history behind it, and experience shows a huge level of adaptability to different contexts and to the coexistence with other participatory tools and devices. Participatory Budgeting also proved – in the majority of places – that citizens are capable to make good and sustainable decisions, and to act responsibly in face of legal and financial constraints. Even more so in cases when solidarity is needed for the sake of vulnerable groups, especially when correct and detailed information, as well as careful voting methodologies are provided.

In this setting, there is not real justification for maintaining PBs constrained by small (or even shrinking) pots of funding, refusing its input to larger and more structural issues and to overcome the confinement in limited parts of urban territories. The only acceptable justification to maintain limited scope and “light” PBs would be the stiff financial and management structures of countries where (as in Greece or in some African and Asian countries) decentralization frameworks are still very unbalanced, and the autonomy of local powers is undermined by authoritarian structures. Nonetheless, even in similar conditions, there are examples (as some Tunisian PBs during the political transition of 2013–2016) where local governments showed a strong willingness to open discussions and co-decisional arenas on budgetary issues. Hence, in administrative situations which prove to have fewer constraints, there is no excuse to keep PBs marginal, rather than the lack of political will of public
officials to accept a reduction of their discretionary power.

Today, the “competitive” dimension of PB is definitely important for making it attractive, but must be considered just as a temporary means. As more and more experiences show, there are many ways to increase solidarity and evidence-based decisions that take into account the need of the most vulnerable, such as: working on different voting methodologies that enhance the creation of alliances among social groups; and favouring informal moments (as the caravans, or walking collective tours of the city space) that help to overcome the lack of knowledge and awareness that citizens have about the larger territories in which they live. Reimagining PB as a space to construct a fairer redistribution of resources requires a shift in relation from the present, prevalent models. These present and prevalent models could be called “roof-less PBs,” because their limitations on proposals and restriction of resources do not allow full and proper implementation, and barely are able to fund the construction of entire buildings. The limits on budgets discussed in a specific PB determine its capacity to be an incisive tool (or not) for addressing social inequalities (Allegretti, 2012).

Undoubtedly, financial and budgetary constraints shape many Participatory Budgeting and their capacity of incise upon political and social changes. Overcoming these constraints is possible, but for that it is necessary to avoid applying PB only to the traditional monetary resources of an administrative unit (the traditional budget intended as a pot of money mainly coming from local taxes, service fares and transfers from other State levels). Indeed, PB could progressively grow only if applied to the larger pot of resources that constitute the overall wealth of a territory, which include town planning compensations for building permits, foreign aid and income deriving from public-private partnerships, but also resources coming from crowd-funding and other creative sources.

Applying PB methodologies to a wider set of resources, means renewing PB and overcoming its original model in order to create hybrid experiments. Hybrid models of PB must mix online and offline tools, use different channels of outreach and participation that may target diverse audiences, and centre around a variety of single and complementary topics. Such hybridization of models and tools, will certainly grow when several administrative scales start interacting with each other.
Today, there is no doubt that PBs cannot work in isolation from other participatory devices to overcome financial and budgetary challenges. The political environment in which PBs operate can be thought of as “participatory ecosystems,” where different channels of participatory tools and policies are integrated to enable shared decision-making on diverse issues of public interest. These (seemingly utopian) ideas are already taking shape in several cities worldwide. In 2013, Canoas (Brazil) started to experiment with a so-called “participatory system.” Its aim was integrating several different, and already existing, participatory systems of different kinds, into one system in order to exploit synergies (Zanandrez, 2016; Prefeitura de Canoas, 2015) and optimize their joint-impact on the quality of the local administration. Today, different cities (as Lisbon, Cascais, and Milan) are trying to connect other participatory tools around their PB. Such systems are still in their infancy. Unfortunately, they are still too technologically driven, and dependent on institutional intervention, which almost completely shapes their functioning and deliberative quality.

These experiments can only assume their form of “ecosystems” if different actors (as social movements, research institutions, and different groups of citizens) increase their protagonist and take an active role in: mobilizing people, structuring information, monitoring results, supporting, evaluating, and eventually even partially leading the interactions between the different tools of social dialogue. For this to happen, it is fundamental to value and make visible bottom-up work, and the key role played by non-institutional actors. Few cities have started to work on this. For example, Cascais municipality (Portugal) created already two editions of a booklet (entitled “for Cascais partcipo”) that collects interviews and stories of PB successes, told from the perspective of participants. Grenoble municipality (France) published a Handbook on running PB from the perspective of the citizens. This handbook details suggestions aimed at people who want to involve themselves in the process. PBs will only mature as ecosystems once the contributions of different social and institutional actors is valued and recognised. Rather than keeping PB confined as a mere tool for administrations, PB offers alternative models for development and can reframe the vision of the “Right to the City for all”.

GLOBAL DYNAMICS
The Global Spread and Transformation of Participatory Budgeting

*Brian Wampler, Stephanie McNulty & Michael Touchton*

**Introduction**

Participatory Budgeting (PB) is spreading quickly and now exists in environments that are very different from Porto Alegre, Brazil, where it began, including places as diverse as New York City, Northern Mexico, and rural Kenya. PB also now exists at all levels of government around the world, including neighborhoods, cities, districts, counties, states, and national governments, although it is most widely implemented in districts and cities. Many donors and international organizations support PB efforts, as do non-profit advocacy organizations in countries that use PB. PB is rapidly expanding across the world because many of its core tenets appeal to many different audiences. Leftist activists and politicians support PB because they hope that PB will help broaden the confines of representative democracy, mobilize followers, and achieve greater social justice. However, PB is increasingly used as a policy tool and a social accountability mechanism, rather than a radical democratic effort, which was its original purpose. PB is also attractive within major international agencies, like the World Bank, European Union, and USAID, because of its emphasis on citizen empowerment through participation, improved governance, and better accountability.

PB’s attractiveness and rapid spread merits a better synopsis of PB research as well as a greater understanding of its diffusion, its transformation, and its impact. This chapter focuses on these four areas. First, we introduce and review the key trends in research on PB to identify the parameters surrounding general questions and issues of interest to academic and policy communities. Second, we describe PB’s spread across the globe and the conditions for its implementation. The third section builds on the previous one and identifies the issues that adopting governments often have to address when they adapt PB’s rules to meet local needs. This section also
focuses on specific considerations related to the implementation of public works projects and social service programs that PB participants select. The fourth section explores PB programs’ potential impact. Importantly, the focus of this chapter is on the PB experience in democratic regimes in the Global South. We do not systematically analyze the growing number of PB cases in Europe, the United States, Canada or South Korea; we obviously recognize their importance, but narrow our analysis to those sociopolitical contexts that are more similar to the original PB cases in Brazil. In addition, we also exclude PB programs in authoritarian environments, such as China, Cuba or Russia, from our analysis.

The General State of PB Knowledge

There is a vast literature about PB around the world, and there is an emerging consensus in several areas for how researchers might continue to build knowledge on PB. We highlight these thematic areas, below, and emphasize PB’s adoption, its transformation, and its impact. Researchers have identified several key factors that explain PB adoption. These are the government’s ideology (Goldfrank 2011), civil society mobilization (Avritzer 2002; Baiocchi 2005), democracy promotion (Santos 2005), international organizations (Porto de Oliveira 2017; Goldfrank 2012), the government’s electoral incentives (Wampler 2007), and nationally-mandated programs (McNulty 2013). Relatedly, excellent research evaluates PB’s diffusion; key explanations for diffusion include the role of international donors, international advocacy organizations, and individuals who promote PB, called “participatory ambassadors” (Porto de Oliveira 2017).

PB’s roots lie in a radical democratic project, and initial research on PB reflected that framing. Radical democracy, as it was framed in the 1990s, includes incorporating ordinary citizens into government decision-making processes, the “inversion of priorities” that led governments to allocate public resources to underserviced areas (shantytowns) and policy issues (basic health care), and a strong emphasis on social justice. This line of work is not as visible today as PB becomes less associated with the political left. Relatedly, there is consensus that PB can act as a “school of democracy,” whereby citizens learn to deliberate, learn how governments function, and begin to engage in dem-
ocratic practices. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are often a vital part of many PB programs’ adoption and functioning (Avritzer 2002; Baiocchi 2005). Researchers have therefore sought to assess how the configuration of civil society and this new democratic experience are interrelated. This line of research is often linked to the concept of “PB as a school of democracy. The density of civil society is often identified as one key factor conditioning PB’s performance because PB requires a broad base of citizen-participants. But, the ability of citizens to actively contest and deliberate is also important; there is a greater likelihood that PB will evolve into a robust institution when citizens more actively demand their rights.

Of course, PB is also increasingly identified as a “tool,” or “technique” that international organizations such as the World Bank and USAID use to promote improvements in governance (Baiocchi and Ganiuza 2016). However, two important components—social justice and radical democratic orientations—are missing from World Bank and USAID advocacy. Instead, these organizations emphasize transparency and participation as a means to generate accountability. Participation, although at times unwieldy, helps to improve government efficiencies because it creates better connections between citizens’ needs and government outputs. Transparency also leads to more efficient use of public resources because it promotes project monitoring.

The impact of PB on politics, social indicators, civil society behaviors (e.g., voting, protest, civil society organization), and citizens’ social well-being (e.g., health and education) is, perhaps, the most difficult area to evaluate. Several factors explain outcomes in these areas, including: the government’s ideology (Goldfrank 2011), civil society mobilization (Avritzer 2002; Baiocchi 2005), and the government’s electoral incentives (Wampler 2007). State capacity, the level of local resources, and institutional rules also explain variation in PB-generated outcomes. However, key challenges include identifying the appropriate time frame to assess change, finding reliable data, and parsing PB’s causal mechanisms from other potential impacts. One line of research on PB’s impact assesses PB’s relationship with social well-being (Gonçalves 2014; Touchton and Wampler 2014). Other lines of research include efforts to assess how PB affects civil society and public discourse (Johnson 2017; Baiocchi et al. 2011). We can report that the initial body of large-N findings corroborates previous case study results, although there are relatively few large-N studies at this early stage of data availability.

Conditions for Implementation

Governments face a series of issues that they must contend with for PB to succeed as it is adopted around the world. Several issues to be considered include: identifying the appropriate scale, determining funding mechanisms to support project implementation, political economy is-
sues, political and partisan competition, executive-legislature relations, civil society, and state-society relations.

**Scale:** PB currently operates at all levels of government around the world, including neighborhoods, cities, districts, counties, and in federal agencies. However, PB is most widely implemented at the district or city level— a trend we expect to continue. This level of implementation reflects its origins (Porto Alegre) and its diffusion to hundreds of Brazilian municipalities and dozens of cities across Latin America, Africa, and Asia. In these cases, the municipal government worked with local civil society organizations to implement PB and sustain it locally.

Extending PB processes to all subnational governments around the country through national legislation is a recent trend in the developing world. This “top-down” PB is generally based on constitutional reforms or new legislation that specifically requires subnational officials—usually some combination of district, city, county, and state governments—to use PB when deciding what infrastructure projects to fund. This occurred in Peru (2002), the Dominican Republic (2007), Kenya (2010), South Korea (2005), Indonesia (2000), and the Philippines (2012). National legislation also opens the door for PB to scale-out in subnational governments across these countries. For example, the Korean government revised the Local Finance Act in 2005 to incentivize, but not mandate, PB. Internationally, interest in scaling up PB continues to gain strength in activist and funding circles.

Three additional scaling processes exist surrounding PB. First, municipal processes have scaled up to the state (or regional) level in some places, such as Podlaskie Voivodeship in Poland and Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil. Second, Portugal became the first country to implement a pilot national PB process in 2016. Portugal’s program allocated 3 million Euros (less than 1% of the national budget) for education, science, culture, and agricultural projects in its first year. Another innovative aspect of this project is that citizens may be able to select projects via ATM-based voting in the future. It is not clear if this will become a trend, but it could prove to be a model for easing some of the challenges associated with scaling PB in European countries. Third, PB has also emerged in some local government agencies. This is most prevalent in school board authorities, such as Youth PB in Boston and the Bioscience High School in Phoenix, Arizona (Cohen, Schugurensky, and Wiek 2015), but has also been implemented in the Toronto Community Housing Authority in Canada.

**Funding Sources:** An impressive variety of funding sources exist for PB. By far, the most common PB model allocates government funds. The resources for these processes come from discretionary funds (such as city council members’ funds in New York and Chicago), earmarked funds (such as the new process in Portugal), social development funds (such as most
Latin American examples), and in fewer cases, extractive revenue funds (such as some cities in Peru). In Chicago, Tax Increment Financing has been used to fund PB projects, which has been controversial (Participatory Budgeting Project 2016). In Vallejo, California, residents approved a 1% increase on a sales tax and the city council decided to allocate 1/3 of this revenue through a participatory budgeting process. Foundations and multilateral banks are funding many organizations that provide technical assistance for PB. Finally, individual donors contribute funds and can even make decisions regarding how to spend their donations using an online PB voting process for some non-profits, such as the Participatory Budgeting Project (PBP).

**Local Political Economy:** PB programs allow citizens to intervene directly in government spending, which produces a close relationship between governments’ available resources and citizens’ ability to exercise decision-making authority. At the same time, public resources must be available so that governments can delegate authority to citizen decision-making forums; PB programs lose their distinctive characteristic of allowing citizens to select specific projects when public resources are not available. Moreover, governments are more likely to withdraw or limit PB program funding as resources become scarce. In contrast, governments are more likely to invest in PB when resources are plentiful.

In general, there are two opportune moments that positively affect government officials’ willingness to expand citizens’ access to these resources. First, decentralization creates an opportunity for subnational governments to access new resources and create participatory institutions like PB. Reformist governments have a window of opportunity to invest additional resources in PB because no specific political group or bureaucratic unit “owns” these resources. Examples include constitutional reform and accompanying decentralization in Brazil (1988), Indonesia (1998), Peru (2002), and Kenya (2010). In all of these cases, an emphasis on participation accompanied decentralization, which created the political and policy conditions that favored PB adoption. Second, the availability of additional resources permits government officials to dedicate more funding to PB during periods of economic growth. Government reformers adopting PB do not have to engage in difficult political struggles with entrenched bureaucrats or legislators in these cases. Rather, reformers side-step disagree-
ments and allocate new resources to PB programs. The Philippines, under President Aquino (2010-2016), is an excellent example of a reformist president overseeing the allocation of hundreds of millions of dollars through PB.

State capacity is directly related to PB funding and project implementation. The local state’s capacity to implement specific, citizen-selected projects then influences PB’s long-term sustainability. Thus, researchers, activists, and NGOs need to carefully consider what the state can implement as well as its available resources to fund project implementation. A backlash against PB is likely when governments expand policy options to include projects that the state cannot implement because selected projects will never appear and participants will lose confidence in the process. For example, the Brazilian city of Belo Horizonte’s government created “PB Housing” to focus government and civil society leaders’ attention on building new housing units. Yet, the government lacked the resources and capacity to build these housing units. Long-time civil society activists withdrew their support for government officials and PB programs as a result. A key lesson from this experience is that governments need to have basic administrative capacity and resources to organize PB and to implement selected projects.

Political parties and Political Competition: There is no clear consensus in the literature regarding the role of political parties for implementing PB. Yet, there is wide variation in party systems and the strength of individual parties around the world. This translates to environments where political parties and competition are essential for PB and others where they are inconsequential.

Political competition through representative elections theoretically induces politicians to invest in activities that citizens support to win their votes; PB simultaneously appeals to citizens for the voice and vote they gain in policymaking processes. Having a minimal level of political competition among parties appears to be an important aspect of producing vibrant PB programs because it induces parties to respond to citizens’ demands (i.e., the classic Madisonian explanation of democracy). However, weak parties and weak party systems in most developing world countries means that it is very difficult for ordinary citizens to easily identify which reformers and parties are responsible for new forms of citizen engagement. In turn, political reformers often have a
hard time claiming credit for their reform efforts, which diminishes politicians’ and parties’ potential interest in a new political project that delegates authority to citizens. The literature does provide several key insights that link PB and political competition around the world. First, ideologically leftist political parties (e.g., Workers’ Party in Brazil; PSOE in Spain; ANC in Durban, South Africa; Communist Party in Kerala, India) initiated the earliest PB programs in their respective regions. These leftist parties used PB as a political platform through which to signal their interest in changing the status quo. Parties also used PB to seek other citizens’ votes by signaling their efforts to expand democratic practices.

Political reformers from a variety of ideological backgrounds adopted PB as a means to generate accountability in PB’s second wave. For example, Alejandro Toledo, an economist who previously worked with the UN, the World Bank, and the OECD, advocated PB to generate social accountability once he became Peru’s president. Center-right reformers interested in the transparency and efficiency processes associated with PB promoted the program in the Dominican Republic. Entrenched political parties may also promote PB if they wish to change local political dynamics and seek new supporters. Thus, “late adopters” in many countries also come from a wider spectrum of political parties than early adopters. These late adopters are not necessarily interested in using PB as a radical democratic process, but use PB as a tool to improve governance, in the hopes that ordinary citizens will recognize the combination of citizen participation and improved service delivery, which will then influence their voting behavior in favor of adopting parties.

Second, there are scale-related issues to consider when connecting political parties and competition to PB adoption and performance. Opposition political parties often initially champion PB as a new form of governance at subnational levels; these smaller, minority parties implement PB when elected to demonstrate that they can alter basic state-society interactions. Brazil provides a good example of this practice, as the politically-weak, outsider Workers’ Party originally championed PB to better incorporate citizens into the political process and seek their votes. India’s Kerala state provides another good example in this area, as members of the elected Communist Party of India promoted PB as a means to re-engage civil society.

PB is more likely to be implemented as part of a new political coalition’s reformist push when it is part of a top-down policy reform at the national level (e.g., in Peru, Indonesia, or Philippines). These reformers often seek to leverage participation as a means to alter traditional political processes, but it is vital to recognize that these coalitions use their newly-won access to national power to implement PB programs.

The role of PB in single-party political systems is less understood. PB programs struggled to find a foothold in single-party dominant systems, such as
South Africa and Venezuela. For example, the governing ANC invested little energy to delegate decision-making authority to citizens in South Africa (Heller 2001). In Venezuela, the Chavez-dominated government favored its Bolivarian Circles over PB (Goldfrank 2011).

In sum, although more research is needed, political competition among parties appears to have a positive effect on the likelihood of PB adoption, its sustainability, and its potential impact. Political competition through representative elections induces politicians to invest in new institutions that delegate new types of authority to citizens. Thus, having a minimal level of political competition among parties appears to be an important aspect of producing vibrant PB programs.

**Strong executive versus a representative council**

A contradictory feature of many PB programs is that authority is often first concentrated in the hands of a fairly strong executive, who then delegates resources and decision-making authority. Executives’ significant involvement helps to explain why political reformers are at the center of efforts to adopt PB—these executives dedicate precious time and political capital to PB in the hopes that PB will generate desired social and political changes. Most PB programs also require strong government leadership to promote the delegation of authority because governments are central to organizing PB. Many PB programs use internal representative bodies to manage their responsibilities, including oversight roles. PB programs use two main types of internal representative bodies. First, some programs create an internal council of PB delegates so that citizens can exercise direct oversight over internal rule-making, program administration and organization, and project implementation. This strengthens citizens’ voice as they have a venue to unite and deliberate vis-à-vis government officials. The pioneering case of Porto Alegre provides the most notable example, where a body of citizens closely monitored PB processes. However, there is very limited evidence that these internal bodies effectively co-govern. A second type of internal representative councils is citizens’ oversight committees, where citizens monitor the implementation of specific projects (e.g., health care clinics, street lighting). These types of representative councils are likely to have a larger impact than general councils because they focus more narrowly on specific projects rather than on overall program management.

Elected legislatures are a second kind of representative body that plays an oversight role in PB programs. Elected legislatures can check the types of policies citizens select as well as monitor policy implementation. However, the potential drawback of legislative oversight is that legislators may begin to use PB as chan-

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1 By executives, we mean mayors, governors, presidents; by representative councils, we mean (a) municipal, state, and national legislatures and (b) internal bodies that assist in PB processes.
nels through which to bolster their electoral support. We should note that many legislators tend to be opposed to PB because they view it as a threat to their position in a representative democracy—the argument is that popularly elected legislators have greater legitimacy to make decisions surrounding public resources than unelected citizens. Thus, this last scenario reflects another tradeoff in the debate between representative councils and executive stewardship in PB programs.

Civil society: The configuration of civil society prior to PB adoption conditions implementation and performance. Civil society’s configuration includes its density (the number of organizations willing to participate) and its previous repertoires of mobilization and political engagement (co-governance vs. protest). Density and repertoires both shape how civil society affects PB adoption, performance and impact. We identify five ideal types of civil society–state engagement surrounding PB.

Civil society leading with positive government response: Civil society mobilization around participation produces robust citizen engagement because CSOs are actively involved in recruitment. These CSOs are also invested in deliberation and work to ensure that PB processes function well. Mobilized CSOs are also likely to encourage government officials to delegate greater authority and resources to PB. In turn, government officials that seek CSOs’ support are more likely to invest the time, energy, personnel and resources to make sure that PB functions well.

Civil society leading with marginal government response: Government officials may be less supportive of PB than citizens, even when civil society mobilizes around PB and convinces government officials to adopt the program. Government officials may not support PB because they are unwilling to take the political risk of delegating authority to citizens or because these officials do not believe that PB will benefit their communities (broadly) or their political careers (more narrowly). Either of these scenarios diminishes the likelihood of producing a high-functioning PB program.
Civil society–government partnership: PB is a joint process that links CSO leaders and government officials. Citizens and government officials create PB through a mutually constitutive process whereby the two partners design programs and determine operational rules together. This ideal type provides the conditions with the greatest likelihood for program sustainability because it embodies the collaborative co-governance features in the ideal PB model.

Government leading with positive CSO responses: Public officials often take the lead on establishing PB programs. But, PB tends to function better when greater numbers of CSOs are present (Putnam’s density argument) and when CSOs are willing to work with the government. The positive relationship between the government and CSOs also depends on government officials’ willingness to work closely with a broad range of CSOs and citizens, to delegate authority, and to listen to CSOs’ and citizens’ inputs around program design, rules, budget allocation, etc.

Government leading with limited or no CSO response: Public officials may adopt PB without much response from civil society. Simply put, the cliché, “build it and they will come,” does not apply in this situation. The reasons for limited civil society engagement are varied but include: (a) low levels of trust due to corruption, an authoritarian state and governance practices, civil war, and other conflicts; (b) weak civil society, which means that there may not be organizations to bring into public participation venues; (c) a hierarchical civil society dominated by elders, men, and local elites; and (d) high levels of poverty that make it difficult for people to overcome the daily struggles of income generation and food security to turn their attention to participatory decision-making opportunities.

Broader Institutional Eco-system: An initial body of research suggests that several policies enhance PB processes. First, adopting PB requires several socio-political conditions. PB must take place within a decentralized state structure. Without effective decentralization—fiscal and administrative—there is no way that PB processes, and the decisions

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2 Putnam et al. (1994) argue that a greater density of civil society organizations is positively associated with greater government performance.
that emerge from them, can be meaningful. Next, PB theoretically works best in places where legal guarantees for freedom of speech and association allows participants to question their elected officials and hold them accountable publicly (although some PB processes do take place in authoritarian contexts). Finally, PB requires an environment with at least some rule of law to be effective. This ensures that the budget is not fictitious and that PB is not simply a new venue for clientelism and corruption (which is common in PB processes in Latin America, for example).

Effective Project implementation: The presence of “PB champions,” internal rules that promote inclusive and robust participation, a capable state, and sufficient resources are key factors within government that enable the effective implementation of PB. First, internal advocacy champions who are convinced that PB will solve the problems facing their communities must exist for effective implementation – it is essential that elected officials incentivize bureaucrats to implement and sustain PB.

Second, a series of design decisions can enhance PB’s effectiveness, including:

“Social justice” requirement: The earliest PB experiments in Brazil included what scholars call the “social justice” requirement, which directs governments to increase spending in geographic areas that are under-served and under-resourced. Although many would argue that this is an implicit goal of PB beyond Brazil, some have advocated for making it explicit, such as in Rome, where social territorial mapping identifies under-served areas, and Seville, where the government partners with local universities to ensure that funding goes to poor areas.

Binding decision-making rules: It is important to ensure that there are incentives and even mandates that the government fund the projects that participants select in prioritization workshops. This increases the likelihood that participants will emerge from the process with a sense of personal efficacy and that projects will ultimately benefit communities.
Policies that incentivize widespread and inclusive participation: Different PB design choices can open processes to historically marginalized populations. Examples include quotas for leadership positions and waiving a citizenship requirement, which allows all residents to vote.

Open vs. closed meetings: Some operational rules engage individual citizens (open meetings), while others encourage or even mandate civil society organizations’ participation, but exclude the public (closed). Anecdotally, it seems that programs that incorporate citizens directly, such as in the Brazilian PB model, will engage more people overall than those in places like Peru, that restrict participation to CSOs.

Third, as noted above, the local government must have the capacity to organize PB processes and execute the projects. Research has documented that participants in many PB processes already tend to prioritize “pro-poor” projects, such as those that target the community’s most disadvantaged areas. However, this does not always translate to executed public works projects. For example, subnational governments in some Latin American countries have a hard time spending their budgets because their internal financial systems are weak. Further, the implementing government needs training and resources to set up the different steps of the PB process in contexts where PB is new or mandated by national governments. An educated civil service sector that has been briefed about the goals and the potential outcomes of the process will also be able to develop and oversee a more participatory form of PB. This condition is also important when governments contract with organizations to execute PB projects during the implementation stage. For instance, the PB process has become a mere formality in most places in Indonesia precisely because these two key factors—advocacy champions and strong local governments—do not exist. District officials are not willing to share information with the public and the local governing councils are too weak to implement the proposals (Sutiyo and Maharjan 2017).

Fourth, sufficient funding for training and infrastructure projects is also important. Usually, the amount of money allo-
cated through PB is small relative to the overall subnational (and national) government budget. National budgetary requirements can also impede the effectiveness of the process in places where subnational governments rely on national budget transfer processes. For example, Peruvian government officials often report that the national government budget process makes it very hard to undertake PB annually. The national investment project database is difficult to use and the national government will not fund infrastructure projects after PB approval until several costly feasibility studies (often not included in the original budget) are complete. Further, annual budget projections often do not align with final budget transfers. These complications have led many Peruvian citizens to lose faith in the government’s ability to respond to their demands.

**Transformations**

PB has transformed over time; this section discusses some of the technological and non-technological adaptations that have taken place within PB as it spreads around the world. Innovations include:

**Bi-annual processes:** Some PB programs have moved to a bi-annual selection process in order to reduce the demands on citizens as well as to ensure that projects are implemented in a timely fashion. For example, governments in Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre transitioned to a bi-annual process to solve two problems—participation fatigue and a focus on smaller projects. A bi-annual process allows for the selection of larger projects because governments can allocate higher spending and can commit the administrative personnel (e.g., engineers) to be involved.

**Peer-to-Peer learning:** Advocacy NGOs and government networks often share documents and materials. This lowers the start-up costs for new governments that are interested in adopting PB.

**Project selection rules:** PB programs have developed a variety of project selection rules over time. For example, some programs use a “Quality of Life Index” to ensure that projects are implemented in poor areas.

**Participant recruitment:** Social media pages, texting, and email are now commonly used to recruit citizen-participants in areas where technology is easily available. Governments use these technologies to remind participants of meeting times, which greatly eases the governments’ administrative burdens of publicizing upcoming meetings. These technologies are not substitutes for traditional forms of organizing, but ease costs once programs are established and well-managed.

**Multi-Regional projects:** Governments have sought to move projects beyond specific communities by encouraging the selection of projects that address the needs of multiple communities. For example, the Peruvian national govern-
ment now pressures local and regional governments to fund projects that have large-scale impact, instead of small, local projects such as repairing one street in a small area of a city.

Surveys: Governments administer surveys to collect information on participants’ basic socio-demographic profiles in many programs in the United States and Europe. Data collection also includes questions about participants’ experiences. This helps evaluate and improve future processes.

PB Digital: PB digital allows citizens to vote online. Early efforts to create parallel deliberative forums online appear to have fallen by the wayside (Bertone, DeCindio, Stortone, 2015:10). Online voting greatly reduces participation costs, but issues pertaining to the digital divide are still relevant because middle class sectors are more likely than poorer citizens to participate online (Spada et al 2016). Moreover, internet access is still very limited in poor and rural areas of most developing countries. PB Digital thus has the potential to broaden PB participation, but can also detract from its poverty-reducing mission. The most extensive use of digital PB is in Germany, where government officials sought to use IT to more efficiently incorporate citizens into new policymaking arenas.

Impact
Governments, donors, and activists hope that PB will produce changes on several different levels. There are three general areas of consensus in terms of when PB has its greatest, most beneficial impact: when it has strong government support, available resources, and where an organized civil society exists. First, strong government support through advocacy champions is vital to program performance. Not all government officials in cities that adopt PB are willing to experiment, innovate, or cede some decision-making authority to PB participants. But, PB programs require government support:

Once underway, government officials must be willing to commit personnel and carry administrative costs to sustain PB processes. Thus, greater government support contributes to greater PB impact. Second, there is a direct relationship between resources available for allocation through PB and its impact. This represents one of the greatest challenges for PB—government officials often oversell the program to excite followers and pursue adoption, but programs with relatively few resources tend to produce incremental changes, at best.

Third, the presence of a strong, organized civil society is critical to PB performance. PB works best when civil society organizations work with government officials to provide information, mobilize citizens to participate, work to ensure project implementation, and provide technical assistance throughout. Simultaneously, CSOs must avoid being co-opted by the government, which can result in PB becoming a tool for political patronage.
Research on PB’s impact is at an incipient stage and underdeveloped in terms of the general range of possible impacts, such as PB’s impact on participants’ behavior, on citizens’ well-being, on electoral politics, and on local governance. Case studies have generated the bulk of evidence surrounding PB’s impact, but large-N analyses are rare because the data needed to perform these analyses has not been available. As a result, there are few quantitative analyses of PB over time as well as very little cross-national work comparing sub-national programs across countries. There is also very little systematic work on variation in PB rules or program design. Thus far, there have been no natural or true experiments to evaluate PB’s impact. Studies thus rely on statistical tests to assess the counter-factual; namely, that cities with PB would have achieved similar outcomes without PB, possibly due to omitted variables that drive both PB adoption and outcomes in the above areas.

**Citizens’ attitudes:** Early research on PB’s impact focused on the attitudes of citizens who participate in PB (Baiocchi 2005; Wampler and Avritzer 2004). Researchers evaluated hypotheses about the extent to which PB altered participants’ support for democracy, their sense of empowerment, their perception of government or government efficacy, and their basic knowledge of budget and general government processes (Baiocchi 2005; Wampler 2007). A variety of case studies assert that PB participants feel empowered, support democracy, view the government as more effective, and better understand budget and government processes after participating in PB. This continues to be a focus of research as Public Agenda and the Participatory Budgeting Project have invested time and resources to better understand participants’ attitudes in the United States.

**Participants’ behavior:** A consensus from case-study evidence is that PB participants increase their political participation beyond PB and join civil society groups following exposure to PB processes. Additional potential impacts extend beyond PB participants to civil society organizations and government officials. Many scholars expect PB to strengthen civil society by increasing its density (number of groups), expanding its range of activities, and brokering new partnerships with government and other CSOs. There is some case study (Baiocchi 2005; McNulty 2011; Van Cott 2008) and large-N evidence
that this occurs (Gonçalves 2014; Touchton and Wampler 2014). PB is also expected to educate government officials surrounding community needs, to increase their support for participatory processes, and to potentially expand participatory processes in complementary areas. For instance, early reports from Kenya’s experience suggest that PB produces at least some of these impacts.

**Electoral politics and governance:** PB promotes social change, which may alter local political calculations and the ways governments operate. PB may deliver votes to elected officials that adopt it and to officials from national parties that promote it, at least, if PB is perceived to work well. The downside to this potential impact is that newly-elected governments may abandon PB. PB proponents also expect the program to improve budget transparency, which may have the effect of increasing government programs’ transparency in general. Efficient resource allocation at the neighborhood or micro-regional level is another goal inherent in many PB programs. PB proponents hope that government program allocation will become more efficient through PB’s ability to collect information about community needs. Transparency and project monitoring surrounding the program will also decrease waste and fraud as accountability spreads across government contracting and project implementation in other areas. This hypothesis raises a concern associated with many PB programs: namely, PB participants demand greater roles in local decision-making, but are also expected to monitor their own projects. This creates potential conflicts of interest, which undermine monitoring in PB compared to the oversight mechanisms used in other institutions.

**Social well-being:** Finally, PB proponents expect it to improve residents’ well-being through the channels described above. There is no consensus on how long it may take for effects surrounding well-being to appear, but several recent studies have identified these effects for infant mortality over a relatively-short time (Touchton and Wampler 2014; Gonçalves 2014). Beyond infant mortality, the range of potential impacts could easily extend to other health areas, sanitation, education, women’s, children’s, and ethnic minority groups’ empowerment rights, and poverty in general. Caution is justified here because results from Brazil may not appear elsewhere: change
in human well-being was measurable and visible in Brazil’s unusually rich local data.

**Conclusion**

Although there is a large and growing body of literature about PB, there are still several areas of research that are under-developed and under-theorized. This concluding discusses many of them and suggests priority research areas for future projects. First, there is limited cross-national, cross-regional comparative research on PB. Research that systematically compares PB programs across a diverse set of regions does not yet exist. The Sintomer et al. (2013) book represents an important effort to map PB’s diffusion and develop a program typology. However, the book does not systematically compare the inner-workings of these programs. Baiocchi and Ganuza’s 2017 book analyzes the spread of PB, but it only closely examines a small number of cases; the book is theoretically insightful but we are still uncertain about its generalizability. We should be cautious before drawing global inferences from the few large-N studies as well because of their heavy reliance on Brazil. Results from Brazil may not appear elsewhere: change in human well-being is measurable and visible in Brazil’s unusually rich local data.

Second, research that compares multiple PB programs within specific countries (i.e., within case analysis) is limited. Most research continues to be based on single case studies or very small-N comparisons. The lack of reliable data compounds problems with these case studies and small-N comparisons. Municipal-level data is available in some contexts, such as Brazil, and greatly aided Wampler and Touchton’s research evaluating PB across municipalities. However, most countries in the developing world do not systematically collect data in all municipalities; creating a subnational database would greatly advance the field.

Third, rigorous evaluations of who participates and how (or if) this participation impacts the outcomes and citizens’ attitudes are largely absent from scholarship on PB. There is very little understanding across and within cases about who participates, why, and what the effect of that participation is. Further, as far as we know, there are no pre- and post-tests of citizens’ attitudes surrounding PB participation. Survey work on citizens’ attitudes exists, but surveys tend to be administered in the middle or at the end PB processes. There is limited research on participants who drop out of the process as
well as limited research on the attitudes of non-participating citizens. Future research could also focus on who participates, why, and what they may gain from participating. We have noted that PB should engage a wide variety of participants, representing gender, class, age, and ethnic/racial diversity to be effective. Additional research that better explains this variation is important (e.g., cultural context, rules, recruitment efforts). We also do not have a strong understanding about differences in how the sociodemographic profile of citizens affects outcomes. We suspect that the gender composition of meetings matters, but more research is needed.

Finally, PB’s recent spread to Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia highlights the potential relevance of decision-making processes and rule structures. PB programs in these regions tend to use consensus-based decision-making processes to select projects, instead of direct voting. We do not know whether this practice influences project selection in comparison to using secret ballots. We also do not know the extent to which voting rules, such as ranked or majoritarian systems, influence project selection. Future research will assess which rules promote more robust outcomes in terms of process, reach, and sustainability. Are some rules more important than others? These issues are still not well understood. Conducting randomized controlled trials might be an excellent way to better pinpoint which rules produce social and political change.

In sum, the research on PB has dramatically expanded over the past decade. The four areas above highlight areas in which researchers could use to advance the debate.
2. Regional Dynamics
Africa
Participatory Budgeting in Africa: A Kaleidoscope tool for good governance and local democracy

Bachir Kanouté & Joseph-Désiré Som-1

Introduction
Africa is arguably the fastest growing region in the world: BP has become an African story. This circulation of BP throughout the continent is done through several adaptations when compared with Brazilian models, including those of Porto Alegre and Recife. In this BP fresco in Africa, we will demonstrate how it has adapted to various political and institutional situations on one hand, how it participates in building a participatory / local democracy on the other. It is thus a powerful tool for promoting good governance.

I- Participatory Budget: an African story
A few years ago, on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of the participatory budget, we drew up a first overview of the expansion of Participatory Budgeting in Africa (Kanouté, 2012). We have shown that the increasing growth of PB in Africa can be explained in particular by the fact that it allows local authorities to rebuild the necessary link between the local government and citizens, which strengthens fiscal citizenship. Indeed, the very low rate of local tax revenues, coupled with a low level of support from the central government to local governments (Yatta, 2011) encourages councils to find ways to increase their tax revenues. In many African countries, moreover, council mayors are personalities appointed by the central government and therefore enjoy low legitimacy. This is often compounded by the weak participation of civil society organizations and non-state actors in the management of public affairs, especially at local levels.
A- Overview of PB practice in Africa

Nowadays, PB continues its exponential growth in Africa, with an annual demand evaluated at more than 200 new intentions registered each year with the regional bureau of local authorities. The African continent has 347 experiences, according to the statistics of the last comprehensive census conducted by Enda and IOPD Africa in September 2014. To date, estimates indicate more than 500 cases. We have thus gone from a dozen experiences in 2005 to 162 experiments by the end of 2012 and more than twice the number five years later, that is, 2018. This eagerness for administrative budgeting reflects the democratic gains of African society and an irrepressible movement for the democratization of institutions in Africa, especially those at local levels. All regions of the continent are concerned by this involvement impulse. Southern Africa, which is home to at least one PB in almost all countries, is home to the majority of participatory budgeting experiences at local levels in Africa. The Republic of Madagascar alone has more than 160 PB accounts for nearly half the number of experiences in Africa. West Africa, which has played a pivotal role as forerunner of PB in Africa, retains an important place in the circulation of PB in all regions of the continent, due to the enlistment of majority of its member countries and the role of civil society organizations with their headquarters in these countries. East Africa is not behind since most countries joined the PB movement in Africa. Mozambique plays a pivotal role, both as a place for experiences with different PB models and as PB’s circulatory arena in Africa (Saunier, 2008). Central Africa offers unprecedented situations where PB allows populations to develop models of local management in order to overcome the shortcomings of a State in its absence such as is the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Finally, North Africa is probably the African region with the greatest potential, which is mainly focused on Tunisia. Since the Tunisian revolution and the first experiences of PB in 2014, the country now has about 20 active PBs. The adoption of the Constitution in January 2014 talks about participative democracy and citizen participation to the local public policies in Article 139. Morocco is also experiencing, although with difficulty, the PB, including Chefchouan. In several countries (Senegal, Tunisia, Mali, etc.), the laws of local authorities adopted create enable the implementation of participatory mechanisms. More recently, we have noted the emergence of a charter of citizen participation (particularly in DR Congo where local authorities are appointed by the central government) negotiated and signed between local authorities and citizens and which enshrine the rights and duties of citizens in municipalities. These advances on the normative level are likely to favour the expansion of PBs in the local communities.

B - A successful transfer of South-South public policy

Participatory Budgeting in Africa display an incredible power of adaptability. Thus,
it can be used in countries with proven democracy as well as in countries with authoritarian regimes such as the Democratic Republic of Congo. Its vitality is not questioned by local political situations. In Madagascar, the PB has experienced a tremendous growth in Africa whereas the country is in the grip of a cycle of successive political crises since 2002. In Tunisia, the first experiences of PB are set up in an atmosphere of legal uncertainty and institutional weakness (Som-1 & De Facci, 2017, Som-1, 2017). This modularity of PBs in Africa calls for several hypotheses which do not exclude each other.

First of all, we have to assume that PBs are more easily established in Africa in a country where the legal framework, especially regarding the management of local authorities, (1) explicitly provides for the obligation to make use of participatory schemes, or it simply recommends participation as a guarantee for quality of the process, or (2) where the legal framework is unclear and subject to broad interpretation in favor of participation in local governance, especially during periods of political transition and institutional transition. The first case corresponds to the Malagasy experience while the second is illustrated by the Tunisian experience.

The second hypothesis refers to the local government’s capacity for initiative vis-à-vis the central government. We will then say that PBs are deployed more easily as the municipal institution has a significant capacity for institutional initiative that comes as a result of either the institutional weakness of the central, structural or transitory State, or legal provisions, which refer to the first case of the first hypothesis. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Madagascar find themselves in this hypothesis. The third and last hypothesis concerns the financing of the PB deployment. The PB deploys all the more easily as it has specific funding that allows national / local actors to invest time in training PB facilitators or to support specific costs (communication, staff dedicated) to start this mechanism in a given municipality. In Tunisia, thanks to specific funding from the European Union, supported by funding from German bilateral cooperation (GIZ), the NGO Action Associative was able to boost the PB of 8 municipalities in 2014. Thanks to the Local Development Fund (LDF), the PB experiment was able to extend from 9 to 159 cases in Madagascar in almost two years.
II– PB models and their effects
We observe three kinds of PB models in Africa. The most prevalent seems to be the managerial model that emphasizes on good governance, including financial resources at local levels. The second type is the so-called political model which insists on the political dimension of PBs, especially in terms of radicalization of democracy and pursuit of social justice. Finally, the model we will call “state-building” which aims at rebuilding the state from below because of the collapse or collapse of the central state. These three models are ideal/typical because we observe that all the PB experiences proceed from a modular arrangement of two or three of these models.

A – Political model or radicalization of democracy
PB owes its international success to its proven ability to bring about positive political and socio-economic changes for people whose local government implements participatory budgeting. It is for this reason that the experience of the Porto Alegre PB has become iconic. It is the same with Madagascar, which has been the most successful in Africa in the distribution of PBs. In Madagascar, participatory budgeting has allowed financial resources from mining to be redistributed according to criteria of social justice to the people that need it most. PBs have helped to “meet needs in schools, healthcare centers and better support the Millennium Development Goals such as education, health, environment, etc.” (Kanouté, 2012). This work of emancipating the local population continues in various Malagasy municipalities in the wake of the municipality of Ampasy Nahampoana, which received the Artur Canana Excellence Award.
for its PB during the 2012 edition of Afrocities in Dakar. Tunisian experiences are also part of the pedigree of radicalization of Porto Alegre’s democracy. They intervene in a context of democratization following a popular revolution and by empowering the local people after five decades of political authoritarianism. In the latter case, the emancipatory dimension of PBs sometimes gives way to this type of managerial dimension (Som-1, 2017).

**B - Good governance model**

The NGO Transparency International produces each year a ranking of countries according to an index on corruption. In its 2016 ranking, only one African country, Botswana, was among the 20% least corrupt countries in the world, while 18 African countries were among the 20% most corrupt ones. More broadly, as shown in Figure 1, corruption is a cankerworm that is eating up African states. Furthermore, the lack of transparency and accountability mechanisms negatively affects the effectiveness of public policies and the relationship of trust between citizens and their governments. It is in this vein that participatory budgeting appears to be an effective solution for good governance, especially at local levels. In the case of Madagascar, PB has streamlined the management of royalties paid to municipalities under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) ratified by Madagascar. In Dakar, participatory budgeting has restored trust between citizens and the local government, with a positive impact on local taxation as a result of better knowledge of the financial management of the municipality by citizens. Transparency and accountability, which are at the heart of the PB’s procedural dimension, promote people’s fiscal citizenship and a rigorous management by local governments.
Map 2 Corruption in Africa
CPI2015 (Corruption Perception Index) is an indicator with a scale from 0 to 100, built by Transparency International NGO. It assigns each country a score by compiling evaluations made by organizations such as the World Bank or the African Development Bank. Depending on the country, the number of sources used varies from 3 to 9. North Korea and Somalia have the worst score in the world (8), while the first place is occupied by Denmark (score of 91).

**Interpretation**

With a score between 34 and 47, South Africa is among the 30% of countries ranked around the world median, 17 African countries are in this category. Botswana is the only African country in the top 20% of countries.

**Position in the world rankings according to corruption perception index.**

**Caption**

- 63
- 53 - 55
- 34 - 47
- 27 - 33
- 8 - 28
- no data

**Source** CPI2015
C- Model of “state-building” or rebuilding the state from below
As seen in the Malagasy case, PB can help provide the population with basic social amenities such as education and health, just as it can allow the construction of heavy projects such as roads in the case of Dakar. This ability of participatory budgeting can have structuring effects in the case of a bankrupt or collapsed state. The local communities allow, in this case, the State to be re-built through the establishment of both essential infrastructure, but also by creating reciprocal systems of allegiances which are at the epicentre of the creation of the State Westphalian modern. This is the case with the Kivu PB experiences in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Particularly affected by successive wars and armed conflicts since 1997, Kivu is a real state desert both owing to the lack of State security and the scarcity of social infrastructure of all kinds that ensure the territorial presence of the country. The BP here is far from being a sign of a transfer of power from the Central government to the local communities, as is the case in a process of traditional decentralization, which is bottom to top.

D- Approach to implementation of African PBs
It is difficult to talk of a unique approach to the implementation of PB in Africa, since the sources of inspiration are diverse. In Mozambique alone, we have PBs inspired by the example of Recife while others are inspired by Porto Alegre. However, the majority of PB experiences in Africa are in-line with the same pattern that is popularized by the handbook on PB in Africa produced by the NGO Enda Ecopop in 2017. This manual capitalizes on the early experiences of PB in Africa in the early 2000s, including those of Fissel in Senegal and Dondo in Mozambique. We have summarized this approach in 10 steps.

Figure 1 Voting for a public accountability project during a citizens’ forum within

Caption
1 Affirmation of political will and preparation of process  2 Neighbourhoods Forum  3 Forum of delegates  4 City Forum and choose of projects  5 Vote  6 Implementation of projects  7 Social audition  Source B. Kanoute, 2015
As soon as the municipality takes the decision to implement a participatory budget, a roadmap that is broken down according to the following points: (1) signing of an agreement of PB between the municipality and associations registered in the repertoire of the council concerned, (2) choice by the municipal executive of the posts and the budgets submitted to the PB [Sometimes the municipal executive consults the associations before taking a decision], (3) training facilitators who will animate the mechanism, (4) citizen forums in neighborhoods where both projects to be funded and delegates to represent the neighborhood during the other phases of the process are selected, (5) technical evaluation and budgeting of the projects voted by the citizens at forums at the level of the technical services of the municipality, (6) arbitration on projects to be funded by the assembly of delegates of the PB [the delegates retain the projects which can ultimately be financed in accordance with the available budget], (7) deliberation and vote of the municipal council on the selected projects for incorporation into the budget of the following year N + 1, (8) implementation of projects, (9) monitoring and evaluation of projects by citizens’ delegates and the citizens themselves, and finally, (10) the renewal or not of the PB for the next financial year, as well as its possible enlargement in terms of open topics and budget level allocated. This scheme draws heavily on the PB manual in Africa, whose writing was coordinated by Bachir Kanouté and funded by Onu-Habitat.

III- Resistances and challenges
Since PB’s first experiences in Africa in the mid-2000s, and despite its rapid and exemplary growth, its expansion process on the continent is subject to various resistances and challenges.
We believe that the legal framework, specifically the inadequacy of legislation on local authorities, is one of the main challenges and one of the sources of resistance to PB in Africa. In most countries having French as an official language or drawing on French legislation, local authorities are governed by legislation compiled in a single text, the laws enacted by local authorities. The latter often lacks reference to participation in local governance, which is an obstacle because municipal officials are subject to control of conformity in their decision-making. This supervision is often carried out by officials, who depend on the central power, so that there is often an asymmetry between local authorities who are closer to the citizens and the state institutions that do not follow the aspirations of these democratic people.

The second major hurdle for PB in Africa is weak transferability of skills (scope of action) and/or resources (financial, human, technical) from central to local levels. Even as they face an increasing number of people’s needs, local governments have less than 5% of national budgets (Kanouté, 2012). Most often, it is these human and technical resources local levels lack for the realization of the missions that the central State has assigned to them. This is compounded by a weak leadership of elected municipal officials which accompanies this shortage of qualified personnel quite regularly. The difficulty of the central state to let local communities take their own initiatives can also be seen in the conduct of territorial development plans. This is the case in Morocco where the state has argued for its leadership in the conduct of a national plan for local development to deprive the municipalities that had begun to experience PB of funds they needed for their sustainability (Goehrs, 2017).

Finally, we wish to draw attention to the risks posed by the institutionalization and/or the rapid growth of PB on the continent. We observe that, in some countries, the institutionalization of PB leads to a bureaucratization that will insist on the procedural dimension. This is the reason why Cameroon has seen a backlash and even a decline in PB, both in number and prestige, after a decade of success, by the way local actors have appropriated PB in order to build sectoral leadership, or even to re-build customer networks (Massardier et al., 2012). The lack of evaluation by third parties in PB does not allow the actors to have enough hindsight to continually improve the system.

IV- Prospects

In 2018, PB covers all sub-regions of Africa. It remains to cover all the countries of the continent. Central Africa and North Africa offer good prospects for expansion. In some countries, such as Tunisia, there are great opportunities for growth. Indeed, the municipalities have just acquired elected municipal councils that have the legitimacy to engage their municipality in participatory budgeting. This change of the municipal executive comes a few weeks after the adoption by the Assembly of People’s Representatives (ARP) of the new code of communities that ex-
plicitly encourages the use of participation in the management of municipalities. The scaling up processes in countries like Senegal (thanks to the law on participatory budgeting of local authorities) or Madagascar (Local Development Fund-FDL) are likely to extend the number of municipalities that experience PB in Africa.

Introduced in 2005 in the PB process in Africa, ICTs are expected to play an increasingly important role. Even if the Cameroonian experience seems not to have been conclusive, NTIC positively impact PB in Africa. The Tunisian examples of the cities of La Marsa or Sfax bear witness to the fact that ICTs help to improve the quality of choice of projects to finance and the delegates of PB thanks to algorithms developed by the NGO Democracy 2.1. Scaling up PB in Africa is on a geographical (more territories to conquer) or at a thematic level: PBs diversify and cover issues and themes that challenge local authorities to respond to community resilience needs. The emerging themes of PB relate to:

- The problem of children and young people for better care and integration in public policies,
- Climate change for the need for adaptation to climate shocks and the vulnerability of cities,
- Gender mainstreaming and vulnerable groups.

Conclusion

Fifteen years after its introduction in Africa in the mid-2000s and 30 years after its birth in Porto Alegre, participatory budgeting has established itself in Africa as a valuable asset both as an instrument of induction of good governance and as an instrument of radical democracy. In several African countries, PB contributes to a better distribution of wealth and to reduce inequalities of access to government services. It also serves as a place to learn and express forms of democratic inventiveness. All this work of diffusion and transfer of PB is ensured by ambassadors of PB (Porto de Oliveira, 2016, 2017, 2018) which are relayed at the national and sub-national / local levels by brokers of the participation (Som-1, 2018). These ambassadors and brokers of participation play a leading role in the local transfer and ownership of the various PB models in Africa. The creation of an academy of local democracy by UCLG-A is likely to accelerate the circulation of PB throughout the continent.
Latin America
30 years of Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: the lessons learned

Lígia Lüchmann, Wagner Romão & Julian Borba

Introduction
Considered one of the most important contemporary democratic innovations, the Participatory Budgeting (PB) is turning 30 since its emergence in Porto Alegre, capital of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, in the south of Brazil, at the end of the 1980s. In that context, the country was going through a process of re-democratization with the return of direct elections, the multi-party system, as well as mobilizations and social movements expressing not only indignation for rights secularly denied, involving social inequality, racial and gender discrimination, but also the emergence of a broadened citizenship (Telles, 1994) or a new citizenship, in the sense of the “right to have rights” (Dagnino, 1994). It was a time of a public sphere full of demands, topics and issues, amongst them social participation. The 1988 Federal Constitution became a landmark on participation, opening legal pathways for its institutionalization in the governmental structures responsible for public policies. The regulation of the Constitution defined participatory devices in several public policy areas, especially health, social security and children’s rights (Avritzer, 2006; Romão, 2015). Moreover, it established a new federative pact, as remarked by Fedozzi and Lima (2014), characterized by a reversal of the federal centralization toward more autonomy for municipalities in the political, legislate, financial and administrative dimensions, although a rerouting of resources to the federal sphere began to take place in the 1990s (Almeida, 2005).
PBs emerged in this context.\(^1\) Their originality was related to the fact that PB programs, differently from other participatory modalities, such as public opinion polls, public hearings and councils, proposed democratizing what was always considered the “heart” of governmental policies, giving the population a chance to define the destination of a portion of the public resources historically limited to the mayor’s office and internal – and not at all transparent – political negotiations in the governmental sphere. In fact, the implementation of PBs aimed at breaking that political logic, pioneering a participatory process of deliberating the municipal budget which came to be redesigned over time, reaching not only national but international projection.\(^2\) More or less inspired by the Porto Alegre model, hundreds of municipalities in the country and abroad\(^3\) have implemented PB programs in the following years.

What lessons can be learned from this Brazilian experience of institutional participation in local government? What implications does it bear to the field of institutional participation more generally, which encompasses other participatory modalities and programs such as councils, conferences, urban planning policies, among several others? It is with this in mind that we aim at taking stock of the thirty years of Participatory Budgeting in Brazil, based on three analytical dimensions: the contextual dimension; the political–institutional dimension; and the dimension linked to the

\(^1\) The origins of PBs in Brazil can be traced to embryonic experiences before the incorporation of citizens in discussions over the public budget. We highlight, for instance, the city of Lages, in Santa Catarina, at the end of the 1970s, run by Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement – MDB), still in the military regime. The program “Prefeitura nos Bairros” (“Town Hall in the Neighborhoods”), in Recife, implemented by the Jarbas Vasconcelos administration in 1986, is cited by Olívio Dutra as one of the main sources of inspiration for the Porto Alegre PB. Olívio was the mayor in whose administration, the first one from Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party – PT) in that capital, the PB was created, in 1989. According to Pires and Martins (2011), not only Porto Alegre but also other cities run by PT implemented the PB in that period, such as Piracicaba (SP), Angra dos Reis (RJ), Vitória (ES), Santo André (SP), Ipatinga (MG), among others.

\(^2\) The study by Fedozzi and Lima (2014) presents the different phases of PB, as follows: from 1989 to 1992, creation and consolidation in Brazil; from 1993 to 2000, national expansion; from 2000 onwards, the internationalization of PBs.

\(^3\) According to Sintomer, Herzberg and Rocke (2012, p. 80), “despite its limitations, Porto Alegre has been the most important transnational reference for Participatory Budgeting and is still one of the most fascinating experiences. The process convinced aglobalization activists, as well as local governments and advisors for international organizations, such as the World Bank and the UNDP.”
methodologies of participation and their implications for two elements considered central in the field of democratic theory: inclusion and political learning.\textsuperscript{4}

**Contextual dimension**

As it is known, the original Porto Alegre model inspired the development of a concept of PB which incorporated some of the central premises of participatory and deliberative theories of democracy, inasmuch as it established new relations between civil society and the state, relations structured by a set of rules and procedures with the goal of political inclusion and the promotion of social justice. According to the “rules of the game” of Brazilian democracy, the executive branch has the prerogative to begin and coordinate the entire process of defining the budget. The legislative branch has, among other attributions, the prerogative of analyzing it, proposing amendments, and approving it, overseeing its execution by the executive power. Typically, the participation of the population in this process is limited to the choice of representatives in the executive and legislate branches through universal suffrage.

The Participatory Budgeting presented itself, therefore, as an alternative to this dynamic in the sense that it incorporates, through the creation of mechanisms and spaces of direct and representative participation, a large portion of the population. In Porto Alegre, the PB experience began with the victory of Frente Popular\textsuperscript{5} (Popular Front) in the municipal 1988 elections, and it gradually became the central administrative policy in the city. It certainly has changed over time, through several conflicts and contradictions. Its success\textsuperscript{6} and diffusion, in that context, are owed above all to PT’s municipal electoral victories. As analyzed by Souza (2015), the PB became a trademark of the party, one of its main political platforms. Moreover, as we have seen, in the context of redemocratization the demand for participation became central in the agenda of a multiplicity of political and social actors.

\textsuperscript{4} This research was done within the scope of the project “New Forms of Political Participation: Protests and Institutional Participation in Brazil and Portugal in Comparative Perspective”. PROGRAMA CAPES/FCT, EDITAL Nº 39/2014.

\textsuperscript{5} A coalition between PT and the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party – PCB).

\textsuperscript{6} In 1996 the Porto Alegre PB was recognized by the United Nations (UN) as one of the 40 best governmental practices in the world. Moreover, the editions of the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, the first one in 2001, led the Porto Alegre PB “model” to the five continents.
In that context and the years following that, especially in the 1990s, the pro-participation discourse became highly valued in the country’s local elections (Fedozzi and Lima, 2014), and the PB was adopted by other parties, such as Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement – PMDB) and Partido da Social-Democracia Brasileira (Party of the Brazilian Social-Democracy – PSDB), which in some cities implemented PB programs. The expansion of PBs to other regions of the country in that decade, as shown by Avritzer and Vaz (2014), is a result of this process. This expansion of PB programs, considering the variation of governing parties due to electoral processes, seems to have continued in recent decades. Although high precision is difficult, we indicate below a chart with PB experiences from 1989 to 2016. In these almost thirty years, there has been a gradual expansion of PB over the country; however, after 2004 a sensible reduction is evident, at least in the bigger cities. For the chart we take into consideration the number of Brazilian cities with more than a hundred thousand inhabitants which have implement PB programs:7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number of Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989–1992</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–1996</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997–2000</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001–2004</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005–2008</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009–2012</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012–2016</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The drop in frequency of PBs on the local level was also identified in a research carried out in the state of Santa Catarina. From 295 mapped municipalities8, 16 had, in 2014, PB programs. Of these, 15 were run by PT (13 as coalition leader). In 2017, after the 2016 municipal elections, we found 13 cities with PB programs, seven of these run by PT (four as coalition leader). Data indicates two situations regarding PT’s fading presence: on one hand, the PB was kept by other parties, and on the other hand, other parties adopted the PB.9 In the case of the Porto Alegre metropolitan region, out of 10 cities with PB programs in 2016, seven did not continue it.

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7 Data obtained from the compilation by Paolo Spada, which aggregates efforts by Ribeiro and De Grazia (2003) about the 1997–2000 period, Avritzer and Wampler (2008) about the 2001–2004 period and other years before that, and Spada (2012) himself, concerning data between 2008 and 2012 available at <http://participedia.net/en/content/brazilian-participatory-budgeting-census>. The data from the 2013–2016 period were collected by Wagner de Melo Romão and his team, in a research based on an analysis of Brazilian town halls’ websites. The research was funded by the Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo Foundation for Research Support – FAPESP).

8 We thank the students Gustavo Venturelli, Heloísa Domingos and Gabriel Scapini for this effort.

9 We also noted the extinction of PB programs in nine cities in which PT lost the executive office. Additionally, we identified the lack of PBs in 24 cities governed by PT.
Therefore, even though there has been a pluralization of parties involved (Wampler, 2008; Fedozzi and Lima, 2014; Avritzer and Vaz, 2014), the historical relationship between the PB and PT seems to be a determining factor for the decrease in the number of PBs in the country, especially since 2016, a moment of impactful electoral loss for PT, whose presence in municipalities diminished by 50%, particularly in the biggest cities in the country (Nicolau, 2017). Beyond that, the literature also discusses how PT in a certain way abandoned the PB, particularly beginning with Lula’s election in 2002 (Spada, 2014; Fedozzi and Lima, 2014). Souza (2015) highlights the fact that PT changed its electoral and institutional strategies when it reached the federal government. Beyond strategies for governmental coalitions, in Lula’s and Dilma’s mandates the dynamic sector of social participation in Brazil clearly left the local sphere and entered the federal/national level. It was a period of the expansion of national councils—something reasonably consolidated before—but above all of the expansion of national public policy conferences, 93 of them held between 2003 and 2016, in several areas of public policy and rights, processes which ignited thousands of municipal as well as hundreds of statewide conferences.

PBs have thus clearly lost ground in the country. This is also the case for the relative decrease in the thrust for institutional participation in Brazil in a more general sense after the June 2013 protests and the National Congress’ vote to not approve the Política Nacional de Participação Social (National Social Participation Policy) in 2014.10

10 This was a presidential decree which sought to articulate more strongly the instances of participation into the federal executive branch and the production and implementation of public policies, in order to strengthen their efficacy—a central criticism which members of social movements and the civil society had expressed to the government. The National Congress, however, blocked the decree, in the context of waning parliamentary support for Dilma Rousseff (Romão, 2015; Almeida, 2017). The polarization of political positions in the country after Dilma Rousseff’s victory in her 2014 reelection bid created an environment conducive to the execution of a parliamentary coup which led her vice-president Michel Temer to power in August 2016. In this context, the already difficult landscape of institutional participation—above all in the federal level and in policy areas in which government initiatives are fundamental for the maintenance of participatory spaces—became even worse, and the thrust for institutional participation from the 1990s and 2000s sapped.
This expansion of other participatory modalities, especially councils and conferences, as well as the creation of new models of society–state interfaces, in particular the creation and adoption of programs and digital platforms, seems to also count as an element which, if it does not eliminate the implementation of programs such as PB, especially due to their complexity, in the end makes them secondary in the face of a broader offering of participatory devices, despite their limitations in terms of deliberative competence. Even Porto Alegre, a PB pioneer, expanded its society–state interfaces over the years, primarily through the City Congresses, still in the 1990s (Borba, 1998; Moura, 1998), then later by incorporating first the concept of solidary governance (Busatto, 2005), and finally the digital platform projects oriented toward participation, as was the case of Project Wikicidade (Espíndula, 2016).

Therefore, the path of the PB was made according to the political and social context of the country. As we have seen, the political transition facilitated a gradual formal return to a democratic legal state, bringing forth institutional innovations which incorporate into the public sphere more direct participation of the civil society in public policy-making. Such a scenario was the result of trends taking shape in the authoritarian period, particularly in the late 1970s and during the 1980s. During the political transition, the country was energized by a demand for social participation which culminated with the introduction of direct democracy devices in the 1988 Carta Magna, such as plebiscites, referendums and popular initiative bills.

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11 According to a study by the General Secretariat of the Presidency (Secretaria-Geral da República) based on data from the Brazilian Geography and Statistics Institute (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – IBGE), there were (in 2014), in Brazil, 62,562 municipal councils in several public policy areas: health, education, social security, property preservation, environment, food safety, senior citizens’ rights, culture, housing, etc. (SECRETARIA-GERAL DA REPÚBLICA, 2014).

12 Isunza Vera and Hevia (2006, p. 61) define the concept of interface as “a site of exchange and conflict in which some actors interrelate not casually but intentionally. A specific type of interface is the space where societal and state actors meet (because of this, we call them society–state interfaces). These society–state interfaces are structurally determined by both the public policy as well as the social–political projects of the (societal and state) actors concerned.”

13 A 2005 project, when PT no longer ran the government, which prescribed the creation of spaces of information and collaboration between state and society, such as public–private partnerships (Busatto, 2005).

14 A digital platform introduced in 2001, lasting until 2014, hosted at <http://portoalegre.cc> and aimed at being “a space for citizen collaboration” around the problems of the city (Espíndula, 2016).
The Constitution also opened pathways for the construction of institutions which enhanced social participation in the government structures responsible for public policies. As a consequence of this process, the following decades were marked by the growth of such participatory institutions. As PBs were not regulated by law, they oscillated over time, depending thus on electoral and partisan leanings and strategies. Originally linked to PT, the program spread to other regions and parties in a dynamic that, given a context in which participation was highly valued, multiplied or pluralized its ideological bases, especially considering party coalition strategies, as we shall see next.

2. Political-institutional dimension

Scholars have, for some time now, studied the importance of political dynamics in participatory spaces and programs, such as changes in partisan agendas and priorities, shifts in government due to electoral processes, and, particularly in the case of Brazil, electoral coalitions. As we have seen, if in some cases there is a direct link between the implementation of PBs and a left-leaning project, based on the principles of political inclusion and social justice such as the cases of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, the dynamics of electoral competition were also important, as they ultimately produced other institutional PB models, managed by center or even right-leaning parties.

It is certain that the implementation of government programs or experiences, as in the case of many PB processes, depends on the will and commitment of the respective government for its success. It is not by chance that the large majority of cases of creation and extinction of PBs coincides with the period that the political group that sustains it remains in power. Thus, there are various studies showing a positive relationship between an electoral defeat and the extinction of a PB program. Nevertheless, studies that evaluate their permanence over time (in consecutive administrations), indicate the need to understand this variable more complexly. The study by Borba and Lüchmann (2007), for example, by finding some data on the permanence and extinction of PB in municipalities in the state of Santa Catarina, found tensions between political will and commitment, effective government control and electoral dimensions.

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15 The behavior of the executive branches in the implementation and maintenance of participation is related not only to its centrality in the set of government actions, but also to the amount of resources – human and material – invested in the process. Thus, some indicators of this variable are the place that the participatory institutions occupy in the administrative structure; the amount of resources allocated to the viability of participatory processes; the commitment to and respect for the participatory deliberations; the involvement of key representatives of the administration; the promotion of measures for training participants; and the guarantee of institutional infrastructure (Lüchmann, 2014; Borba and Lüchmann, 2007).
Perceiving a weakening of PBs during the second and third mandates of the government, the authors suggested that the termination of a PB occurs not only because of a change in the municipal executive branch, but also because of changes in the party alliances and or in the government’s base, to a large degree extended to different parties in the name of “governability.” In this process, if coalition-building practices facilitate the negotiation and approval of bills in the legislature, they are also responsible for mischaracterizing and disqualifying the implementation of participatory innovations by bringing to government ranks political actors who oppose these innovations. In this sense, in the name of “governability,” the opportunity for a minimum consolidation of “democratic-participatory” projects is often sacrificed (Borba e Lüchmann, 2007).

In an analysis of the PB experience in Mayor Marta Suplicy’s administration of São Paulo, Tatagiba and Teixeira (2006, p. 234) emphasize the participants’ sense of frustration due to the decisions being concentrated in the mayor’s office, the fragility of popular representation (“it is always the same people who participate”) and the use of this participatory space by political parties. They remark on the tensions and debilities of the relations between participatory and representative institutions, and warn of a combination “whose direction and meaning are predominantly guided by the demands and challenges particular to electoral competition. This involves (...) ‘not a situation of complementarity, but of a combination between participation and representation, under the hegemonic direction of the latter’.” PB is inscribed in this logic, and suffers all the consequences of its institutionalization being dictated by electoral competition.

Upon evaluating the cases of Porto Alegre, Montevideo and Caracas, Goldfrank (2006) emphasizes the importance of factors such as, in addition to the degree of decentralization of authority and the quantity of resources provided, the framework of opposition parties. Thus, if in Montevideo and Caracas the strong opposition imposed the adoption of more restrictive mechanisms subordinated to the structures of the dominant local parties, in Porto Alegre the opposition parties were not successful, due to their low institutionalization, in articulating a reaction that threatened the implementation of the PB in the form it was designed over time. This relationship with the opposition parties was also identified in Wampler’s (2008) study of Brazilian experiences. Seeking to evaluate the diffusion of PBs by other parties,
the author identified that “mayors appear more willing to implement a PB program in their communities when the left is very weak (...). A reduced number of leftist council members leads to an increase in the probability that a municipal government would adopt the PB” (p. 83). In this sense, the author suggests that the adoption of the PB by parties not aligned with the left is related to a political–electoral evaluation of the project. To separate PBs from PT and consolidate a “reputation as reformist aimed at ‘good government’” (Wampler, 2008, p. 84) can be an efficient political strategy “where the competition represented by the leftist forces is weaker” (idem).

Thus, programs like the PB are not only subordinated to the will and moods of elected governments, but also subject to the logic of the political system and, therefore, to the interests and strategies of other sectors, as well as of party and legislative leaders. As emphasized by Goldfrank (2006, p.18), in addition to attending different political interests – in particular winning elections – the results of innovations such as the PB “are not necessarily those originally expected. The consequences depend not only on the intention of the designers and the local contexts, but on the intentions and strategies of other actors, including political opponents.”

Beyond the insertion of the PB in the scope of governmental strategies, another explanatory dimension for its weakening or loss of centrality in governmental actions seems to be its exhaustion as a decision–making method. At the same time as its regular implementation over more than two decades in some cities (such as Porto Alegre) offered possibilities for its institutionalization, understood as its expectedness and recognition by social actors in the scope of their actions, this same process seems to “stiffen” it over time, with the PB losing its innovative and socially transformative character. Data on Porto Alegre, for instance, indicate how difficult it is to renew PB participants, especially its representatives (delegates and councilors). According to Fedozzi and Martins (2015), a political “elitization” process has taken place within the PB program, with a decreasing renewal rate for its representatives (councilors).16

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16 In the study by Fedozzi et al (2013), data for youth participation in Porto Alegre (people aged between 16 and 25) point to low adhesion: 18.5%, in 2009 and 12.8%, in 2012. “It is in this age range that the biggest differences in proportion related to the city’s general population appear, as young participants in the PB are underrepresented (IBGE, 2000; 2010)” (Fedozzi et al, 2013, p. 28).
It is also possible to claim, based on the scholarship and above all on case studies (Wampler, 2007; Neves, 2008; Romão, 2010), that the deliberative and participatory strength which characterized the Porto Alegre PB model has lost impulse as a kind of third popular power beyond the local executive and legislative branches (Dias, 2002). The political strategies for local government support, chiefly from PT and other left-leaning parties, no longer hold PBs as a reference. Hence Participatory Budgets, even where they remained as a governmental practice, gradually lost centrality in the administrations in favor of governability strategies sustained by coalitions with parties of different ideological orientations.

This practice, which was already present in the period before PT ran the federal government, has increased with Lula’s 2002 victory. Political relations on a federal level provoked an expansion of municipal coalitions between PT and center or even right-leaning parties (Carreirão and Nascimento, 2010), pressing for the hollowing of the PB as an alternative of popular power and direct dialogue with the population. This has relevant implications for PBs, since the broader the coalitions forming local governments are, the stronger the attrition between the many departments – which will be occupied by members of different political parties, in many cases averse to participatory administrative practices – tend to be. Therefore, the broader and more diverse the coalition, the greater the competition among the departments and the specific political projects of parties and leaders composing the coalition. In this sense, any participatory project which aims at dislocating decision-making power away from secretaries and closer to the population – through the PB – tends to be politically blocked.

Another dimension which has been one of the chief hardships in the more long-running PBs (those who last at least more than one mandate) is related to the accumulation of services and works not carried out by the executive branch, having been the object of deliberation within the scope of the PB process. A considerable amount of the experiences begin with yearly processes of collecting demands and, years later, become biannual processes. The non-execution or delay in delivering public works has generated backlash within society, which undermines the legitimacy of the process. Such situation, already felt during the early years of PBs, was aggravated in the context of the budgetary crisis affecting most Brazilian cities since 2014. Also, the participatory process itself increases costs for the city
in addition to investments in the works and services the population deliberates. The process of prioritizing demands generates the creation of assets (hospitals, schools, childcare facilities, etc), demanding human resources that increase personnel costs, which diminishes the municipalities’ capacity to invest. These medium and long-range impacts are amplified by economic crises, when potential income for the cities decreases.

3. Methodologies of participation: inclusion and political learning
The constitution of participatory political spaces, such as the PB, can significantly influence the alteration of socioeconomic determinants of participation and political learning. As it is known, just as participation is conditioned, to some extent, by the centrality of the individual in the social structure (Milbraith, 1965; Verba and Nie, 1987), the process of political learning is also positively correlated to economic and educational resources. Generally speaking, it is widely understood that individuals with higher status are more interested in politics, have more information, resources and skills, more conscience of the importance of politics, more sense of duty and more political efficacy (Verba and Nie, op. cit.). However, other factors also intervene, to some extent, in participation and political learning, mainly the structures of political opportunities, such as the PB, and the networks or identity contexts in which the individuals are inserted (the types of socialization, the networks of participation, associations, among others) (Pizzorno, 1985; Warren, 2001). In this sense, PBs could, in some way, be playing the role of secondary institutions when it comes to political learning (Fedozzi, 2002).
As several studies (Lüchmann and Borba, 2008; Fedozzi, 1996; Abers, 1997) have indicated, the PB experiences manage to mobilize sectors from the most impoverished classes, which contradicts any immediate relationship between the phenomenon of poverty and non-participation. However, to think of the pedagogical implications of PBs implies evaluating the participatory methodologies involved in the process. By studying PB cases in the state of Santa Catarina, Lüchmann (2012) realized that the educational dimension is not part of the objectives of the programs which, moreover, are in several ways limited in terms of promoting collective debates between the different sectors of society. In the researched municipalities, learning processes are constituted as sub-products of participation. The actions and objectives of governments are much more directed towards “efficacy,” that is, the execution of prioritized works, and less to the development of a culture of citizenship. Therefore, there is an absence of
spaces and mechanisms (such as training courses) promoting further development and enhancement of expertise, skills, attitude and political practices directed toward a kind of “citizenship school.” Therefore, even though studies with PB participants have indicated a process of democratic learning or even of moral development which positively correlates with the time the participants in question stay involved with the program (Fedozzi, 2002), a causal relationship between participation and citizen learning can not be taken for granted (Montambeault, 2016). Anchored in researches carried out in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, Montambeault (2016, p. 283) remarks on two paradoxes found in the PB dynamic: “The paradox of equality and the paradox of participation as guichet politics, or a place to come to obtain services and then go back home.” According to the author,

“On the one hand, while PB aims, in principle, to include marginalized populations, this mechanism can, to the contrary, strengthen exclusion, crystallizing already existing inequalities among types of citizens within a political community (citizen-observers). On the other hand, social inclusion through PB targets specific infrastructural needs. In such contexts, citizen participation often follows individual-demands logics, and once their immediate needs are fulfilled, communities and individuals tend to demobilize (citizen-users).” (Montambeault, 2016, p. 283)

Moreover, it is also necessary to take into consideration that awareness-raising programs for local governments’ workers, on the importance of participatory practices, are unheard of. It seems to us that resistance from public servants to participatory processes (PBs, councils, conferences) is one of the factors leading to the isolation of PBs in the context of local governments. This resistance occurs, on one hand, because participation activities (assemblies, meetings) eventually become “one more thing to do,” beyond the ordinary daily activities. On the other hand, new relationship practices with the elected representatives (delegates) in the PB assemblies are not created – and they, as expected, begin to feel empowered to act in coordination with the town hall.

Still concerning political learning, a dimension which could be called organizational, related to the participatory institution’s ca-
pacity to add new institutional designs or technologies to the process, should also be noted. One indicator of such could be, for example, the expansion of mechanisms of digital interaction in PBs. Data reveal, however, that the relationship with digital tools is still flimsy within PBs. Literature demonstrates that a great amount of online Participatory Budgeting emerged from in-person PBs which came to use, or test, digital tools for their processes (Sampaio, 2015, p. 299). A research conducted in 2016 on the 283 Brazilian cities with more than a hundred thousand inhabitants\textsuperscript{17} showed that only 12 municipalities had a digital PB tool. The use of these technologies do not seem to offer quick solutions, and virtual processes keep presenting the same traditional problems, such as activities restricted to the citizens, participation restricted to the local population, or a badly developed governance communication plan which negatively impacts the efficacy of the process.

However, even with all its limitations in generating political or organizational learning, it is our understanding that PB has been of fundamental importance for the creation and expansion of a vocabulary of participation (governance, partnership, digital government, e-democracy, etc.) used by most public managers in the country.

In the face of this set of issues we can say, in summary, that after a period of growth and expansion peaking in the mid-2000s, we are living through, especially after 2016, with the ousting of PT, in particular from municipal governments, a significant decrease in the number of PBs in the country. Even where PBs remained as a governmental practice, they have been losing centrality within the administrations, whether in favor of governability strategies sustained by coalitions with parties of different ideological orientations, or through the expansion of other participatory modalities, such as councils, public hearings and the creation of digital platforms. An important indicator of this

\textsuperscript{17} The research “Gestão e status político da participação institucional. Censo das experiências de Orçamento Participativo no Brasil (1989-2014) e pesquisa exploratória sobre democracia participativa em nível municipal (2013-2016)” (Management and political status of institutional participation. Census of Participatory Budgeting experiences in Brazil (1989-2014) and exploratory research on participatory democracy on the municipal level (2013-2016)), coordinated by professor Wagner de Melo Romão and funded by FAPESP.
weakening of the PB in the country seems to be the current non-operating status of the Rede Brasileira do Orçamento Participativo (Brazilian Network of Participatory Budgets).

**Final remarks**

More than thirty years after the emergence of PBs, what lessons can we learn from the Brazilian experience? We discussed above some tentative answers, especially analyzing political, institutional and societal aspects. Beyond such dimensions, which can signal great pessimism among authors concerning the future of this participatory institution, it is convenient to list some opposite arguments.

First, we should not understate the fact that a participatory institution was gestated in a context of deep inequalities, in a country with a strongly authoritarian tradition in both its political institutions and social relations. The survival of this institution for more than three decades is even more impressive.

Secondly, it should be recognized that the PB deeply related to a left-leaning political project, implemented in a context of much-needed renewal within the left with the end of the Soviet Union. It can be said that the PB was the institutional materialization of a participatory strand of leftist thought which had begun to be conceived in the 70s (Held, 1995), but had not until the Porto Alegre case been consolidated institutionally. In this sense, PBs imparted institutional density to the renewal of the global left, with its participatory ideas being incorporated all over the world.

Directly related to this ideological dimension, it can be said, in the Brazilian case, that the electoral viability of PT itself was owed to the PB, since if that experience became its poster child as a management model in the 1990s, one cannot disregard the strong possibility that part of the electoral support the party received over those years was related to how positively voters rated such experience. As it is known, this project culminated with the party winning the presidency, remaining in power for three full mandates and a fourth interrupted by the 2016 impeachment process.
Going back to the institutional debate, it is worth mentioning one last dimension related to PBs. It seems to us that, as institutions which challenge what is already instituted, PBs carry with them a need for constant renewal as a condition for their own survival. And when such institutions become a routine, they in many cases lose their innovative and daring character, beginning a slow descent to extinction. They disappear not because their deaths are decreed by a ruler, but because they cease to be central in the configuration of the political processes. They die in a political sense well before being formally extinguished.

In view of the above, we consider to be the task of new generations of public managers, intellectuals and political militants to keep alive the democratic flame which generated the first PB experiences in the end of the 1980s, in a Brazil which had just ended its authoritarian regime. Both Brazil and PBs changed a lot in all these years, and the current situation is of doubt and uncertainty regarding the future of the Brazilian democracy. It seems to us that, more than ever, the PB flame must be renewed.
After three decades of existence, Brazilian Participatory Budgeting (hereinafter PB) experience a time of maturity that has gone beyond experimentalism. Empirical and investigative accumulation allows a more realistic and critical reflection on democratic contributions as well as on the limits, contradictions and challenges of that participative innovation that has spread all over the world. Proliferation of participatory innovations marked the period opened with Brazilian re-democratization in 1988, which were strengthened during the presidential administrations of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT), in 2002–2016. They included Councils on Public Policy or Rights, National Conferences on sector-specific policies, urban Master Plans, Public Hearings and Participatory Budgeting (Avritzer, 2008; Pires and Lopez, 2010). Academic literature called these emerging spaces “new participatory institutions” (Avritzer, 2008; Pires and VAZ, 2010). Within this spectrum, Participatory Budgeting gained international repercussion. In an earlier opportunity, the book Hope for Democracy. 25 years of Participatory Budgeting in the World (Esperança Democrática. 25

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1 Public Policy and/or Rights Councils are bodies made up of governments and civil society representatives. They are present in the three levels of the Brazilian Federation (municipal, state and federal) and result from either legal obligation or social actors’ initiatives. National Thematic Conferences are processes carried out with certain periodicity for interlocution between State and society representatives on proposals for specific public policies. Cities’ Master Plans regulate the action of actors that build and use urban space. The Statute of Cities approved in 2001 provides for mandatory Master Plans designed with social participation in any city with 20 thousand inhabitants or more. We thank Celio Piovesan from Brazilian Network of Participatory Budgets, for the kind sharing of the data from PB-2015 and the undergrad student Leonardo Alexandria for the important support during the manuscript preparation.
anos de Orçamentos Participativos no mundo (Dias, 2013) addressed the history of the emergence of Participatory Budgeting in Brazil, the phases of their construction and their nationwide dissemination process (Fedozzi and Lima, 2013). This history will not be recounted here and it is already known in international literature. However, considering that PB are not a mere “social technology,” at the end of this chapter we intend to point out some recent elements that have significantly changed the conditions that allowed the emergence and expansion of that democratic innovation. As will be seen, this context-specific variable, which includes recent economic, fiscal and political changes, combined with the advance of political conservatism in the country, has given rise to a new historical context that constrains and prevents adoption and sustainability of PB by Brazilian municipality. Given this new context, it is our understanding that PB are closing a cycle of political prestige.

Based on a literature review, we intend to look into and discuss issues about PB practices that may contribute to a synthetic evaluation of democratic advances and limitations indicated by this type of institutional participation in the Brazilian case. Of course, this goal will not be exhausted.

Public budget is the core of socio-state decisions. Major battles take place around it, whether they are focused on tax policy or the destination of society’s resources — hence the relevance of public debate on that backbone of the State. The emergence of PB provided such opportunity. However, an analysis of their possible democratizing contribution depends on the multiple goals involved in the adoption of such participatory institutions. Such plurality of goals, in turn, responds to theoretical and ideological references of the subjects that promote it (Dagnino, 2004; Goldfrank, 2012) and the subsequent empirical analysis of the models.

Notwithstanding the diversity of PB models in Brazil, some elements can be pointed out that support the viability of participatory alternatives over hegemonic assumptions of elitist/realistic theories of democracy. As we have known from Weber and Schumpeter, the latter advocate restriction of citizen participation in behalf of democracy itself (Santos, 2002).

Therefore, our intention is to discuss some issues considered relevant for the analysis of democratizing potentials achieved by PB, but also the contradictions, dilemmas and limits that emerged in Bra-
zil’s long-term practice. These issues are related to the importance of PB’s institutional design, their place in the public management system, and the content discussed by these forms of institutional participation and its relation with urban planning. These dimensions are somehow linked to the topics of effectiveness and quality of participation, which are more recent concerns in Brazil’s research agenda on institutionalized participation.

Institutional Design, Socio-Political Inclusion and Quality of Participation

Starting from the main assumptions of historical neo-institutionalism (Amenta et al, 2005; Skocpol & Pierson, 2002; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992) the analysis of the main forms of social participation in public policies in Brazil shows the great relevance of that institutional design. Not being neutral, institutional designs delimit, to a large extent, a series of characteristics that will influence participatory processes. Issues such as who participates in it (inclusiveness); conditions for participation (quality); the real power of influence over public policies (effectiveness); topics discussed and who controls the agenda of the process (substantiality); how social control over decisions takes place (accountability) – all are elements that tell a lot about the democratizing character of participation, whether formal or informal.

The inclusive nature of PB in Brazil is mostly due to their institutional design. This design is generally marked by territoriality in the demanding process by actors historically marginalized from urban development, which occurred in an accelerated and exclusive way in the country from the 1950s on.

Assemblies organized according to city region and open to citizen participation are the most significant and innovative expression of this participatory arrangement. In spite of the multiple PB models practiced in municipalities, it is possible to state that the following innovative rule has been replicated in the country: public discussions about the population’s demands conducted in distinct and socioeconomically unequal territories in terms of access to infrastructure and public services. Election of representatives to collective bodies (PB councils, forum of delegates, supervision committees, etc.) is usually added to this stage of direct participation.
Therefore, unprecedented inclusion of poor segments in public policy decisions was one of the main characteristics of the invention of PB. Compared to other participatory spaces created after Brazil’s re-democratization, the PB allow more participation of poorer segments, less schooled people, and black people (Ação Educativa and Ibope 2003; Vaz, 2013). Considering the social inequality that marks Brazilian society and the well-known debate about inequality and political elitism in participatory spaces (Cleaver, 2001, 2005; Kothari, 2001), this characteristic of inclusion gains strong democratizing meaning.

Two points related to this inclusive design resulting from the innovation of assemblies are worth mentioning: the role and status of representation in PB and the quality of participation. This is because experience shows that these are still challenging issues.

Academic debate on the latter was a late phenomenon in the analysis of PB. The causes for this are likely to be multiple and complex. However, some conceptual interpretations exerted strong influence on PB in their first stages. Anchored in the phase of “euphoria” as a result of the peak of PB’s national and international success in which Porto Alegre was emblematic, these propositions interpreted PB as an expression of direct democracy (Pont, 1997). Furthermore, their innovative character would be based on an “autonomous structure of the State [which would be] self-regulated” and constitute a “non-state public sphere” (Genro, 1995, p. 11–13).2

We have pointed out elsewhere the misunderstandings about such concepts and their potential to mythicize the real experience of PB (Fedozzi, 2000). This is because they wrongly assume that the State is absent from the institutional configuration of the process while overestimating the autonomous components of civil actors’ action towards

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2 According to Lavalle, Houtzager, Acharya (2004), the polis’ perspective contrasts with the assumptions of Habermasian-inspired theory of the new civil society (Cohen & Arato, 1992) that strongly influenced studies on social movements and participation in the 1990s in Latin America. The polis approach originates in works by Skocpol (1992 and 1999) and Tilly (1978 and 1997), among other authors, as well as in other lines of comparative institutionalism, such as Evans’s (1995 and 1996). At least two assumptions can be raised by this approach and which point to views differing from the theory of the new civil society: first, the idea that the ability to participate is conditioned by actors’ construction history, their relations with other actors (of the State or the universe of civil organizations) and by the scope of political institutions where those relations are negotiated; second, the action capabilities of civil organizations and the State are the product of an interactive and contingent history of mutual constitution. It is, therefore, an eminently relational approach critical to the dichotomy between State and civil society.
the State. The construction of PB is only viable through relational cooperation between State actors and civil actors. The alternative proposed here is to interpret PB as spaces for co-management, where the Executive branch and civil actors shared budget decisions (Abers, 2000; Fedozzi, 2000; Gret and Sintomer, 2002).

Assuming that PB are full expressions of direct democracy may have contributed to obscure the analysis about the exercise of representation within their participation processes. This is not about the necessary and complementary relationship between citizen participation and representative parliamentary institutions in participatory democracy; it is rather related to the factual reality of representation as a dimension of institutional participation (Lüchmann, 2007).

Growing empirical evidence on the importance and the problems of representation in participation, together with new theoretical frameworks for analyzing interactions between the Lüchmann State and civil society, have recently allowed for a more robust and realistic discussion on PB, since representation had already been gaining attention in studies about Public Policy Councils. In the wake of criticism to excessive normativism of deliberative theories, the polity perspective gained ground through the notion of imperative mandates into practices similar to traditional parliamentary representation. This is the case of Porto Alegre’s PB, where councilors changed bylaws in 2007 to allow their permanent re-election without consulting community bases. Consequently, renewal rates decreased while political elitism increased in the PB Council (Fedozzi and Martins, 2015).

The third aspect mentioned above – quality of participation – is highly relevant to evaluate the long period of existence of PB in Brazil. This is because it is perhaps one of the least developed dimensions of PB in the country. As it is well known, the topic of quality requires analysis of a set of indicators in

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3 Only 28.7% of PB participants said they favored permanent re-election of council members’ terms. Another 15.7% said they did not know or did not respond. The vast majority claimed to be “against re-election” or for a temporary restriction of terms (55.6%). Source: Observando (2016, p. 32).

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the working cycle of these processes. There is extensive international literature on the subject, especially after the introduction of deliberative democracy theories (Habermas, 1984, 1987; Ackerman, 1993; Bohman, 1996, 1999; Rawls, 1999; Chambers, 2003; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Cohen, 2007) but a review would be out of the scope of this article.

However, two contradictory phenomena in PB are related to the reaction to deliberative theories. The first – of theoretical-analytical nature – was the attempt to interpret PB (and participatory institutions in general) as expressions of deliberative democracy (Elster, 1998; Abers, 2000; Fung and Wright, 2001; Santos and Avritzer, 2002; Fung and Wright, 2003). The second phenomenon, at the empirical level, was low or nonexistent incorporation of some aspects of deliberative theories that – if viable – could increase PB’s quality. The paradox here is that, in the former case, the deliberative approach ended up covering up real problems by reifying concrete cases. In the latter case, the topic of participation quality was heavily neglected as a non-issue.

In fact, considering qualitative differences between the cases, it would be wrong to attribute the normative characteristics required by deliberative democracy theories to the empirical reality of PB in Brazil. This is because, in general, and despite having their moments for public debate, PB operate the decision-making process by aggregating interests and by majority rule in their basic or collegial representation bodies. At best, certain elements consonant with deliberative policies may be found. The realistic hypothesis presented here is that the advances necessary to give better quality to participation in PB will not be feasible, in the Brazilian reality, if they are fixed in deliberative assumptions. However, it is accepted that certain deliberation requirements – mainly regarding more equality in participation conditions, quality information, publicity, creation of moments for free exchange of arguments – can be introduced so that PB are improved in Brazil. Current retrocession and reformulation of views in deliberative theories of democracy help that. It is not only about having “deliberative moments” within a larger range of procedures (Goodin, 2008), but also about incorporating conflict, everyday formal and informal speeches, the search for self-interest, recognition of emotion and passion – together with the concept of public reason –, acceptance of forms of agreement and bargaining
to generate results as well as the search for consensus (Mansbridge, 1995). Finally, it is about incorporating all realistic adjustments that bring deliberative assumptions closer to pluralist and neo-corporatist theories of democracy (Farias, 2012).

It should be noted that the quality challenge was neglected by the political and social operators of PB in Brazil. The causes, once again, are many and complex. A partial explanation may be in the establishment of the assembly-based model for PB in the country, exercised even in metropolises and large cities. Once again we are back on the importance of the institutional design.

As already seen, citizen assemblies were a highly valued innovation in PB procedures. The symbolic positive value acquired by the assemblies strengthened the view on the legitimacy of PB according to basically quantitative criteria, always vaunted by political leaders and participants themselves. The establishment of that model – whose experience in Porto Alegre had a powerful demonstration effect – caused its side effects. Firstly, it prevented recognition of the diverse makeup of civil society participants and consequently the asymmetries that make a major difference in participation conditions – especially education. In addition, the dispute over priorities according to the criterion of quantity in assemblies created incentives that favor mobilization of alienated individuals, sometimes under the patronage of social and political leaders. At times, they are simulacra of participation based on plebiscitary practices under heteronomous forms of engagement. Of course it is not possible to speak of quality in these cases.

Second, the prevailing view sees PB playing the role of “schools of citizenship” guided by their “spontaneous pedagogy”. That is the common idea that the mere presence of individuals and social actors in PB assemblies and representative bodies would promote citizen learning and possible changes in participants’ political culture. Although in long-standing PB cases it is possible to see some improvement in political culture, this “homogenizing assembly-based” view has proven to be clearly faulty.

Considering the longevity of PB in Brazil, the lack of methodologies to improve participation is one of the main deficits to be pointed out. Stressing this limit in the long and pioneering Brazilian experience does not mean proposing the elimination of key moments for civil actors’ participation in the workings of PB, as is the case with
assemblies open to all citizens. It rather means recognizing that the model did not evolve towards the adoption of institutional methodologies and designs that favor participation quality. Naturally, this goal requires rethinking institutional designs with an eye to quality. However, PB operators need to be more opened to learn from other international experiences that are more successful in this respect.

The place of PB in the public management system: the challenge of effectiveness

The emergence of PB, although limited to a number of municipalities, provided opportunities to establish greater democratic and republican rationality in Brazilian budget management. However, this potential depends on several factors, including PB’s – central or peripheral – place in the governmental decision-making system; access to information on the whole budget; citizens’ real power to influence priorities; the degree of citizen control over the public budget (social accountability).

Similarly, using Santos’ (2007) critical discussion of contemporary democracy and the possibilities of participatory democracy, it can be said that when these factors are satisfied, the cases would be closer to “high-intensity PB”. Conversely, actual practices can be interpreted as cases of “low-intensity PB”. The Brazilian experience with PB includes different cases with higher or lower degrees of democratic radicalism.

Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish cases where PB are central to public management (they are adopted as the main, albeit not the only, method for allocation of public funds) from those where they play a secondary role in management. In the latter model, PB are generally considered as programs with lower status in public management. They are often managed by a small team or a government agency of low political standing.

The above distinction leads to one of the central issues in the evaluation of models, which is related to citizens’ real degree of influence, that is, the percentage of the budget actually available for public decision in PB. Although official data on this item are not availa-
ble in all PB, it is possible to state that in most cases civil actors have limited leverage in deciding the destination of funds. That is, in general, the proportion of budget funds effectively discussed and over which civil actors have decision-making power is low. Added to this is the fact that consultation – rather than decision – is the most widespread form for exercising power in PB.

Effectiveness in PB also depends on the levels of access to information for making decisions as well as on the crucial issue of budget transparency. The former refers to producing knowledge about the reality of the municipalities. This information, which in some cases is built in collaboration with social organizations, is relevant for the debate and for more conscious decisions on priorities.

The latter refers to public access to budget data. Considering the Brazilian experience, even in municipalities with high-intensity PB, the criteria above still pose challenges to the evolution of the processes. And for several reasons: first, there are significant differences between governments in terms of budgetary transparency and accountability. Remember that secrecy is the soul of power (Weber, 1994). Second, it is well known that tax legislation and budgets are difficult to master and require expertise. Third, use of ICTs is still not widespread in Brazilian PB.

It turns out that the possibilities for exercising social accountability are restricted to monitoring the demands approved. Therefore, it is not uncommon for participants in certain PB to be surprised by government news about financial crises or unforeseen changes in the budget, causing delays cancellations of demands approved by them.

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4 There is no way to know the percentage of budget resources intended for public deliberation in all PB in Brazil. This is because governments usually do not report separately on the amount of resources allocated to works chosen by PB and the rest of the works. There is no legal obligation to that effect. Researchers agree that this is one of the main obstacles to evaluate the performance of PB in Brazil.

5 Most PB cases do not go beyond the consultation stage. In 77.0% of them, municipal governments privatized the task of finalizing the Budget to be approved by parliament (Ribeiro and Grazia, 2003, p. 88–94).

6 See the case of the Porto Alegre’s City Observatory (ObservaPOA) implemented in 2006, based on the project Observatories of Local Participative Democracy funded by the URB–AL program of the European Commission aimed at cooperation between cities in Latin America and the European Union. See www.observapoa.com.br

7 Except for some municipalities where NGOs support participation, it is necessary to reflect critically on the reasons for universities’ low involvement in these processes of translation and social control.

8 Two major metropolises and state capitals adopted digital media in PB: Belo Horizonte and Recife.
Ineffectiveness in complying with agreed demands has been one of the main causes of loss of credibility by civil actors in PB. It is important to remember that successful PB were able to establish a virtuous cycle that included the stages of “discussion of priorities – approval of demands – execution of demands – accountability”. That is why loss of confidence due to non-compliance with agreements about demands is often a major disincentive to participation and a factor contributing to the extinction of several PB. Not following agreed decisions is a result of lack of political commitment or changes in cities’ financial capacity.

Another factor that has led to the extinction of PB is the alternation of power in electoral competition. However, this possibility increases when PB still do not have deeper roots in civil society and local political society, that is, when their legitimacy is not strong enough to prevent their extinction by new political coalitions. In these cases, the political cost of deciding whether to discontinue PB is relatively low, making it easier for political forces opposed to participation to undermine the process.

The issues listed above are related to the State’s ability to provide conditions for the exercise of citizen participation. The long period of participatory experimentation instigated the academic field, in addition to government actors and civil society actors, to try to answer the following question: what kinds of State capabilities are necessary for participatory democracy to function properly? Going beyond the variables of “political project” and the level of State organization, other competences needed to implement participatory democracy began to be discussed (Souza, 2011; Gomide and Pires, 2014).

In addition to changes in State structure in order to make it less bureaucratic, less fragmented and less corporative, technical-political know-how is needed that involves forms of communication, language and pedagogical methods in the interaction between State agents and civil actors. That is, making administration participatory requires financial, political, technical, management, communicational and training investments on participating actors. In fact, citizen training – whether it is carried out by government actors or civil society – is still far from ideal.

Accumulated experience shows great variations in terms of capacities. Only cases of high-intensity participation promoted some degree of change in this sense. Besides the already mentioned nature
of the political project, these variations also depend on public servants’ involvement – a major challenge for participatory arrangements (Cortes, n.d.; Wampler, 2010).

At the same time, a political phenomenon observed in recent years poses greater difficulties for the implementation of more transversal and effective management models – that is, which are more permeable to social demands: the significant increase in the number of new political parties in govern under the coalition system. This phenomenon has increased the traditional division of public administration in areas of influence, reducing state capacities for efficiency and effectiveness.

A finally but highly important topic is PB’s effectiveness, which gained prominence in the academic field when participatory processes had already gone a long way and seen reasonable expansion. Effectiveness can be defined as “institutions’ ability to influence, control, or decide on a particular policy” (Cunha, 2010, p. 98). Even though participants’ profile favors the redistributive potential in the allocation of funds for basic infrastructure and public services, this depends mainly on the amount of public investments, besides political commitment to social justice. Although there is no comprehensive national data on the substantive results of PB, some variations depend on the radicality of the models already mentioned.

Among the case studies carried out, those of Porto Alegre (Marquetti et al, 2008) and Belo Horizonte (Pires, 2009) stand out as relevant contributions to PB’s redistributive potential. In addition, PB usually address demands for construction works and basic services such as sanitation (water and sewage), pavement, popular housing, health policies, education and social assistance, among other public services, thus contributing to improve the living conditions of the most vulnerable segments of the population. These were findings from the studies of Cabannes (2014) and Wampler (2013) on PB. Also, according to a World Bank study, “the impact on better access to water and sanitation is positive for all PB municipalities” (World Bank, 2008, p.98).

9 There are currently 35 registered political parties in Brazil (TSE, 2018).
PB, Urban Reform and City Planning

Brazil’s new 1988 Constitution established mechanisms for urban reform that had been advocated for a long time by the National Movement for Urban Reform (Movimento Nacional pela Reforma Urbana, MNRU), whose members were progressive professionals and social movements. Thus, the reform agenda was aimed at reversing the scenario of exclusion determined by the logic of spatial segregation, by aggressive commercialization of urban land and real estate speculation, by private appropriation of government investments in infrastructure and public services (Ribeiro and Santos Júnior, 1994). In summary, it challenged unequal production of urban space, considering the duality between the city of the rich and the city of the poor – the legal city and the illegal city.

The urban reform movement understood that meeting those demands would only be possible through democratic participation in municipal management, until then dominated by the exclusionary logic of technocratic master plans of the 1960s and 1980s during the military regime. Thus, the platform consolidated was centered on the right to the city (Lefebvre, 1968; Harvey, 1973) and characterized by participatory management of cities, by the fulfillment of the social function of the city and the social function of property – principles approved in the 1988 Constitution and regulated by the Statute of the City (2001). The creation of the Ministry of Cities in 2003, during President Lula’s administration (PT), complemented an institutional framework favorable to progressive urban policy (Rolnik, 2009).

However, the historical ideas of Urban Reform have emphasized that the accomplishment of the right to the city requires the necessary complementariness between the processes of inverting budgetary priorities (universalization of access to infrastructure and public services) and implementing socio-spatial policies focused on the perverse logic of production and reproduction of urban space. Today, this logic is presented as the tendency to commodify cities (Harvey, 2005).

Connection between PB and their impact on urban planning, especially in large cities, is perhaps one of the least understood and least effective challenges in PB’s three-decade history. And not only because of the actors in the participatory process, but also as a result of the academic research agenda. In practice – even when PB have reasonable decision power over public funds – the vast majority of cases are not characterized by discussion of and participating in de-
cisions about urban planning as a whole. Such dissociation confers unequal powers of influence over the fate of cities to distinct social actors. In the PB, communities compete for limited funds to meet needs related to rights that are denied to them, even if formally provided for. In the bodies responsible for Urban and Environmental Master Plans, the prevailing influence is that of economic actors representing urban capital – real estate industry, landowners, developers, construction companies, investment funds. An outstanding example of this dissociation occurred during the events of the 2014 Football World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. No state capital’s PB discussed or deliberated on the major urban projects that required vast public as well as private funds. The so-called special projects and their effects on cities’ socio-spatial configuration – many of which required removing poor communities living in precarious housing areas – were not discussed or deliberated at PB bodies. These bodies remained unaware (due to their own lack of understanding) or were excluded from decisions. This was no exception and it begs the question: how can PB have some degree of influence on cities’ more global decisions? Despite the vast Brazilian experience, the practice has not yet answered this question.

**The Future of PB in Brazil: from Heyday to Loss of Political Prestige?**

After a time of significant expansion in the number of municipalities that adopted PB, a new phase poses great difficulties for expansion and continuity of those practices. When investigating cases between 1989 and 2012 in cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants, Spada raised the hypothesis that PB would disappear within about 10 years if the rate of abandonment – or discontinuity – remained constant (Spada, 2014: 13-14). Current data do not corroborate that hypothesis. It is hard to quantify cases with precision over time, for several reasons, including Brazil’s high number of municipalities (over 5,600) and its large territory. At the same time, the question of the minimum criteria for defining what a PB is makes the task even more complex for purposes of comparing existing censuses. Numbers are

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10 Belo Horizonte is an exception. In that large metropolis (population 2.5 million as estimated by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics – IBGE, 2016) there is a system that coordinates the PB with elements of urban planning. See Pires (2008).

therefore “approximate since there are methodological and procedural variations in the cases found, with differences in results and reach” (Pires and Nebot, 2013). The 423 cases raised by the last RBOP survey (2015) probably include some that can loosely be called PB, since the study did not adopt a single model (Figure 1). Therefore, we agree with other studies (Pires and Martins, 2012; Rennó and Souza, 2012) in that it is still not possible to provide conclusive answers about the number of PB in Brazil.

Chart 1 Number of PB in Brazil – 1989–2015

At least three factors make up such new adverse scenario for the adoption of PB and even for sustaining existing ones.

Firstly, the effects of the economic crisis after 2008, which were felt as decrease in tax collection by municipalities. Local governments, along with the state entities of the Federation, have been suffering from severe resource restriction, causing great reduction in their investment capacity.

Secondly, there is the process of reversing deconcentration of resources in favor of municipalities that took place after the 1988 constitution. Changes in the tax distribution by the Federation led to a reversal of the scenario for local and state finances, reactivating a cycle of concentration of tax revenues in the hands of the Union.13

12 From 8.6% in 1980 to 13.3% in 1988 and 18.4% in 2011 (Roberto and Afonso, 2012b)

13 Successive marches of thousands of mayors to Brasília express the tension among federated entities after the changes started in the 1990s.
Added to this is the pressure for municipalities to assume policies that are not their responsibility, such as public safety. This scenario was strongly worsened by austerity policies and neoliber al adjustment in progress after the coup/impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016. The fiscal crisis of municipalities and states is virtually widespread, with dramatic situations in which not even salaries of public servants are guaranteed.

The third factor concerns PB’s loss of political centrality for Leftist parties, especially PT – the one most identified with this type of participatory institution. There has been a slowdown in PT-led administrations’ impetus toward adopting PB, especially after the party arrived at the Presidency. At the time of the emergence of PB (1989–1992 terms), 23.7% of the cities governed by PT had PB (9 out of 38) (Wampler, 2008). At the peak of the expansion of participatory institutions in Brazil (1997–2000), the percentage of municipalities governed by PT with PB increased to 46.8% (52 out of 111) (Ribeiro and Grazia, 2003). That was when the party saw strong electoral growth of in municipalities, before arriving at the Presidency in 2003.

However, in the 2009–2012 administrations, when PT had been in the presidency since 2003, that percentage dropped to 26.9% (150 out of 558 municipalities), decreasing to levels close to the initial period (RBOP, 2012). But growth was small in the 2013–2016 administrations, with 33.2% (211 municipalities out of 635) (RBOP, 2012). These signals certain fluctuation in indexes rather than a trend. However, percentages in the last two surveys are far from the “glorious” period of PT’s relationship with PB, which marked the second half of the 1990s.

The reasons for such loss of intensity have to be looked at closely. Several studies point to ideological change in PT after arriving at the Presidency, including its new policy of establishing alliances with Center and Right-Wing parties to provide political support to the federal government (Goldfrank and Schneider, 2006; Souza, 2010, 2014; Singer, 2012). This new scenario is added to the loss of space by the Left in the last municipal elections. PT lost about 60% of municipal governments and it does not run any relevant city in

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14 Running expenses are around 211% higher than the funding received by other entities, which causes imbalance in municipal accounts (Afonso, 2012:12).

In Brazil, the ideological profile of governments influences adoption of PB. Studies in progress point out a statistical association between the ideology of the governing party and adoption of PB. Municipalities run by Leftist parties have 1.869% more chances of adopting PB than municipalities with Right-Wing administrations, while those in the political Center are 700% more likely than those on the Right (Fedozzi et al., 2018).16 This new context and the growing hegemony of the conservative field strengthen the hypothesis of the likely decline in the importance of PB in the country’s political agenda.

Final Remarks

The emergence of PB in Brazil in the late 1980s meant important democratic advances in the country’s fledgling re-democratization. Together with other forms of citizen participation, PB gained national and international recognition and began having a significant demonstration effect.

Among the advances resulting from PB and in spite of distinct degrees of radicalism, the inclusion of the poorest and most vulnerable social segments stands out, creating opportunities for them to express their demands for the right to the cities. This fact, considering the deep inequality that marks Brazil’s history, is perhaps one of the greatest achievements resulting from the creation of PB.

After three decades of existence, in parallel to achievements, PB’s practices reveal contradictions and limits that still challenge its evolution. In addition to issues related to institutional design, such as representation performance and forms of accountability, at least three topics can be highlighted: lack of concern about participation quality; deficiencies in terms of measurement of actual effectiveness in improving social welfare and political rationalization of public administration; and PB’s relation with the overall planning of municipalities – regarding not only major infrastructure works, but also decisions about regulation and use of urban space, something that usually occurs in other spaces of public administration.

At the same time, a number of significant changes that have recent-

16 This is a study about explanatory variables for the adoption of PB in Brazil. In the case cited, the technique used was logistic regression.
ly taken place in the country – in terms of the State, the economy, the federation, political parties – are creating a negative environment for the adoption and sustainability of PB. Besides the economic crisis, the breakdown of the federative pact is worsened by the neoliberal adjustment after the coup/impeachment that overturned President Dilma Rousseff in August 2016.

Added to this context is PB’s loss of the political centrality within Leftist parties, the main promoters of PB, especially PT. The Party’s major electoral defeat in the last municipal elections – losing 60% of city governments – has to be considered together with the resulting advance of conservative parties.

As a whole, these changes, which are presented in the context of the advance of political and cultural conservatism in Brazil, are creating a new historical moment that is adverse to participatory practices, especially those of higher democratic intensity that focus on the destination of public funds, as is the case of PB.

Considering the history of PB in Brazil, it is plausible to assume that they are undergoing a critical situation. The phase of glory is being replaced with a moment of loss of political prestige, including reduction in their symbolic potential for democratic and inclusive urban reform. This trend is consistent with the strong urban commodification process that has been growing in the world and in the country.

We seem to be facing a paradox: there is international expansion of PB – albeit under distinct and often modest models in redistributive terms – together with the political decline in their country of birth. The future will respond to this new challenge presented to PB in Brazil.
Participatory Budgeting in Argentina (2002–2018). Advances and setbacks in the construction of a participatory agenda

Emiliano Arena

Introduction

The Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a public politic that from beginning of the year 2000 has expanded in different Argentine local governments. Since 2007, the diffusion of the PB significantly grew; and the same year, the Secretariat of Parliamentary Relationships, dependent on the Head of Cabinet of Ministers, implemented the National Program of Participative Budgeting (PNPP).¹ This national instance allowed to build a platform of dialog and exchange of experiences between the different local governments that were implementing this policy; as a part of this process, in 2008, the Argentine Network of Participative Budgeting (RAPP) was created. This ecosystem, local governments implementing a public policy and a national program strengthening these experiences, managed to extend the diffusion of PB to more than 50 local governments. In 2015, the change of political sign in the national level, produced a change in this ecosystem; however, the number of local governments implementing PB seems to be the same.

In this article, we look forward to describe the current situation of the Participatory Budgeting in Argentina. For its major comprehension, in the first part we will concentrate on the institutional Argentine structure, that is to say, in the description of the federal structure and the competitions of the different levels of government. Then, in the second part, we will describe the PB diffusion in Argentina: the ecosystem developed between 2007 and 2015 and the current one; and at the end of this section, we will show some particularities of the PB in Argentina. In

¹ Ministerial Resolution 597/2012
the third and last part, we raise some discussions on the construction of an agenda linked to the participative democracy in Argentina. Regarding the information, there will be used different sources: the Third National Survey of Local Governments with Participatory Budgeting (III ENPP), that took place between 2013 and 2014; data provided by National Program of Participative Budgeting in 2015 and, finally, primary data relieved for a current investigation.

The Argentine local regime

The federal organization of Argentina has three levels of government: the national, the provincial and the local level. The Constitution of the Argentine Nation, reformed in 1994, establishes, in its article N°5, for each province the competence to dictate its own constitutions and, among other things, to establish the local regime itself. On this last point, in the article N° 123, claims that provinces must assure the autonomy of the local governments. That is to say, the National Constitution does not define what a “local government” is, but it does oblige the provinces to develop a local regime. Iturburu (2012) affirms that the concept of “local regime” includes all entities with local government level, including municipalities and those institutions that do not have that level (for example, municipalities, communes, development commissions, municipal commissions, municipal delegations, among others). In Argentina, there are 2,285 local governments; 1,182 are municipalities. In that sense, among other aspects of the municipal regime, the institutional design of each province differs in the forms and requirements of creation, resources and competencies, territorial definitions. Likewise, the distribution/concentration of the population favours the existence of local governments that are more populated than some provinces (or, in the contrary, that are under-populated). Finally, another feature that characterizes the heterogeneity and inequality between local governments, is the fiscal dimension, partly determined by the contributing capacity of the residents and partly by the decentralization of the expenditure in the top levels (nation and provinces).

Regarding the functions of the local governments, they can be distinguished between traditional and new ones (Cravacuore, 2007; Iturburu, 2012). Between the first ones, there are those linked with the urban infrastructure (construction and repair of streets and local ways, maintenance of squares and parks, cemeteries, urban equipment, etc.), provision of public services (system of illumination, sweep and cleanliness, compilation and solid urban waste treatments\(^3\)), regulative power on activities of the community life (to grant building licences, commercial qualifications, license of driving and control of traffic) and the assistance to population in risk (social assistance, low complexity services of health and service of civil defence). Between the second ones, we can find functions linked to the environment (recovery of protected areas), to the economic development (construction of infrastructure of commercial interest, incubators of companies, programs of promotion of international trade, promotion of the social economy, etc.), to the civil safety (implementation of centres of security monitoring, community alarms, anti-panic buttons, and economic support to police forces), to the promotion of human rights and to the alternative resolution of conflicts, to the social development (the implementation of public policies related to new problematic, such as the development of “Local Services of Protection of Laws,” policies orientated to major adults, etc.).

It should be noted that there are rarely local governments that develop all these functions and competences; the local agenda tends to be built according to citizen demands. On that sense, local governments have two sources of income: one the one hand, those incomes generated by the local government itself, through the tax collection for the provision of services; fines for contraventions or taxes delegated by the province: on the other hand, there are income transfers from other jurisdictions (national or provincial level) that are realised through the tax co-participation or by direct transfers through agreements with the national or provincial states.

In this sense, we can affirm that although local governments have increased their competences, they have still have a huge budget restriction. According to the III ENPP, on average, local governments that implement Participatory Budgeting allocate 84% of their total budget to current expenditures. This dimension strongly affects the capacity of PB to generate important transformations in cities.

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\(^3\) Except in the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires where the treatment is carried out by the CEAMSE (Ecological Coordination Metropolitan Area State Society).
Participatory budgeting in Argentina

Since the end of the 1980s, in Latin America, different public policies that promote citizen participation have exponentially been disseminated. Among them, the Participatory Budgeting (PB) occupies a central place. Since its first experience in Porto Alegre, the PB has expanded to a large number of local governments, including some sub-national experiences, such as the one that took place in Rio Grande do Sul.

Yves Cabannes (2005, p. 8) identifies three different stages in the development and dissemination of this public policy: “Experimentation in Brazil (1989-1997), Massification in the different states of Brazil (1997-2000), Expansion and great diversification outside of Brazil (since 2000)”.

In this last stage we can locate the development of PB in Argentina. As shown in Figure 1, since 2002 –where the first experiences of Participatory Budgeting were registered– up to the present, a total of 51 local governments apply this public policy with different results. It is important to note that the population of those 51 local governments represents, approximately, 30% of the total population of the country. Likewise, this public policy had its greatest territorial expansion in the period 2008-2010, registering a slowdown in the 2010-2011 biennium and an increase after that year. This is probably due to the fact that many local authorities went through elections (Martínez & Arena, 2013). Also linked to the electoral cycle, is a slight decrease in the number of local governments that apply the PB in Argentina after the change of the national government at the end of 2015.

**Chart 1 Evolution of Local Governments with Participatory Budgeting**

Source own elaboration based on data from the National Participatory Budgeting Program of the Secretariat of Parliamentary Relations of the Nation (until 2015), of the Secretariat of Municipal Affairs of the Nation (2016) and from an own survey (2017 and 2018)
The experiences of Participatory Budgeting in Argentina, beyond its apparent expansion, have not had a linear evolution, and although in many districts once the policy was incorporated it was not discontinued (Morón, Villa María, Rosario) there are cases of significant failures in its application (Santa Fe, Córdoba and CABA). As an example of this, between 2002 and 2018, about 40 experiences were discontinued, of which only 7 re-implemented PB.

Also, the geographical distribution of those local governments that currently implement PB shows a higher concentration in Buenos Aires and Santa Fe provinces, whose municipalities have an average age of 6 and 8 years, respectively, implementing PB. In that sense, Map 1 shows how the distribution of local governments with PB is concentrated in the Pampeana region (Provinces of Buenos Aires, La Pampa, Entre Ríos, Córdoba and Santa Fe). Both in the Patagonian region and in the Northwest region, the number of local governments that implement PB tend to decrease.

Map 1 Municipalities with PB, 2018

Caption
- Buenos Aires
- Chaco
- Córdoba
- Corrientes
- Entre Ríos
- Jujuy
- La Pampa
- Mendoza
- Misiones
- Neuquén
- Río Negro
- San Juan
- Santa Fe
- Tierra del Fuego

Source
Own elaboration based on data obtained from the survey of web pages and interviews with municipal officials.
It is also important to analyse the regulations regarding the PB in Argentina. First of all, the National Constitution, through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948, article 21) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966, article 25) provide the general framework for citizen participation. However, there is no national law that regulates or promotes the PB in Argentina⁴, as it does exist in other countries, such as Peru or the Dominican Republic. In this sense, it should be noted that the first attempt to institutionalize and promote the PB in Argentina from the National State was the National Program of Participatory Budgeting, dependant of the Secretariat of Parliamentary Relations of the Chief of Cabinet of Ministers. Among other actions, and together with the Secretariat of Municipal Affairs of the Ministry of Interior, different local governments and Universities, built the RAPP, which is a forum for the exchange of experiences among different local governments that develop or are interested in developing this policy.

As for the provinces, it can be noted the case of the parliament of Entre Ríos Province that sanctioned the provincial Law No. 3,001, reformed in 2006, which in its article 120 enables local governments to apply PB, making explicit mention of the citizen's role in the control of public policies and establishing as the only requirement to participate the age of 18. Corrientes, is the only province in Argentina that in its constitution establishes PB as one of the local government powers (Article 225 subsection Q). In 2005, the government of Buenos Aires province approved the Decree No. 3,333/05 creating the Provincial Program for the Progressive Implementation of Participatory Budgeting, which invites the Buenos Aires local governments to implement this policy. This Decree is of great importance when analyzing the development of the PB in Argentina, since it characterizes it within the framework of the "second generation reforms" and as a part of the process of modernization of the State, defining it as a form of decentralization. This characterization limits the policy, taking away all its democratizing power and reducing it to its function of improving public administration.

The Capital City, the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, which acquires a new legal status after the reform of the National Constitution in 1994, sanctioned after two years its own Local Constitution where it established the participatory nature of the public budget and obliged the sanction of a law that fix its proce-

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⁴ It should be noted that in the Honorable Chamber of Deputies of the Nation the deputy Sergio Buil (Union PRO) presented the project “Municipal Participatory Budgeting System. Implementation” (file 3793-D-2017), deputy (MC) Ariel Basteiro (Nuevo Encuentro) was the author of the project “Creation of the National Fund for the Strengthening of Participatory Budgeting in the Field of the National Executive Power” (file 0912-D-2011, without a parliamentary state) and the deputy (MC) María José Lubertino (PS) presented the project “Participatory Budgeting Regime” (file 5257-D-2003, without parliamentary status). None of them was treated in committee. While in the Honorable Chamber of Senators of the Nation no bills have been presented
dure. Currently, no law has been sanctioned; instead there is a ruling by the Chamber on Contentious Administrative and Tax Matters of the City of Buenos Aires that obliges the city government to act in that sense, implementing the PB (Adaro & Arena, 2015, p. 11). However, this situation has not yet been resolved.

According to the III ENPP, most of the local governments that ever implemented this public policy did not do so because of a demand from civil society but, on the contrary, it was due to an initiative of the local government (Figure 2). In this sense, it is feasible to argue that "... Far from being power-transfer policy, the PB is a process of opening management, always directed by governments. Not coming from a social pressure in favour of a democratization of the management, the opening of local management is rather an initiative of the government in the search for political legitimacy for management... "(Annunziata, Carmona, & Nardacchione, 2011, p. 313).

**Chart 2 The initiative to implement PB was promoted**


Which are the main characteristics of the PB in Argentine local governments? Regarding its legal dependence within local government’s structures, in the results of the III ENPP carried out by the National Program of Participatory Budgeting, it was shown that most of the experiences are concentrated in the government secretariats, as it can be observed in Figure 3. This location in the flowchart is important because it marks the need of this type of public policies of being guided by a transversal and intersectoral approach.
As for the organization, the majority (90%) of the PBs are structured from the territory and not by theme. Moreover, 50% of the local governments that implement this public policy do so by designing a criterion of division of the territory for the PB. Regarding the criterion for the allocation of resources, there are two options that local governments follow: distribute equal amounts of money to all areas or follow an equity criterion, establishing differences between the zones. With respect to temporality, 70% of the local governments that implement PB begin their cycles between February and April and on average the cycle has 4 stages: presentation and diagnosis, preparation of projects and viability, choice of projects and finally, the execution of the most voted projects.5

The Participatory Budgeting in Argentina, besides being implemented in local governments, had the strengthening of the national government that between 2007 and 2015 implemented the National Program of Participatory Budgeting (PNPP). The objective of the program was to strengthen and disseminate instances of citizen participation, for which, in 2008, it constituted the Argentine Participatory Budgeting Network (RAPP). This platform allowed for the articulation of different actors and functioned as a space for public policy dissemination. In this sense, the strategy of dissemination of the PB by the national government followed the model of vertical influence, described by Berry and Berry, in which "...the states do not emulate the policies of other states as part of a process of horizontal broadcast, but emulate the policies of the national government ... " (Berry & Berry, 2010, p. 250). The Argentine Participatory Budgeting Network was the platform through which the National Participatory Budgeting Program strengthened and disseminated this Participatory Budgeting.

The RAPP, by including a number of heterogeneous actors (civil society organizations, universities, local governments and state secretariats) established a coordination through a council formed by a president (elected in a general assembly), two general secretaries (a representative of the Secretariat of Parliamentary Relations and another of the Secretariat of Municipal Affairs), a representative of the cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants and a representative of the cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants. Through the RAPP, the National Program of Participatory Budgeting organized 7 National Participatory Budgeting Meetings, 3 Regional Meetings, 1 Meeting of Young Participatory Budgeting with UNICEF. These spaces crystallized a platform for the exchange of experiences and learning in PB. Likewise, the existence of a national authority favored the collection and systematization of information as well as allowing interaction with international organizations such as UNICEF, which promoted the dissemination in Argentina of the Young PB.

Figure 2 Structure of the Argentine Participatory Budgeting Network (2013/2014)

Source Own elaboration based on data obtained from the survey of web pages and interviews with municipal officials

As of March 2016, the PNPP was discontinued and the RAPP was practically disarticulated. Currently, the agenda linked to the promotion of the Participatory Budgeting fell to the Secretariat of Municipal Affairs.6 Although change in the ecosystem of actors that promote and implement the PB has not produced a significant decrease in the number of municipalities that im-

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6 A partir de 2018 la Secretaría de Asuntos Municipales fue disuelta y estas funciones fueron delegadas a la Subsecretaría de Relaciones Municipales.
plement this policy, it is possible that this is because the PB agenda in Argentina achieved an important degree of recognition and have emerged some actors that can also promote it. In this sense, UNICEF has organized in 2016 and 2017 two National Encounters of Young Participatory Budgeting.

The Young PB is one of the variants that the Participatory Budgeting has acquired in Argentina since 2002. Currently, around 15 local governments implement the Young Participatory Budget, this modality covers young people between 12 and 25 years old and, in general, it is applied in municipalities that already implemented Participatory Budgeting in general terms. The first experience was carried out in 2006 in the city of Rosario. It should be noted that there are also experiences in Participatory Budgeting for children under 12, such as the "I think of my City" program in Gualeguaychú (province of Entre Ríos) or the "Mayor of the children" in Villa María (Córdoba).

Another particularity, in age terms, is the Participatory Budgeting of the Elderly. This modality focuses on adults over 60 years of age and is applied in two local governments: Santo Tomé (province of Santa Fe) and Gualeguaychú (province of Entre Ríos). In addition, there are also thematic experiences such as the Participatory Green Budget implemented by Zárate (province of Buenos Aires).

Finally, beyond local governments, some universities have developed Participatory Budgeting programs in their internal governance system, among which are implemented: the National University of the Litoral, the National University of General Sarmiento, the National University of Patagonia Austral and the Faculty of Political Science and International Relations of the National University of Rosario.

**Challenges and possible scenarios for the construction of a participatory agenda**

Participatory Budgeting in Argentina has been focused on local government experience and has been highly volatile. As mentioned above, currently more than 50 cities implement this public policy, however 40 have discontinued it and only 7 have resumed the implementation of PB. That is, when a local government fails to implement this policy, it is very unlikely that it will resume in the future. In this sense, taking into account the capacities of local governments in the implementation of public policies, the existence of na-
tional or sub-national policies that can strengthen the different PBs becomes decisive. A good practice linked to this was the National Program of Participatory Budgeting and the Argentine Network of Participatory Budgeting that promoted instances of exchange of experiences but also promoted the systematization of information, as an input for decision-making.

Another important aspect centered on the need to have instances of national or sub-national coordination is the possibility of building bridges with international cooperation organizations that can strengthen PB implementation experiences. For this, it is necessary to have national instances of coordination of public policy.

A critical aspect is the absence of information on the perceptions of participants in Participatory Budgeting. That is, there is information on institutional designs, deficits in the capacities and benefits of implementing this type of policy, but there is no rigorous information about the participants in the participatory processes. At this point, it becomes necessary to link universities and local governments to build a research agenda that can become evidence for public policy decision making.

Two final challenges that a participatory agenda in Argentina must face. On the one hand, look for schemes that allow incorporating technologies into the Participatory Budgeting without affecting the deliberative dimension of this public policy. On the other hand, beyond the need to have national instances to promote citizen participation at the local level, a participatory agenda must include among its objectives to scale at the PB government level. In that sense, the examples of Portugal or Rio Grande do Sul are important.

In summary, beyond the experiences in universities, the Participatory Budgeting in Argentina is a policy of local level that also has a high volatility. Therefore, it is important to have a national or sub-national strategy to strengthen local experiences.
Note from the authors

In loving memory of Deise Martins.
Participatory budgeting in Colombia

Ricardo Jaramillo

Introduction
Participatory budgeting (PB) in Colombia has a history of over 27 years. It began in 1991 with the new political constitution that established human rights as the core of national law, with an emphasis on participation and political and administrative decentralization. Later on, the experience of Porto Alegre was taken as an example for local exercises of participatory budgeting and expanded rapidly through the country.

Participatory budgeting has to do with the design and application of principles, mechanisms, institutions, and instruments that allow the involvement of citizens in the preparation of local budgets. As Velásquez and González have stated, “[PB] is a mechanism of citizen participation that aims to improve the living conditions of people in a specific territory, it is a space for deliberation and concertation in which participate social, economic, academic, and cultural sectors, as well as representatives of local governments, in order to define programs or projects and the allocation of resources for local development” [2012: 68].

There are at least two ways to consider the relation between democracy and development that lie in the core of PB: “a top-down approximation or technocratic that consider that the reform of the State is a technical proposal that can be managed through an accurate institutional redesign and a bottom-up approximation or of radical democracy that considers that the transformation of the State is a constant process of negotiation and renegotiation, with the participation of every social actors, of methods and objectives in the formulation of public policies and the allocation of resources. [Alcaldía Municipal de Ocaña – Corporación Viva la Ciudadanía, 2011: 23].

In this regard, it is considered that PB practices “promote improvements in the efficiency of resource allocation, by forcing planifica-
tion and the transference of decisions about spending, and at the same time encouraging a pattern of relations between local public power and citizens, that extends and helps to consolidate democratic coexistence” [Velasco, 2009: 118]. This is what makes PB a democratic innovation, the fact that budgetary matters are no longer considered mainly technical, of exclusive competence of experts and out of the reach of ordinary citizens.

The arrival of PB broke those myths and involved the citizens directly into a deliberative and concertation exercise on matters that up until that moment were out of their reach. This innovation lead to the rapid spread of PB in Colombia and allowed to establish a connection between technical and political dimensions of resource management by considering social priorities and citizens’ aspirations as a criterion in the allocation of public investment resources. It also meant that government officials were forced to talk with the citizens about spending and resource allocation and to build agreements that were to be considered in their daily work. From the citizens point of view, PB opened a window of opportunity for different sectors to influence the decisions relating resource allocation for their individual and collective behalf, it also meant their compromise to develop citizen control and oversight tasks.

This article aims to present the development of participatory budgeting in Colombia regarding its institutionalization, some local experiences, and the opportunities that the recent peace accord between the government and FARC-EP represent. It is divided in four sections: the first one is this introduction; the second one shows the process of institutionalization both in national law and local standards; the third one contains a detailed account of two of the main local experiences, Pasto and Medellín. In the fourth section it is presented the contents related to participatory budgeting that were included in the Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace.

1. Institutionalization of Participatory Budgeting in Colombia

1.1. PB in Colombia’s legal regime

PB is mainly a local process but it is enshrined in national regulation. The framework of citizen participation in Colombia is the Law 1757
of 2015, concerned with the promotion, protection, and guarantee of different forms of the right to democratic participation in the political, administrative, economic, social, and cultural life, as well as to control political power.

This law establishes some indications about PB on its third chapter “On Participatory Agreements,” where it states the object, purpose and monitoring mechanisms of agreements related with PB, as shown in Table 1:

Table 1 – Law 1757 of 2015 on Participatory Budgeting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art. 90. Definition</th>
<th>Art. 91. Object</th>
<th>Art. 92. Purpose</th>
<th>Art. 93. Monitoring</th>
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<tr>
<td>The process of participatory budgeting is a mechanism of equitative, rational, efficient, effective and transparent allocation of public resources, that strengthen the relation between the State and civil society. To achieve so, regional and local governments promote the development of mechanisms and strategies for citizen participation in the programming of their budgets as well as in monitoring and audit of the management of public resources.</td>
<td>This law aims to establish dispositions that assure effective citizens participation in the process of budget’s participatory programming, that takes place in keeping with development plans agreed with regional and local governments, as well as the audit of public management.</td>
<td>This law aims to gather society’s aspirations and needs to consider them into budgeting and to promote their execution through prioritary programmes and projects, in a way that allows to accomplish integral and sustainable human development.</td>
<td>Participatory Budgeting of regional and local governments reflect in a differentiated and integrated way the commitments and agreements accomplished in the phases of participatory programming. To do so, the instances of participatory budgeting lend support to the agreements and commitments on the Territorial Planning Councils.</td>
</tr>
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In addition to these dispositions, there is another article that has to do with participatory budgeting:

**Art. 100. On participatory budgeting. Local governments may perform participatory budgeting exercises in which the orientation of a percentage of the municipality’s incomes gets to be defined by means of a participatory process. The competent authority will independently define this percentage, accordingly with the targets and objectives included in the development plans.**

Beside the national legal framework, participatory budgeting in Colombia has been developed in different local norms and public policies, specially in development plans. There have been participatory budgeting exercises in at least 280 municipalities, 25% of the country. These are shown in Map 1.
1.2. The National Network of Local Planning and Participatory Budgeting

The National Network of Local Planning and Participatory Budgeting is an initiative that articulates exercises from different municipalities and departments, promoted by social organizations as well as by local governments. As Lara has stated, “the National Network has configured an open, inclusive, transverse, plural, participatory and collective workspace, to ensure a higher efficiency and efficacy in the strengthening of these processes and to attain the proposed common goals. The members joined the network in a voluntary basis. The Network operates through geographic bricks distributed throughout the national territory, and the creation of thematic clusters, around which are articulated several regions, according to their interest in each one. Besides, a technical secretary was created with local and regional authorities, academies, and social organizations, which meet regularly to propose local and regional strategies that can contribute to the construction of the region–nation” [2014, 194]. The objectives of the National Network are:

- Promote the acknowledgment of the existence of processes of local planning and participatory budgeting in the country.
- Generate spaces for the exchange of good practices and the discussion of concepts and methodologies.
- Cope the recentralization policy of the national government.
The activities aimed at the fulfillment of these objectives consider the participation of local governments and the relation that exists between participatory planning and territorial projects, understanding PB as a democratic exercise, not only as a methodological issue.

2. Two relevant experiences

2.1. PB in Medellín

Medellín is the second largest city in Colombia, it is the capital city of Antioquia, one of the wealthiest departments in the country. PB in Medellín has a wide set of norms and it was assumed as a public policy in 2007. A recent investigation undertaken by Viva la Ciudadanía has evaluated this process, emphasizing what happened between 2004 and 2011, considering four dimensions: political project, territory, power, and subjects.

With reference to the political project, the program of Local Planning and Participatory Budgeting was created to “strengthen political culture, qualify citizen participation in local development planning, contribute to the democratization of municipality management and stimulate concertation in the prioritization of public investments in different sectors and territories with higher social exclusion levels and lower human development indexes” [Alcaldía de Medellín – Corporación Viva la Ciudadanía, 2014:69]. In this sense, “each idea and each project were supposed to be a lesson that, from social practices and public reflection, get to build coherence among individual behavior (ethics and moral), norms (law as a social pact) and collective behavior (culture) [ídем].

It was found that the program “managed to activate mobilization of local communities, tightened the functioning of the public institutions and renovated the legitimacy related to the use of public resources; however, it was also found that there was some sort of triumphalism that generated difficulties in order to analyze some issues, as the transformations of local political power, the strengthen of social communitarian fabric and the overcoming of conditions of social exclusion [Alcaldía de Medellín – Corporación Viva la Ciudadanía, 2014:70].

In relation to the territory, the context where the program emerged was characterized by a systemic governability crisis, high poverty rates, the intention to introduce a specific model to the city based on
a perspective of integral human development. It has been found that PB needs to be articulated with other local planning processes and with the local development plan, in order to achieve real development processes, and considering that autonomy does not mean a social transformation, unless it is accompanied by changes in local political culture [Alcaldía de Medellín – Corporación Viva la Ciudadanía, 2014:73 – 74].

In terms of power, the Local Planning and Participatory Budgeting program included the citizens in the process of public decision making, bringing them together with the internal functioning of the State in what has to do with the public budget, as well as relating them with government officials. Citizen participation increased, allowing the community and their interests to prove the utility of organization and participation.

An aspect worth improving has to do with the fact that the program tried to promote political governability by a logic of means and ends, that ended up “using the process and adding it an excessively technical dimension, that lead to higher participation but did not took to the conformation of a critical local citizenship” [Alcaldía de Medellín – Corporación Viva la Ciudadanía, 2014:75].

Finally, it was found that the intermediation of politicians was reduced. One of the consequences of the program was that, for certain issues, it was no longer needed the presence of a politician in order to manage social demands, in spite of which there remains tensions, disputes and limitations to the full exercise of citizenship.

2.2. PB in Pasto

Pasto is a pioneer of PB in Colombia. The city is “capital of the Department of Nariño, borderline of Ecuador and that, in spite not having specific PB regulation, was in force during 17 years and six different governments, thanks to the citizen empowerment and the legitimacy of the processes. The Department of Nariño also has PB experience, started in 2008, and that has created the opportunity for the 64 municipalities of the Department to get to know the procedure” [Lara, 2014: 194].

The process began almost simultaneously with Medellín. In 1995 there were open cabildos in rural areas and in 1997 PB was stated as a program by mayor Antonio Navarro. Later on the process took the form of mingas¹, communitarian spaces of relation among the citizens and the mayor’s office that had an informative, advisory and deliberative nature but that could not decide about budget and investments. From 2001 to 2011, other PB exercises took place both in urban and rural areas of the municipality. In 2011 the new mayor replaced it with another program called “Institutional Supply,” but in 2014 it was retrieved.

This experience is important not only for its sustainability but because it is a bottom-up case, that “began as participatory spaces created in response of the

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¹ Mingas are a traditional form of communal work in many indigenous areas in the Andes.
pressure made by the communities and despite the resistance of some political sectors, leading to the conviction of different social and political sectors of the favorability of such practices [Corporación Viva la Ciudadanía, 2011:63]. It was a learning-by-doing process.

3. PB in the Peace Accord

The Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Built a Stable and Lasting Peace [FA] considers a territorial-based approach that “requires recognition and consideration of the economic, cultural and social needs, characteristics and peculiarities of Colombia’s territories and communities, thereby guaranteeing socio-environmental sustainability; furthermore, it involves implementing the various measures comprehensively and in a coordinated way, with the active participation of all citizens. All of Colombia’s regions and territories will contribute to the implementation of the Agreement, with the participation of territorial-based authorities and the various sectors of society” [Final Agreement, 2016:6].

The peace agreement has six chapters:

i. Towards a New Colombian Countryside: Comprehensive Rural Reform.
ii. Political participation: A democratic opportunity to build peace.
iii. End of the Conflict.
iv. Solution to the Illicit Drugs Problem.
v. Agreement regarding the Victims of the Conflict: “Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Non-Recurrence,” including the Special Jurisdiction for Peace; and Commitment on Human Rights.
vi. Implementation, verification, and public endorsement.

There are at least two levels on which participatory planning appears in the FA: as specific dispositions for the formulation and implementation of a public policy for strengthening democratic, participatory planning and as an approach for the design and implementation of territorial peace devices.

In relation to the policy for strengthening democratic, participatory planning, local participatory planning is a key issue throughout the FA:

“Citizen involvement is the basis of all of the accords constituting the Final Agreement: in general, participation by society in the peacebuilding process
and its involvement in the planning, execution and monitoring of territorial-based plans and programmes – which is also a guarantee of transparency” [FA, 2016: 7].

The section 2.2.6. of the FA states five issues that must be attended in order to promote participation and involvement in local planning:

a) A review of the functions and composition of Territorial Planning Councils (Consejos Territoriales de Planeación).

b) The provision of technical assistance to the municipal and departmental authorities that so require, for the purposes of the participatory formulation of various planning tools.

c) A comprehensive, participatory review of the participation system in planning processes and concerning:

- Connections between territorial and national planning units.
- The composition and functioning of the National Planning Council, with a view to guaranteeing broad, pluralist representation.
- The effectiveness of the system.

d) Consolidation of institutional designs and methodology with the aim of facilitating citizen participation and ensuring the effectiveness thereof in terms of the formulation of public social policies such as in the areas of health, education, combating poverty and inequality, the environment and culture. To that end, the National Government, in collaboration with the relevant sectors, will review the sector-based participatory processes and forums and will issue instructions to the respective institutions for the latter to adapt their regulations, organization and method of operation. The National Government will adopt measures to facilitate the effective participation of women in this scenario, including measures to make it possible to overcome obstacles concerning women’s career and reproductive roles.

e) Consolidation and promotion of the preparation of Participatory Budgeting that take account of gender and women’s rights at local level, with the following aims:
• To promote involvement on the part of men and women in prioritizing a portion of the investment budget in such a manner as to reflect the conclusions arising from the participatory planning exercises.
• To provide incentives for the formulation and implementation of Participatory Budgeting.
• To promote mechanisms for monitoring and accountability in connection with the Participatory Budgeting exercises.

The Law 152 of 1994 defines most of these issues so it must be reformed. The FA also creates devices for local planning to implement the plans and programs defined in the Comprehensive Rural Reform:

a) Development Programs with a Territorial-Based Focus (DPTFs): the objective of the DPTFs is to achieve the structural transformation of the countryside and the rural environment and to promote an equitable relationship between rural and urban areas. The process of the structural transformation of the countryside must cover all the country’s rural areas. Priority will be given to the zones most urgently in need under a DPTF which will enable the national plans to set up within the context of this Agreement to be implemented more rapidly and with greater resources. The prioritization criteria for the zones is:

• Poverty levels, extreme poverty, and unsatisfied needs;
• The degree to which the conflict has affected the zone;
• The weakness of administrative institutions and of management capacity;
• The presence of crops for illicit use and other unlawful economies.

There were defined 16 DPTFs that gather 170 municipalities.

b) Action plans for regional transformation: to fulfil the objectives of the DPTFs, an action plan for regional transformation will have to be prepared for each prioritized zone. This
action plan must include all levels of territorial planning, result from a participatory process, and reflect dialogue between the local authorities and communities. The plans must address:

· The territorial–based approach to rural communities that takes account of the socio–historic, cultural, environmental and productive characteristics of territories and their inhabitants and also their needs, which will be differentiated on the basis of their membership of groups in vulnerable circumstances as well as land suitability, so that sufficient public investment resources can be deployed in harmony with the nation's tangible and intangible values.

· An objective assessment, drawn up with the participation of the various communities — men and women — which, using the aforesaid territorial–based approach, will take account of the needs in a territory and the steps necessary to coordinate the various aspects, with clear, precise targets that will allow the structural transformation of living and production conditions. The National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo) — will encompass the priorities and goals of the DPTFs [FA, 2016: 23].

The agreement states that forums will be set up at the various territorial levels to guarantee citizens’ participation in the competent authorities’ decision–making process to develop what has been agreed in the Comprehensive Rural Reform, attended by representatives of the communities, including rural women and their organizations, and monitored by supervisory bodies, in order to define the priorities for implementation of national plans; to guarantee community involvement in the execution of the works and their upkeep; and to establish mechanisms of follow–up and oversight of projects.

c) Comprehensive community–based and municipal plans for the substitution of illicit crops and alternative agrarian development (CPSAD): This process of participative planning by communities jointly with the National Government and the local authorities must be the result of the formulation and implementation of the comprehensive substitution plans so
as to achieve a structural transformation of the territory and thus the definitive solution to the problem of crops used for illicit purposes.

The main challenges that these devices are facing have to do with the possibility to guarantee citizen participation throughout every stage of the process and their articulation with development plans. There also remain security risks in many of the places where the devices are to be implemented.
Mandating PB: Evaluating Fifteen Years of Peru’s National Participatory Budgeting Law

Stephanie McNulty

Introduction
In 2002, the Peruvian government passed the world’s first national law that mandated participatory budgeting in all subnational governments around the country. Since then, several governments have followed suit, including national officials in the Dominican Republic, Kenya, South Korea, and Indonesia. As a result of these initiatives, citizens and civil society organizations (CSOs) are invited to participate annually in hundreds of thousands of PB processes around the world.
When Peru first undertook this experiment, many lauded the effort. There was a sense of optimism about the law’s potential for improving democratic governance for many years after the law passed. In fact, when I wrote a chapter for the first edition of *Hope For Democracy*, I noted that “[o]f all the participatory aspects of Peru’s decentralization reform, the PB is considered the most successful and most institutionalized…” (McNulty 2014, 209). I documented successful outcomes in those earlier years such as increased citizen engagement and the approval of projects that were directed toward improving the quality of life of Peru’s poorest neighborhoods.
Just a few years later the sense of optimism in Peru has died. With some exceptions, PB has largely become a formality. Authorities hold forums and present projects for approval without robust debate or deliberation. Project proposals are approved through *pro forma* processes, and take
years to finally become executed. Participants are largely disillusioned about the process, noting that it is hardly participatory. Representatives of civil society organizations complain that approved projects get held up in bureaucratic processes or cancelled when governments change. Few in Peru argue that PB is solving societal political, economic, or social problems.

This chapter documents some of the reasons that this project has become so disappointing to activists and advocates in Peru. The chapter first describes the political context that explains why this national PB law originally emerged and the national legal framework guiding the process.

Next, it provides data about PB’s process and outcomes. After discussing why the results have been mostly disappointing, the chapter concludes with some thoughts about mandating PB through national laws. Two central arguments are put forth here. First, the disappointing results can be linked to four factors: the program’s design, the nature of civil society’s participation, levels of political support, and its origin as a neoliberal tool of public policy making. Second, national PB laws do not have to fail. However, they must be tailored to the reality of a given country’s context and provide incentives for opting into the process.

The data and arguments in the chapter present a general picture of PB in Peru and cannot capture the micro-experiences or the nuances that exist around the country and across time. The information stems from my research on Peru’s PB from 2004 to the present in regions and districts around the country. Since 2004, I have interviewed hundreds of people in Peru about PB, including community and civil society activists, donors, government officials in municipal, regional, and national offices, the authors of the PB Law, and scholars. I also rely on the Peruvian government’s online PB portal¹, which houses data about PB since 2004 and secondary documents published by organizations such as GRADE (Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo), Flora Tristán, Pro-descentralización, and Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana.

**Peru’s Top-Down PB Process and Legal Framework**

Peru’s national PB law emerged as part of a sweeping decentralization reform passed by Congress in 2002, which was very participatory in nature. In the first edition of this volume, I carefully outlined the political process that led to this top-down Participatory Budgeting process and the legal framework itself (McNulty 2014). Here I briefly remind readers about the origins of the National PB Law and its specific legal framework.

¹ [http://ppto-participativo.mef.gob.pe/db_distedit.php](http://ppto-participativo.mef.gob.pe/db_distedit.php)
Peru’s participatory decentralization reform emerged after ten years of Alberto Fujimori’s authoritarian rule, a regime typified by the gradual concentration of power in the executive, extreme corruption, and the lack of transparency. After national scandals came to light, involving high-level corruption and links to drug trafficking, Fujimori fled the country. Reformers were left grappling with how to address deep-rooted problems with corruption and transparency. Many of the leftist and center-left politicians and activists from around the country had risen to nationally elected and appointed positions in Congress and the executive branch. At the same time, an unlikely advocate—the Office of Public Budgeting in the Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF)—began to promote the idea of a nation-wide PB process. The leader of this office, Nelson Shak, learned about the participatory budgeting experiences that had taken place in Brazil, Peru, and other Latin American cities in the 1990s and viewed it as a means to hold politicians accountable for their spending. After a one year pilot program in 2002, Congress’ Budget and General Accounts Committee worked closely with the MEF to develop the legislation that would institutionalize the process at all subnational levels of government on an annual basis. This led to the 2003 Participatory Budgeting Law (Law 28,056), which mandates that all subnational governments – meaning regions (like states in the United States), provincial capitals (like counties in the United States), and municipal districts – undertake participatory budgeting annually.

The Ministry of Economics and Finance oversees the process and provides guidance (or instructions) to all subnational governments regularly regarding the specifics of PB. The original Participatory Budgeting law outlined eight phases that occurred over the course of the year, including a call for participation, registration of participants, a training period for participants – called “participatory agents” or PAs – the formation of a technical team, and several meetings during which participating agents prioritize and vote on investment projects. The final phase consisted of setting up an oversight committee, made up of civil society organizations, to monitor spending and progress on prioritized projects. In 2009, the Peruvian government reformed the original Participatory Budgeting Law to reduce these eight steps to four. Law 29,298, outlines the phases for PB at the regional, provincial, and district levels of government (see Figure 1), and the MEF further outlined the process in its 2010 Instructions sent to all subnational government (see Instructivo 001-2010-EF-76.01). This reform also slightly changed the project approval process, giving more power to the technical team, which is made up almost exclusively of government budget and planning officials.

As long as the legally mandated process is followed, each subnational govern-
ment can organize its PB process autonomously. Most processes follow this formula:

- After inviting and registering PAs, phases one and two unfold to engage participating agents. They mostly consist of workshops during which participating agents are trained, go over the regional or local development plan to prioritize spending efforts, and learn what has been approved and funded in previous years (called “rendición de cuentas”).

- After the training and prioritization workshops, the subnational government asks for project proposals from the participants. Before the new instructions were published, these projects were first presented and debated in a plenary session with PAs. Now, proposals are accepted and the technical team scores them first and then presents a list to the participating agents at the final prioritization meeting.

- At a final workshop, participants review and discuss the proposed investment projects and approve them. In reality, governments usually present the projects with the highest scores and participants approve them. Finally, in this last meeting PAs should prioritize the capital investment projects for the next fiscal year and elect an oversight committee.

Figure 1 Phases of the Participatory Budgeting Process

2 Adapted from Prodescentralización 2010.
Participating agents are formally defined as representatives from civil society, members of the local or regional coordination councils, and government officials. Civil society organizations register in advance with the subnational government’s office that runs the process, and each regional, provincial, and district government can determine the exact nature of the registration process. As such, registration criteria vary around the country. Generally, it is common to mandate that the organization have legal status. Some governments are relatively flexible about the criteria in order to allow more informal groups and individuals to participate. Regional processes are supposed to include CSOs with regional, or at least provincial, reach and provincial and district processes mostly engage representatives from neighborhood organizations.

Each government also determines how much information has to be submitted in the proposal file (called “fichas”). Interviewees stressed to me that some of the information required in these forms demands a background in budgeting for public works projects in order to make reasonable cost estimates. The technical team reviews it using a scoring matrix, also developed by each particular governmental office. Generally, the proposals with the highest number of points are presented to participants at the final prioritization workshop.

Once a proposal makes it to the list of prioritized projects, however, there is still a long process to follow before the public works project is actually funded and executed. When an idea moves ahead, the government has to do a pre-investment feasibility study using contracted experts (usually engineer firms) who have to go through a public bidding phase. According to many officials, these studies should be included in the proposal budgets, yet, participating agents almost never work them into their proposed budgets correctly. Thus, almost immediately, the project budget is reworked. In some cases, the project dies at this point because the study may uncover additional costs or problems. If the project does move ahead after this study, it must be added to the national government’s investment project tracking system (formally the Sistema Nacional de Inversiones Publicas, or SNIP and since 2017 called the Sistema Nacional de Programación Multianual y Gestión de Inversiones or Invierte.pe). This involves a long and complex process that is not widely understood by most participants.
Overall, since the 2003 law passed, PB in Peru implementation has varied. Some municipalities have embraced the PB process as one of several institutions that engage new actors in public policy decision-making at the local or regional level. One example is Villa El Salvador, a working class shantytown on the outskirts of Lima, where PB has been taking place annually since the 1990s. Another example is Miraflores, a wealthy district in Lima, where municipal officials have opened up online voting for local residents to encourage participation.

Since it began, some regional governments, such as Yehude Simon’s government in Lambayeque in 2004 and 2005, actively engaged civil society actors to promote a robust participatory experience. However, the average regional, provincial, and district governments have not put time or resources toward engaging a wide array of residents and organizations in a highly participatory experience. Because more than 2,000 subnational governments have been undertaking PB annually since 2004 it is difficult to provide a detailed analysis about the process in aggregate terms. However, some data points are available that illustrate the implementation process around the country.

On the positive side, most analysts and observers continue to agree that PB in Peru is institutionalized. Hundreds of thousands of people (either individual citizens or representatives from civil society organizations) are engaged in public policy decision-making. My own research on regional and district processes documents that participation hovers around 3,000 annually in the 243 regions since 2010, as illustrated in Table 1 (McNulty 2011, 2015). At least 50% are from civil society, and not governments, although that percentage has been slowly declining since 2012. In the hundreds of districts around the country, dozens of participants show up annually, mostly representing neighborhood organizations.

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3 One region, Callao, is given special status in the constitution and is not a typical region (rather, it is an urban area that borders the city of Lima). As such, I do not include data from Callao.
Table 1 Participation in Regional Participatory Budgets

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of PAs (and number of regions that did not report data)</td>
<td>2,592 (3) (73%)</td>
<td>3,596</td>
<td>3,129</td>
<td>2,818</td>
<td>3,213</td>
<td>3,088</td>
<td>3,120</td>
<td>2,554 (3)</td>
<td>2,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of PAs from civil society</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent female</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of CSOs that represent women’s organizations</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of females on technical team</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of females on oversight committee</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
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However, the quality of many of these processes is problematic. Many interviewees complain that PB has taken on a formalistic character. Governments comply with the basic requisites, as mandated by law, but never go farther to improve the nature of participation. Some interviewees charge that problems are deeper, arguing that government officials in the subnational offices manipulate the process to get the outcomes they want. One interviewee in the highlands region of Ayacucho noted, “with PB there is a lot of room for manipulation. The government is supposed to hold training for three days, for example, in reality it only lasts one day.” Another representative of a civil society organization in Pucallpa, a city in the Amazon region, stopped going to meetings, stating, “the regional or municipal governments manipulate CSOs. For us, it did not make sense to keep wasting our time.”
Further, in general terms the PB processes around the country are not engaging actors from a diverse representation of their communities, cities, or regions. Most experts, including academics, activists, and government officials, agree that this has become institutionalized as an elite process. This is reflected in LAPOP survey data, which has asked respondents if they have participated in a municipal budgeting process. From 2008 to 2014, only 3-5% of the respondents reported that they have.

Not only do few average citizens know about or participate in the process, the actors who participate in the budget decisions at the regional level do not represent the diverse kinds of regional and local CSOs and residents. In state processes, the majority of the CSO representatives live in urban areas, giving rise to an urban bias in the process (Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana 2009). At the regional level, several kinds of organizations tend not to participate, such as business organizations and universities (Remy 2011). In my interviews with regional experts, many suggested that business associations and professional groups have more direct means of negotiating local resources, therefore they do not find the meetings necessary or useful.

The provincial and district governments, on the other hand, mostly include neighborhood organizations, which exist around the cities. Because these organizations have existed for decades, their participation tends to be more regular. However, in rural areas, these neighborhood organizations often only meet once a year to prepare for the PB, suggesting that they are neither strong nor institutionalized. For example, when I interviewed one former president of a neighborhood organization in El Carmen, a district in the region of Ica (south of Lima), he told me,

“I have always participated in the PB through my neighborhood organization. But I am not sure it is active when it is not time for PB.”

The most reliable quantitative data on the government’s online portal regarding inclusion exist about participants’ gender in regional processes. The portal allows users to track the number of women and women’s organizations participating in meetings and committees. Table 1 illustrates that, at the regional level, the percent of women attending meetings has fluctuated between 22% when formulating the 2012 budget and 30% during the 2011 budget. The percent of women on the technical teams and oversight committees at the regional level has mostly hovered between 20 and 25% over time (see also Prodescen—

4 See the online data analysis tool at https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/interactive-data.php
The second indicator, the number of women’s organizations represented at the meetings, is much lower. Only 2% to 4% of the PAs that came to meetings officially represented women’s organizations in the meetings. This has remained steady over time. Thus, women themselves and women’s organizations are under-represented in the Peruvian PB process.

Another way to explore the quality of PB meetings and the issue of inclusion is to ask who participates orally in debate and discussion. In 2017, I explored these issues by observing several PB meetings in and around Lima in 2017. While observing, I documented who spoke, for how long, and their gender and role in the meeting. In total, I attended ten district PB meetings and documented speaking patterns for a total of 867 minutes.

Table 2 demonstrates that, in terms of actual speaking patterns, the PB meetings are very much dominated by males, who speak 61% of the total times. However, it is important to disaggregate this percentage by a person’s role in the meeting. The two roles are neighborhood representatives and municipal officials. Neighborhood males speak 58% of the time that all neighbors spoke combined. Male municipal officials speak 73% of the combined number of times that all municipal officials spoke. In other words, males in general speak more and male municipal officials are dominating the meetings when measured in terms of the number of times people speak.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Officials</td>
<td>22 (73%)</td>
<td>8 (27%)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Representative</td>
<td>68 (58%)</td>
<td>50 (42%)</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>90 (61%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>58 (39%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>148</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

For how long do participants speak? This indicator gives us an even deeper glance into the nature of the discursive power of the participants. Men speak 79% of the minutes spoken in all meetings combined (see Table 3). However, again, it is useful to break this down by role. Neighborhood male representatives speak 65% of the time that all neighbors spoke. Municipal males spoke 84% of the time that all municipal officials spoke.
Table 3 Number of Spoken Minutes, by Gender and Rank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Minutes</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Officials</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>502 (84%)</td>
<td>98 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Representative</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>145 (64%)</td>
<td>82 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>647 (79%)</td>
<td>180 (21%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These data tell us two things about the quality of the PB process. First, municipal officials dominate the meetings. When quantified, they were speaking 72.5% of the time. Thus, CSO representatives are not actively debating or deliberating during these meetings. Second, the discussion that does take place, or at least the speech, is dominated by males. Thus, when measured in terms of speaking patterns, the PB meetings are neither participatory nor inclusive.

What about outcomes? Are the projects that are approved serving their communities and protecting the vulnerable? Three economists, Lorena Alcázar, Miguel Jaramillo, and Glen Wright, have analyzed infrastructure projects to tease out the relationship between municipal government effectiveness and participatory budgeting in Peru. They have explored changes in two policy areas—water services and agricultural policies—since the PB began. When testing the relationship between the Participatory Budgeting and water and sanitation service provision, Jaramillo and Alcázar (2013, 2016) find that participatory budgeting has little to no effect on coverage or quality of water. When studying the effect of participatory budgeting on agricultural policy, Jaramillo and Wright (2015) come to a similar conclusion. In fact, they argue that participatory budgeting is leading to even less effective local government services (Jaramillo and Wright 2015).

Nor do these projects empower women. Diana Miloslavich (2013) undertook a comprehensive gender analysis of the Participatory Budgeting process, analyzing investment projects from 2008 until 2011. She finds that the percentage of project spending that is geared towards improving the lives of women in the regions and municipalities is less than 1%. She argues that Participatory Budgeting “have not been an opportunity for women nor have they been a mechanism that helps reduce gender gaps... [instead] they have ended up being a discriminatory mechanism” (Miloslavich 2013, 9). This suggests that governments are not improving their responsiveness to citizens’ needs as a result of this reform (see also López Ricci 2014).
In sum, although the process is institutionalized around the country, there are many problems in terms of the quality of the meetings and inclusion of diverse actors in decisionmaking processes. The diversity of civil society organizations is not well represented. Meetings are formulaic and little debate or discussion takes place. Municipal officials, mostly male, dominate the meetings. And, the projects that are eventually funded do not improve citizens’ lives through improved service delivery or gender empowerment.

Limitations of Peru’s National PB Process
Why has the Peruvian PB process, which originally garnered a lot of enthusiasm within and outside of Peru, failed to effectively engage citizens or improve public spending in the longer-term? Four problems plague the process. First, several aspects of the design of PB in Peru have hindered robust participation. The most glaring shortcoming lies in the more powerful role that the technical team is given in the MEF’s 2010 Instructions. Government officials and the technical teams hold much of the power about infrastructure project decision-making. Projects are presented to the participants at a meeting, and there is little to no discussion about them for the most part (with some exceptions). Another problem lies in the MEF’s infrastructure oversight systems (formally SNIP, now Invierte.pe). Interviewees complain that prioritized projects are not always funded. When asked, government officials blame this outcome on the national government’s strict technical controls. The most common complaint is that the MEF has made it so difficult to meet standards for funding that projects take a long time to be considered “viable.” However, former MEF officials have told me that this is inaccurate, and that subnational governments simply do not respect the participatory process for political reasons. Although there are differing opinions about why some projects are not executed, the end result is clear. Participants become disillusioned with the process, experience participation fatigue, and continue to distrust citizens and their subnational governments.

A second problem, also related to the design lies, in the nature of civil society. Peruvians designed a process that includes CSOs, not individuals (although some individual citizens are allowed to participate in some places when municipal officials are flexible about
requirements). This design decision is complicated by the fact civil society in Peru is quite weak. Detailing the reasons behind this problem is beyond the scope of this chapter, however, it is fair to say that this relatively closed invitation structure combined with weak societal organizations in Peru further prevents robust PB participation. A third problem stems from the nature of the national leadership in Peru. Since the reform, no national president has prioritized participatory governance in any way, for example. Nor has leadership in the MEF decided to actively promote or improve the PB process. Although no leader has actively worked against the idea of participatory budgets, they have done nothing to strengthen the process at the national level. Thus, there are no national voices arguing that the PB process should be improved. A final factor is relevant. Notably, the decentralization reform was passed in the context of a hegemonic neoliberal discourse that dominated the country. Unlike some PB processes in Latin America, such as the original Workers’ Party PB in Porto Alegre, Brazil, the law was not born from a desire to promote social justice. When social justice is privileged in PB, generally the process includes rules that prioritize spending in marginalized communities (Wampler, Touchton, McNulty 2018). In Peru, the national PB law was passed as a technical fix—deeply rooted in neoliberal principles—meant to hold politicians accountable for their spending. This helps explain why the project approval process has not led to improved services or altered gender relations around the country.

**Conclusion**

Peru is one of a handful of countries that have mandated a Participatory Budgeting process in all subnational governments. As the first, the case study provides fifteen years of evidence to evaluate the idea of mandating PB “from above.” As time has moved on and the process has evolved, this case clearly demonstrates that a national law mandating PB is no magic bullet when it comes to meaningful participation and equitable outcomes. The case also confirms most of the scholarship about PB, which posits that several factors are integral to the success of this project, including an organized and engaged civil society sector, committed leaders, and designs that promote active engagement and social
justice outcomes (Avritzer 2002, Baiocchi 2005, McNulty 2011, Goldfrank 2011, Wampler 2007). This discussion does not mean that top-down PB processes must fail. Rather, it signals to advocates of PB that a careful examination of the country’s context is needed. Ideally, these conditioning factors will be present. One trend to mitigate these problems has been creating national PB processes based on incentives and not fixed mandates. This is the case in South Korea, for example, where the Local Finance Act of 2011 requires local governments to engage the public in budget making process, but does not mandate PB. Notably some cities have adopted PB, such as Seoul, but not all. Similar incentive structures exist through national laws in the Philippines and Colombia. This means of incentivizing PB nationally, but not mandating it, seems to solve some of the shortcomings of a mandated process.

In closing, the final word on national PB laws is still out. In cases where civil society is relatively strong and leaders are committed, it should prove an effective way to engage new actors in public policy decisions. Carefully designed rule structures that allow a diverse array of participants to actively take part in the process will also ensure more positive outcomes. Incentivizing and not mandating PB around the country appears to be one of the more recent means to ensure adequate support for the process. Unfortunately, a careful examination of more than fifteen years of PB in Peru emerges as a cautionary tale for those who are interested in nation-wide PB laws.
North America
Unlike in most other world regions, participatory budgeting (PB) remains relatively incipient in northern North America. Since the first decade of the twenty-first century in Canada and its second decade in the United States, PB has spread slowly and haltingly. As of early 2018, PB continues to be limited in terms of the number of cities that adopt it, the number of participants, and the share of funding allocated through it. At the same time, PB in Canada and the US has demonstrated the potential to play an important inclusionary role in an era of rising xenophobia and racism, especially in the US, where PB began to show signs of faster growth over the past two years. This chapter examines why PB has remained generally limited in Canada and the US thus far, where its transformative potential may still exist, and what the prospects are for its future expansion. We make five main points.

First, the spread of PB in Canada and the US has been limited thus far by the lack of a strong political champion for it. Second, where PB has been adopted in Canada and the US, it is often hampered by its particular institutional design, which typically limits PB to specific individual city districts or themes and does not enhance distributive justice, as well as by the inadequate resources dedicated to PB in most cases. Third, where greater resources are devoted to PB, participation rates tend to be higher, which suggests that PB could grow in the region if a strong political champion were willing to invest in it. Fourth, in the United States especially, PB is typically designed to include those who either are ineligible to vote in regular elections or who tend to vote in lower numbers – immigrants, teenagers, and minority groups – and thus offers a potentially valuable channel of political expression and representation. Last, positive signs have
emerged that PB may start to expand more rapidly in the US over the next several years. The recent rise of PB in public high schools – first in Phoenix, Arizona, and now in New York City – presents one path towards expanding PB more broadly in the medium or long-term future. Another possible path would be through a re-invigorated Democratic Party allying with progressive social movements to take up the mantle of inclusionary PB in local and regional elections as part of a broader response to the exclusionary policies and rhetoric emanating from the national government under President Donald Trump.

The chapter proceeds by describing the tentative spread of participatory budgeting in Canada and the US that reflects the lack of support from a powerful political party or social movement. Next, we briefly review the nascent academic literature on PB in Canada and the US, highlighting the distinctive features of PB in northern North America in comparative perspective. In the following section, we present and analyze data on the roughly 30 locales in the region for which we could find recent reliable figures for either funds spent through PB, participation rates in PB, or both, illustrating the limitations of PB’s implementation thus far, but also the potential that more generous funding could offer. We conclude by considering two promising pathways forward for PB in the US.

From its inception in Canada and then the United States to its timid propagation within both countries and finally to its current status of stagnation in Canada and rapid expansion in the US, participatory budgeting has displayed a halting pattern of growth in northern North America. It originated in the Canadian city of Guelph in 1999, just ten years after the first PB process in Porto Alegre, Brazil, and a decade before the United States’ first PB initiative in Chicago. Guelph’s Neighborhood Support Coalition (NSC) first instituted a process that resembled PB, without the title, in 1999 with several community groups, the city government, and other private and public partners (Secondo and Jennings 2014, 242). The next year, the process in Guelph was formalized and recognized as participatory budgeting.

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1 This section draws from Secondo and Jennings (2014), from the data set made available by the Participatory Budgeting Project at https://www.participatorybudgeting.org/pb-map/, and from official city government websites and news sources to attempt to ensure accuracy. However, we may have missed some locales with PB in Canada and the US, especially those started in 2018. As the PBP website notes: “There are over 1,500 cities and institutions implementing Participatory Budgeting (PB) [worldwide], and it is almost impossible to keep track of them all.”
budgeting; it continued until 2012, when the NSC decided to use a different process to allocate funds. Another early instance of PB involves Toronto Community Housing (TCH), which is now the longest running PB process in North America, continuing without interruption from 2001 until today (Foroughi 2017). In 2006, a PB process was launched in Plateau-Mont-Royal Borough, a borough in the City of Montreal, where it continued until a change in political leadership two years later (Patsias et al. 2012, 7).

These first three Canadian experiences of PB exemplify the dominant pattern in the region until recently. Rather than city-wide PB processes as in the original Porto Alegre model of PB, they focused on specific groups or districts: a small number of community groups – from five to fourteen – in Guelph (Pin 2016); community housing tenants, staff, and managers in the TCH process (Foroughi 2017); and residents in Plateau-Mont-Royal, one of Montreal’s 19 boroughs. The TCH and Plateau-Mont-Royal processes also followed the general four-step design of PB most prevalent in Canada and the US: Residents discuss local problems, needs, and potential solutions in public assemblies; Groups of residents develop project proposals, often with technical help from government officials or NGOs; Residents vote on projects; Governing authorities implement the projects that receive the most votes.

After 2006, no new Canadian city adopted PB until 2012, when the city councilor for Hamilton’s Ward 1 did so. From 2014 on, eight more Canadian cities and towns adopted PB, mostly city-wide processes such as those in the small towns of Dieppe, Hinton, Saint-Basile-le-Grand, and Tofino, and in the slightly larger cities of Peterborough and Victoria. In addition, three districts in Halifax started PB in 2014, and the City of Toronto initiated a three-year pilot PB process from 2015 to 2017 in one ward and two neighborhoods. Finally, the Provincial Government of Ontario launched a small PB process in 2017. The recent expansion of

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2 Interview with the Executive Director of Guelph Neighborhood Support Coalition, Brendan Johnson (April 10, 2018); see also Pin (2016, 73).

3 Guelph’s process differed in that rather than city residents voting, decisions were made by consensus of the leaders of the neighborhood groups, and those groups then received funds to implement projects and programs on their own (Pin 2016, 85-87). It is also worth noting the North American model’s other main difference with Porto Alegre’s model: in the latter, voting was not open to all residents but only to participants in the public assemblies, who voted both on spending priorities and on specific projects within those priorities (Goldfrank 2011, Chapter 5).

4 The former towns have populations of 25,000 residents or fewer, while the population in the latter cities is roughly 85,000.
Participatory budgeting in Canada is somewhat illusory, however, as nearly half of the PB processes started there have been discontinued. These include those in Guelph, Plateau-Mont-Royal, Peterborough, Tofino, and Hinton, while Toronto’s pilot PB is currently under review. Participatory budgeting arrived later to the United States than to Canada, but has expanded more quickly and with fewer false starts. In 2009 Alderman Joe Moore of the 49th Ward in Chicago launched the first PB process in the US, and it now operates in eight of the city’s fifty wards (PB Chicago 2018). New York started its own participatory budgeting process just two years later, and PB has continued to expand across the US in subsequent years, usually with the help of a non-government organization called the Participatory Budgeting Project (PBP). New York City’s PB process, known as PBNYC, began in four city council districts in 2011 and has now grown into the “largest local civic engagement program in the US and Canada” (PBP 2018, 4). Over 100,000 New York residents voted on how to spend over $40 million in capital funds in 31 districts in 2017 (New York City Council 2018). Since the first two processes in Chicago and New York City, PB has grown to impact communities in all regions in the US, from coast to coast, and mostly in medium-sized cities. Participatory budgeting has now been implemented in specific districts or for specific sectors in San Francisco, Long Beach, San José, Oakland, Merced County, Phoenix (school district), St. Louis, Boston (youth only), Niagara Falls, and Buffalo. City-wide versions of PB have been adopted in Vallejo, Clarkston (Georgia), Cambridge, Greensboro, Hartford, Seattle, and Freehold (New Jersey). Six of the PB processes currently operating started in 2017: Phoenix, Oakland, Niagara Falls, Merced County, Freehold, and Seattle (which converted its youth-only process in 2016 to a city-wide process in 2017). In fact, 2017 was a year of expansion for PB in the US in many ways, including the first school district-level PB in the Phoenix Unified High School District and the first county-level PB processes in two county districts in Merced. Another new area of growth for PB has been the use of federal Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) in Oakland and Niagara Falls (PBP 2018).

The recent surge of new participatory budgeting processes indi-

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icates that PB continues to expand in the United States, but, just as in Canada, there are several instances of PB processes that failed to continue beyond their first year or two. In the US, PB experiences that started but were not maintained include those in Clarkston, Cleveland, Lawrence, and Long Beach. Furthermore, even within cities that maintained PB, like Chicago, San Francisco, and St. Louis, while new wards or districts join the process, others have opted out. Even in New York, the number of city council districts participating in PBNYC dropped from 31 to 27 in 2018 after the city council elections, illustrating PB’s halting progress. Overall, according to the Participatory Budgeting Project (PBP 2018), there have been over 250 individual PB processes in northern North America, including and counting separately those in schools and universities, individual districts or wards within cities, and housing communities, since its inception in Guelph in 1999.

In our estimation, including processes in specific districts in cities, themed city processes, and city-wide processes, but not including PB in schools or universities and not counting each city district separately, the number of locales with at least one city district practicing PB grew from five in 2012 to roughly 25 throughout Canada and the US as of early 2018. Though the quintupling of locales with PB in a six-year span represents rapid growth, it should be kept in mind that Canada and the US are home to roughly 25,000 cities and towns. Compared to other world regions, then, North America lags behind in adoption of PB. After all, at least 2,500 local governments world-wide currently practice participatory budgeting, and at best one percent of these are located in North America. Nonetheless, PB has caught the attention of hopeful scholars in the region looking to improve the quality of democracy.

Before participatory budgeting emerged in the US, a few North American scholars of PB in Brazil began advocating for PB’s adoption beyond its birthplace. To our knowledge, the first was William Nylen (2003), whose book about PB in Belo Horizonte and Betim, *Participatory Democracy versus Elitist Democracy: Lessons from Brazil*, concludes with lessons for potential practitioners in the US. Like most schol-

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6 Two other early and influential books on PB were by Abers (2000), who published the first English-language scholarly book on Porto Alegre’s PB, and the collection of essays edited by Fung and Wright (2003), the latter of which implicitly advocated PB as one example among several of “empowered participatory governance.”
ar-advocates of PB, Nylen’s (2003, 146-155) promotion of PB balances hope for its empowering capacity with warnings against over-promising and with pragmatism regarding differences in context between North and South America. This type of balanced perspective permeates the growing academic literature on PB in Canada and the US. On one hand, scholars view PB in general as capable of transforming democracy by offering a meaningful channel of participation in government decision-making processes to non-elites. The hope is that PB can include the excluded, increase government transparency, reduce political inequality as well as inequality of access to public goods and services, and, ultimately, change political culture by transforming city residents from passive, apathetic political objects into active, empowered subjects cognizant of their democratic rights.

On the other hand, PB scholars recognize that the northern North American socio-economic context differs from that of Brazil, and may present obstacles (Pinnington et al. 2009; Stewart et al. 2014). In the wealthier North, with its more developed infrastructure, desire for participation may be lower for various reasons: most city residents have their basic needs met; citizens tend to be politically apathetic at the local level; and citizens already have some access to opportunities for participating in local government policy making through forums such as public hearings and advisory boards. Organizing participation may also be complicated by the greater linguistic diversity of the immigrant-rich cities in Canada and the US (Pinnington et al. 2009, 459-460). Finally, some scholars doubted that the governing political parties would be open to bottom-up democratic experiments: “In countries (and cities) historically dominated by one or two traditional, elitist parties, like that of the United States, it may be unrealistic to think that they will introduce or accept new participatory forms of government” (Goldfrank 2005, 138).

After nearly ten years of PB in the US, and nearly twenty in Canada, how well did the scholar-advocates’ hopes for PB fare? A review of the literature shows a mixed picture. Overall, participatory budgeting has been established in a few dozen locales in the region, over a hundred thousand residents have participated in the past two years – including teenagers, immigrants (documented and undocumented), and people from different class and ethnic backgrounds, and tens of millions of dollars are being allocated through PB every year, leading to upgrades in schools, parks, streets and sidewalks, librar-
ies, transportation, and public housing (Public Agenda 2016b; Su 2017a). Where PB has been in place longer, like Chicago and New York, some promising findings are emerging as well. In some districts of New York City with PB, the poor and ethnic and racial minorities participated at much higher rates than in traditional elections (Su 2017b), and PB has been found to improve participants’ opinions of and trust in their city councilors and local government (Swaner 2017); in Chicago’s 49th Ward, PB has allowed residents to redirect funds from street paving to areas they prioritized more highly (Stewart et al. 2014).

At the same time, scholars continue to find significant limits on the transformative effects of PB in North America. The literature emphasizes what constrains PB and how to improve its ability to attract the poor to participate, to achieve greater equity in the allocation of resources through PB, and to empower those most excluded from traditional politics (Lerner and Secondo 2012; Pape and Lerner 2016; Su 2017a, 2017b). While researchers ask different questions – Why is PB implemented and how is it designed? Who participates? What kinds of impacts does PB have on public infrastructure and services or on community organizations and civic attitudes? – taken together, their answers point to a fairly consensual composite view. To wit, the limited diffusion and impacts of PB in Canada and the US thus far stem primarily from three factors: the political actors implementing it, the way it is designed, and the amount of money dedicated to it. Until recently, major political figures, political parties, and social movements in northern North America had not thrown their weight behind participatory budgeting with the goals of popular empowerment or radically transforming democracy. Instead, the primary adopters of PB in Canada and the US have been individual city councilors in specific districts of large- and medium-sized cities with the hope of winning the trust and votes of local residents (Public Agenda 2016a). 7 Partly as a result of this type of adopter, PB is usually designed such that it is: restricted to one or more city districts, rather than practiced city-wide; focused on small infrastructure projects, rather than on broad priorities; and lacking in built-in criteria to favor the underprivileged, despite implicit and sometimes explicit goals of enhancing equity (Pape and Lerner 2016, 6–7). Even in city-wide processes, like Greensboro and Peterborough, each district received the same amount of funding (Public Agenda 2016b, 49). Finally, this pattern of city councilor-led and district-focused PB coincides with low levels of funding dedicated to PB, both in terms of dollars spent per capita and of percentage of the city’s budget (Pin 2016, 75; see the next section). Given this landscape,

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7 Chicago Alderman Joe Moore credited his re-election to PB, and PB was widely touted in the US to “pay off politically” (Baiocchi and Gauza 2017, 127).
leaders of the main promoter of participatory budgeting in the region, PBP, have consistently advocated for more powerful political figures to support PB and scale it up, for mayors to adopt PB city-wide, for designers to explicitly include equity-enhancing mechanisms and to make concerted efforts to include marginalized groups, and for governments and other institutions to increase or open new sources of funding for PB (Lerner and Secondo 2012; Pape and Lerner 2016; PBP 2018; see also Su 2017b).

If cautious optimism about PB’s potential (despite the mixed picture) remains the predominant perspective in the scholarly literature, a more skeptical current has surfaced as well. Skeptics like Peck and Theodore (2015, xx, xxxi, 236) argue that as participatory budgeting has diffused globally, including to North America, it is being “borrowed for merely tokenistic purposes by calculating politicians; “put to work more as a tool of urban management than as a prelude to ever-deeper forms of transformative democratization;” and has become “depoliticized and technocratic.” For Peck and Theodore (2016, 221): “There is a cruel irony in the way that some forms of PB have been folded into the very neoliberal hegemony that the original model was designed to contest.” Reflecting on her study of Guelph’s now defunct PB, Pin (2016, 102–3) agrees, arguing that: “While participatory budgeting is appealing in terms of its potential to place real decision-making power in the hands of citizens, in a context of hegemonic neoliberalism, participatory processes risk being utilized to offload municipal service provision, backstop budget cuts and market-based solutions, or alleviate concerns about a lack of democracy in more substantive venues.” Patsias and her colleagues (2012, 2218) are similarly skeptical of the advantages of PB at the margins, that is, in an “infralocal” context (within a city rather than city-wide) like that of Plateau-Mont-Royal.

In our view, participatory budgeting is currently at a crossroads in Canada and the US. The skeptics are likely right that PB has been and will remain marginal in Canada. However, there is more room for optimism in the United States, where, in some cases at least, PB has shown signs that it is not merely tokenistic, technocratic, or marginal. At the very least, in several important US cities, PB provides a channel of political expression for those most disenfranchised by the xenophobic Trump Administration, and thus should be defended, expanded, improved, and scaled up as much as possible. The key to ensuring that PB makes it past the cusp of relevance will be putting more resources into play. As we show in the next section, a primary weakness of PB in Canada and the US has been the paltry amount of funding dedicated to it. To put PB spending in North America into a broader context, it is worth highlighting the great variation that exists across the globe. In a recent book examining 13 cities with PB across five continents, Cabannes (2017, 49–50) finds one city spending $200 per person per year on PB (Ilo, Peru), an-
other spending between $100 and $200 per person per year (Guarulhos, Brazil), Paris at $50 per person per year, a few cities at between a $20 and a $30 rate, several cities below a $20 rate, and a few more below a $10 rate. Goldfrank (2017) presents stark differences between Porto Alegre’s PB in its heyday and PB in present-day Montevideo, Uruguay, cities with populations of roughly 1.5 million inhabitants. In the 1990s and early 2000s, before the Workers’ Party was voted out of office in 2004 and PB began to decline in importance, Porto Alegre’s city government allocated between US$30 million and US$120 million per year through participatory budgeting, roughly equivalent to US$20 to US$80 per inhabitant per year. By contrast, Montevideo’s government dedicated roughly US$600,000 through PB to each of its eight municipal districts to be implemented in 2017 and 2018, or about US$1.80 per inhabitant per year. Where do Canadian and US cases of PB fall along this spectrum?

Given the affluence of Canada and the US, one might expect to find PB spending on the higher end, yet that has not been the case thus far. The city that spends the most annually through PB is New York, at about $40 million for a population of 8.5 million, while Vallejo spends about $1 million for a city of 120,000 inhabitants. According to a study by Public Agenda (2016, 19), on average, across Canada and the US, districts and cities allocated about US$1 million per year through PB, or about $11 per resident per year in 2016. Those figures would place PB at the lower end of the spectrum internationally, but not the lowest. Here, we present an updated and modified analysis of spending through PB. We use all cases for which we could find data (see footnote 1) and present the most recent year data was available, which was usually 2017, though earlier for some cases where PB was discontinued. We do not include the Toronto Community Housing process, which allocates more money per person than other cases but is *sui generis*.8 One other modification is that we use the entire city population as the denominator when presenting dollars spent per resident (and participation rates) across the city, even when the process is limited to a subset of city council districts or to young people (in the case of Boston).9 With this modified and expanded data set, the PB spending annual average drops to $3.37 per person.

Figure 1 (below) shows that only half the cases in Canada and the US reached

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8 The most recent scholarly article on TCH’s PB process (Foroughi 2017, 8) also casts some doubt on its participatory nature, calling it a confusing “information sharing process” that has frustrated tenants.

9 This obviously skews the data towards showing less money spent per person in cities where only a few districts use PB, but that is precisely the point: PB’s impact is relatively weak in Canada and the US partly because it has often been restricted to a few districts in a city. Furthermore, for several cities, we were unable to find information on the population of individual neighborhoods or city council districts.
the low rate of spending through PB in Montevideo, and no case reached Porto Alegre’s spending rate. In only one town, Freehold, did the rate reach above $10 per person per year. Freehold’s relatively higher spending rate is largely due to the fact that it is a small town of approximately 12,000 inhabitants.

While these spending rates are surprisingly low, they only tell part of the story. Spending through PB as a percentage of total city budgets is even more disquieting. In only two cities does PB spending represent even one percent of the total city budget (Freehold and Vallejo). In the large majority of cases, PB spending represents less than a tenth of a percentage point of the city budget. For example, in New York, the $40 million spent through PB in about half of the city’s districts represents .0025 percent of just the capital budget ($16 billion), or .0005 percent of the city’s entire budget ($87 billion). While a significant portion of city budgets are dedicated to wages and benefits, debt payments, and other costs that legally cannot be up for public debate, there is clearly space for a larger share of city resources to be discussed if politicians were willing.

Despite the relatively meager funding allocated through PB thus far, however, participation rates have been more in line with international standards. Public Agenda (2016, 23) reports that in 54 distinct PB processes – counting individual city districts – in 2015–2016, voter turnout ranged “from less than 1 percent to 7.2 percent of their respective census-estimated PB voting age population” and

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10 Public Agenda (2016) uses the PB cycle that runs from July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016.
reached 2.2 percent on average. This average rate is similar to that of Porto Alegre when PB was in its prime. Our update for PB in Canada and the US for 2017 again uses the entire city population as the denominator (see footnote 9), but our findings are similar to Public Agenda’s: the participation rate varies from less than 1 percent to 6.1 percent of the population, and the average is 2.4 percent. Figure 2 (below) shows participation rates for twenty cities and the Province of Ontario.

These participation rates, especially those towards the higher end, demonstrate that northern North America is not entirely inhospitable to PB. Even cities with a population over 100,000, like Cambridge and Vallejo, can attract a reasonable number of participants. The fact that participation rates are not lower may be related to the way PB is designed in the region to include non-citizens and young people. In none of the cases did we find rules indicating citizenship status was required, and most cases specifically allow all those residing in the city or district to participate. In some cases, no minimum age to participate is listed, but in most cases the minimum age varies from 11 to 16. In Freehold and Vallejo, the minimum is 14, in Dieppe and Cambridge, participation starts at age 12, and in Seattle and New York, eleven-year-olds can now participate, too. In addition, in some cities, especially New York, PB organizers have made considerable efforts to include marginalized groups with targeted outreach. In 2018, NYCPB had ballots available in thirteen languages, and Kasdan and
Markman (2015) show that in 2015, nearly a quarter of NYCPB voters would not have been able to vote in regular elections because of age or citizenship requirements. Furthermore, examining only city- or province-wide PB processes (see Figure 3, below), we find that where PB allocates larger pots of money, the rate of participation tends to be higher. This finding echoes Public Agenda’s (2016, 21) more comprehensive study of several dozen individual districts with PB for the 2015-2016 cycle, which demonstrated that: “In communities where the amount of money allocated to PB was comparatively high, more ballots were cast in the PB processes. This relationship remained significant even when controlling for the number of residents in the jurisdiction, the number of days the vote lasted and the total number of voting sites.” International comparisons are relevant here as well. In Porto Alegre, participation rates did not increase until significant funds were allocated through PB, and participation rates were higher and grew faster in districts that received more resources (Goldfrank 2011: Chapter 5). The preceding discussion again suggests that a primary hindrance to more rapid expansion of PB in Canada and the US has been the lack of politicians willing to dedicate substantial resources to it. North Americans are willing to try PB, but as is true elsewhere, their willingness increases with the stakes.

**Chart 3** Dollars per capita allocated through PB and participation rates selected North American Cities, 2017
What are the chances that participatory budgeting will gain broader significance in Canada and the US in the near future? If recent trends can serve as a guide, we consider the chances to be substantially greater in the US than in Canada. In the latter country, the longest-running PB processes were discontinued (in Guelph) or have declined (TCH), half of the newer city-wide PB processes only lasted a year or two (Peterborough, Tofino, Hinton), and the rate of expansion has been glacial. In this concluding section, we therefore focus on PB’s potential future in the United States, where its growth has accelerated in the past few years. We outline two complementary paths forward. One would involve the Democratic Party – or major politicians within it – becoming a champion of participatory budgeting as local activists and politicians see PB working as a counter-example of inclusion to the Trump Administration’s national exclusionary model. We use the case of Freehold to show that PB’s demonstration effects have already begun. A second, more long-term path for PB’s expansion in the US would involve the present surge of PB in schools becoming more widespread, meaningful, and sustained, such that current students begin to promote scaling up PB upon graduation.

Freehold is noteworthy for being the smallest town in the US with participatory budgeting and for spending the most per capita on PB, but more interesting and promising for the future of PB are how it started and the trajectory it has taken. The Borough of Freehold, a town of just under 12,000 inhabitants, initiated PB in 2017 after two city councilmen stumbled upon PB separately. Councilman Kevin Kane learned about PB in an Information Technology class while Councilman Ronald Griffiths read about it after the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard’s Kennedy School gave PBNYC its 2015 Innovation in American Government Award. The councilmen compared PBNYC’s success in engaging diverse residents to the lack of attendance at Freehold council meetings and the widespread voter apathy and dim view of government at all levels in the US. They then convinced the City Council to task the town’s Innovation Committee and Business Administrator with researching PB in different US cities. The Business Administrator, Joe Bellina, went to New York City to see PB in action, and spoke with those responsible for PB in New York, Chicago, and eventually Cambridge. After a number of teleconferences, Freehold officials adopted the Cambridge model of PB as a guide, adapting its rulebook and mission statement for Freehold.

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11 This section relies on three main sources: the Borough’s website (Borough of Freehold 2018); the nomination form for an award at the New Jersey State League of Municipalities website (NJLM 2017); and most significantly, an interview with Freehold Councilmen Ronald Griffiths and Kevin Kane and Business Administrator Joe Bellina on March 12, 2018.
The experience of Freehold is also helpful to understanding the promise of PB as an inclusionary process that targets those who are either unable to vote in regular elections or who do not typically vote in large numbers. In a town whose Latino population is 40%, Freehold officials stressed the need of incorporating those who do not participate and bringing some of their constituents out of the shadows. And, as in Cambridge and many other US cities with PB (Paper and Lerner 2016, 3-4), Freehold’s guidebook lists expanding and diversifying civic engagement as one of its goals, stating that it wants to: “Ensure that all community members have a voice in the development and improvement of their city, especially marginalized communities, reticent voters, and people with limited opportunities to engage in the political process” (Borough 2017). Any Freehold Borough resident over the age of 14, regardless of citizenship status, is eligible to participate (Borough 2017). Councilman Griffiths discussed the purposeful decision to address the fears of non-citizens in the Latino community by using an honor system in which proof of residency is not needed. After all, PB in Freehold, according to Councilman Griffiths, is “about inclusion, not exclusion.” The PB ballot was available in English and Spanish, and a substantial portion of the votes were collected at the town’s annual Latino Festival.

While the Freehold officials with whom we spoke noted several ways they wanted to improve the town’s participatory budgeting process – such as including more young people at the high school – they were enthusiastic about renewing it in 2018 and about helping to encourage the spread of PB to other towns in New Jersey. For them, PB had boosted residents’ engagement with and knowledge of local government, pointing to the five-fold increase in the number of residents attending Council meetings when PB was discussed. They also recognized the benefits to public safety of the three projects with the largest number of votes: sidewalk installation, additional street lighting, and, most costly, a pedestrian bridge over a lake to allow fishermen to avoid crossing a dangerous road with heavy traffic. Encouraged by Freehold’s success with PB, Councilmen Griffiths and Kane submitted their experience to the New Jersey State League of Municipalities’ Innovation in Governance Award, and received an honorable mention. In turn, this recognition was sufficient to spark the interest of towns across New Jersey: not only Freehold officials but the director of the League of Municipalities are receiving calls about PB; city coun-
cilor candidates have begun putting PB on their campaign platforms; Freehold is planning to host a meeting for New Jersey towns seeking information on PB; and one town, West Orange, has already held a PB “kick-off meeting” to start the process in 2018. 12 Finally, Freehold’s city councilors are hopeful that the new governor, Phil Murphy, will provide matching grants to promote PB across the state.

The story of Freehold’s PB is thus a classic example of diffusion through learning and emulation. If significant Democratic Party officials, such as state governors like Murphy, do take up the mantle of PB, diffusion could occur at a much swifter rate. Such a path is not implausible. After all, every city with PB in the US thus far has had a Democrat in the mayor’s office. All of Freehold’s city councilors are Democrats, and all of New York City’s 27 councilors adopting PB are Democrats as well. Participatory budgeting should be doubly attractive to the progressive wing of the Democratic Party as a form of ongoing civic engagement in between election campaigns and as an example of positive inclusion of the minority groups that collectively form the bulk of the Democratic constituency.

A move by progressive Democrats to support PB would be welcomed by (at least some) social movements in the US as well. Already, the Movement for Black Lives, which groups together more than 50 organizations linked to the Black Lives Matter Movement, has called for implementing PB at the local, state, and federal levels.13 Participatory budgeting fits well with the Movement’s vision of a world “where those most impacted in our communities control the laws, institutions, and policies that are meant to serve us – from our schools to our local budgets, economies, police departments, and our land…” and “where Black people and all marginalized people can effectively exercise full political power.”14 The Movement has members or allies promising to adopt PB this year in the mayor’s office of at least two important cities in the South, Jillian Johnson of Durham, North Carolina, and Chokwe Antar Lumumba of Jackson, Mississippi. Even if participatory budgeting in the US needs to go much further to “promote equity in our racially charged political landscape,” it has succeeded in including marginalized communi-

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ties in local politics, at least in New York City, as Celina Su (2017b, 5, 8) argues. And messages and policies of inclusion are particularly necessary now, given the toxic xenophobia flowing from the White House that invites racist and anti-immigrant behavior across the country and creates a climate of fear.\footnote{We lack the space to document the extent of Trump’s racist rhetoric and policies and their effects, but on the issue of undocumented immigrants, for example, see Human Rights Watch (2017) and Tyler (2018).}

The other path to spreading PB in the US is related but distinct. Two Democratic mayors of large cities—Greg Stanton in Phoenix and Bill de Blasio in New York—have introduced participatory budgeting in public high schools. Prior to 2017, several individual schools at different levels in both Canada and the US had adopted PB, often for only a year or two. In 2017, the Phoenix Unified High School District became the “first school district in the US to use PB to allocate district funds” (PBP 2018) for its ten public high schools. The next year, in his State of the City address, New York’s Mayor de Blasio spoke of the need to “re-democratize a society that is losing its way” and unveiled a ten-point plan, “democracy NYC” in response (Office of the Mayor 2018). Point six launched a schools-based PB process, allocating $2,000 to each of the more than 400 public high schools in the city (Office of the Mayor 2018).

This schools-based path may take more time than the first, but it may be durable if it is able to reach a critical mass of young people. Targeting the youth and teaching them the tools and practices of civic engagement has the potential to create more informed, more involved citizens in the future, citizens that will perhaps take up the mantle of participatory budgeting as adults and become the political and social champions that PB needs in order to grow in North America. Nonetheless, the schools-based path is hampered by the same factors that have limited PB’s significance in the region thus far: school-based PB is restricted to a small segment of the city, involves highly circumscribed resources, and fails to address inequalities. Bolder steps need to be taken to advance participatory budgeting in the US in order to make it broader, more generous, and more redistributive.
Note from the authors
The authors appreciate the significant inputs and comments by Nelson Dias (Participatory Budgeting expert and also team member of the Cananea project and main author of the PB methodology designed for this process) and Marcela Rubio (Consultant at the World Bank Governance Global Practice and team member of the Cananea project). The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this article, do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors or the governments that they represent.
Participatory Budgeting for enhanced transparency and Accountability in Mining Royalties: A Breakthrough Story in Mexico

Guadalupe Toscano & Carolina Vaira

Introduction
In 2014, the Mexican government introduced a royalty tax that is applied to holders of any mining concession in Mexico. The revenue—collected by the government under a special facility called the “Fund for the Regional Sustainable Development of Mining States and Municipalities,” or publicly known as “Mining Fund” (“Fondo Minero”)—is distributed among the communities affected by mining activities to promote economic development, through public investment programs, toward improving the lives of people in those areas. The Mining Fund (MF) was designed to help share prosperity at the community level and to promote a more inclusive and sustained development path in the mining municipalities. The MF, however, did not set forth among its core provisions a dedicated mechanism to help citizens voice their priorities in the selection of public investment programs to be financed.

Within this context and as part of the Open Government agenda led by the Government of Mexico, a pilot project for implementing a Participatory Budgeting (PB) initiative1 was designed to (a) help enhance transparency in the use of re-

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1 This initiative was part of the World Bank technical cooperation with the Federal Secretariat of Public Administration (SFP) implemented as part of the Project for “Improving Transparency and Accountability Mechanisms,” funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This mechanism was prepared with the strong collaboration and commitment of the Municipality of Cananea and the full support of the Federal Secretariat of Agrarian, Territorial and Urban Development (SEDATU, by its acronym in Spanish).
sources allocated to mining municipalities and (b) allow citizens to engage in the decision-making process for the selection of public investments to be financed by the MF. The PB mechanism was piloted in Cananea, a small municipality in Sonora State that receives one of the largest shares of royalties distributed by the Mining Fund. This short note presents the characteristics of the PB mechanism developed for the Mining Fund and implemented in the Municipality of Cananea, Mexico, as well as the overall results and impact achieved so far.

**Local Context: The Mining Fund and Cananea**

*The Relevance of the Mining Fund for Mining Communities*

In 2014, the Mexican Congress reformed the Federal Law of Rights to establish a special royalty tax to be applied to all mining concessions in Mexico. According to the law, mining companies in Mexico are to pay a standard tax of 7.5 percent, called Derecho Especial, on their reported profits. An additional 0.5 percent is applied as extraordinary tax for precious metal concessions of gold, silver, and platinum. The revenue collected through these special taxes is transferred to the Mining Fund—led by the Secretariat of Agrarian, Territorial and Urban Development (SEDATU). The Mining Fund’s main objective is to redistribute the royalties obtained from mining companies to the mining communities by funding public infrastructure projects with a social, environmental, and sustainable human development impact for the inhabitants in extraction regions. Of the companies’ annual reported profits taxed and transferred to the MF, 77.5 percent, or approximately $150 million, is allocated to subnational governments (states and municipalities) and disbursed against approved investment projects.

In 2016, $104 million was distributed among 237 beneficiary municipalities, each of them receiving an average allocation of $440 thousand. Allocations are assigned according to the value of the extractive activities in the mining area of the municipality relative to the total national value. Earmarked resources assigned to the municipalities through this mechanism are significant and are in addition to the annual fiscal budget of the beneficiary states and municipalities. In some cas-
es, the funds are similar in amount to the local public investment budgets, and in a few extraordinary cases, the amount could match or even double the municipality’s entire annual fiscal budget.

Projects to be financed by the MF are presented by the beneficiary municipalities and approved by a regional development committee (RDC), which is in charge of ensuring that the proposals submitted are eligible for financing as per the criteria set forth by the Mining Fund. The RDC includes members of the three levels of government (national, state, and local), mining companies, and an indigenous community leader. Despite the multi-stakeholder representation in the RDC, its members have a say only on the projects that were already selected by the municipalities and do not necessarily represent citizen’s priorities or address their needs.

Because of the substantial amount of funds distributed by the MF and given that the amount received by some of the beneficiary municipalities could, in some cases, double their annual local budgets, a well-articulated accountability mechanism is needed that would help ensure that funds are used in a transparent manner and for the intended purpose. This particular national context also presents a unique opportunity to redefine the social contract between the local governments and their people to help ensure public investments financed by the MF are indeed tending the needs of the citizens of mining communities. The latter is possible only when a concrete engagement mechanism, such as the one proposed by the PB initiative, is put in place. Such a mechanism (a) allows citizens to have accessible information about the MF and the benefits it could bring to the community, (b) creates citizen-oriented data about investment projects financed through the MF, and (c) establishes multiple ways for the community to participate in the decision-making process in the use of resources distributed by the MF.

2 Investments to be financed by the MF have to comply with at least one of the following criteria: (a) the construction, remodeling, and equipping of schools or urban public spaces; (b) paving works and maintenance of local streets and roads or installation and maintenance of public lighting that is respectful of the environment, as well as public services based on energy efficiency and renewable energies; (c) infrastructure works for environmental protection, such as landfills; water treatment plants; installation and maintenance of public drainage works; integrated management of urban solid waste; improvement and monitoring of air, water, and soil quality, as well as potable water supply; (d) works that preserve natural areas, such as protection, restoration, rescue, or rehabilitation of aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems, and for the conservation and sustainable use of wildlife; or (e) works that positively affect urban mobility, including suburban train systems, metro transport or equivalent, or any other environmentally friendly and low-carbon public transportation system.
Why Cananea?

Cananea is a mining municipality in the Mexican state of Sonora, close to the Mexico-US border. Cananea has a population of 35,057 inhabitants. Its main economic activity is the mining industry. It is an urban municipality, with higher education attainment, low poverty rates (36.3 percent), and low levels of marginalization.

Cananea is one of the most important mining centers in Mexico, with the largest copper mine in Mexico and the seventh-largest in the world, the “Buenavista del Cobre,” operating a few kilometers outside the city. Because of its proximity to one of the most profitable extractive areas, during the first two years of the operationalization of the MF (2015–2016), Cananea received about $7 million per year. In 2017, $15 million was earmarked for the municipality, more than doubling the average annual municipal budget, which is around 7 million dollars.

During the first two years, the infrastructure program financed by the MF was decided based on priorities identified by the local government. The program, while ensuring social benefits for the community, was developed without running any formal consultation with the citizen, because of a lack of mechanisms to consult and to involve them in the decision-making process.

However, the municipality – and, in particular, its mayor – prioritized citizen engagement as one of the pillars of its government plan, which pledges an “effective and citizen-centered government.” The strong leadership of Cananea’s mayor and the conviction to engage with its people in a more systematic and articulated manner opened a clear opportunity for creating a deliberative and participatory process to be implemented within the context of the MF. The latter was critical to pilot the PB initiative in the context of the MF in Cananea.
Piloting Participatory Budgeting in a Mining Municipality

**Planning Stage**

As a first step, the municipality decided the amount of the budget to be allocated to the initiative. It assigned $3 million (40 percent of the year’s allocation of the MF) to the PB, this is equivalent to $95 per capita. Second, a decision about the territorial impact (partial or complete) of the pilot was taken. From the beginning, it was decided that the PB should apply to the full territory of Cananea, so participatory budgeting territorial assemblies or territorial participation units (TPUs) were created. The reason behind this division was to organize and facilitate the process while representing in a differentiated manner the diverse social, economic, geographic, and development conditions and needs of the population in every TPU. The municipality assigned six units in Cananea City and four in some of its communal lands.

Once the division of the territory was set, a decision was made regarding the amount to be allocated to each TPU. The government decided to assign an equal amount of resources for each of the TPUs in Cananea City. It distinguished the level of complexity and investment needed to solve problems in the city, however, from the amount needed to tend the needs of the communal lands. Thus, $400 thousand was allocated to every city TPU and $150 thousand to each of the communal selected. Finally, a powerful brand identity was created naming the PB as “Cananea tú decides” (Cananea, this is your opportunity to decide).
From Planning to Action

The Cananea PB was modeled taking as a reference the international experience but adapted to the local context and to the local needs. It followed the cases of PB initiatives under a non-competitive territorial approach which allows a more inclusive exercise in terms of territorial coverage. In practical terms, this approach allowed to ensure that all TPU were allocated funds of the PB and, for the same, they did not have to compete with each other. This resulted in an increased trust in the process and greater interests of the neighbors in each TPU to participate in the PB initiative. As such, a tailor-made methodology was developed to guide the entire implementing process. To ensure that transparency and citizen interaction were at the core of the process, a communication and public outreach strategy was designed and implemented.

The PB was implemented in record time: from April 2017 to April 2018, the Cananea PB was designed, launched, and implemented, with 13 projects currently under execution.

A detailed description of the methodology specially developed for the PB in Cananea and some of the salient features of each stage are described below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>May – Jun 2017</td>
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<td>Jun – Jul 2017</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>Nov – Jan 2018</td>
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Participatory Meetings

During June 2017, 14 meetings were held in the TPUs. Through social networks, radio programs, and the official information channels of the municipality, citizens from the TPUs were invited to attend. The municipal president welcomed all participants, and a presentation was delivered that socialized the Mining Fund’s objective and virtues, the PB methodology for Cananea, and the potential impact of their specific participation.

In all, 615 citizens from Cananea participated in those meetings, presenting and discussing 377 proposals for public investment projects. Through a deliberative voting process, two to four proposals were chosen by the participants in each meeting, with a total of 34 proposals. During those meetings, volunteer citizens were chosen by the participants to follow the development of proposals into projects; thus, Citizen Monitoring Groups were instituted.

Participatory Meetings in Numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participatory Meetings</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Proposals</th>
<th>Proposals Voted on Plenary Session During the PM</th>
<th>Proposals Approved and Reviewed by the Municipal Public Works Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Technical Validation

After the 34 proposals were chosen by the citizens of Cananea, the technical team of the Department of Public Works of the Municipality made an assessment of each project. First, the team took the Mining Fund criteria into account, verifying that each of the proposals complied with the eligible spending categories established in the regulations and that no restrictions existed. Second, given the technical team’s experience in project preparation and execution, a preliminary costing of each proposal was made.

In this stage, 31 proposals were deemed viable. For all 34 proposals, a user-friendly data sheet that included all relevant criteria was developed. It indicated the outcome of the validation process, including reasons for rejection when that was the case. The data sheets were made public via the “Cananea tú decides” (http://cananeatu-decides.com/) webpage, as well as through social media, and the municipality informed the citizen monitoring groups directly.
Caption
Road Surfacing/Paving (53%)  Water Sewage and Garbage Services (17%)  Street Lighting (18%)  Water Works (9%)  Improvement of Public Areas (3%)

Public Voting
From September 16, 2017 to October 20, 2017, the citizens of Cananea were invited to vote on the proposals that were validated by the technical unit. An electronic ballot with real-time counting of the people participating was set up. There was one terminal in the municipal hall and one terminal in a vehicle that circulated throughout the territory so that everyone who was interested could vote. Citizens had to identify themselves with the voting credential, and then personnel from the municipality handed them the voting instrument. Each citizen could submit two votes for different projects.

In this stage, a total of 5,718 people participated in the public voting process. In each TPU, projects were ranked in order of voting, and those with the most votes up to the amount assigned to each TPU were selected, resulting in 13 winning proposals in the amount of $2 million. The whole process was made public, with the number of votes received announced in real time and the winning projects announced in a public ceremony on October 20, including the number of votes that each proposal received as they were directly downloaded from the electronic ballot system.
Formulation and Approval of Investment Projects
After the projects were selected in the voting stage, the technical team of the municipality prepared the dossiers that SEDATU requires for all projects to be submitted to the regional development committee. In this stage, the municipal team had support from the technical unit in SEDATU that advises local governments on the requirements to integrate a solid and effective project. The first nine projects were approved in the December 2017 session of the RDC; the remaining four were approved in February 2018. The municipality continuously informed the monitoring groups about the stage each project was in, and they informed citizens in general through social media and the “Cananea tú decides” webpage.

Bidding and Execution of Projects
In January 2018, the public bidding for all projects began, following the procurement regulations. Again, the citizen monitoring groups were informed of each bidding and award process, giving them an active role in supervising the transparency and compliance until the award of the contract. Once project execution began, the monitoring groups had an active part in attesting to the physical advance of the work. The execution of all 13 projects is expected to conclude by September 2018. A public ceremony headed by the municipal president and the citizen monitoring groups will take place to inaugurate each work.

Communication and Public Outreach Strategy
A communication and public outreach strategy was designed, taking into consideration the local habits and preferences of the PB targeted audience. The objective of the communication strategy was twofold:

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3 Because Cananea is a small municipality, a common way to inform the citizens of any event is megaphone advertising done from a vehicle circulating the territory. That was the main channel to announce the participation meetings, especially in the outskirts of Cananea.
first, to ensure transparency of the entire process, and second, to ensure that citizens have enough information to participate in a meaningful way in each stage to maximize the effect of the participatory approach being implemented. Having a well-designed communication strategy was key to build people’s trust in the PB process. The website www.cananeatudecides.com was designed and developed by the municipality to maximize the public outreach of the initiative and to make sure that information for each stage of the process was made available not only to citizens of Cananea but also to the general public. By doing so, the process provides greater transparency and accountability of the PB initiative and in the use of mining funds by the local government.

**Municipal Resources**

To be able to carry out the PB, the municipality committed important resources to the task. A team led by the municipal treasurer managed all the stages. A facilitating team was set up and trained to carry out the participation meetings. A communications team was in charge of their corresponding strategy. Finally, the technical team participated in crucial stages of the PB, such as the validation process, the formulation of investment projects, and project execution. For this process to work out, a carefully planned chronogram was defined and followed.

**Stakeholders**

Because this was a pilot activity, the engagement of the leading institution, SEDATU, was key in the development of the PB methodology and in its implementation. From the beginning, the idea was welcomed and supported by senior management at SEDATU and was supported at the federal and state level. The technical team of SEDATU was especially helpful in supporting the municipal technical team while integrating the dossiers to be presented in the RDC. More important, the PB of Cananea as a pilot initiative was considered successful by SEDATU. This pilot offered SEDATU an alternative: a comprehensive citizen participation tool that ensures that communities are part of constructing solutions to the development and public investment needs in mining communities, making the mission of the Mining Fund more effective.
Overall Results
The project was successfully implemented in one year (April 2017–April 2018). At the end, 21 percent of the adult voting population of Cananea had participated in the initiative, one of the highest rates of participation for a first-time-implemented PB in the global context. As a result of this process, 13 projects were selected, and all of them are currently being executed. In one year, the project achieved most of the goals set forth at its designing stage, including (a) increasing public participation of citizens in government matters; (b) promoting a bottom-up approach for public investment, allowing citizens to identify and prioritize their community needs; and (c) promoting greater transparency in the use of public resources and improved accountability in public investment because of the monitoring process designed as part of the initiative. Because of this project’s success, the government has considerable interest in institutionalizing the PB among mining municipalities and extending the experience in a harmonic way as an open government approach that can foster citizen participation for better service delivery.

Required Conditions for Successful Implementation
The existence of a dedicated fund, the Mining Fund, that allocated resources for public investment at the local level provided the right financial vehicle for piloting the PB project. As a very emblematic fund for the mining community and an important instrument to implement a social-oriented public investment policy, the MF provided the needed conditions to advance the open and participatory government agenda at the local level in Mexico. The amount of resources allocated to the PB was significant. The mayor of Cananea assigned 60 million pesos of the total allocation of the Mining Fund for 2016, which represented about $95 per capita, to the Participatory Budgeting pilot program. That is one of the highest levels of allocation in the records of international experience. The pilot had a dynamic team, technically capable and committed to the public function, which allowed the successful completion of the pilot in less than a year.
Having political commitments from key government officials at all three levels of government who provided support every step of the process was key.

An open and transparent process, including a trusted electronic voting system, gave sufficient confidence to have high participation rates from the citizenry at all stages.

The concrete results witnessed by the citizens of Cananea enabled them not only to value the power of their participation but also to see their community needs addressed, with 11 projects currently under implementation and two of them already finalized.

Lessons Learned

PB provides a great entry point for a longer-term engagement with citizens and for promoting greater transparency and accountability in the use of public resources. If there is interest in constructing more democratic societies in which citizens are at the center, open and participatory government practices should be more widely explored and developed.

Citizen participation is not limited to voting. Wherever projects that are of high impact, visible, and close to the community are being implemented, such as infrastructure development, a citizen engagement strategy to monitor the adequate execution and operation of those projects can be put in place.

This project developed a methodology for a systematized and organized process that ensures citizen participation at different stage of the public investment cycle, contributing to greater accountability and trust in government. The PB methodology can be incorporated as part of financing facilities—similar to the one of the Mining Fund—that are developed and implemented by the government to support economic and social development at the national and local level.
Asia
Participatory Budgeting in China: Approaches and Development

Li Fan

The development of participatory budgeting (PB) in China has evolved for more than a decade since first introduced in China in 2005. PB in China is a product of various Chinese experience combined with the international models. From a practical point of view, participatory budgeting in China is still in the process of continuous exploration. Nonetheless, it is worth noting at this point that China has explored and developed quite a few different PB models distinct from foreign PB experiences. In reviewing China’s experience, PB in China meets the goal of several domestic reforms in China: China’s recent open budget reform, local government governance reform, and public participation reforms. From its broad scope of applicability, participatory budgeting will have much room for development in China.

I. China’s Budget Reform and the Emergence of Participatory Budgeting

China’s budget system is the byproduct of the establishment of China’s market mechanism. After many years of economic reform in China, the issue of budget system remains a major problem and requires several reforms: 1) the open budget reform; 2) the establishment of a budget formulation and review process; 3) improving the budget process to better account for the economic construction, population needs, and budget estimate performance. The ongoing budget reform needs to incorporate and strive to achieve these three goals.

1. The Opening of Budget

Making China’s various governments open their budget books to the public remains an extraordinarily difficult obstacle for actual budget reform. For a long period of time in the past, every level of the Chinese government kept their budgets secret. Since coming into office in 2002, China’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabao had been committed to making every government level more accountable and transparent by opening up their books to the public. However, in practice,
this proved to be a strenuous task. In China’s budget system, local
government budgets are only opened to a few individuals, such as the
Party Secretary, the Head of the Government and the Head of the Fi-
nancial Department. During the People’s Congress sessions, the de-
puties may review the government budgets but they may only view a
few numbers stripped of any details. Overall, the government budg-
gets are kept confidential. Not many government officials know the
details, and the citizens know even less. The open budget reform was
difficult to achieve under the government’s perennial habit of put-
ting off these reforms.

Instead of approaching the reform from the top, which has always
proved slow and arduous, a rather plausible way is to cultivate the re-
form from the bottom. Much like most other reforms in China, a local
government took the lead to first open its budget books to the public.
In July 2005, the public budget reform was launched in Xinhe, a small
town in Wenling City, Zhejiang Province. It became China’s first pub-
lic budget reform example. Xinhe was the first local government to
disclose all its budget details to the People’s Congress and to the pub-
lic. Three years later, the other towns in Wenling City also achieved
full government budgets transparency.

The Jiaozuo City in Henan Province was the first city-level gov-
ernment to achieve full openness of government budgets. In 2008,
eight stacks of government budgeting documents containing very
detailed accounts of the budget were publicized. However, it is hard
for other local governments to open their budgets this same style,
opening up the budgets in a single act. The budget reforms in other
city or county governments, such as Wenling City and Minhang Dis-
trict in Shanghai, were gradually opened and publicized rather than
done in one step.

Influenced by local practices, the State Council accelerated the open
budget reforms on all levels of the government. Unlike previous re-
form to open budget, this reform focused on opening the “three-pub-
lic expenditures” of the total budgets, which are the public reception,
official vehicles and pubic travel expenses. This was a wise and effi-
cient way to carry out the reform. Led by the central government, all
levels of the government across the country began publishing their
“three-public expenditures” to the public. Though the opening of
“three-public expenditures” budget reform did not accomplish the
opening of the entire government budget reports as the previous re-
form goal set out to do, it was perhaps the only way to carry on the public budget reform in China at the time. Then in 2013, Premier Li Keqiang commanded all levels of the government to open their entire government budgets. Building upon the experience from the “three-public expenditures” reform, now the entire government budget was required to be made public.

2. Establishing the procedure of budget review

The government budget estimation is calculated based on government’s income and needs. Although the budget is made by the government, the People’s Congress ultimately reviews and approves the final budget arrangements. Thus in China, each level of the People’s Congress must review each level of the government budget. When all levels of the government budget were required to be opened and approved, the People’s Congress (hereby Congress) can finally review and decide on the budgets made by the government. The role of Congress suddenly became increasingly important.

When Xinhe town in Wenling City launched the budget reform in 2005, it also reformed the review procedures in the Congress as well. However, the effect of the reform in the first year was limited because both the deputies and the government officials were unfamiliar with the new procedures. Since 2006, this new budget review system has been improved year after year and a relatively comprehensive review procedure was established in 2008. This new review procedure was then also adopted in other towns in Wenling.

The procedure includes the following parts: (1) publicize the government budget; (2) enable the public to participate in the first review of government budget; (3) have deputies in the Congress question the budget while government officials give answers publicly; (4) have the Congress, the government, and the party committee convene in a joint meeting to discuss the adjustments and revisions of the original budget; (5) have deputies discuss the adjustments and revisions in groups; (6) to have deputies to raise a budget amendment bill; (7) have all members of Congress discuss and debate on the budget amendments bill; (8) have all members of Congress anonymously vote on or veto the amendments bill; (9) have the Congress vote on all the budgets by a show of hands. These were the first procedure established in China to enable the People’s Congress to deliberate on government
budgets. Although the original scope of application only reached the town–level budget review, this process made a profound influence on China’s politics. Later, not only did other towns in Wenling applied this procedure, other city-level government as well as Minhang District in Shanghai City also established their own procedure to enable the People’s Congress to deliberate on the government budgets.

3. Public participation in the budget process

To gauge the performance of the budget is a very difficult process. First, it is necessary to determine the objectives of the budget. Only with the goal in mind, can there be efficient report on the cost-effective implementation of the budget, determine financial waste, and evaluate the satisfaction levels of the society, etc. Making a reliable evaluation procedures and standards are also important aspects of the reform. The budget assessment involves a series of technical evaluation standards and the establishment of several evaluation index systems. It is critical to have a system to evaluate the entire process of the budgeting, including the setting up process, the modification process, and the social approval ratings on the final project. So far, there has not been a very successful effective evaluation index system. In some local projects, especially on issues dealing with everyday people’s livelihood, the social approval ratings are not high. It is believed that these government projects are still plagued with corruption, wasted funds, and an overall lack of purpose. The voice of criticism continues to emerge and the local governments remain very passive towards the projects.

In recent years, the Chinese government has advocated for more innovative local governance methods. One of the innovative methods is to promote public participation in various governing projects. Some places have implemented public participation in connection with the budgeting. For example, through public commentaries, the society became involved in the public finances and government economic plans. To some extent, this participation process set a precedent and was the catalyst for the emergence of participatory budgeting projects in China.

All three aspects of the budget reforms involves public participation in the government budgeting process. And active public participation is a prerequisite for a successful budget reform. At this time, the concept of Participatory Budgeting (PB) in the foreign countries was
introduced into China. Since the concept of public participation in PB addresses issues arisen from the budget reform process, various models of PB began taking form in China.

II. China’s Approaches and Development of PB

In 2005, participatory budgeting (PB) was formally introduced to China in a large conference held by the China Development Research Foundation (CDRF), a subsidiary of Development Research Center of the State Council. In this conference, experts and scholars overseas were invited to introduce the concept and practices of PB to scholars and local government officials in China. This conference was held to promote the public budget reform.

After this conference, CDRF organized an expert observation tour to Brazil, where PB had originated. Various leaders from the local governments were also invited to join. After this tour, starting from 2006, CDRF cooperated with local governments and launched participatory budgeting experiments in the cities of Wuxi and Harbin. In these experiments, the Brazil model was applied.

Since 2005, the concept of participatory budgeting has been popularized. Chinese-style PB have continued to develop. There has been many different attempts and established practices or models. In most cases, China adopted similar concepts and methods as other countries while carrying out PB, namely the process that the government budget is discussed and decided by the residents or representatives of residents. The attempts and practices of PB within China each have their own development trajectories. Different areas in China have integrated and formed their own models of PB from various angles, creating an array of new and colorful models of PB in China.

1. Practices of Pre-Participatory Budgeting Concept

Before the concept of participatory budgeting was formally introduced to China in 2005, there were several local experiences similar to the practices of participatory budgeting. These local experiences have had considerable impact on the subsequent development of PB on the local government level.

First, there is the emergence of the “menu” approach. In 2003, Huinan Town, Shanghai Municipality, first created the “a la carte” or “menu” approach. In this, the town government takes 15 percent of govern-
ment funds and proposes twenty projects related to people’s livelihood. Then, the Congress delegates discuss and select ten projects out of the twenty through the process of voting. These selected items would be included in the government’s financial plan of the following year. At the time, this practice was not considered as part of the budgeting reform. It was only attended by representatives of the local People’s Congress and no other personnel were involved. This practice was later studied by Ninghai County in Ningbo City of Zhejiang Province and applied in several townships as a way of reforming the budget. The practice of Ningbo is completely similar to that of Nanhui. Where only deputies of the local People’s Congress can participate. But unlike Nanhui, Ningbo made it clear that the fund deliberated was part of the government budget.

The above approach is considered as the “menu” approach because the government prepared the list in advance. The only participation aspect was the filtering down process from the list, selecting ten projects out of the twenty projects on the list. With the addition of expanded public participation, this approach has become a common method for participatory budgeting later in places such as Shanghai, Ha’erbin and Wuxi City. This approach is relatively easy to carry out and it will most likely to be used as the basic method in many parts of China’s participatory budgeting in the future.

The second method emerged from the expansion of public participation in government projects developed in places such as Zeguo Town, Wenling city of Zhejiang Province. Also in 2005, Zeguo town conducted a random sampling to select representatives from the residents to discuss the prior government proposed projects. These representatives, also in accordance to the “menu method,” would hold several round table discussions and vote for the projects they want based on the allocated government funds. This is an example of “deliberative democracy” styled public participation. The project was led by the project’s designer, Professor James Fishkin of Stanford University. The purpose of this approach was not to reform of the budgeting process nor to introduce the concept of PB. It was just a new way for the public to participate in government decision-making. Those involved in this project also did not link it to the budget reforms. Nonetheless, this could constitute as a case of budget reform as well as a case of participatory budgeting in China.
2. Double Participation Model – Participation in budget initiating and review (Wenling Model)

The earliest participatory budgeting practice in China with unique Chinese approach appeared in Wenling. With the exception of Zeguo town, as mentioned above, Wenling city has been the earliest and most consistent advocate for the concept and development of China’s participatory budgeting. Building upon previous experience of budget reforms, both the preparation of the government for the budget and the reviewing process done by the local People’s Congress had an additional procedures for public participation. This style of PB reform in Wenling began in Xinhe town. It involved public participation from the beginning stages of governmental budget initiation. Then the public participation was enlarged through the participation at the People’s Congress’ review stage as well. This is the Wenling model or the Double Participation Model. This is a native model of PB in China. The real change to the budget participation occurred at the end of 2009. Local government held a democratic consultation meeting at the budget-making stage. While the budget agenda was being set, the government brought the proposal to each village meetings for the villagers voice their opinions on the proposals. During this time, the People’s Congress members and the villagers could pose questions and suggestions on the proposal. Then, the questions were referenced by the local government officials when they made their decisions on setting up the budget. And some budget agenda contents were actually revised based on these questions. In addition to Xinhe, other villages and towns adopted similar practices. For example, Wenqiao conducted a budget agenda meeting concerning gender. After participating on the side of government budgeting initiation process, the public also has the opportunity to equally participate during the Congress budget reviewing process. This is the model continued in Xinhe even today, while Zeguo continued its original random representative model mentioned above.

From these experiences, public participation in Wenling can be seen at both the local government level during the budget initiation process as well as at the review procedure in the People’s Congress. Therefore, we called this the Double Participation Model and it is a unique Chinese-styled PB approach. The Double Participation Model has shown amazing results in Wenling for more than a decade. However, virtually nowhere else can this
process be replicated. This is mainly because it is extremely difficult to launch reform at any level of the People’s Congress system. However, it is not difficult to facilitate public participation at the stage of creating or setting the budget agenda at the local government side. For example, in Luohu District, Shenzhen city, the local government allowed public participation at the stage of setting the budget agenda. Furthermore, in Shunde city, Guangdong Province, an elite group participated in the discussion of local government’s budget. These steps were learned from the practices of Wenzhou. This type of participation is mainly consultation-based rather than full decision-making. Therefore, this method still faces the problem of low degree of participation.

3. “Menu” or “a la carte” (“caidan”) Model also known as the Shanghai Model

The practice of participatory budgeting in Shanghai is mainly refers to as the “Menu Model.” This practice is prevalent in many local communities. The advantage of this model is its accessibility. However, the problem with this model is also the low degree of public participation. Public discussion only occurs just before the stage of voting. Strictly speaking, if during the final process of decision, only the People’s Congress members are allowed the vote, then this process is not a form of participatory budgeting at all. Rather, it is only a session of People’s Congress budget review. But since Shanghai expanded the voting eligibility to the street level, this process can be seen as an introductory participatory budgeting model. In this model, the society has the power to determine the final projects. However, it is the local government who provides the list of projects for society to choose from. Furthermore, the discussion process is also usually very short. Therefore, again, the degree of participation is relatively low. After the CDRF convened a budget meeting in 2005, they led local government leaders who were interested in promoting budget reforms to visit the city of Porto Alegre, the birthplace of Brazil’s participatory budgeting. In Brazil’s model of PB, under the authority of the municipal council, a part of the budget is drawn from the government budget. Resident
representatives and social organizations from all regions participate in the discussion of the relevant budget items. After several rounds of discussions, the resident representatives open up the floor to vote. The budget items that are discussed and decided by the resident representatives will no longer be modified by the government. They will become part of the government budget and the Congress will not need to approve these projects.

In accordance with these experiences, CDRF conducted experiments on several street governments of Harbin City, Heilongjiang Province, and also in Wuxi City, Jiangsu Province. Experiments with Participatory Budgeting are conducted on the street government level. The government proposes several projects on the development of these streets and the resident representatives decide on the projects. According to China’s political system, the street government is not an official government office, but an agency of District Government at the first level. But the street government has some power to decide on the local budget. Because it’s a not the official government level, there is no setup for the People’s Congress. This allows some resident representatives to directly discuss and decide on these projects.

This practice is currently popular on the streets and communities in Shanghai. This method is relatively simple and easy to implement, without long time for deliberation to the projects, and it is a decision-making type of participation of PB. Although the “menu” approach has made great progress compared to the consulting-based participation models, the level of public participation is still relatively low. This is mainly because the public discussion before the voting stage is far from enough. Also the scope of participation is not wide enough either.

Shanghai now expands this approach to street and communities, so it can also be viewed as a Participatory Budgeting. Although the Menu Model also has the problem of low participation rates, it allows the public to the decision-making process and makes it easily accessible. Therefore, the Menu Model could serve as a transitional practice at the initial stage of participatory budgeting.
4. Community Competition Model or Maizidian Model

Maizidian, a street level government in Chaoyang district of Beijing City, conducted a “Practical Affairs Project of the People’s Livelihood” (shishi gongcheng) in 2013. In this approach, local government renders disposable budget as funds that could be used for people’s practical affairs. The usage of this fund was initiated and discussed by the residents. They can even propose their own projects. A community committee, for some projects initiated and discussed by residents their own, will first reach a common agreement and then compete against other projects proposed by other community committees in the same street level. In the process of competition, five community committees present and explain their own projects and raise some questions on other projects. The agreement on the final projects will be achieved through voting by all representatives from five communities. The total amount of government budget fund cannot exceed 200 million RMB.

The advantage of the Maizidian Model, or the Community Competition Model, is its high degree of participation. The duration of the discussion period also lasts a longer period of time. Two months is given to have in-depth discussion, beginning in the community and then moving to a process of competition with other communities. The Maizidian Model takes several elements from global practices of participatory budgeting; namely, it pays serious attention to the process of discussion and has high degree of participation on budget decision.

One problem with the Community Competition Model is that of selective knowledge. Residents who participate in the final voting stage are only familiar with the projects of their own communities rather than those of all others. Therefore, they may only vote for the projects of their community and reject the other ones. One possible solution to this problem is to have some delegates from the various street level government offices, their representatives as the experts either policy or technique participate in the final vote so that the results can be balanced.

Another issue is that the competition among communities leads to only the discussion of community-level project, excluding mentions of the street-level projects. This phenomenon has a negative impact on the promotion of the capacity of public participation and thus harms the efficiency government fund usages.

The practice in Maizidian has attracted much attention. However, due
to its complicated and time-consuming processes, it is also difficult for other regions to learn from them even if the other regions may have strong desire to do so. At present, the Community Competition Model has been promoted as the standard model of PB at the street level in Beijing.

5. Departmental/Sector Budgeting (Yanjin’s model)

Since 2012, the Yunnan Provincial Department of Water Resources has received a project from the World Bank to support the construction of water conservancy in rural areas in addition to the government funds already allocated for the local water conservancy construction. This project was received by Yanjin County. According to the provisions of the World Bank, how this money is used should be determined through the participation of the society. Therefore, the Department of Water Resources decided to start a participatory budgeting exercise in four townships in Yanjin, which formed a departmental participatory budgeting case conducted in an unique water conservancy department. An expert group was established in Yunnan for this purpose. The relevant scholars from Fudan University, Tsinghua University and Zhongshan University were involved.

In this model, the public and government agencies may propose projects in congruence. Thus, the Department formed a project library. Afterwards, the villages selected representatives, including some village officials, deputies to the People’s Congress, and the general public, to form a representative team in order to determine the budget for the township projects. These representatives raised, discussed, selected, and voted for the projects. The projects that were voted were then formally included in the government budget. The projects that have been adopted include both village and town level projects.

The Yanjin Participatory Budgeting case also requires a long period of time to carry out. The results of repeated discussions can also flesh out and review more in-depth details. It has received many positive feedbacks. This is also a decision-making approach rather than consultative-based and has high level of participation. It is worth noting that this is also the first case of departmental budgeting in counties and town level in China. The specific practice of Yanjin is worth advocating. However, this reform stopped after 2014.
6. Fund Distribution in Community Model
The cases stated above are conducted by the local governments and are typically conducted according to the basic method of participatory budgeting, where the government allows the society to make a decision on the whole or parts of the government budget. Another version that some claim as a unique model of PB in China is the Fund Distribution Model. Some wealthy local governments would pass money down to the village committees (in rural area) or community committees (in urban area) to use. Sometimes the funds are packaged in the name of party building or people’s livelihood building.
Although different governments have different goals, all funds are parts of the government funds. Some regions allow the communities decide on the usage of the funds. This process does not include government budgets planning or review process. These fund has already been decided by local governments from the budget. Local communities may suggest and discuss how to use these funds. And they may further set up discussion procedures. Nevertheless, the final decision is still within the government’s authority, rather than in the hands of the residences. The local government, either street or township, has the final power to decide the fund usage. In other words, residents only have consulting power.
Therefore while some people also call this as a model of participatory budgeting. Others do not think it is participatory budgeting due to the inability to decide the amount of budget and the pack of an official process in the budget process. Because of the prevalence of this model in China, we call this “participatory-budgeting-like” approach the Fund Distribution in Community Model. It can serve to promote grassroots autonomy. Several communities of both rural and urban areas in Chengdu city widely conducted PB following this model. This type of PB was also conducted in some urban areas in Shenzhen and Beijing. Although this practice lacks high level of participation and strict procedures, it is still a commendable effort. Therefore, we think this model should be encouraged and popularized in China.

7. Newest Model: Comprehensive and Inclusive Model
Since December 2016, a new type of participatory budgeting mod-
el has emerged in the Meilan District of Haikou City, Hainan Province. In this model, the local government takes out an amount of funds from the government budget for people’s livelihood to use in both the street and community levels. At the street level, there are a total of one million RMB. At the community level, there are 300,000 RMB in each community.

The purpose of the budget is determined by the residents themselves, and the government does not intervene. The specific approach is that all residents over the age of 15 who live, work, and study in the community can submit their opinions and suggestions on the usage of this fund. Then an organized initial project list would be discussed by the residents in a round-table format. Resident representatives participate in this discussion. As a result of these discussions, a preliminary list of projects will be formed. This more succinct list of projects would be ranked based on the number of votes. Then according to this list, the relevant departments at the district government will designate the amount of funds each project may need. Then the lists, including the estimated funds needed, would be presented as a ballot. And there are two separate ballots: one for the projects in the Community level and the other for the street level projects. Under this design, the residents may vote on both the community level and the street level projects.

The voting phase lasted one week. All local residents over the age of 15 allow to take vote. After voting, the results was shown for the public. The government determined the execution of the project based on the results from the voting. The scope of project content included both construction projects and service-oriented projects. In Hainan, two streets participated, which consisted of thirteen communities and nearly 100,000 residents.

The Hainan Model is a Comprehensive and Inclusive Model, which ranked the proposal by popularity and followed by a referendum to cast votes. The entire process usually lasts for four months. The discussion was repeated again and again and it went through several processes. And during the voting process, only a simple voter registration was required to avoid repeated voting. Therefore, Hainan’s practice is the best case of recent PB in China in terms of the degree of public participation, breadth, and decision-making power.
The Hainan approach combines two trends, the reform of community autonomy and the practice of participatory budgeting. It meets the needs of China’s current social development and also helps resolve certain social problems that the local government finds difficulty to deal with.

Other local governments also expressed interest in this model of PB and have already made preparations or have already begun carrying out their own Participatory Budgeting reforms modeled from Hainan. For example, from October 2017 to February 2018, Xihu District of Nanchang City in Jiangxi Province carried out a similar PB project. They implemented the Comprehensive and Inclusive Participatory Budgeting Model on two streets, 21 communities, with a population of 70,000. In Nanchang, the PB project further included the participation of civil organizations, which in turn increased the depth and breadth the discussion.

In February 2018, the Meilan District of Hainan expanded the scope of the original participatory budgeting and conducted PB activities for “citizens’ proposals and referendums” in 24 communities across four streets. It also welcomes social organizations into the process.

The following table summarizes the various PB models in China. The table looks at the participation level, degree of decision power, and the width of participation of the residents or resident representative. The “level” column corresponds to the level of government that is involved in the PB process. “High” means that there is government involvement and “Low” means PB is carried out by community level, rather than government. The “degree of decision” power looks mainly at if the participation of the public is mainly consultative-based or do they have actual decision-making power. The width of participation is measured by the amount of time and the number of residents that participate in the process. It also takes into account the depth of the discussions. High width of participation means more participation and low width means less participation.

### Table 1 China’s Participatory Budgeting Model Comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Degree of decision</th>
<th>Width of participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Participatory Budgeting Concept</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low/High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menu Model</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Competition Model</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Departmental Budgeting Model</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fund Distribution in Community Model</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comprehensive and Inclusive Model</td>
<td>High</td>
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</table>
III. Characteristics of China’s Participatory Budgeting

To summarize the approaches and development stated above, China’s PB has four basic characteristics:

First, some practices of PB, such as those in Wenling and Shanghai, developed simultaneously resulting from the domestic budgeting reforms. Other cases evolve the local governments taking fiscal self-determination along the path of self-government, such as the practices of grassroots communities. Still others learn much from foreign experiences, such as the PB models of Wuxi, Haerbin, Maizidian, Yanjin, and even Hainan. Their practices are fairly international. China may learn many things, including some shortcuts, from looking at foreign models of PB especially in the initial stages. The appearance of these various forms are the result of China’s budget reforms.

Second, in comparison, the models that looked to the international models paid closer attention to the authenticity of the public participation and attached more importance to the degree of participation. Therefore, the participation of these models are relatively higher, the degree of decision-making and the depth of discussion are also higher. However, other than the Comprehensive and Inclusive Model of PB project conducted by Hainan, the general public participation of China’s PB is still relatively low. The foreign participatory budgeting models can basically guarantee representative participation in developing countries, and direct participation of all citizens in developed countries. Some places even allows foreigners to vote. Other places put very low voting age limit to encourage as many to participate in the community affairs. The ideal behind it is for all residents in the community to be involved in public affairs. Unfortunately, other than Hainan and Nanchang, China’s participatory budgeting cannot achieve such high degree of participation. It is only the participation of representatives and the selection of those representatives are also limited. Therefore, the overall level of China’s participation is relatively low.

Third, China’s PB shows major procedural problems. The procedures are not strict and are rather confusing. For ex-
ample, there are many problems in the process of presenting the projects, picking the representatives, producing the projects, and voting. On the one hand, this lack of strict procedures is due to the fact that local governments do not pay attention to the procedures. On the other hand, it is because the local governments are not used to delegating power to the society in making budgetary decisions.

Fourth, judging from various cases, it is shown that the participatory budgeting experiments in any single place generally cannot be maintained for a long time. This is because the choice to conduct participatory budgeting comes from the local government and is not stated by law. And because a well-developed Participatory Budgeting projects require a long period of time, government officials must input a lot of energy. They may cause the local government to allow conducting such projects once or twice, but it becomes difficult to stick with an annual process for a long period of time. So several cases were abandoned after a few years. So far, only Wenling is able to persist for a long time.

There can be many reasons for the above characteristics, but we have identified one fundamental reason. The promotion of PB requires an institutional background. At the very least, this is a game played by democratic nations, a product of combining various elements of the democratic institutions. China has failed in promoting a real representative democracy. And therefore, there are naturally difficulties in implementing participatory budgeting including the lack of a real motivational force. However, as a transitional country, such democratic experiments and democratic systems should be beneficial to China’s transitioning process.

From these perspectives, there are still a lot of room for China’s PB to continue developing. There are several reasons for this:

First, although the Chinese government has questioned electoral democracy and is ready to restrict it further, there is a real need for democracy within the society.
Therefore, there was the emergence of the concept of deliberative democracy in China. From a foreign point of view, deliberative democracy is complementary to representative democracy. It uses a degree of direct democracy to supplement the deficiency of the representative system. However, in China, the representative system has not yet developed. The demand for democracy in the society is represented by direct democracy, and participatory budgeting is itself a relatively good form of direct democracy. Therefore, in this stage, the social and political demand for PB is even higher and more necessary.

Second, China’s society is facing many problems on the grass-root level. For example, China is dealing with a premature aging society, the backward nature of grass-roots infrastructure, and the dissatisfaction of local residents towards the local governments. The local governments must think of many new ways to solve these issues, sometimes by bringing the many social opinions in the process. PB gives a framework to hold a dialogue between the society and the government to solve the problems and give them a combination of public funds and social autonomy. This allows the government funds to better serve the residents, benefiting both for the government and the residents. With the vast scope of social and political needs, participatory budgeting seem to be able to address many of these concerns. Therefore, PB in China still has much room for development.
History and Issues of Participatory Budgeting in South Korea

Won No

Introduction
Since it was first adopted in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 1989, participatory budgeting (PB) has spread to over 1,500 cities around the world. The way each jurisdiction implements PB varies with different social, political, and cultural contexts (Choi, 2004; Goldfrank, 2007). In a few countries such as the Dominican Republic, Peru, and South Korea, PB is mandated by law for all municipalities (Dias, 2014). In South Korea, participatory budgeting was mandated by the revision of the national law on local finance in 2011.

Understanding how PB became mandated is important because it provides not only the historical and political context of the different cases but also the basis for exploring the effects of process design. In Peru, national decentralization reform in 2002 was a trigger to establish several participatory institutions. In this country, PB was mandated by the Participatory Budgeting Law in 2003 and its revision in 2009 (McNulty, 2012). The reform was part of the efforts that aimed to clean up corruption in politics after the authoritarian Fujimori regime (McNulty, 2012, 2014). It is important to note that the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) was the main actor in this reform, which reflected the citizens’ demands for change to address the lack of transparency in funding decision-making processes (McNulty, 2012, 2014). In the Dominican Republic, PB became mandatory for all municipalities in the nation in 2007 with the adoption of two National Laws, which were later transformed in a constitutional amendment in 2010 (García, 2014). One noticeable aspect of this case is that the methodological guide that was prepared for PB practice was transcribed into the law, in contrast, to the more common case of laws being made while not considering the participants (García, 2014).
Several scholars have studied some of the accomplishments and challenges of the mandated cases of PB. For instance, for the case of Peru, McNulty (2014) states that the success of PB was possible because it was mandated, but also because it remained flexible: her interviews with officials reveal that the laws on the books helped engage new actors in local decision-making processes. McNulty (2014) noted that although the Peruvian law requires government officials to hold meetings, it is not guaranteed that those meetings would be truly participatory. For this reason, PB advocates in Peru ask for stronger sanctions that would prevent officials from manipulating the PB process. Similarly, in the Dominican Republic, García (2014) reports that two laws and the Constitution have set forth the process, and points out that even though the process is mandated for all municipalities, its implementation still depends on the political will of the heads of local government. In addition, when the financial capability of the municipality is low and thus cannot respond to the needs of the citizens, participatory processes such as PB disappointed citizens when they saw that their participation had no results (García, 2014).

It is still not clear, however, whether the success and challenges suggested in the literature regarding the other cases of PB were mainly because PB was mandated or because of the nature of PB itself. In this regard, this paper provides a review of how PB was mandated in South Korea and to identify challenges in South Korean PB in the context of legally mandated PB.

**History of PB in South Korea**

PB in South Korea is rooted in decentralization reform and the expansion of civil society organizations. In 1995, South Korea changed the way of electing local government leaders from indirect to direct election, and any citizens over 18 years old became eligible to vote for the leaders of the district, city, town, and/or state. The total population of South Korea was about 45 million in 1995. Koreans started to realize not only that they have the right to vote, but also that there are many other ways they could participate in government decision-making processes. Each local government became autonomous and could focus more on local issues than in the past when the central government ruled the whole country. At the same time, many local civil society organizations (CSOs) emerged.
The very first mode of public participation in the government budgeting process that the CSOs actively engaged was monitoring. This was not direct participation itself, but since 2000 the CSOs held many different budget-monitoring workshops nationwide. Those CSOs interested in civic participation in the government budgeting process formed the “budget monitoring network” and advocated for adopting PB. Based on these CSOs’ activities, in the June 2002 general election, the Democratic–Labor Party (a left-wing party) first adopted PB as one of their main campaign pledges. Before forming their pledges regarding PB, the South Korean Democratic–Labor party had communicated with the Brazilian Labor party (Lee, 2014). Although the party won only 0.1% of the seats, it was the first time in the country that the possibility of implementing PB was officially discussed.

The full-fledged efforts of adopting PB started when Moo-hyun ROH was elected President in December 2002 and named his cabinet “participatory government.” Two of his main presidential agenda items were government innovation and decentralization. On this basis, in “the roadmap for promoting decentralization in the participatory government” adopting PB was suggested, by the government advisory committee, as a way of institutionalizing the increase of public participation in the policy process (The government innovation and decentralization committee, 2003). Moreover, in July 2003, the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) suggested local governments increase public participation in their budget formulation process by conducting online surveys and holding public hearings and meetings and also (Kwak, 2005).

Within this social context, the first PB case started in 2003 in the City of Gwangju, the sixth-largest city by population in the country (about 1.35 million in 2000). Bukgu, a district in the City of Gwangju, first started by installing a participatory budgeting committee, then establishing its own PB ordinance in the next following year for the first time (Lee, 2014). Adopting PB was one of the pledges of the district head, who was from the same party as the President (Kim & Schachter, 2013). Although it was the very first case in South Korea that named the program “participatory budgeting,” the type of participation allowed in the first year was close to a public consultation rather than co-production or empowerment because the district head was in charge of constituting the PB committee and calling for meetings. The voluntary participative culture was not yet formed to make the PB active (Nah, 2005).
After then, following the strong will of President Moo-hyun ROH, the Local Finance Act was revised to encourage active involvement of residents in the local budget preparation process in 2005. At that time, the Local Finance Act opened the possibility of including residents in the budgeting process. Article 39 (Residents’ Participation in Budget Compilation Process of Local Governments) states that “the heads of local governments may set and implement procedures for residents to participate in the process of compiling their budgets under the conditions prescribed by the Presidential Decree” (KLRI, n.d.a). Meanwhile, Article 46 (Procedures for Residents to Participate in the process of Compiling Budgets of Local Governments) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Finance Act listed the ways that residents can participate in the budget preparation process as 1) public hearings or informal gatherings for discussion of major projects; 2) written or Internet question surveys on major projects; 3) the public offering of projects; 4) other means to appropriately solicit the opinions of residents, as prescribed by Municipal Ordinance (Korea Legislation Research Institute, 2013). Also, specific aspects of operation such as the scope of the budget, the procedures, and the means of PB should be prescribed by the Municipal Ordinance of each local government.

Following this revision of the law, 91 of 244 local governments (41.8%) in South Korea established PB ordinances during the five-year period 2005-2010 (Song, 2013). In October 2010, the MOPAS suggested three exemplary models as guidelines to facilitate local governments’ PB adoption and implementation: (1) optional installation of a PB general committee, (2) required the installation of a PB general committee, and (3) required the installation of a PB general committee and thematic subcommittees.

During this time, the national congress had been preparing another revision of the Local Finance Act that made PB compulsory for all local government units in the country. After this revision in 2011, public involvement was mandated in two ways: 1) heads of local governments were required to establish procedures that allowed resident participation in local public budgeting processes, and 2) heads of local gov-
ernments were required to enclose written statements that included residents’ opinions of the budget proposal and submit them to the local council. Although all local governments were required to guarantee public participation in the budgeting process, they still had a certain degree of discretion in deciding how and to what extent they would involve people, from consulting to allowing them to make decisions.

After the second revision of the Local Finance Act, as of August 2014, 241 of 243 local governments (99.1%), including the city government of Seoul and its 25 district governments, established their own PB ordinances (Seoul PB, 2014). It took about 14 months for all 25 districts in Seoul to first adopt PB in any way by establishing ordinances, regardless of whether they had implemented PB in practice from the last day of December 2010 to February 2012. Even though there is no penalty for noncompliance, almost all local governments in South Korea had complied with the PB requirement. This could be attributed to many different reasons, but three possible explanations can be advanced. The first is that the central government incentivized local governments by including “whether the local government established its own PB ordinance” to the local finance analysis index, which is used as a basis of financial support for local governments (Park & Choi, 2009). The second is that an administrative culture of traditional authority remains in South Korea that expects local governments to comply with requirements from higher government levels without any question (Jeong & Kim, 2012; Seong, 1999). The third is that changes in the governance system making heads of local governments directly elected by citizens have formed political motivations for heads of local governments to become more accountable to citizens by involving them more in decision-making processes (Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011).

Issues and Challenges in PB in South Korea

Although involving the public in the budgeting process is legalized and mandated for all local government units in South Korea, there are many issues and challenges. In the next part
of this paper, I present three issues that currently concern those who are interested in PB in South Korea.

**Government-led Process**

One interesting characteristic of the PB process in South Korea is that the facilitation of the bottom-up process has been initiated through a top–down approach. This is because budget formation authority is given to the administration, and budget ratification is in charge of the council. It is “opening up” one part of the budgeting formulation process that has been considered the sole purview of the government. Therefore, deciding the scope of participation (inclusiveness) and implementing the winning projects are the responsibility of the local governments themselves.

First, it is the electoral leader’s will (e.g., Mayors) to decide whether to fully implement PB, which allows the public to make real decisions or to involve the public in a limited way, consulting through public meetings or surveys. As a result, although most local governments (99.1%) established their PB ordinances, there are only a few local governments that fully implement PB. Seoul city’s PB was adopted and implemented because of Mayor Won-Soon PARK’s strong will to enhance public participation as a new mode of governance for the city, embracing not only ordinary citizens but also city councils and civil society organizations (Park, 2015). When the adoption of a government process relies too much on one leader’s will, the continuity and stability of that process can be easily questioned when there is a change in leadership. In summer 2017, Seoul PB had its sixth cycle, and it is the last year of the current Mayor’s second term. In other words, it is still uncertain whether Seoul PB will continue its seventh cycle if people elect a different Mayor in next year’s national election. This is mainly due to the generic language of the Local Finance Law, which allows any type of participation. Since the national law cannot regulate the specific type of participation, it can result in various types of implementation, including disguised compliance.

Second, PB processes are completely designed and managed by the government. When designing the process, it seems that some government officials have hesitated to fully “give up” their control of budget decision-making. In the city of Busan, for example, one-third of the PB committee was initially constituted of city officials (Kim,
One of the reasons for this is that there were no public meetings or hearings at the stage of forming or establishing a PB ordinance (Kim, 2016). In addition, PB committee meetings are sometimes managed in a way that is more convenient for government officials than for the residents. PB committee meetings are usually held in government offices (e.g., city office, district office), and government officials are in charge of preparing the meetings. Since government officials have to be present all the time, they tend not to set meetings on holidays. In Seoul, PB committee meetings were held on weekday evenings, which made the participants rush tasks, leave early in the middle of the meetings, and difficult to even attend the meetings if they have families and children to take care.

**Whom to Involve?**

In a literal translation, the PB in South Korea is called “Resident Participatory Budgeting System”. Taking this into account, it is important to clarify who are considered residents in the system, because the scope of eligible participants shapes the outcomes of PB (Chang, 2006). According to Smith and Huntsman (1997), there are three types of citizens: customer, owner, and value-centered citizens. Neither a customer purchasing government services nor an owner exercising his or her limited rights, citizens can be recognized as a value-centered citizen through PB—collaborating with the government for the development of the community (Choi, 2011). According to the Local Autonomy Act, persons who “have domicile within the jurisdiction of a local government” shall be residents of such local governments (KLRI, n.d.b). However, the Seoul PB ordinance defines residents more broadly. It defines a “resident” as someone who 1) has an address in the city of Seoul, 2) works in an institution located in the city of Seoul, 3) is a representative or employee of a business that has its head office or branches in the city of Seoul, and/or 4) are currently enrolled in elementary/middle/high schools or universities in the city of Seoul. Moreover, there is an additional condition as to who is allowed to participate: the definition of a resident excludes public officials who work in the city government of Seoul or any other local government or government-funded organizations.

This broad scope of resident defined by the city of Seoul is understandable, since anyone who lives and/or works in the city can be con-
sidered beneficiaries of the city’s administrative activities. However, other cities surrounding the city of Seoul may allow only those who live in the city to participate in their PB. This inconsistency may also cause some conflicts of interest. Seoul, where approximately 10 million people reside, has been the capital of the nation for a long time in Korean history. Due to the rapid growth of the area since the 1970s, all the nation’s social, economic, and cultural opportunities are mainly concentrated in this area. People started to move out to suburban areas and still commute to work in Seoul because of the skyrocketing housing and rent prices. In 2015, about 1.28 million people commuted from Gyeonggi-do (the province surrounding the city of Seoul) to Seoul (Statistics Korea, 2015). Since many people work in one city but live in a different one, some might be involved in PB processes in two or more cities. It would not be problematic if all cities allow everyone who lives and/or works in the city. If there are certain cities not allowing those who work in the city participate in PB unlike other cities around them, the process may not be considered fair.

In addition, there are no specific clauses in the law to make sure the process includes those who have been traditionally neglected. One of the common criticisms regarding the participatory process in the government is that it often ends up including those who are well educated and earn high incomes, thus already having some degree of influence and power because those groups can be comparatively easier to engage. However, if the government aims to increase inclusiveness in their decision-making processes, they could consider guaranteeing the participation of people from traditionally neglected groups such as the youth, the disabled, and multicultural families. Seoul PB has tried different ways of including youth and multicultural families, but there is still a lack of available participation avenues for those groups. For example, they once included teenagers in the PB committee meetings and expected them to join the meetings in the late evenings. However, it was difficult for some young students not only to participate meaningfully but also to stay until the end of each meeting. Mothers of multicultural families participated as committee members, but they encountered some language barriers because the meetings used very formal Korean without providing any translations, which sometimes might be not easy for them to understand.
Scope of the Mandate
We also need to consider the scope of mandate—what kinds of activities are exactly mandated throughout the local budgeting process. First of all, strictly speaking, some might not admit that “participatory budgeting” is mandated in South Korea. This is possible because of the various definitions of PB. A broad definition of PB describes it as “a mechanism (or process) through which the population decides on or contributes to decisions made on, the destination of all or part of the available public resources” (UN-Habitat, 2007, p. 20). Under this broad definition, PB could include any participation such as “lobbying, general town hall meetings, special public hearings or referendums on specific budget items” (Goldfrank, 2007, p. 92). Meanwhile, a narrow definition understands participatory budgeting as “a process that is open to any citizen who wants to participate, combines direct and representative democracy, involves deliberation (not merely consultation), redistributes resources toward the poor, and is self-regulating” (Goldfrank, 2007, p. 92). In this regard, what is mandated by the South Korean national law could be considered as PB only under the broader definition, because it is still acceptable to simply consult with citizens without giving them any decision-making authority.
Second, although involving the public to some degree is mandatory, the rest of the participatory budgeting process has not been mandated. On the one hand, implementing the winning projects is not required in the law, and the decisions are not legally binding (Kim, 2015). Indeed, legally speaking, there is no penalty for not implementing the winning projects. In other words, the projects have no formal way of being realized if the council does not pass it, or if the local government leader does not implement at the end. There has been no such problem so far in the case of Seoul, but not implementing the projects due to budget limitation has been an issue in other countries (see García, 2014). If a project cannot be realized after all these participatory processes, it will negatively affect the participants’ trust in the process and their motivation to participate in the future. On the oth-
er hand, the law does not regulate anything relative to the quality of participation. Seoul adopted a mobile vote to increase participation in the final stages of PB, but as a result, more people merely voted without deliberation, compared to the previous cycles. Before the mobile vote was installed, all voters had to come to the city hall, and there was some deliberation occurring between residents before the final vote.

**Conclusion**

Although PB in South Korea has spread widely following the mandate in 2011, awareness of PB is still low among citizens. One reason could be that there are still many local government units not fully implementing PB in the narrow definition: residents making decisions after deliberation. By 2014, 99% of local government units had established their own PB ordinances. The implementation of PB, however, varies to a great extent from consultation to decision-making due to the way the law regulates participation. Indeed, involving the public and reflecting their opinions in budgeting decision-making processes can be done through either holding public meetings or giving residents the power to deliberate and make decisions.

In this article, I summarized the history of PB and also introduced three issues/challenges with regard to the mandate of PB in South Korea. First, it is important to consider whether the current government-led process could be more open. In order to make the process more participatory the government needs to consider whether they could hand over the authority of managing the process to the PB general committee. The government could be involved in the process as one of the participating institutions, together with other civil society organizations. Second, the matter of involvement needs to be considered. Although the current national law defines residents as persons who have a domicile in the area, PB sometimes more broadly defines residents to include those who work within the area. Currently, the consideration of traditionally neglected groups such as youth and minorities is not included in the mandate. Third, the
mandate only requires each local government unit to include the public in the budgeting process. In other words, the decisions made through PB are not legally binding.

It has been about fifteen years since the first PB experiment in South Korea, and six years after the mandate. It is time to reflect on and consider the achievements and failures of the mandate. In 2017, South Korea elected another President, Moon Jae-In, who values citizen participation and claims willingness to listen to citizens. Despite the language barrier, communicating with other countries that have mandated PB and sharing experiences would be an asset to all PB communities around the world.
Multiple Paths in Search of the Public: Participatory Budgeting in Taiwan

Poe Yu-ze Wan

Introduction

Since 2015, participatory budgeting (hereafter PB) has been successfully implemented in all the major cities in Taiwan. On the one hand, the central and city governments have conducted PB on different themes, scales, and with different sizes of public budget. On the other, a number of local councilors have adopted PB in their districts to decide how to spend part of their discretionary fund.

Among policy circles and the academia in Taiwan, PB has soon become a catchword for a long-awaited type of democratic innovation that seeks to decentralize the decision-making structures, encourage the dialogue between civil society and government, and empower lay citizens. However, Taipei is the only municipality that attempts, from the very beginning, to institutionalize PB on a city-wide basis. By contrast, the other cities have tended to minimize the degree of institutionalization of PB by adopting an “outsourced” approach. More specifically, the government contracts out nearly all aspects of PB to the private or voluntary sector, and therefore plays a minimal role in the PB process, restricting itself to deciding on the amount of resources allocated to PB and to implementing certain winning projects (Wan, 2018). As will be shown in this article, while PB is generally praised as a form of “state–society synergy” (Evans, 1997; Abers, 2000, 2003, 2009), the “state” (the public power and public administration) in Taiwan often renders itself invisible in the process of promoting and organizing PB. This is the first sense in which one can

1 Much of the material in this article is drawn from Wan (2018).
speak of the lack of the “public” in Taiwan’s PB. Like the majority of PBs in Europe, the recent “participatory boom” in Taiwan has been characterized by a stronger top–down than bottom–up mobilization. These participatory practices were almost exclusively initiated by policy-makers (from the top–down), not by citizens, NGOs, or social movements (from the bottom–up). The situation is further complicated by the fact that the outsourcing system creates incentives for the “commissioners” (i.e., the governments) to avoid administrative and political responsibilities, and puts structural constraints on the performance of the “contractors” (mostly NGOs or scholar–led teams). A variety of problems result from this combination of top–down initiatives and outsourcing practices. One problem that this article attempts to address is that PB in Taiwan has not had significant impacts on civic engagement and associational activities. Even worse, the new political space created by PB has often been occupied by the elites in civil and political societies, and generally the existing power relations tend to be reproduced rather than challenged. In other words, PB in Taiwan has neither sufficiently improved the practice of public participation nor substantially broadened the public sphere essential for deepening of democratic governance. This is the second sense in which the publicness of Taiwan’s PB leaves much to be desired.

Plural Practices, Multiple Paths
The main impetus for experimenting with PB in Taiwan’s major cities has been the competition between leaders both in the city government (mayors and their political appointees) and in the political society (political elites from the two major parties in Taiwan, i.e., Democratic Progressive Party [DPP] and Kuomintang [KMT]). The non–partisan Taipei mayor, Ko Wen–je, first included the idea of PB in his platform during the campaign for the mayorship in 2014, and started to put it into practice in 2015. The New Taipei City (ruled by KMT) and the Taichung City (ruled by DPP) soon followed suit in the same year. They were joined by other cities in 2016. There have been dozens of PB experiments across Taiwan (see Table 1 for a classification of the major cases of PB in Taiwan). As mentioned earlier, Taipei is the only city that seeks to institutionalize PB. With the assistance of universities and community
colleges (officially referred to as the “government-academia alliance”), all twelve administrative districts are involved in the yearly PB cycle, following similar procedures (district hearings > neighborhood assemblies > proposal workshops > exhibition > voting > review and implementation). Training courses are provided to acquaint citizens with the basic ideas of participatory and deliberative democracy and the institutional designs and procedures of PB. All residents above the age of 16 are eligible to submit project proposals and cast their PB vote. More than 1,000 civil servants in Taipei have been trained for and/or taken part in PB since 2015, and the internal division of labor of the city administration was slightly modified to meet the needs for implementing PB. In short, Taipei stands out for its conscious efforts to stabilize and institutionalize PB.

PB in Taipei is not without its own problems, however. For example, the mobilization of citizens in Taipei has relied too much on the district offices and the village and neighborhood systems, since it is the Department of Civil Affairs (the competent authority in charge of these offices and villages) that is responsible for organizing PB. In the 2017 round of PB in Taipei, 3,016 citizens participated in the neighborhood assemblies, accounting only for 1.1% of the adult population. The average age of the participants, more than half of whom were mobilized by village chiefs, was roughly 56. Generally, teenagers and young adults did not show much interest in the PB process. Similar patterns can be found in other cities.

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2 One of the twelve districts, the Da’an district, had developed a superior institutional design (including the deliberative methods in neighborhood assemblies and the voting mechanism) that came to be adopted by the other districts in 2017.

3 The village and neighborhood system is the basic administrative unit in Taiwan. Village chiefs (or ward chiefs) are elected public officials, many of whom are active in local civic organizations. A substantial portion of village chiefs (especially in rural areas) are intertwined with patronage connections in local politics. The clientelistic networks formed around this system best embody what I call the logic of elite–mass relations. This article submits that most of the PB projects in Taiwan are practiced in ways that conform to, rather than challenge, this logic. For an extended discussion, see Wan (2018).
PB in Taiwan can be roughly divided into two (though not mutually exclusive) types: district/village-based and thematic. PB in Taipei and Taichung (as well as one case in Kaohsiung) belongs to the former, but the degree of institutionalization in Taichung and Kaohsiung is much lower than in Taipei, leading to serious problems, such as the lack of cross-agency coordination and collaboration. Some of the winning projects in Taichung and Kaohsiung were not implemented precisely because cross-agency coordination was not sufficient. There have been a few impressive cases of thematic PB in cities outside Taipei and Taichung. For example, in New Taipei City, the Ludi

### Table 1 Participatory Budgeting in Taiwan: The Major Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Initiating Unit</th>
<th>District/Village–Based PB</th>
<th>Thematic PB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taipei City</td>
<td>Department of Civil Affairs</td>
<td>All twelve districts (2016–)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Economic Development</td>
<td></td>
<td>Energy Saving PB Project (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Labor Affairs</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Disability Employment Promotion PB Project (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local Councilors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daguan Village (2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dongsheng Village (2016)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xindian District (2016–18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Taipei City</td>
<td>Department of Youth Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Social Welfare</td>
<td>Pilot Project for Publicly Deliberated PB (2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Labor Affairs</td>
<td>Project for Collaborative Communities and Disabled Welfare Service (2017)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PB for Migrant Workers’ Recreation (2017)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Taoyuan City</td>
<td>Department of Youth Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Social Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Labor Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taichung City</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Bureau</td>
<td>Central District (2015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Four Districts (2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Two Districts (2017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei City, Tainan City, Keelung City, Nantou County, Penghu County, etc.</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture (Central Government)</td>
<td>Experimental Project of Civic Deliberation and PB (2015–16) Community-Building 3.0 (2016–2021)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Community College quite successfully organized the immigrant residents in a thematic PB on energy-saving. In Taoyuan city, there was probably the first PB project in Asia involving migrant workers: People from the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam were brought together to discuss and plan their own leisure activities. These plural practices of PB continue to grow, making Taiwan a country with a wealth of experiences in new forms of participatory democracy.

The “Outsourced” Model: Analysis and Diagnosis

With the exception of very limited cases of thematic and village/district-based PB, the majority of PB experiments in Taiwan exhibit similar patterns and face similar problems. PB in Taiwan is generally understood not as part of wider institutional reforms but as an isolated or short-term “policy device” for delivering social services or collecting community-level budget proposals. Under such circumstances, what matters is not only the type and amount of resources allocated to PB, but also the way PB is designed, promoted, organized, and understood in the context of local politics where clientelistic practices have existed for decades. Laura Pin (2017: 131) notes that PB in Chicago “relies on extensive volunteer labor, with some paid support from aldermanic staff, but minimal support from municipal staff.” Things are similar but more striking in Taiwan in consideration of the fact that the main initiators of PB are not aldermen (councilors), but (municipal) governments themselves. What is probably unique to Taiwan is that in most cases outside Taipei, the entire structure and process of PB before the final implementation of certain winning projects, including procedure design, promotion, mobilization, deliberation, and voting, are outsourced to NGOs and/or teams led by scholars (the “contractors” in legal terms).

4 For details, see the report by Taiwan Foundation for Democracy: https://bulletin.tfd.org.tw/tdb-vol-1-no-15-tw-migr-budget/

5 Again, bear in mind the exception of Taipei.

6 Ganuza and Baiocchi (2012) make a useful distinction between “policy instrument” and “policy device.” In its early development in Latin America, PB is closer to a policy instrument because it is generally anchored in a broader political strategy that aims to radically transform the structures of public administration. In contrast, since the 2000s, PB has been gradually disconnected from a broader set of institutional reforms and thus turned into an isolated, “neutral” policy device for urban governance.
This “outsourced” model of PB deserves more critical attention and has broader comparative implications. I submit that outsourcing almost everything about PB to “participatory democracy experts” and NGOs has become a path of least resistance and risk taken by certain local governments in Taiwan. Undertaking a comprehensive institutional reform may risk a strong backlash from within the administrative machine. It is therefore understandable that in the process of its diffusion to Taiwan, PB was soon adapted to the modus operandi of both central and local governments. Besides, to restrict the amount and scope of PB and the degree of its institutionalization by outsourcing also serves as a political signal that PB will not pose a challenge to the power of political elites. However, there are at least two problems with this outsourced model of PB.

First, the extent to which lay citizens are mobilized and involved in the PB process depends excessively on the performance of the contractor, which in turn has to do with the contractor’s understanding of PB and its working method. This involves the following questions, to name a few (cf. Baiocchi and Ganzuza, 2016: 145, 149):

a. Is PB a tool for collecting “sophisticated” budget proposals, or an instrument for empowering lay citizens?

b. Which to prioritize: courting support from local political elites, or organizing those outside the existing political networks?

c. Is it necessary or desirable to involve participants in a deliberative process by, for example, creating a series of mini-publics? Or is voting all that matters? If deliberation is important, should these mini-publics become a point of contact between city officials and citizens?

While all contractors are required to set up formal procedures for PB, these are not tantamount to substantive deliberation and participation (see Table 2 for an ideal–typical distinction between formal and substantive PB in Taiwan). Most importantly, the existing power relations in both civil and political society will remain intact if the contractor adopts a more elitist and non-deliberative approach.
Table 2 Participatory Budgeting (in Taiwan): Formal and Substantive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Substantive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Procedure</strong></td>
<td>Formal procedure: (1) Neighborhood assemblies or workshops; (2) voting</td>
<td>The degree of inclusiveness in the PB process; The deliberative qualities of neighborhood assemblies or workshops The implementation of winning projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Promotion</strong></td>
<td>The village and neighborhood system</td>
<td>Connections with various intermediary organizations (e.g., community-building organizations, social movement organizations, community colleges, schools, trade unions, parents’ associations, religious groups, community care centers, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobilization</strong></td>
<td>Securing support from elites in local civil and political society; Traditional political mobilization</td>
<td>Garnering support and commitment from lay citizens; Challenging the existing elite-mass relations and clientelistic practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aim(s)</strong></td>
<td>City marketing, legitimacy building, etc.</td>
<td>Participation, deliberation, and empowerment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Take a city-wide thematic PB in a large city for example. The contractor did not even try to organize lay citizens, but cut corners by mobilizing a long-existing semi-official organization composed of public officials and local elites (especially village chiefs and community leaders). It turned out that the participants of the PB workshops were mainly the members of this organization, one of whom even reported that she was mobilized by the organization to attend the proposal workshop and had no idea what PB was about.7 I also know of cases where the contractors chose to bypass ordinary citizens, casting PB as yet another channel for local elites to access funding opportunities and policy information.

However, sometimes the contractor is not the one to be blamed. For instance, contractors are often asked by commissioners to make sure that the local political elites (mainly village chiefs and councilors) will support the PB process. This means that governments tend to prioritize their relationship with the city council and thus attempt to avoid conflicts with these political elites.

7 Interview with a member of this organization, May 2017.
Even if the contractor intends to mobilize and organize as many ordinary citizens as possible and enhance the quality of deliberation, it will face substantial financial difficulties, since it is generally the lowest tenderer that is awarded the contract (in the spirit of competitive tendering). As mentioned in the previous section, there were indeed impressive cases, such as the thematic PBs on energy-saving and migrant workers’ recreation. But these successful cases were more a consequence of the self-exploitation of the NGO workers and project assistants than a proof of the superiority of the outsourcing system. Therefore, the point is not that contractors can never realize the core values of participatory and deliberative democracy, but that the outsourcing system puts structural constraints on how far they can go.

Second, according to the Government Procurement Act in Taiwan, the commissioner is obliged to direct and monitor the contractor. In other words, after signing the contract, the contractor and the commissioner no longer stand on an equal footing. Importantly, the contractor is not in a position to intervene in how things are done within the commissioning agency, let alone the entire public administration. One consequence is that the contractor, left to itself, is unlikely to initiate administrative reforms necessary for upgrading the transformative capacity of PB. For example, cross-agency/sector collaboration (often necessary for the implementation of the proposed projects) is unlikely to occur unless the commissioning agency or the whole city government recognizes its role and responsibility.

In some extreme cases, the commissioner even refused to send city staff to neighborhood meetings or proposal workshops because this was not required by the contract. The contractor was therefore relegated to a marginal position, striving to make a difference to the logic of bureaucratic conduct, but often in vain. Besides, tensions may arise between (i) the contractors that at-

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8 It costs a lot, both in terms of time and money, to reach out to the disadvantaged groups and explain to them the core values and procedures of PB. If the local political community is closed and unfriendly to “strangers,” the mobilization of ordinary citizens may contain elements of risk.

9 This means that the contractor has to train or recruit a sufficient number of well-prepared deliberative facilitators. My team in Kaohsiung, for example, organized a two-day training seminar for these facilitators, who played a crucial role in the PB workshops.
tempt to challenge the clientelistic practices (or more generally, the logic of elite-mass relations) prevailing in local politics and (2) the commissioners that aim to adapt PB to the existing power relations. These conflicts have led to considerable frustration and disappointment among a number of scholars and NGOs that had served as contractors for PB.

Conclusion: In Search of the Public
This article argues that PB in Taiwan is generally lacking in publicness due to two factors, one being the low degree of involvement of the public sector in the PB process, and the other the limited impacts of PB on associational activities and civic participation. It is further demonstrated that both factors have to do with the “outsourced” approach adopted by the governments to promote PB: The outsourcing system is a mechanism that tends to create incentives for the commissioner to avoid administrative and political responsibilities, and put structural constraints on the performance of the contractor, particularly as regards the mobilization/organizing of ordinary citizens and the deliberative quality of PB processes.

PB is essentially a democratic innovation that necessitates state-society synergy. In other words, the current structure of public administration has to be challenged before any meaningful progress can be made in the way city staff interact with citizens and deal with budget issues. If the government plays a more direct role in PB instead of contracting it out, it will more or less be forced to learn how to do it well by, for example, systematically training the city staff about participatory and deliberative democracy, reorganizing its internal division of labor, and taking seriously the necessity of cross-agency collaboration, and so on. Nothing of this kind can be expected or demanded of a contractor. My overall worry is that the transformative value of PB will be seriously limited if the governments continue to prefer outsourcing to institutional reform. Practiced in this way, PB in Taiwan may turn out to be a “toothless radicalism,” or a “defanged” version of democratic innovation.

It should also be noted that the more progressive sections of civil society in Taiwan, especially the advocacy NGOs and social movement organizations that have played important roles
in the democratization process, are not particularly attracted by the village- or community-based cases of PB in Taiwan. On the one hand, the transformative value of such a “community grant” version of PB is dubious, especially when the size of the budget is extremely small (usually less than 6,000 U.S. dollars for each winning project). On the other, these organizations are mainly concerned about specific values and policies (e.g., environmental protection, workers’ rights, long-term care, same-sex marriage, etc.). But there is virtually no space for debates over medium- and long-term policies during the PB process in Taiwan. Even in thematic PBs that took place in several cities, the discussion is generally geared toward short-term projects instead of policies.10

Despite these pitfalls, one reason to be optimistic about PB in Taiwan is that even a “defanged” democratic innovation “might open the Pandora’s Box of real citizens’ involvement and deep democratization” (Peck and Theodore, 2015: 227). I submit that the future of PB in Taiwan depends on two factors. First, it depends on whether the current modus operandi (outsourcing the implementation of PB) will be replaced by genuine democratic reforms of the state apparatus. Second, it depends on whether a growing number of active citizens and civil society organizations (especially progressive social movement organizations) can fill the new political space created by PB that may otherwise be occupied by vested interests and political elites. And this in turn depends on whether PB will remain an external tool that deals mainly with small community grants, or develop into a platform in which a wide range of municipal issues can be discussed, debated, and decided on.

10 For example, in the PB on disability employment promotion in Sanxia (2015–16) that was quite successful in terms of voter turnout, participants could only propose and discuss one-year funding projects (see Yeh and Lin, 2017).
Highlights on some Asian and Russian Participatory Budgeting Pioneers

Yves Cabannes

1. Presentation
This chapter is one of the outcomes of the Networking Session on Participatory Budgeting in Asian and Russian cities and regions that took place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia during the World Urban Forum in February 2018 organized by Kota Kita Foundation (Indonesia), The Bartlett Development Planning Unit, University College London (United Kingdom) and the International Observatory on Participatory Democracy, based in Barcelona, Spain.
It is informed by the documentation of specific PB related experiences in six cities and regions [Chengdu, China; St Petersburg Federal District and Stavropol Region in Russia; Seberang Perai, Penang State in Malaysia; Surakarta / Solo in Indonesia and Hwaesong in Korea] with the intention to ground observations in very diverse realities and scales. Exchanges through email before and after the event and various field visits spread over the last ten years by the author, as well as written material available in English, complement the information.2

Previously there has not been a full account of PB dynamics in the

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1 in collaboration with Zhuang Ming, Jing Ping and Min Chen [Chengdu PB experience and China]; Vladimir Vladimirovich Vagin, Nadezhda Gavrilova, Ivan Shulga, Anna Sukhova and Larisa Kalinchenko [Russia and Stavropol Region PB/ LISP / Initiative Budgeting]; Lev Shilov and Oleg Pachenkov [St Petersburg PB, Russia]; Shariza Kamarudin, Rohana Weiler and Ong Bee Leng [Penang and Seberang Perai PB, Malaysia]; Ahmad Rifai, John Taylor, Paulista Surjadi, Bima Pratama Putra, Kaori Ota Cabrera and Rizqa Hidanayi [Solo – Surakarta PB and Musrenbang in other Indonesian cities]; Kang In Choen, Denise K.H. Yoon and Choi Seung Woo [Hwaesong PB case and PB in Korea]; Adrià Duarte [international perspective].

Asian and Russian region despite the existence of significant PB and PB related experiences such as the ones implemented for instance in China, Russia, Korea, Indonesia, Kerala State in India, in Japan, or more recently in various cities and districts in Taiwan. Unfortunately very few of them have been fully documented so far.

**Map 1 Location of PB experiences**

As a result the present chapter mirrors a collaborative work in progress with colleagues and friends who have been involved, sometimes for years, in implementing and reflecting upon these unique experiences. The contribution of each one of the persons mentioned previously is duly acknowledged. The present communication is a preliminary step toward fully documenting the wealth of innovation and democratic experimentations flourishing in thousands of locales in Russia and Asia, led by hundred of thousands of citizens of all ages, women and men, mostly poor and most of the time in quite difficult and dire conditions. One of the difficulties and limits of this paper, but at the same time its contribution, is to try to put these very diverse experi-
ences in perspective and extract some common lessons. It paves the way for further debates and networking among Russian and Asian PB committed citizens, professionals, civil servants and decision makers. After a brief presentation of each one of the experiences within a national context [section 2], a summary of the lessons learned through the presentation will be presented, followed by highlights on some salient features organized under four dimensions: [a] financial and fiscal; [b] participatory; [c] institutional and legal and [d] spatial\(^3\) [section 3]. Unique innovations brought by the six experiences are summarized in section 4, leading to challenges that participatory budgeting processes are facing in Asian and Russian cities [section 5].

2. Brief introduction and significance of the six PB experiences

**Chengdu, Sichuan, China**
Participatory budgeting in Chengdu, the Capital of Sichuan Province started in 2009 in its rural localities and villages and has continued ever since. At present, it is the largest in China in terms of the number of projects funded, the amount of resources allocated and the number of people reached. One of its explicit objectives is to reduce the urban – rural divide. Interestingly, after its first rural-based period, PB expanded under quite different modalities to urban districts and sub-districts. When summing up its urban and rural native residents, migrants and floating populations, Chengdu stands well above 20 millions inhabitants and is arguably the largest metropolis practicing PB so far. However, PB primarily concerns registered households, e.g Hukou's residents holders [户口簿]

**Solo / Surakarta, Central Java, Indonesia**
Surakarta [571 000 inh.] is a pilot and leading city for Participatory Budgeting in Indonesia. When it started in 2000 the local name of the annual forum was “Musyawarah Pembangunan” (Musbang), which means development forum. After 2004 when it was adopted and up-

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\(^3\) Same format as the one used to compare 30 Latin American and European PB experiences carried out in the early 2000s for the URBAL program on participatory budgeting in municipal finance, coordinated by Porto Alegre in Brazil. See Cabannes, base document for PB network, 2003.
scaled nationally its name changed to “Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan” (Musrenbang), which means ‘development-planning forum’. The planning and budgeting forum starts from the smallest 3000+ territories and is consolidated in its 51 neighborhoods, but exists as well for the city level as a whole. Since 2004 Surakarta kept being one of the innovative PB cities with a key supportive role played by a local NGO, Kota Kita.

**Stavropol Region Initiative Budgeting**

Initiative Budgeting (IB) in Russia is an umbrella brand for various Russian practices involving citizens in the budget process, based on a similar principle of civic engagement and participation [http://budget4me.ru]. It covers today about 50 Russian regions and federal administrative entities of the 85 that compose the Russian Federation [see map]. The total budget for debated projects increased from around US$ 43 million in 2015 to US$ 125 million in 2016. A unique feature of Russian PB [Initiative Budgeting] is that Regions contribute significantly to these amounts through their own budget: US$ 25 million in 2015 and US$ 91 million in 2016. The number of implemented projects has tripled between 2015 and 2016, jumping from 2,657 to 8,732 for the country as a whole. The Initiative Budgeting is an up-scaling of the LISP – Local Initiative Support Program – that was supported since 2007 by the World Bank and mushroomed in hundreds of municipalities, primarily small ones, while successfully introducing PB practices.

Stavropol Krai [край] is a territory of 66,500 square kms located in North Caucasus, between the Caspian and the Black Seas. In Stavropol Krai PB [http://pmisk.ru/] started in 2007 as a LISP Practice in some districts of the Region and was continuously implemented till 2015. The region became one of the pioneers of the Initiative Budgeting [IB] that started in 2016 as a national policy and was extended to 33 municipal areas and city districts councils, where over 2.8 millions people live. As a result 125 projects were implemented in 2017, and 161 are expected to be implemented in 2018, summing an amount of over US$ 5.3 millions per year. In June 2016 Stavropol krai hosted an all-Russia workshop on information campaign for PB, based on their advanced experience.

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4 Source: adapted from Ahmad Rifai, Kota Kita, Documentation of Solo PB experience, 2017
5 Source: Vladimir Vladimirovich Vagin power point presentation, 2018
Saint Petersburg

Saint Petersburg, the second largest metropolis in Russia, is not a municipality but a Federal District, like Moscow, with a population of close to 5.3 millions inhabitants [54.4 % women and 45.6 men]. Participatory Budgeting started in 2016 and currently takes place in six out of its 18 districts [http://tvoybudget.spb.ru]. One of the key differences with PB implemented through the Russian LISP or Initiative budgeting mentioned previously is that it is fully deliberative with citizens making the final decision about budget allocations. The members of districts based Budgeting Committees [selected among citizens who proposed projects] take these final decisions.6

As PB, called locally Your Budget, is still quite new, the supporting team from Saint Petersburg European University at Saint Petersburg focuses on: “an intense educational approach with lectures on finance, budget, laws, regulations and overall distribution of authority between different levels of power. Another salient feature refers to numerous activities performed to inform and mobilise citizens through a month-long information campaign using both offline (banners, ads in metro and transport, TV and radio) and online resources (Department of Finance website, social networks like Facebook and Russian social network Vkontakte). In addition presentations are given to specific audiences such as city NGOs or students”7

Hwaseong, Korea

Hwaseong is a fast growing city in Gyeonggi Province, located about 60 kilometres from the country capital Seoul, and that counted in 2014 540,000 inhabitants, with more men than women [279/261]. Hwaesong is clearly one of the remaining peri-urban city of Seoul macro region with a significant rural population [253,000 inh.] facing an accelerated environment degradation, not so much of urban agriculture or agricultural lands, but of mountainous and natural areas that result primarily from an urban sprawl. The city became a commuter city for white collars and a workers city with over 10 000 factories and a migrant growing population.

6 Extracts from St Petersburg city profile, Lev Shilov, 2018
7 Lev Shilov, 2018, documentation of St Petersburg city profile
A Local agenda XXI was approved in 2003 by law and ratified in 2004. It gave openings to the PB process and its development “Agenda XXI and PB goals are shared by both” [interviews, 2015]. PB officially started in 2012 and was maintained ever since. The national PB network, composed of activists from civil society considers Hwaesong one of the most interesting cases, along with a good dozen of others such as Seoul, Suwon and more recently Siheung, located in Gyeonggi Province [see picture].

Seberang Perai, State of Penang, Malaysia

State of Penang [1.2 millions inhabitants], in Malaysia is composed of Penang Island and Seberang Perai where approximately 800,000 inhabitants live in its three districts. Two different PBs are taking place in the Penang Local Councils: one as a top down approach in the three districts of Seberang Perai under a citizen’s consultation:

Since 2012, the Municipal Council of Seberang Perai does survey to get feedback on how to prioritize its budget according to citizen’s needs. The budget survey form is distributed to the people through the State Assembly Person, Parliamentarians and the Councilors. The survey form is made available as well via MPSP’s website and facebook. To complement the budget survey, MPSP organize the Budget Dialogue to get feedback from the local leaders including CSOs and NGOs. The main innovative feature of the process is that the consultation phase allows going beyond the survey exercise and takes place at community level including women and men, girls and boys from different backgrounds. Based on this feedback, the Municipal Council of Seberang Perai plans its budget to fit the needs of the people.8

A second modality, called Gender Responsive and Participatory Budgeting (GRPB), started in 2012 too in low-income rental housing compounds in both Penang Island and Seberang Perai. These bottom-up processes are spearheaded as well by the Penang Women Development Corporation [PWDC].

8 Extracts from the documentation of Seberang Perai experience, Shariza Kamarudin, 2018
Looking back to PB timeline

Table 1 Timeframe of PB in the cities and regions presented in the dossier

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Source: local teams; Processing of data: Cabannes, 2018
* Years 2000 to 2003 were a pilot of the current and national musrenbang ** LISP – local Initiative Support Program has been active since 2007 whilst Initiative Budgeting (IB) started in 2017

Table 1 indicates that PB practices in Russia and Asia, under different modalities and names have a much longer track record than is commonly acknowledged. In Surakarta PB under different forms has been practiced for nearly 20 years, and the LISP program started over ten years ago [2007] in Russia paving the way, after one year of interruption in 2016, for the current modality of Initiative Budgeting. St. Petersburg started the program in 2016, but the budgeting committees’ methodology is implemented in various Russian municipalities since 2013. Chengdu PB has also passed 10 years of practice and can be arguably considered the oldest experience still in place, as unfortunately the oldest PB in China, Wenling City in Zhejiang province has been interrupted.

New experiences keep emerging, as illustrated by Hwaesong in Korea or Seberang Perai in Penang, that are entering into their seventh year in 2018, and more recently St Petersburg that started in 2016. An important observation in relation to this time line is that it seems that Asian experiences are much less volatile than in other regions as they depend much less on international aid and are being built and regulated as national or regional policies. The interruption of most of the Chinese experiences that depended on foreign aid is quite noticeable, but analyzing them go beyond the limits of this report.

3. Lessons learned and salient features

The analysis of the cases and the presentations made during the session led to the following lessons that highlight to what extent Russian and Asian PBs are unique.
**Impressive scale & spread**

The scale and spread of PB at least in Indonesia, Russia, Korea and Chengdu, China are far from numbers that are usually related to participatory budgeting in other parts of the world. For instance, in one Chinese mega-city, Chengdu, PB is being practiced every year in over 2,600 rural villages & localities and 1,400 urban sub-districts and neighborhoods. Over 100,000 projects, decided by citizens, have been implemented since 2008, representing a public investment superior to 1.2 billion US$ equivalent. Musrenbang in Indonesia exists in most cities even if not all of them can be considered fully developed PBs. There is, at least in these 3 countries a huge capacity to grow. The map below highlighting the regions covered by PB in Russian sub-continent contribute as well to demonstrate the impressive scale of PB and its swift geographical spread in a limited number of years.

**Map 2 Russian regions participating in Initiative Budgeting / PB (2016 – 2017)**

**Prospects to grow and upscale**

Prospects to grow and upscale appear just as impressive. For instance, advocacy efforts from civil society in Indonesia, following the national regulation about PB/Musrenbang in 2004 focused on introducing a better PB model in rural territories where budgets have been decentralised. The recent enactment of the Village Law [2016] is opening a new era for scaling up in the astonishing number of 73,000 villages and small human settlements.
all through this country of 260+ million people.\(^9\) Even if Penang Island / Seberang Perai PB practices in Malaysia are much more modest than in Indonesia, Russia or Korea, they follow a similar path as the PWDC is lobbying and advocating for a new law at Regional State level that would turn PB into a policy, setting up a new milestone and reference for participatory democracy in the country. The recent strengthening of Initiative Budgeting in Russia, essentially with national budgetary resources, after a World Bank LISP program launched in 2007, again opens up new possibilities of continued up-scaling PB in the different regions, cities and rural settlements all through the country.

In Korea, Moon Jae In’s government, which came to power due to the “candle protests” (series of peaceful protests where participants lit up candles) in 2016, announced in January 2018, that participatory budgeting, already existing in numerous cities, would be implemented at the national level. This first national PB in Asia should closely follow the model experimented by the Seoul Municipality.\(^10\) Such a unique decision, at a worldwide level [beyond the still modest Portuguese national PB] highlights again how PB ranks high in the national, regional and local Asian and Russian political agenda, and most probably will continue to expand. These recent developments clearly raise the importance of monitoring the expansion and point out serious challenges that will be discussed in the final section.

**Despite their importance PB in Russia and Asia remain largely invisible internationally**

One key lesson learned is that, despite their huge numbers and their growing importance over the last decades, PB experiences in Asia and Russia remain largely undocumented, or better said, the existing and scarce information is far from giving an account of the multiplicity and diversity of experiences taking place, some times for a short period of time in both regions. Very scarce firsthand information exists on concrete experiences and therefore some national reports [for instance on China] do not grasp the multiplicity of PBs at different scales, and tend to mix existing and disappeared cases. The efforts made by Kota Kita [for some Indonesian Musrenbang], or by the LISP

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\(^9\) Communication via email with Ahmad Rifai, Kota Kita Foundation, March 2018.

\(^10\) Emails communication with Cho xxx from Korean PB network who could not come to the event.
program for Russia, or the work planned by Huizhi participation center for China, based on firsthand observations are paving the way to better document positive changes happening on the ground. Another hurdle to international visibility clearly identified comes from language obstacles. For instance reports and information in Korean on Korean PBs do exist, and a national report identifying the most innovative experiences is being produced at great cost by the Korean PB network. Unfortunately, they are not translated and the vast majority of PB activists and civil servants involved in PB speak exclusively Korean, making international research by, and communication with, non-Korean speakers quite difficult. The same could be said for Russia, Taiwan or Indonesia, and maybe to a lesser extent for India, or Malaysia where the Penang Island / Semarang Perai PB experience stands as a relatively unique case with information available in English.

**Limited communication among PB actors beyond their national boundaries**

The meeting that took place in February 2018, was not only a milestone in connecting people directly involved in very innovative practices in Asia and in Russia, but at the same time to network with other actors from Europe and Africa. As a matter of fact, about ten years ago, in August 2009, the first International Conference\(^\text{11}\) on Participatory Budgeting in Europe and Asia took place at University of Zhejiang, Hangzhou, China and explored Key Challenges of Participation with PB actors and scholars from Korea, India [Kerala], Japan, Indonesia, China and Thailand, from the Asian side and others from Germany, UK, Portugal, Spain, France and Italy. One needs to reflect why it is only ten years later that another opportunity was created to network unique experiences and people, and just as importantly why no follow up happened among Asian cities and between Asia and Europe, not to mention with Latin America or Africa, where PBs experiences count in the hundreds. The lack of attention given to this partially explains such a situation, but at the same time, it clearly highlights the positive role that the International Observatory on Participatory Democracy [OIDP] that co-convened this session plays and could play in the future.

\(^{11}\) Funded by The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and with the support of the French–German Centre Marc Bloch
**PBs and SDGs**

One of the expected outcomes of the exchange was to explore to what extent PBs practiced in Asian and Russian cities could contribute to attaining some of the SDGs [Sustainable Development Goals]. Interestingly, to the question: ‘Which of the SDGs do you think PB contributes to more and why?’ the various panellists from the different cities agreed that SDG 11 Sustainable cities and communities is ‘probably the most linked to participatory budgeting, since it relates to urban planning from the points of view of inclusion, resilience and sustainability, aspects that can be well approached with the participation of citizens’... Converging voices arose from Chengdu, where “most PB budgets have been allocated to infrastructure and PB facilitated community groups organization development, citizen capacity development” and from Penang, where “Gender Responsive and Participatory Budgeting [GRPB] demands community participation – women and men, by making people as partners in deciding the directions of the program and how State should spend its money. The process itself empowers people to be agent of change and care for the environment”. At the same time, SDGs 11 acts somehow as “the tree that hides the forest” just because PB contributes to many more SDGs, and quite importantly to Goal 10 Reduce inequality either social [“GRPB in Penang is a tool to empower community and challenge the status quo by putting people in the center of budget planning”] or spatial [“Chengdu PB initiated with the aim to reducing urban–rural public services gap”]. Additional evidence gathered during the training session on engendering PB – see appendix for 2 details – where experience from Penang, Surakarta, Yaoundé in Cameroon, Rosario in Argentina and various European cities clearly demonstrated that PB can significantly contribute to Goal 5: gender equality, even if it has not been often the case. A work still to be done is to develop a systematic evidence-based research highlighting the contribution of PBs to SDGs [and targets], similar to the one that was produced in 2004 for UN Habitat on the contribution of PB to the Millennium Development Goals [MDGs].

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12 Adrià Duarte, Barcelona
13 Zhuang Ming, Chengdu
14 Shariza Kamarudin, Penang
Reversing of priorities and paradigm shift.

Establishing links with Goal 10 reduction of inequalities being social or spatial, and Goal 5 gender equality, is not only important in terms of development but is important too to connect Asian and Russian PBs experiences with other experiences worldwide and the original ideas of “reversing priorities” that were at the heart of Brazilian PBs, and Porto Alegre in the first place and that remained central to many subsequent PBs over the last three decades. Originally, PB was a means to construct a new political, social and spatial justice and order though reverting three priorities:

- **Reversing spatial priorities**: resources are channeled to those spaces such as neighborhoods, rural and peri-urban areas, villages and remote settlements, non legalized or occupied lands, derelict city centers, etc. that historically were and are still excluded and do not benefit as much as productive spaces from public investments and subsidies.

- **Reversing social priorities** consists in channeling more resources through PBs precisely to those social groups who historically had less. Such a positive discrimination towards the “have not” means as well opening up participation channels and spaces to the most vulnerable social groups. According to cities these vulnerable groups are the youth, the elderly, women, afro-descendant population for instance in Brazil, migrants and refugees, LGBT+, prime nations and ethnic minorities, etc.

- **Reversing political priorities, or “power to those that were powerless”**, consist in opening political space for those who never had political space. PB can be, but it is not often the case, a powerful means to shift decision making power in favor of the powerless, through transferring financial decision making power to the PBs participants and transferring them as well the power to define the PB rules.

The six experiences documented and the various presentations pointed out clearly different levels of this triple reversion: reverting spatial priorities remain clearly at the heart of Chengdu PB that channels significant resources to peri-urban and rural villages, in order to
reduce the urban–rural gap. Similarly, Initiative Budgeting in Stavropol region, Russia, and most probably in many others such as Bashkortostan, was designed to reach all small and intermediate municipalities of more than 1,000 inhabitants that historically have scarcely benefitted from public resources. The experiences of PB in Penang Island and Seberang Perai in Malaysia or in Surakarta, Indonesia are clear examples of “reverting social priorities” insofar as they both contribute to empowering women, and change historically unbalanced men–women relations. Reverting political priorities and increasing political power for the powerless is well illustrated by St Petersburg PB, even though still on a modest scale, where people’s decisions in assembly are final for selecting PB projects and where PB rules are defined by the people. Similarly, some Korean PBs, such as in Hwaesong do represent a political paradigm shift where people have gained significant decision-making power.

When taken as a whole, Russian and Asian PBs do represent a paradigm shift in relation to reverting policy priorities that connect them with historical and current PB practices worldwide. In order to better differentiate these PBs practices, it would be interesting to explore further their level of social, spatial and political reversion of priorities and to better identify which are the conditions that make this reversion possible.

4. PBs in Asian and Russian cities: a huge field of innovation for urban transformation

One of the key lessons learned through the workshop, the documentation of cases, the field visits and the [scarce] literature is that PB in Russian and in Asian cities represents a huge field of innovation that should deserve a lot more attention. These innovations are not only important at city or national level, but are quite relevant internationally: knowing them better and disseminating them worldwide would enrich existing PB communities of practice. Here are some illustrative examples identified by the various contributors:

Financial catalytic role of PB: co–financing PBs in Stavropol Region and in Russia in general is quite significant and is embedded into the system. The resources allocated by the Ministry of Finance at regional level represent only a portion of the total costs of projects funded through PB: communities, local governments and even the private sector do contribute in quite a significant form, and much more than in other countries.
There are no fixed obligatory levels of projects co-financing from the local population, business and the local budget. Municipal entities can apply with projects that imply any level of co-financing, however the higher is the co-financing the higher is the likelihood for the project to be selected. There is a competition between projects in terms of the degree of involvement and contribution of local communities in the development of their settlements. At the same time, local businesses can be involved in the projects both under financial and non-financial forms.16

“The overall idea of co-financing is to improve targeting, and create incentives for community oversight monitoring, not to create barriers to participation”. 17

Chengdu PB, linking up short-term budget programming with longer term planning.
PB Chengdu is important as it clearly included projects that strengthen village economy, whereas few PBs at international level do the same. Another innovation is that innovative measures were built in, that connect short-term decisions by villagers with longer-term planning perspectives:

Villages can apply for a loan [to Chengdu public development bank] with the PB funds they have. The maximum loan they can get is 7 times their original funds. This is very helpful when some very costly PB projects are prioritized, like a village road.18

Participatory Budgeting in low-income rental housing in Penang Province, Malaysia
In addition to bringing in a unique and robust gender perspective into participatory budgeting through their Gender Responsive and Participatory Budgeting, the Penang Women’s Development Corporation [PWDC] has introduced PB in two large Council low-income rental flats located in Penang Island and Seberang Perai: Ampangan Flats is

16 Local team, Stavropol case study, 2018
17 Communication with LISP team, Moscow, March 2018
18 Local team, Chengdu case study, 2014
a one 10-storey block of 250 units 3-bedrooms rental at US$ 35.00 per month and Jalan Sungai Flats are two 22-storey blocks summing 529 rental 3 bedrooms units at US$ 35.00 per month [see picture]. Very few participatory budgeting processes experiments have been tailored and implemented exclusively for the realities of low-income rental flats. All through these years, there has been a growing interest to tailor PBs to low income housing tenements, for instance in China and more recently in Russia [Bashkortostan’ Courtyard PBs]. Therefore the innovations introduced in Penang and the positive results obtained in benefice of low income and traditionally excluded social groups are quite essential for PBs in the Asian region.

Mini-atlas in Surakarta / Solo

One difficult issue faced by participatory budgeting is how to address the tensions between immediate demands from specific groups and the interests of the different groups living in the same community, or the same neighborhood, and corresponding to different social groups [women, men, adults, elderly, the youth, etc.]. Various cities while implementing PB, have been promoting participatory local/neighborhood/parish development plans in order to put in perspective the various priorities and interests, and at the same time, define collectively priorities; Cordoba in Spain, Cuenca in Ecuador or Belo Horizonte in Brazil are outstanding examples. Surakarta / Solo, in Indonesia, has been contributing in an innovative way to community mapping in the perspective of improving PBs:

Kota Kita has introduced Mini-Atlases since 2010 as a tool for communities to assess the issues in their neighborhood, which can later be used to map the shared needs of the community. It helps them to be more aware of the main problems so that they can propose at PB level programs and activities based on their assessment. The building and sharing of neighborhood profiles, or Mini Atlases, with citizens from each neighborhood for the process became a citywide regulation since 2011. The Mini Atlases visualize basic information about neighborhood conditions in a way that helps to facilitate discussion, identify

19 Source: Shariza Kamarudin’s ppt: Gender Responsive Participatory Budgeting (GRPB) in Penang: The People-Oriented Model, 2014
areas and issues of need, and prioritize proposed projects. The information is collected every two years through a city-wide community mapping process, which crowd-sources the information from each community.\textsuperscript{20}

**Budgeting committees selected by drawing lots in St Petersburg**

Participation in PBs takes place under two basic forms: the first one is direct, universal and voluntary [Porto Alegre model] where usually any person beyond 18 or 16 years can participate. A second form less common is indirect participation that we call Civil Society Representative Democracy through which only registered organizations and Community based organizations can participate through their delegates or representatives. In this case the number of participants is much more reduced and the common citizen is not directly involved. Experiences such as Seberang Perai or Chengdu where individual surveys are conducted with each family, sometimes on a very vast scale as a starting point for PBs process are less common.

Among the six experiences presented, St Petersburg established an innovative process, even if tested in different countries that deserves attention and monitoring. Here is a short summary of its basic principles.

Any citizen of St. Petersburg aged 18 or older, except city administration workers and deputies of any level, can apply to the PB with an idea. Then, Budgeting Committees composed of 20 people are established in each one of the participating districts of St Petersburg. These members will have the voting rights to decide on the projects to be prioritized in the district. In addition, 20 to 30 people are selected as “a reserve or substitute committee,” with voice but no voting power. In 2018, 3288 people from all 18 districts applied with a project [over four times the 2017 figure] and 240 people were selected to become members or substitute members of the six budgeting committees established in each one of the six districts that were selected, for having achieved the highest number of proposals. The original aspect is that the committee members’ selection is made by drawing lots [or lottery], out of the applicants that are interested. Such a procedure

\textsuperscript{20} Ahmad Rifai, Kota Kita, 2018, case study documentation of Solo PB.
gives equal rights to participate to everyone. The method is very similar to citizen’s juries or court juries.\textsuperscript{21}

**Korean PB network**

The experience accumulated by the **Citizen Action Network** that gathers various organizations and activists engaged in PB from different cities in the country is quite inspiring and relatively unique in Asian countries or in Russia [goodbudget.kr]. Around 50 Korean cities are represented through local representatives in the network that remains independent from public and government resources. Every year the members scrutinize pre-defined indicators and variables the diverse PBs implemented nationally. As a result they present 12 to 15 “good practices”, sometimes publishing a national report, in Korean only, and available on Internet. In order to reduce functioning costs, as they have to survive and work, they tend to meet only for one day, twice a year. The principle to speed up presentations and spare time and money [no resources] are hackathon and generally in 5 to 6 hours all presentations are made.\textsuperscript{22} An important contribution, beyond how to make a PB network functions through time, is to maintain a critical and qualitative approach to PB and a willingness to deepen democracy. Currently the Korean PB network is facing a weakening process being addressed by its members.

5. **Highlights on some challenges for the future**

Despite the huge achievements realized over the last years, various challenges, most of them common to the various cities need still to be addressed. Some of them, identified and discussed during the sessions on participatory budgeting during the World Urban Forum are highlighted below.

In most cases, and this is not only the case under Russian and Asian skies, innovative PB that strengthens through time, share common features that are currently challenging:

- **Strong, independent, and committed civil society organizations**

\textsuperscript{21} Synthesis from Lev Shilov documentation of St Petersburg PB, 2018.
\textsuperscript{22} Interview of Korean PB network coordinator and fieldwork, Cabannes, 2015
One identified challenge is how to increase and secure more power for people to decide, both for projects priorities, but for defining PB rules as well. The “institutionalizing capacity of citizens” is part of the essence of participating budgeting looking not only for social or spatial justice, but that are aimed at deepening democracy. A serious risk that usually appears on the road, particularly when PBs are becoming successful and growing in visibility, is cooptation by politicians and party politics as well as elite capture. How to address these risks is a challenge so far for maintaining and increasing the quality of PB experiences in Asian and Russian cities.

- **Long term strong political commitments from mayors & politicians**

Strong PB needs strong commitments from local, regional or national politicians in power, but at the same time they need to become independent from these same politicians, and live a life on their own, beyond political mandates. International experience unfortunately highlights how PB processes, that apparently were looking strong and alive, do not survive beyond political mandates. Inscribing as was done for instance in Chengdu China, PB processes in policies, is one of the conditions that reduces volatility and the risks of unfortunate interruptions to PB processes. Again this is a challenge highlighted for the present period and that will need further attention.

- **Strong and independent non-government organizations, universities and research centers or academies.**

One clear lesson learned through the presentations and the cases documented is the role played by local and National NGOs such as HuiZhi / Participation Centre in Chengdu, Kota Kita in Solo and more generally in Indonesia; Penang Women’s Development Corporation in Penang or the Centre for Good Budget in Seoul. In some contexts, and this is the case on St Petersburg or in other cities in Russia, Universities, Research centers and academies are playing a similar positive function. This support and advisory role that covers multiple functions among such as training, helping in community mapping, awareness campaign, monitoring and evaluation or creating bridges between organized citizens and local authorities is essential and largely under-estimated despite the evidence gathered. The expan-
sion of PB in a country, without losing quality, depends largely on their expansion, their multiplication and their strengthening. How to achieve this and getting local and regional governments supporting them is quite essential and does not seem to be enough considered today. This remains a major challenge.

Channel more resources to participatory budgeting experiences

A common feature of PBs in Asian and Russian cities is the moderate to extremely low level of budgetary resources being debated. The indicator that has been used to put experiences from different countries in perspective is to divide the amount debated [converted in US$] by the number of inhabitants residing in the city or the region where the PB is taking place. This method has limitations and therefore any comparison has an indicative value only: [a] The purchasing power of the local currencies varies significantly from one country to the other; [b] the fluctuations of the exchange rates brings some distortion as the data obtained in the different cases are not from the same years; [c] The amounts debated vary quite significantly from one year to the other and can bring distortion as well. This is why we usually use a three years average and [d] and this is the most serious limit, the [PB] budgetary values indicated officially might related either to a planned and expected PB budget, or to the real PB budget obtained and that will depend on the reality of transfers from central governments or to the actual capacity of a given city to get the taxes paid, or it can refer to the budget actually spent in projects that have been approved through the PB process. Usually, this last figure is significantly lower than the planned, expected or confirmed budgets, as cities do not always have the capacity to spend their resources, primarily for PB related projects. We have been using, as much as possible, this latter figure, that remains the most significant and “real” one.

Keeping these limits in mind, one clear finding is that at the top end one finds Chengdu rural PB with a moderate value in the range of US$ 10/inhabitant/year. Then, Hwaesong, Korea quite similar to Seoul ranges around US$ 5/inhabitant/year. Surakarta/Solo, Stavropol Region and Chengdu urban PBs debate low figure in the range of US$ 2/inhabitant/year. St Petersburg so far debates budgetary resources below US$ 1 level whereas Seberang Perai in State of Penang, Malaysia so far debated only US$ 0.1/inhabitant in 2017.

Such numbers are relatively modest in relation to international practices, both in developed and developing countries: a significant number of experiences debate more than US$ 20 or 50/inhabitant/year. Cities debating out US$ 100 or 200/inhabitant/year, such as Porto Alegre in Brazil for most of the years, or Ilo in Peru are more the exception than the rule, but have been far from being unique. And they are not necessarily wealthier than their Asian and Russian equivalents. Ob
viously PB in cities where large amounts are debated are of a different nature and contribute to hugely transform cities positively in a relatively short period of time

**PB budget vs Municipal overall budget**

One could legitimately argue that these resources need to be put first of all in relation with the overall municipal budget available in the same city or region, in order to gauge the financial importance given to PB and the real capacity of citizens to control a significant share or not of the city resources.

The available public resources in the six cities and regions analyzed summed up to the significant number of US$ 15.5 billion annually. According to the information obtained, Hwaesong [and this is true for Seoul as well] would be at the top end with approximately US$ 3000 /inhabitant for 2014 [to be verified once again, as it appears extremely high]. St Petersburg Federal district is a wealthy metropolis as well posited in the US$ 1,600 /inhabitant / year range [2017, all districts], followed by Stavropol Region with US$ 525 /inhabitant in 2017, [actual budget], Chengdu US$ 258 /inhabitant in 2012 [executed] and Solo US$ 204 /inhabitant in 2017 [expenditure]. Seberang Perai enjoys a very low overall budget of about US$ 6 /inhabitant for 2017 that relativizes the extremely low amount debated through PB.

**PB, Pb, pB or pb?**

This being said, one needs to insist as well on the fact that “Participatory Budgeting” cannot be limited to its “Budgeting” dimension. However it cannot be either limited, as it is often the case to its “Participating” side, as if the control of public resources was trivial and unimportant. The argument here is that both sides of the coin need to be balanced and be P, for Participatory and B for Budgeting in capital letters, instead of pb in minor tone!

**Final comment**

How to keep in touch and learn from each other among Asian and Russian actors involved in PB remains an open question. Exchange of information, of tools and methods, of know–how and of critical reflections will certainly contribute to maintain and improve the quality of PBs that are increasing in numbers every year. Setting up a community of practice in Asia was felt as an important step to address collectively the challenges just highlighted. Finally, it would contribute as well to lobby for higher recognition at international and at national levels of the potentials of PB to improve people’s lives and to achieve the triple reversion of spatial, social and political priorities in a perspective of social and spatial justice and the deepening of democracy.
Europe
Participatory Budgeting in Portugal – standing between a hesitant political will and the impacts on public policies

Nelson Dias, Simone Júlio, Vânia Martins, Vanessa Sousa & Filipa Biel

Participatory budgeting emerges as a response, albeit partial, to the crisis of democracy

In his speech celebrating the 42nd anniversary of the 25th April Revolution, the current President of the Republic recalled the frankly positive balance of the Portuguese democratic system. On this occasion, he highlighted the processes of decolonization, democratization, European integration and restructuring of the economic system. Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa claims that the benefits are felt in strategic issues, such as the stability of the political regime, political parties and government systems, and also in the fundamental rights, freedom of speech, and civic organization.

As he himself acknowledges, this legacy, nevertheless, goes hand in hand with a marked loss of confidence in political players and in how democratic institutions operate, in their ability to care for the common good and to respond to the needs and expectations of the people. This very popular perception is confirmed by the European Social Survey’s data for 2014, according to which Portugal is the country with the lowest confidence levels in the system. For example: i) 39.1% of the Portuguese men and women consider that the political class is not at all interested in what the people think; ii) 26.2% is completely sceptical about the Parliament’s actions; iii) 40.7% lack confidence in politicians. These are indicators that, when combined with others, such as high voter abstention rates, prove there is a
process of lassitude in the country’s still young democracy. It was in a context of a deceleration of the democratic enthusiasm, with a confirmed downward trend in electoral participation rates, that the first Participative Budgeting (PB) initiative in Portugal emerged in Palmela. It was launched in 2002, 26 years after the first local elections\(^1\) and during the 8th term for local government bodies.\(^2\) On that occasion, the abstention rate was very close to 40%, which would progressively increase to 47.4% in 2013 and 45.03% in 2017, the highest figures registered in the country. This correlation is important because the emergency and development of PB in Portugal is closely related to the breach of trust in the system and its main political agents, assuming itself as an attempt by the State to respond, albeit partially, to the need to rebuild dialogue and grow closer to the population.

The inexperience regarding PB, the still shy aspiration of those elected to promote an effective sharing of power, as well as the lack of knowledge of the Portuguese society about these processes, dictated the conditions for the first ten PB initiatives,\(^3\) having opted for a consultative drift, according to which people could submit proposals, but the decision-making power would continue to be on the side of the elected.

With the progressive growth of electoral absenteeism and due to the failure of the consultative PBs – due to the inability to generate confidence in the populations – the first deliberative experiences appeared in 2007 and 2008,\(^4\) respectively in Sesimbra and Lisbon, in which the municipalities began to decide part of the municipal investments through public voting. Only in 2012, that is, in the second half of the third term under the PBs in Portugal, did this type of process – which should have been the only one that could be designated as Participatory Budgeting – became the majority for the first time. This period was also marked by the very strong public financial crisis and the consequent Troika in the country, which greatly contributed to the Portuguese society losing trust in institutions and political agents, thus reinforcing the need by some authorities to create mechanisms

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1. They took place on December 12, 1976.
3. Conducted between 2002 and 2006, during the 8th and the beginning of the 9th terms of the local authorities.
4. During the 9th term of the local authorities.
for greater participation and dialogue with the population. At the risk of simplifying a necessarily complex reading of the many variables that influence this reality, it seems important to conclude that, as the electoral participation decreased, the PB initiatives in Portugal increased, which curiously implied a more intense civil and political activity, due to the annual characteristic of these practices, and more extensively, due to the increasing number of people involved. As an example, about 1,250 finalist projects of all the PBs in operation in 2016 registered about 350,000 votes, which represented a value close to or higher than the electoral result achieved by some political forces in the last local elections.\(^5\)

**Figure 1** Evolution of the voter abstention rate in municipalities and number of PBs in Portugal

A significant growth in processes but an intermittent political will
After a hesitant start, due to the consultative characteristics of the first cases, Portugal became, in only 15 years, the country with the highest percentage of municipalities that has experimented or is developing PBs, on a voluntary basis – namely 46 %.\(^6\)

\(^5\) PPD/PSD–CDS–PP (379 thousand votes), Groups of Citizens (344 thousand), CDS–PP (152 thousand), BE (120 thousand).

\(^6\) This does not include Peru and the Dominican Republic, where the implementation of Participatory Budgeting is mandatory by law.
From the previous chart, we can see that in addition to the instability of the PBs, their growth dynamics is cyclically interrupted in the electoral years. This means that several mayors prefer suspending the initiative in these situations, usually using as arguments:

i) the idea of safeguarding the process, by avoiding electoral contagion,
ii) the uncertainty about the results and the decision not to compromise investments that can only be assumed and carried out by the new officials.

The opposite is also true, that is, there are municipalities that decide to keep the PB operational, justifying that: i) the Portuguese population is mature enough to distinguish between voting on campaign projects and electoral choices, ii) there is a broad political consensus on the positivity of the process, and the newly elected must respect the results of the PBs, by implementing the winning investments. Of the two positions mentioned, the first is clearly the majority. This means that even excluding situations of post-election democratic alternation in the municipalities under analysis, there is a significant trend in Participatory Budgeting (91.2%), with a maximum duration of 1 to 4 years.\(^7\) This indicates that it is the same councils that initiate Participatory Budgeting that after an electoral act decide not to resume them.

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\(^7\) The terms in office for town halls in Portugal have duration of 4 years.
### Table 1 Longevity of Participatory Budgeting in Portugal – 2002 to 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Longevity of PBs</th>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Parish PBs</th>
<th>Youth PBs</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 term / 1 to 4 years</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>94.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 terms / 5 to 8 years</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 terms / 9 to 11 years</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own

This is an element of enormous relevance in that it shows weaknesses in the sustainability of these processes. In other words, the growth of participatory budgeting processes in Portugal is significant, but its duration is very short, showing that the political commitment to the consolidation of this mechanism and its continuous improvement is still very fragile.

This could mean that the political willingness to experiment has been significant in terms of the number of cases reported, but is not steady enough to ensure higher levels of quality of PBs and their institutionalization as a standard practice in Portuguese municipalities.

It was hoped that with the affirmation of deliberative PBs, which were authorized after 2012, they would gain greater political strength and sustainability, contrary to the previous trend of high mortality rate of the consultative processes. The longevity of this tool has somewhat increased, but not enough for the PB to consolidate, so far, as a differentiating governance brand.

From the reading of these data, it is possible to verify that many elected were curious with the PB, as a device of dialogue with the society, but they did not convert to this model of participation. At the root of this “waiver” there are multiple factors, which sometimes coincide in the same autarchy, reinforcing each other:

- Weak investment in communication and mobilization of people, with the process registering very low levels of participation, which are interpreted by those elected as lack of interest by the population;
- Delays in the implementation of winning projects, with municipalities in this situation opting to suspend the PB, with the “promise” that this will be resumed after correcting the temporary deviations in the implementation of investments;
- Methodologies that are not very consistent and incapable of generating confidence in people, such as PBs heavily based on Internet platforms and without a specific bet on the face-to-face relationship.
All of the above situations show that the PB has not been a political priority, with inflexible support from the local leadership, a variable that is known to be indispensable to the success of an initiative like this. Another of the elements that should be analysed is the emergence of the electronic platforms supporting the PBs. These were decisive, at least in the first years of operation, for the generalization of the idea that the adoption of a participatory budgeting process is very simple and linear, being enough, to a large extent, to create a webpage that allows the submission of proposals of the citizens and the voting of the finalist projects. The products of these companies have been dubbed “turnkey” as a PB solution that is ready-to-install on computers as an easy deployment for technicians and no risk to the elect. This path, which can be dubbed the “fast PB”, neglected essential elements for the sustainability of these initiatives, among which: i) the conceptual and methodological training of the teams, ii) a diagnosis of the territory taking into account, for example, the population profile and the appropriateness or otherwise of the use of new technologies in such an initiative, iii) the realization of an institutional diagnosis, that allows to know the competences and availabilities existing inside the entity for the development of the different phases of the PB, iv) the design of a campaign to communicate and mobilize people for the process; v) the establishment of a permanent monitoring and evaluation system. Existing companies in the market have supported the development of 56% of signalled experiences. According to an analysis carried out, it is possible to conclude that PB initiatives that use e-platforms as the centre of the participatory process have an average longevity of 3 years, which is shorter than the duration of a mandate. By comparison, the most sustainable PB initiatives are those that add to the political will and the commitment of the technical staff to contract external consulting to assist in the design, development and evaluation of their initiatives. The PBs carried out by the respective promoters, without resorting to any platform or external support; show longevity close to 2 years.

Confidence grows more circumscribed
Through a reading of the different stages of the Portuguese autarchies regarding their degree of commitment to the promotion of citizen participation, it is possible to identify three major groups:
i) a majority that only complies with the legal requirements, triggering the traditional public consultations, when they are obliged to it, ii) a collective, with an oscillating evolution, that has been voluntarily extending the spectrum of citizen participation to other areas of governance, with a clear focus on participatory budgets, iii) the few who are trying to follow a path, still unknown, of multiplying the tools of participatory democracy, in some cases the concern to reach levels of articulation between them.

Contrary to the previously presented trend, it is possible to find – in the second and third groups – some successful PB initiatives, where investment in the process has been determinant to reach more expressive levels of participation and longevity. According to the monitoring processes carried out over the years to several of these cases, it is possible to conclude that a dynamic of rebuilding confidence in the institutions promoting PBs is underway. This is also true in the political and technical commitment to the initiative, and in that this tends to be stronger in the “loyal” participants, who regularly adhere to the different editions of the OP in their respective regions. Here we can see that trust is the result of a continuous and gradual dynamic, not in line with temporary or short-term participative initiatives. In the study under analysis, about 3,000 participants were surveyed on the following dimensions:

- Belief in the accomplishment of the approved projects and in the fulfilment of the deadlines;
- Perception of the degree of transparency of the PB;
- Knowledge and clarity of rules;
- Consideration of the PB as a positive contribution to the development of the territory;
- The PB as a result of the autarchy’s capacity for innovation;
- The PB as a tool for disseminating initiatives in the territory.

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8 Participative Budgets of Cascais, Alenquer, Ponta Delgada, Águeda, Caminha, Lousã, Penacova, and Lagoa (Algarve).

9 On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 corresponds to the lowest level and 6 to the highest level of confidence, participants’ scores are mostly between levels 5 and 6.
The data presented is of great relevance, but it cannot be generalized to all cases or to all the activities of the municipalities that promote Participatory Budgeting. The degree of citizens’ civic and democratic maturity allows them to clearly distinguish that the PB represents only a percentage of public money, in most cases a very small one, and a limited field of action of local governments, leaving out of this equation the remaining budget, projects, measures, and public policies.

It is this understanding of the scope and of the span potential of a PB that allows concluding on the non-existence, at least for now, of a direct relation between the adhesion indexes that are increasingly more expressive to the processes and levels of electoral participation. In other words, the existence of a PB, however successful it may be, is not sufficient to reverse the high abstention trend. This increased widely between the local elections of 2009 and 2013, i.e.: during the most severe period of the crisis that Portugal went through, not leaving aside the municipalities with the Participatory Budgeting of greater longevity in the country.¹⁰

¹⁰ This sample includes the Participatory Budgeting of Lisbon, with 11 years, and those of Cascais, Amadora, Odemira, and Vila Franca de Xira, with 8 years of uninterrupted operation.
The realization that the errors of governance, which led the country to the need for international aid, would be offset by austerity policies on wages and social rights, overwhelmingly overtaken any countercyclical stimulus aimed at reconstructing dialogue and trust. In other words, the mistrust is structural, while the gains obtained from the PB, despite important, are circumscribed. From another perspective, when people decide to participate, they mainly believe in their act of citizenship and not necessarily in the elected politician.

In summary, Participatory Budgeting are contributing to increase trust in institutions but they are not, and could not be, because of their limited size and scope, which are decisive in reversing the abstention behaviour of the Portuguese population. This means that people make a complete differentiation between the PB and the electoral acts, thus counteracting the mayors who suspend PB initiatives for fear that partisan campaigns will infect participatory processes.

Bearing in mind the context of progressive alienation of people from politics, and the fact that the main objective of PBs in Portugal is to rebuild trust in institutions, it is only natural that the commitment of the elect in strengthening these participatory dynamics and in the credibility of governance in general has to go beyond the timid investment and often move back, similarly what happened so far. In other words, the gains of trust with the PB are proportional to the political will of those elected to move from the PB as experience to a policy of participatory governance.

In order for the PB to be a counter-cyclical mechanism, a partial contribution to overcoming the participation deficits and the crisis of democracy, it must be strengthened in terms of its deliberative quality and sustainability, as well as tools for participation and transparency to other policies and areas of governance.
Participatory Budgeting are reaching more specific rather than comprehensive audiences.

From the monitoring study carried out over several editions of PBs, referred to in the previous point, it was possible to outline the profile of participants in the processes under consideration. Their average age is 48 years old, which tends to decrease as: i) the population size of clusters increases; ii) it goes from North to South, including in the latter group, the case of Ponta Delgada, in the Azores. In practice, this means that in municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants, the average age of participants is about 50 years old. In the territories that have between 20,000 and 50,000 people, the average age is 48, while in municipalities with demographic expressions higher than the previous ones, the age decreases to 46 years old. In terms of geography, the age of the participants in the PBs in the North is 53 years old, while in Ponta Delgada, in the Azores, this drop is significant, to 43 years of age. In any of these cases, the younger layers of the population remain quite far from these processes.

Regarding school education, three important conclusions are highlighted: i) the training of the participants increases as the population level of the agglomerates grows, ii) the educational level of those involved is higher than the average registered in municipalities with PB and in the country. For example, 31.8% of the people involved in these Participatory Budgeting have a higher education, whereas in the municipalities under study and in Portugal they stand at 17.7% and 13.8% respectively, iii) the individuals involved in the PB processes in the North and Centre regions are the least educated (55% and 51.5% with secondary and higher education, respectively), compared to those in Ponta Delgada with the highest (74.5% have secondary and higher education). From these data, it is clear that Participatory Budgeting are mobilizing, above all, people with higher levels of training, possibly also the most enlightened ones, while revealing the need for a strategic reflection on communication mechanisms and dissemination used in these processes.

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11 This data refers to the participants in public participation meetings, where they present, debate, and prioritize proposals for their Participatory Budgeting.
About 55.3% of the participants in the Participatory Budgeting under study are mostly male, which is contrary to the more feminine trend of the population of these municipalities (52.7%) and of the country (52.6%). It should also be pointed out that the territories with a demographic dimension of more than 50,000 inhabitants have the most significant participation of women in the PBs (47.8%), but it remains below that of men. Gender inequalities are thus also felt in the access to these processes, which apparently aim at creating more
universal conditions of participation. This is a dimension with impacts at various levels, among which the typologies of investments prioritized in each participatory budget, in as much as it is known the greater sensitivity of people of the female gender to the social areas, which, despite some cases of success, tend to be minimized in relation to other types of projects.

When analysing the situation of the respondents in relation to economic activity, it is verified that the majority is employed (58%), or retired (20.3%). The unemployed and the students do not respectively exceed 5.9% and 5.7% of the participants.

Considering the associative profile of the respondents, it is concluded that although an important part has a previous history of associative involvement:

i) it is in medium-sized municipalities (from 20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants) that there is a greater linkage between participants and social organizations (50.6%), ii) the regions of the Centre (48.7%) and Lisbon and Vale do Tejo (49.4%) have the highest levels of relationship between the respondents and the collective of the third sector of the respective territories, iii) it is in the age groups up to the age of 24 and from 35 to 64 that the associative involvement reaches the highest values.

**Figure 7** Participants according to associative involvement and region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Yes, but I’m not active</th>
<th>Yes, and I’m active</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon, Tejo Valley</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>99.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islands</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Caption*
- Yes, but I’m not active
- Yes, and I’m active
- No

*Source: In Loco*
There is a preponderant homogeneity when analysing the profile of the participants regarding the frequency of voting in national and local elections, and it should be pointed out that: i) about 6% assume that they “never” or “rarely” voted, ii) abstention rates are slightly higher in the Lisbon and Tejo Valey area, with 7.7% in the acts in question, iii) electoral participation is reduced as the age of the participants decreases, especially the 18-24 age group, with 23.9% and 25.4% responding that “never” or “rarely” voted, respectively at local and national level.

The data presented so far confirm two trends of the same reality: i) participatory budgets, however consolidated they may be, have not been enough to reduce structural distrust in institutions and, consequently, high electoral abstention rates, ii) PBs are able to mobilize a small proportion of the abstentionists for civic participation, showing a still limited potential for persuading people who, by their own determination, have distanced themselves from political participation.

In summary, the degrees of trust obtained by Participatory Budgeting are mainly related to a “typical profile” characterized by being a man, aged 48, secondary school education, employed, linked to the associative movement, and active in electoral acts.
From multiplying processes to creating a participatory ecosystem

During these 15 years, the participants in PBs in Portugal decided approximately 100 million euros of municipal investments, of which about 98% were implemented by municipalities and the remaining 2% by parishes.

It is also interesting to highlight the dynamics around Participatory Budgeting with children and young people. There are 62 initiatives signed between 2006 and 2017, with significant impact in the last term. These experiences enabled the young people to decide on approximately 5.5 million euros for the execution of public projects, but more than the amount in question, what is relevant in these practices is the strong educational and formative charge for participation and for democracy, especially when this has been little assured by the main instances of sociability in Portugal.

The track of PBs in the country also allows concluding that, despite its strong dissemination throughout the national territory, there is a greater concentration in the metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto, where there have been 66 experiments so far, about 27% of the total. These two territories have more than 4.5 million inhabitants and a significant part of the municipalities with the largest population – those that proportionately have expressed a more expressive availability for the adoption of the PB.

In 2017, the country witnessed the birth of three Participatory Budgeting initiatives at the national level, promoted by the Government of the Republic, namely the Participatory Budgeting Portugal, the Portugal’s Youth Participatory Budgeting and the Participatory Budgeting of Schools. These were followed in 2018 by the first regional process organized by the Government of the Autonomous Region (and insular) of the Azores. Portugal is thus the first country in the world with PBs at all levels of government – national, regional, and local.

These dynamics demonstrate the existence of a favourable context for multiplying PB, at different scales and through different types, providing the Portuguese population with multiple opportunities for participation, as is the case of the younger generations, who, in a single territory, can be invited to participate, integrate the young Participatory Budgeting of their municipality, the Participatory Budgeting of the school they attend, and also the national young Participatory Budgeting. According to data characterizing the profiles of the participants of the public meetings of the latter case,
about 20% to 25% assumed to have previously joined other PB initiatives that took place in their territories.

The context in Portugal is thus very favourable for the creation of a “participative ecosystem,” characterized by the proliferation of processes, offering quite attractive opportunities for exercising citizenship and democracy. The continuation of this dynamic should, however, lead to greater organization and articulation between the different levels of government, so that multiplication is accompanied by articulation and, if possible, integration of initiatives, enhancing existing resources and increasing the impacts of these people, territories, and administrations.

In some participatory budgeting processes, not only part of the money is decided. It also influences the design of public policies. The impacts of PBs on management, society and territory have not been adequately analysed, thus preventing a broader and more complex reading of the shortcomings and benefits of these processes. Without being able to generalize, however, it is possible to affirm that in circumscribed cases the PBs did not remain for the opportunity given to the populations to decide a part of the municipal investments, which, in itself, already represents an important gain compared to the classic model of democratic governance.

An analysis of this level on these initiatives, however, reveals that they have become, in certain contexts, the main sensor of the municipalities for the understanding of the perceptions and positions of society on governance issues, thus influencing the design of some public policies.

The Municipality of Lisbon received, during the 10 years of PB, about 6200 proposals. This is undoubtedly the best barometer the capital could have for ideas for the development of the city. These are not just investments made by groups of people. It is inherent in these to identify problems, concerns, priority thematic areas, lines of thought on the direction to be given to certain public policies, among much other information.

In 2008, at the time of the first edition of the PB, the bike paths were residual in Lisbon. On this occasion, a strong movement of citizens won a project that aimed to create several cycle routes in the capital, as a mode of alternative transportation to motor vehicles. The
dynamics surrounding this theme was growing and the Municipality was not indifferent, having turned this idea into a structural policy, and it is likely that in the coming months it will reach 200 km of cycle paths throughout the city.

From the Municipality of Águeda comes another interesting example. One of the winning projects of the first edition of the PB was the creation of a support office for disabled people. The City Council recognized the importance of the subject under consideration and, after reflecting with the proponents of this idea, decided to carry out a broader policy, which provides: i) the provision of a sign language translator in the attendance to the public in the Municipality and in the parishes, as well as in Águeda TV and in certain public events, ii) the adaptation of your website to people with impaired vision, iii) the creation of Braille forms, iv) (ramps, elevator, automatic doors, seats in the auditorium and parking lot, etc.).

In Caminha, in the north of Portugal, the fishing community was organized for the first time as a social class to defend the repair of a quay and the installation of a crane for boats, a project worth 60 thousand euros. The dynamics of this group mobilized the local society and the Municipality itself for the need of requalification of the riverside front, being foreseen today an investment of over 1 million euros. The PB is, therefore, a process in which “works” decided by the citizens carry with them other “works,” directly influencing the public policies and investments.

In Cascais, where the most voted PB of the country is located, the Town Hall has been changing its institutional culture, changing procedures and forms of relationship with citizens. The significant success of this initiative has led the municipality to voluntarily launch new participatory processes, around the definition of policies and strategic documents, in areas such as health promotion, urban mobility, and education. What is particularly important in this dynamic
is that the participation is no longer restricted to the representatives of the organizations present in the territory and is now open to the whole population, assuming the many thousands of participants in the PB as a large panel of citizens who must be heard. Although circumscribed, these are some examples that confirm that Participatory Budgeting can be a catalyst for change when taken seriously by administrations. With the PB and its effects, the modalities of dialogue between some municipalities and society tend to be a little more horizontal; the organic structures of certain municipalities have seen services dedicated to the design and management of participation processes; others began to adopt mechanisms to involve the population in their activities; various programmes competing for the elections have been inspired by proposals submitted by citizens in the PB; in some territories, civil society has appropriated itself in such a way from the process that it will be difficult for any government to have the audacity to interrupt or cancel it.

In cases of success, what seemed to be only a participatory mechanism, thought by the mayors as a mechanism for rebuilding the confidence of the citizens, based on the decision of a small part of the local investments, was so assumed by the populations that today it became a channel of direct dialogue for the discussion and definition of public policies, whose impacts on the territory are much higher than the projects decided within the scope of the own Participatory Budgeting. Looking at these from this new perspective becomes even more noticeable the enormous potential that these processes contain, which, when properly exploited, can contribute much more significantly to their own credibility and sustainability.
20 Years of Participatory Budgeting in Spain

Francisco Francés, Liberto Carratalá & Ernesto Ganuza

Introduction
The implementation of participatory budgeting in Spain has taken place at breakneck speed. The first of these projects were piloted in 2001, and up through 2010, Spain had the highest rate of growth of participatory budgeting in Europe.\(^1\) In 2011, in the midst of an economic crisis, the conservative party succeeded in shifting the political leanings of many municipalities, including those with a previous track record of implementing successful Participatory Budgeting over the past decade, such as Santa Cristina d’Aro in Girona, Getafe in the suburbs of Madrid, and Seville in Andalusia. Whether due to the political transformation or the economic crisis that considerably reduced the budget of many local Spanish governing bodies, the newly successful ventures into participatory budgeting were brought to an abrupt halt. In 2015, a new set of municipal elections was held. This time, the political landscape of many municipalities shifted once again, with new political parties arising in the wake of Spanish left-wing national party Podemos. While 2009 saw the implementation of nearly 150 participatory budgeting projects, in 2013 there were only 80, with the majority being found in municipalities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants.\(^2\) On the other hand, in 2017 only Catalonia had implemented 100 participatory budgeting schemes, a figure that is tripled in the rest of the country (300). It should be noted that these statistics are not derived from a formal census. As there is no centralised database on the number of participatory budgeting projects implemented,

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1. See Ganuza, E and Francés, F, El círculo virtuoso de la democracia, Madrid: CIS.
2. Spain has over 8,000 municipalities, the majority of which have a very low population.
these figures are merely approximations that enable an examination of overall trends. Despite this, the rough figures presented here demonstrate a remarkable number of on-going changes that have been bolstered by 1) the political leanings of Spanish municipalities, which are now more open to trying out participatory schemes, 2) continuing development and maturation of this tool (participatory budgeting), which has led to a noticeable rise in the implementations of these projects throughout Spain, and 3) the extensive incorporation of digital tools in the design and implementation of these processes.

What has changed over the last 18 years? Are the projects that were piloted before the same as those currently being implemented? This article seeks to answer these questions and offer a general overview of what is currently taking place in Spain. To address this issue, it is first necessary to have an in-depth understanding of the political and social context in which these participatory budgeting projects have been developed.

**Political and Social Context**

Since the beginning of the 21st century, participatory decision-making has been highly regarded by academics, organised civil society groups, and transnational institutions (such as the World Bank or the OECD) as an invaluable tool that can be used to counteract the pitfalls of democracy. This particular context has not changed since the first participatory budgeting schemes were introduced in Spain. However, these projects have primarily been implemented within the country’s municipalities, and their contexts have indeed changed considerably. For example, municipal elections have enabled a change in the political landscape at various moments over the last 18 years, greatly influencing the introduction of new Participatory Budgeting (PB) schemes. However, politics are not the only influence at play; the economic crisis had a notable impact on the country’s municipalities, greatly affecting their capacity for action and therefore their political strategies, including those involving participatory decision-making. Finally, one must also take into account the social changes that have significantly influenced the way in which public institutions interact with the general public.

Since the beginning of the new century, the political context within Spain has followed a timeframe that can be divided into three dif-
different phases. The first phase took place from 2000–2011, the second between 2011–2015, and the third is currently on-going. These three distinct phases are primarily the result of the political landscape decided by municipal elections. During the first decade of the new millennium, the electoral map did not allow for any major changes over time; the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) was the most successful party on a municipal level, followed by the conservative party, but the United Left (IU) coalition governed many municipalities as well, making it the third most powerful political force at that institutional level. The majority of Participatory Budgeting were thus developed by the more progressive municipal governments, United Left and the PSOE. These two parties were responsible for around 70% of the participatory budgeting pilot schemes during this time. A few conservative governments also initiated hesitant attempts at participatory budgeting in the mid-2000s, such as the city of Málaga, Castellón, and Logroño.

In the second of the aforementioned phases (2011–2015), many left-leaning municipal governments were replaced by conservative leaders during the 2011 municipal elections. For example, Getafe’s participatory budgeting project was completely stopped, despite it having been governed by the PSOE or IU for the entirety of the past decade. In Seville, the PSOE and IU government had been using PB schemes since 2004. As of 2011, both municipalities were governed by the People’s Party (PP). The lack of conservative party enthusiasm for participatory decision-making at the time, together with the economic crisis affecting public administrations in general, resulted in a sharp decrease in the number of PB schemes. Regarding the implemented projects undertaken in 2013 by the authors of the present article, it was found that a third of PB projects were developed by the traditional conservative party, another third by traditionally leftist parties (PSOE and IU), and the final third by nationalist parties in the Basque Country (Bildu) and Catalonia, with a total of 80 schemes altogether.

During the third phase (after the municipal elections held in 2015), many municipalities were now governed by new parties that had arisen in Spain in response to much heated protest. Traditionally left-leaning parties also gained renewed power during this time. The amount of participatory budgeting schemes increased immediately, but with a few new developments. According to the census conducted for the purposes of this article, which is randomised but not entirely representative of all instances of participatory budgeting schemes, half were implemented by the PSOE, while almost 15% were driven by the newly formed parties. The remaining projects would have been implemented by conservative parties. This third phase also saw increased implementation of participatory budgeting schemes by nationalist conservative parties such as PNV in the Basque Country or

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3 See Gauza, E and Francés, F, El círculo virtuoso de la democracia, Madrid: CIS.
PdCat in Catalonia. It remains apparent, however, that Participatory Budgeting have consistently been favoured more by left-leaning parties over the past couple of decades. With the exception of the second phase, the progressive parties have always been at the forefront of implementing participatory budgeting schemes. What has changed in the political landscape between 2000 and 2018 has been the rise of new parties and the type of municipalities that opt for participatory budgeting strategies. In the first of the aforementioned phases (2000–2011), one third of these schemes were introduced in small municipalities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, with another third introduced in medium-sized municipalities (up to 50,000 inhabitants). The remaining schemes were implemented in large municipalities but not in any large cities, with the exception of Seville and Málaga. During the second phase (2011–2015), a period marked by economic crisis and political shifts within municipalities, the majority of Participatory Budgeting were introduced in small municipalities. A very significant change took place during the third phase (2015–2019). For the first time, participatory budgeting schemes began to appear in large cities such as Madrid, Valencia, Zaragoza, and Barcelona (the four largest cities in the country, comprising around 20% of the Spanish population). Other, more medium-sized cities that often still exceed 100,000 inhabitants, such as A Coruña, Santiago, Tarragona, and Palma, Majorca, have also introduced participatory budgets, led in all cases by the newly emerged parties. Apart from this, during this time period Participatory Budgeting continued to grow in all municipalities, whether big or small.

In order to provide a thorough explanation for this growth of participatory budgeting in Spain’s large cities, it is not enough to focus only on the emergence of these new political parties. It is true that their rhetoric is very conducive to the implementation of participatory budgeting projects. However, the addition of larger cities (with a population greater than 100,000) is also due to another element, the development of which has made it possible for political leaders to introduce participatory budgeting programmes in cities like Madrid, which has a population of 3.5 million. A single, very simple example will shed light on an element that is essential to better understand the evolution of participatory budgeting in Spain. In 2000, mobile phones were a novelty, and people still used public telephone boxes. Now, in 2018, landlines are hardly ever used, and people regularly speak into a microphone attached to their body while walking down the street or use the computer to have video calls with people on the other side of the world. The first generation iPhone premiered in 2007. There is a significant difference between the patterns of participatory budgeting observed in the first decade of the new millennium and those seen towards the end of the second decade: digitalisation. This trend, of course, can be seen in most other countries as well. The topic of digitalisation is important to mention in order to highlight the great
differences between the PB schemes from the beginning of the new millennium and the more recent ones — today the thought of participation without digital tools is almost unfathomable, whereas they barely existed at the beginning of the century. As anyone can imagine, current participatory budgeting projects involve the use of digital tools on a regular basis. This has made it possible to resolve a major problem in larger cities, as it allows for the participation of a greater number of people from urban areas with high population density. Moreover, it has also transformed one of the fundamental characteristics of Spanish participatory budgeting projects during the first phase, how debates were carried out and the prioritisation of proposals in assemblies. Before exploring these differences in further detail, first it is necessary to analyse the newer instances of participatory budgeting in order to finish off with an ideal comparison between the typical experiences observed during each of the three phases outlined previously.

**Participatory Budgeting Schemes in Spain After 2015**

As previously stated, 2015 saw the beginnings of a new phase of participatory budgeting in Spain. The emergence of new political parties, incipient recovery of the economy, and powerful rhetoric of equality and political involvement present in Spain at the time were the driving factors behind the sudden surge in participatory budgeting projects throughout the country. A sample of 60 Spanish municipalities provides an idea of the different types of projects that have been implemented. It is not a representative sample, as that would require knowledge of each and every participatory budgeting programme that has been tested or implemented. As it is impossible to know all those details for sure, the examples selected for this sample are meant to represent a significant number of different experiences, enabling the analysis of what does currently exist in ideal terms. The examples selected have also been divided into four groups according to population size in order to better appreciate the differences that may appear between larger and smaller municipalities. Thus, 15 municipalities were analysed from each of the four population groups: over 100,000; between 50,000–99,999; 20,000–49,999; and fewer than 20,000 inhabitants.

**Who Participates?**

Since its inception in 2001, participatory budgeting in Spain has sought to increase...
the number of citizens participating actively in politics. Before its implementation in the new millennium, the power to decide on political participation within municipalities lay mostly in the hands of associations. This new methodology, which called upon anonymous citizens to participate individually, often led to severe conflicts in the municipalities.\(^6\) Beginning in 2015, the figures begin to tell a different story. The majority of these projects are open to the participation of collectives as well as citizenship on an individual basis (this is the case in 61.7% of the processes studied). Only 38.3% of the cases studied assume individual citizens as political subjects. The debate begun during the participatory budgeting projects undertaken in the first decade of this century appears to have been resolved. There was a certain tension between the concept of sectorial or territorial representation (in which associations were called upon to play a central role in the processes) and the concept of individual involvement (in which the individual residents were those who attended the participatory budgeting process without the mediation of formal collectives). These tensions led to conflict on more than one occasion. However, we can verify that the majority of participatory budgeting processes registered today opt for a mixed model that varies from place to place, granting different roles to individual citizens and collectives.

This particular bid appears to be influenced by a few aspects such as the size of the municipality, the political leanings of the town hall (although in the councils governed by the People’s Party, the notion of individual citizenship as the only viable form of participation is much more residual), or the area’s experience with participatory budgeting projects (only in the municipalities that implement the process during the first year is there a preponderance of opting for individual participation).

**The Prioritisation of Proposals**

The way in which citizen proposals are prioritised is another one of the key questions when it comes to the organisation of Participatory Budgeting. Budgets are limited and there are always many proposals; therefore, the strategy used to prioritise said proposals provides a lot of information about the basic characteristics of each particular

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process. In general, three out of every four of the municipalities analysed opt to prioritise citizen proposals through individual voting systems. Therefore, the most prevalent model moves away from an imagined ideal in which collective consensuses are reached through debates about the real needs of the municipality and the relevance of solutions introduced via proposals within the Participatory Budgeting. This was a key characteristic of the processes observed during the first phase (2001–2010). Even so, it is possible to identify factors that conflict with the idea of homogeneity of these participatory budgeting schemes in relation to this issue.

For example, the size of municipalities is a variable that may influence which prioritisation strategy is chosen. It appears that the larger the number of inhabitants in the case studies observed, the less likely a participatory budgeting scheme was to prioritise individual votes, instead opting to select criteria that would help establish the order of importance of citizen initiatives. However, as seen in the following chart, the majority of participatory budgeting projects use only individual votes as a means of prioritisation.

**Graphic 1** Number of inhabitants in each participatory budgeting process and the strategy selected for prioritising citizen proposals.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
<th>Prioritisation only through voting</th>
<th>Prioritisation through criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20,000 inhab</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 - 49,999 inhab</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 - 99,999 inhab</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 and more inhab</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Caption

![Prioritisation only through voting](black)

![Prioritisation through criteria](green)

The method of prioritisation also appears to be correlated with the definition of who exactly is being called upon to participate in the budget-making process. Thus, in 91.3% of the processes in which participation is solely open to citizens on an individual basis, the method
of prioritisation of proposals is done by vote, with only 8.7% of the processes being able to use criteria for distributive justice. On the contrary, in the participatory budgeting processes that also allow the participation of collectives and associations, the option of prioritisation via voting drops to 65.7% of cases, and the option of prioritising through the use of criteria rises to 25.7%. This presupposes that these particular processes be more open to collective deliberation.

Thus, it appears that participatory budgeting processes in Spain throughout this third phase have simplified the decision-making processes on behalf of citizens. This factor surely helps to streamline the participatory budgeting process, although some of the quality of decisions may also be lost.

The Rules of Participatory Budgeting

Another aspect that must be considered upon analysing the methodology behind these participatory budgeting schemes is the existence (or lack thereof) of some form of regulations to determine the best strategy for the process — and, should they exist, how they have been established. This is an example of one of the most significant changes observable in current participatory budgeting processes when compared with those implemented in Spain 10–15 years ago. Of the processes analysed for the purposes of this study sample, only 13.3% opted for a kind of “self-regulation,” in which the rules and standards were agreed upon by the very same group of people participating in the process. This was without a doubt one of the most striking characteristics of most of the participatory budgeting projects established during the first decade of the century in Spain. In fact, in many cases it served as a recurring theme or motif at the beginning of each new budgeting process, as in practice it constituted a space in which the collective imagination was upended with regard to how to define not the participatory budgeting model itself, but rather the model for citizen participation within the municipality. Currently, the most prevalent option as per the study sample involves the development of a set of rules by the municipality council or the particular political areas driving forth the process. These rules then dictate the methodology for the process and guide all participatory action taken within it. There is clearly not a majority of implemented projects in which

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7 See Ganuza, E and Francés, F, El círculo virtuoso de la democracia, Madrid: CIS.
the citizenry takes part in defining the norms for participatory budgeting. There is even a sizeable portion of processes (26.7%) in which no form of regulation was established at all, which opens the door to discretionary management of the actions and decisions involved in these types of processes. Proof of this can be found in the collected data, which shows that not one unregulated process opted to use distributive justice criteria for the prioritisation of proposals. However, in the case of those municipalities in which the participants determined the rules of procedure, this option is chosen in 62.5% of the applicable processes, with none of the groups fitting this profile opting for private methods of prioritisation with neither voting nor criteria.

What is decided?
The issues raised by the proposals made during these participatory budgeting processes are another element that must be considered when outlining their scope. Here, once again there are differences between the current participatory processes and those from the first phase. The first participatory budgeting processes in Spain mostly centred on small investments in infrastructure. This was the space for debate, and it was here that citizen proposals and initiatives were formed. Today, however, there is greater heterogeneity in terms of the issues up for debate. Thus, only 45% of the processes studied limit the scope of the Participatory Budgeting to infrastructure. The majority (55%) also include other areas of municipal spending, especially with regard to issues concerning the implementation of programmes, activities, and municipal services.
The openness of participatory budgeting with regard to expenditures is closely linked, as one might guess, to how connected the process is to other local planning mechanisms. In this sense, participatory budgeting has emerged as a common space used to settle and determine spending priorities, including other planning instruments used in municipalities.

The Impact of Digitalisation
Before 2015, participatory budgeting processes in Spain were generally organised as in-person meetings that citizens attended to propose, discuss, and prioritise different proposals. The data from this exploratory study shows that this has changed considerably in the more recent participatory budgeting processes. 91.7% of the pro-
cesses studied incorporate some digital element within the Participatory Budgeting. That said, these digital participation channels are used almost exclusively to provide further channels for input (providing proposals) and output of the final results (voting or prioritising proposals). In other words, the internet is frequently used for submitting proposals and voting on them. Deliberations between participants, a key characteristic of the processes of earlier phases, are still organised as in-person meetings in 61.7% of the cases studied. This leaves 38.3% of processes in which no face-to-face debates are organised. With regard to digital tools, only 6.7% of the processes studied had the option to debate or deliberate on the nature and relevance of submitted proposals online. These figures demonstrate the importance that digital tools have acquired in the world of participation, but at the same time, very few of the processes (1.7%) exclusively employed digital tools in order to devise Participatory Budgeting. On the other hand, 8.5% of the cases studied were organised purely using face-to-face meetings. The majority (71.2%) of processes make use of both in-person meetings and digital tools, although there are differences in the use of the latter correlated with the size of the municipality. The smaller a municipality, the less likely it is to use digital tools to organise. Larger cities, for example, tend to use a combination of both forms of participation.

The Internal Structure of Participatory Budgeting

One other hallmark of past participatory budgeting processes that is no longer used as frequently in Spain is the establishment of a representative body of citizens within the methodological design. These representative bodies are often tasked with prioritising residents’ initiatives or applying the criteria established for said prioritisation. This type of body, which is often called a “Participatory Budgeting round table” or “Participatory Budgeting council,” is made up of representatives from collectives or people elected as delegates by citizen assemblies. They were frequently used during the first development of these participatory budgeting processes throughout the first decade of the new millennium. Currently, practical-
ly 75% of the studied processes have either done away with or not even considered forming such a governing body. The main reason for this shift lies in the work carried out by these groups (their main role essentially being the prioritisation of citizen initiatives). This work has in many cases been transferred to the virtual sphere, which, unlike these delegated bodies, is unlimited in space and scale. In theory, if these tasks are moved to digital platforms, all participants are able to take part in the prioritisation of proposals. This accounts for the fact that within the sample analysed, in those processes that enable online prioritising or voting on proposals, these citizen representative bodies are only established in 19.5% of cases. However, the growing use of digital platforms is not the only factor that influences the existence (or lack thereof) of these types of governing bodies within participatory budgeting systems — population size also plays a key role. Municipalities with lower populations are the most likely to avoid using these kinds of appointed bodies entirely. The larger a municipality, the more likely they are to form a representative body of this kind, above all in their associational composition. The reduced presence of these types of representative bodies in the structure of participatory budgeting processes greatly influences citizens’ ability to supervise and follow up on proposals. This oversight and supervision of decisions was frequently carried out in the past by creating follow-up committees, which were almost always comprised of participants who were also members of the representative body. In this respect, as evidenced by the present case study, these types of bodies are a thing of the past. They were only identified in three out of ten of the processes studied. This does not mean that it is not possible to monitor the decisions and agreements reached. There are plenty of options offered on the internet and digital platforms for providing information that enables citizen oversight, as evidenced by the various online platforms designed by many municipalities. However, it remains the case that this capacity for oversight has not been made formal in most cases, which lends a much higher degree of discretion to institutions.
The existence of committees formed to oversee agreements depends in large part on whether or not there is a strong underlying foundational organisation to support this follow-up work. Of the processes that lack any rules of procedure, for example, 93.8% lack any supervisory committees. Similarly, when there is no form of citizen delegation, in 84.1% of cases there is no follow-up committee either. On the other hand, in the processes in which a method of self-regulation has been agreed upon by the citizenry, in 62.5% of cases, this self-regulation is accompanied by the formation of citizen-led committees responsible for overseeing the implementation of prioritised proposals. Along the same lines, three out of four processes that had a representative body comprised of individual citizens also had some form of follow-up committee with regulated procedures.

Types of Participatory Budgeting

In summary, the types of participatory budgeting implemented in Spain have evolved and are not exactly the same as those from ten years ago. The use of digital tools has led to many significant changes, often relegating the space for interaction between citizens and administrations to the virtual sphere. This has enabled the participatory process to become more streamlined (fewer rules, prioritisation of proposals decided by voting), which has both benefits (increased participation) and drawbacks (lack of oversight). We can sum up the general overview of participatory budgeting before and after.

In 2005, any citizen from any municipality could attend an assembly to learn more about Participatory Budgeting. There, they were able to share their opinion and propose specific goals they would like to see realised using the municipal budget for the following year. These assemblies could elect representatives to comprise a representative delegation and oversee the budgets. The members of these delegations deliberated and decided on the rules for the participatory mechanism, with these decisions being reviewed each year. Municipal staff verified proposals to
ensure their legality. Proposals were generally prioritised by applying social criteria. In other words, participants did not decide directly in the assemblies, but rather in these delegations. The representatives of these delegations were renewed each year.

In 2018, any citizen from any municipality can connect to the internet and submit a proposal from their own home. In many cases, one can also go directly to a city or town hall to deliver their proposal in hand. In some municipalities, associations (or at least the citizens who choose to) meet to discuss the proposals submitted by citizens via the internet. From there, they decide which proposals will be subjected to a vote, which can be decided in various different ways. In some municipalities, the submitter of a proposal must attend in person to explain their proposal. In many other cases, only those at the meeting make the decisions, which are often mainly comprised of members of various city associations. In all cases, the municipality is responsible for verifying the legality of any proposals. Once the proposals have passed through this screening process, the municipality posts them online, and any citizen can vote on them from the comfort of their own home.

This quick overview is not an attempt to evaluate or assess the processes that took place before and after. Rather, this article stands to bear witness to the evolution of participatory budgeting processes.
Note from the authors

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Participatory Budgeting in Italy. Towards a Renaissance?

Stefano Stortone & Giovanni Allegretti

Introduction
In the last five years, many changes have taken place in Italy from both a civic and political standpoint. Since 2013, when the 5 Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, or M5S) prevailed in the national electoral arena, becoming the first party (with 25.5% of the vote\(^1\)), Italy witnessed a strong reconfiguration of the political panorama. Such a shift was confirmed by recent elections (held on March 4, 2018), where M5S strengthened its role as first party (with 32.7% of the vote\(^2\)). Electoral results – which at the national level determined the impossibility of naming a majority government – had different geometries at local and regional levels. This confirmed an ongoing cataclysm, the outcome of which is still unpredictable, but which could have a powerful impact upon the future of participation and participatory budgeting (PB).

Indeed, PB has already shown a resurgence. The renewed interest in democratic innovations based on the expansions of civic engagement beyond traditional forms of mere consultation, and the number of PB initiatives in Italy, have indeed increased in the last five years. PB is also expanding and with an improved quality in other environments such as schools. Undoubtedly, the changes in the political panorama could have triggered such a revival, taking into account that the strong discursive centrality of direct democracy in

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\(^1\) The rate refers to the Low Chamber of Parliament. 47 political parties run for election but 37 of them garnered less than 1% of total votes.

\(^2\) In the Low Chamber of Parliament, 28 political parties run for election; only 9 of them garnered more than 1% of total votes. Here M5S was far ahead of the left-wing Democratic Party (18.7%) and the right-wing Lega (17.4%).
the M5S platform also stimulated other political forces – at both the national and local levels – to put more emphasis on issues related to participation and in fostering new experiments related to the promotion of democratic innovations (Gianolla, 2018). One example of this is the reinforcement and extension of the Law of Participation of Tuscany Region by the Democratic Party in the aftermath of the results of national elections in February 2013. However, the transformation of the international context also played a relevant role in the change of the Italian PB panorama. Paris and Madrid recently joined other Western global cities already investing in PB (such as Lisbon, Reykjavik and New York). This represents a strong encouragement to the implementation of important initiatives on a larger scale in Italy, as in the case of Milan (2015 and 2017) and Bologna (2017). A third factor which played an important – though less relevant – role in multiplying the number of Italian PBs – in metropolitan cities as well as smaller municipalities – is the spread of new technologies for supporting participatory processes. In particular, open and free projects like EMPATIA (a project at EU level, but based in Portugal) or CONSUL (based in Spain) made it easier for municipalities to involve a greater number of citizens while keeping costs low. This spurred a reimagining of the organizational methodologies of PB experiments according to hybrid models – mixing online and offline channels of civic engagement.

In light of the growing number of local administrations implementing PB processes, as well as their territorial relevance, are we really witnessing a renaissance of PBs in Italy? This chapter’s underlying question is whether the experiments that took place and were developed in the last five years represent a new wave of PBs and, if so, what shape and features characterize them, and which direction do they seem to be taking.

The first section of this chapter briefly recalls PB’s history in Italy (already broadly addressed in the previous editions of this book). In the

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3 The Regional Law 69/2007 was officially expiring on December 31, 2012 – as for the effect of a “sunset clause” which was conceived it as an experiment to be evaluated and eventually continued or amended. After a difficult period in which the Regional Government seemed uninterested in prolonging its life, the national election in March (with the strong growth of M5S) gave new life to the debate around the law. This resulted in the approval of Regional Law 46/2013 that summer, which strengthened some obligations of the Regional Government in relation to participation, as is evident in the mandatory Public Debate procedures concerning regional infrastructures.

4 See: empatia-project.eu and consulproject.org.
second section, we will go through the major changes which occurred since 2013 by means of some data, case studies and by exposing some specific innovations characterising the new scenario, from the role of technology, to methodological evolutions, and the internationalisation of the debate on PBs.

**Origin and first transformations of Participatory Budgeting in Italy**

The birth of PBs in Italy dates back to 1994, in the Adriatic town of Grottammare (pop. 15,000), where a long and exceptional experience of participatory governance occurred, involving citizens in many different aspects of territorial planning and even in the construction of public–private partnerships (Sintomer & Allegretti, 2009). However, PB as a diffuse practice, only started gaining momentum from 2002, when a large group of progressive councillors, activists and academics, related to far-left parties, NGOs and social alter–globalist movements, joined the second Porto Alegre’s World Social Forum (WSF) and brought participation back to the core of the national political agenda. During the WSF, they launched the Charter for a New Municipium and founded an organization of the same name, the Network of the New Municipium (*Rete del Nuovo Municipio*, or RNM).\(^5\) Referring to the core principles of the Aalborg Charter in fostering processes of Agendas 21 and – more widely – other “new forms of direct democracy,” the RNM network played a crucial role in triggering the promotion of alter–globalist political measures. From this perspective, PB practices were chosen as a sort of metaphoric example of a possible political shift. At the same time, RNM played an influential role in the drafting of the first regional law about participation in Tuscany, as well as on several local financing measures enacted by the Lazio region and the Milan province (Allegretti, 2011; Floridia, 2013).

In Italy from 2002 to 2009 initiatives and experimentations concerning civic participation flourished, thanks, in part, to a series of new tools and plans for fostering “integrated development,” which were stimulated by both national government and European Union funding schemes. PB proved to fit in well with this context, starting with a few trailblazing experiences, and then gaining momentum, substance and (mostly) new forms.

\(^5\) See: nuovomunicipio.net
The first generation of PBs grew between 2002 and 2005 and included approximately sixteen experiences in small and medium-size administrative entities such as Pieve Emanuele and several districts of Venice and Rome (Sintomer, Herzberg & Röcke, 2008). This wave of experiences was strongly ideologically-driven, centring its discourse on the ambition of repeating and adapting Porto Alegre’s experience and declaring that “democratizing democracy” was its first goal. A second generation of PB experiences boomed soon after, numbering close to 2005 by 2010. Much more realistic in nature, and less ambitious in its goals, this generation of PBs (which included experiences promoted by a wide range of parties, even some conservative political forces) was stimulated by a growing international interest in the practice and by the means of a juridical and financial support provided by cooperation and development programs shaped at different institutional levels.

A first family of incentives to the development of this new wave of PBs was offered by transnational programs around 2004 to 2005. The programs aimed at fostering mutual learning and institutional exchanges. For example, the European Union URB-AL funding scheme co-funded European and Latin-American cities to develop joint evaluation projects and experimental forms of learning-by-doing. Specifically, the so-called “Network n. 9” focussed its activity on “local finance and participatory budgeting,” and included more than 30 Italian local administrations, plus several organisations from civil society and the academic milieu, many of them already related by a common militancy as members of the RNM.

A second family of incentives came from two ad-hoc designed juridical tools, in Lazio and Tuscany regions. In Lazio in 2005 a wide policy to promote participation was started up and in the years following (2006 to 2009) a biannual call to fund local participation processes in local authorities was launched (Allegretti, 2011). During that time more than 150 municipalities tested PB, with the possibility of benefiting from a fund of 900,000 euros for support in process-organizing and facilitation, and 10 million euros per year dedicated to co-fund the first priority that emerged from each process. Possibly the most interesting aspect of that experiment is that in 2006, the regional Minister for Finances and Participation also undertook a first attempt of scaling up PB at the regional level, reserving the modest sum of 5 million euros per year to be allocated by citizens through a hybrid structure of minipublic (random selected citizens from different regional areas) in charge of choosing priorities to be included in a specific regional policy (education, environment, new energies, etc.) on the basis of a yearly rotation of topics. The Lazio region also supported the multiplication of
online tools: for example, an experiment was done with some voting-polls stations provided to local authorities, so that – using their health card – citizens could vote for local and regional priorities at the same time.

In the same year (2005) the Tuscany region also took a step towards strengthening the legal right of citizens to be engaged in participation, by starting a wide debate to collectively structure the contents of its first Law on Participation, an organic framework which was approved in 2007. The act established the creation of an independent regional authority for participation (Autorità per la Garanzia e la Promozione della Partecipazione, APP) aimed at selecting, supporting and monitoring local participation processes around the regional territory. The law also regulated the so-called débat public, a participatory device based on a French national law modified in 2002, which was conceived to involve citizens in the planning and implementation of major public works. The law soon became a case study at the international level and it prompted other regions to follow suit; for example a similar act was approved in the Emilia Romagna region in 2010.

Thanks to the Tuscan law, in the period from 2008 to 2012, out of 40 applications, a total of 24 PB processes were approved for co-funding. A strong methodological imprinting promoted by the Authority (a monocratic agency until the 2013 reform) resulted in most of these PBs sharing a very similar, deliberative approach, using a random selection of citizens to shape decisional panels, and methodologies similar to World Café for discussing proposals (Picchi, 2012). Interestingly this induced wave of experiments by different types of institutional entities (schools, inter-municipal associations, mountain communities, marshes reclamation consortia, etc.) which started experimenting with PB, showing its possibilities on different scales of territorial governance and planning. On the other hand many of them were very fragile from a political support standpoint and ended up being “intermittent” and highly dependent on the existence of regional co-funding to exist (Festa et al., 2013).

Before 2013, the majority of PB experiments were concentrated in Lazio, Tuscany and in areas mainly governed by left-wing coalitions (such as Emil—

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6 That is why, after 2013, the newly-appointed board of directors of the Tuscany Regional Authority decided to co-fund only a small number of PB experiences that had already been started and could show an autonomous commitment to exist independently from external resources that had to be used mainly for providing a qualitative upgrading of the methodologies and (as in the recent case of the Campi Bisenzio city) a creation of a networking system of coordination with other different processes of social dialogue active in the same administrative area.
ia-Romagna region and Milan’s province). In that period, the far-left party – Rifondazione Comunista – represented the PB’s main sponsor among local administrations and embodied the alter-globalist approach to PB. Moreover, a small but well-organized fabric of cooperatives and agencies of facilitation and conflict mediators started to consolidate in several areas of the country, also fuelled by the creation of specific master degrees and by the funding of many participatory processes. During the period 2005 to 2010 the number of provincial capitals implementing PB – such as Modena, Parma, Reggio Emilia, Arezzo and Bergamo – grew significantly (Sintomer & Allegretti, 2009), and the networking efforts proved to have a visible effect on the spreading, cross-pollination and diversification of methodologies.

The dark side of the moon of this dramatic increase in the number of Italian PBs was – undoubtedly – the fact that several low-quality processes self-classified themselves under the label of PB, and the political commitment to evolve and to be repeated on a yearly basis proved very fragile, especially in Lazio and Tuscany where their number was artificially “inflated” by the accessibility of targeted public funding. This second PB generation also marked a shift from a left-wing political and ideological approach – oriented to look to Porto Alegre’s model and spirit as its main reference – to an approach more technically-grounded and more ideologically neutral. Such an approach, somehow anticipated the birth of a third generation of PB experiences, usually methodologically supported by academic institutions or professionals, and even more oriented to give greater weight to deliberative quality, imagining PB rather as a “tool of governance” in a period of political and social uncertainty than as the metaphor of a “another world possible.”

The above-mentioned shift almost overlapped with a more international trend where – in the academic world – the interest in deliberative democracy practices emerged, sometimes opposing more participatory approaches to democracy. In Italy, the main studies on deliberative democracy and mini-publics have been carried out at the University of Turin by Luigi Bobbio (2013) and at the University of Bologna by Rodolfo Lewanski (2016). Their work contributed greatly to the shaping of specific model of PB which was intended to create a higher quality of deliberation. This model uses drawn samples of citizens asked to debate on projects and alternative solutions within meetings facilitated by experts, integrating and alternating these phases with others built on the “open-door” principle, where all citizens of a specific territory are entitled to participate, make proposals and cast votes. A benchmark of this model has been Capanori municipality in Tuscany (pop. 46,000) which, in 2012, structured a PB that gained media attention paving the way to similar experiments in other regions.

The above-mentioned turmoil pushed Italy – for some years – into the centre of the international context as one of the most relevant laboratories for PB world-
However, rather than being a launch pad for a new generation of PB, a period of waning interest in PB ensued, mainly due to the lack of capacity to creatively re-elaborate the links between the participatory practices and the fading political panorama which had generated them. Hence, a generalized conservative turn in local and regional elections – including Lazio region and Milan province – and some structural changes in the local finances framework (as the cancellation of the municipal tax on properties, or ICI, in 2008) generated a rapid decline in the number and pervasiveness of the PB experiences, similar to what happened in Spain after the fall of the Zapatero socialist government. Consequently, in 2011 the number of PB decreased dramatically to only ten or so – many of which were still concentrated in Tuscany.

Within this scenario of decline, a new PB model emerged in the Municipality of Canegrate (pop. 12,500). In this city, located in the Lombardy region, the PB took shape from the ashes of Pieve Emanuele’s experience, aiming at giving new life to a Porto Alegre-like approach, but including methodological and technological innovations proposed by the Study Centre for Participatory Democracy (Centro Studi per la Democrazia Partecipativa, or CSDP). A rather simple, viral mechanism of idea competition was designed: the most agreed-upon proposals could progress to an evaluation phase and subsequently be subjected to public voting. The goal was two-fold: pushing citizens (and especially the authors of each proposal) to create new bonds with their fellow citizens, and to bind the proposals of the most active citizens to the consensus collected in their own communities, thus measuring their representativeness. Within this framework, meetings were replaced by individual paper questionnaires and online forms, that anybody could fill out. The results achieved throughout the 2-year experiment (in 2011 participants represented 9.9% of the population, an increase from 4.8% in 2010), and an effective dissemination activity brought Canegrate’s PB to broader attention (Amura & Stortone, 2010), so that the model was adopted by other local authorities.7

This progress also led the CSDP to develop a software platform, called “BiPart,” which could simultaneously manage several participatory processes in all their phases, and therefore support the idea-gather-

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7 The municipalities of Cernusco Lombardone (Lombardy region) and Cascina (Tuscany), as well as by the province of Pesaro–Urbino (Marche).
ing phase in a more advanced and easier way than the ballot papers used in Canegrate. Through the software platform, the preliminary phase of proposals collection and filtering changed radically; now a viral mechanism supported by web tools, whose authentication procedures strengthen its security, although to the detriment of “face-to-face” relations among participants. Other PBs around Italy adopted the platform, thus favouring a shift towards hybrid models of PB mixing offline and online features.

These experiences of hybrid PB were preceded by other experiments and by another prototype of web-based platform for PB in 2008. This platform – called “Quimby” – was also conceived for gathering recommendations and proposals from citizens and ranking them according to their level of support. It was tested for the first time within the PB of the 11th District of Rome. Indeed, Quimby represented a trailblazing project for that time, and possibly because of this, the experiment did not really take root and spread. The decline of PB nationwide did not help to further interest in the platform.

The recent technological and methodological evolution of Italian PBs owes much to the Canagrate model, which appears alongside – but diametrically opposed to – the Capannori one. In fact, while the former was based on a wide citizenry engagement from the very first phase of proposal design and filtering (also by means of emerging web-based technologies), the latter – by sampling citizens to be engaged – focused mainly on the qualitative and face-to-face dimension of deliberation, thus reducing extensive participation in the proposal design phase. Moreover, differently from Canagrate, Capannori tried to reduce the role of the civil society organizations in favour of the direct involvement of “common citizens.” Despite their differences, both models shared a co-decisional nature – refusing the consultative approach to participation which is majoritarian in other countries (such as Germany), and giving citizens the right to cast a final vote on priorities to be funded, usually through the use of electronic polls.

8 The software included an advanced process for registration of citizens, able to validate each account by verifying the user’s fiscal code and sending a confirmation SMS to the user’s mobile number (Stortone & De Cindio, 2014).

9 In a few years (from 2012 to 2015), BiPart managed to grow and provide support to seven PBs, including the cities of Turin, Monza and Faenza, and the Pesaro-Urbino Province, where the software platform was necessary for managing the whole process. See bipart.org

10 Created after a national call for projects launched by the Ministry of Research and Technology, that helped to develop the first national e-democracy platform.
The recent shift and its drivers.
Since 2013, a gradual renaissance of PB has been taking place in a new political panorama with different protagonists, and thanks to a diversified involvement of web-based tools and social media in the political and civic activism spheres.

New political geographies as a catalyst?
Undoubtedly, the slight change of the PB geography can be partially connected to the consolidation and expansion of the electoral base of the M5S. Since 2013, this party has been stabilizing its position within national and local political arenas, winning in 45 municipalities, including some important cities such as Rome and Turin (2016). PB represents a strong discursive reference – together with quorum-free referenda – for many councillors and activists of M5S, and its presence in local government initiatives (proposals, institutional interrogations, etc.) as well as in the debate on social media has been growing visibly in the last five years, although the “mutual emulation” among concrete practices forged by M5S has been occurring at a much slower pace.

Even if the process is hard to track due to the lack of specific studies,11 this convergence of different advocacy positions for fostering a new wave of PB experiments represents a new feature in Italian politics, in relation to the past decade. In several cities, elected members of M5S have been active in advocating and then, concretely supporting PB from the opposition to ruling majorities, helping to reinforce the (often marginal) components of left-wing coalitions which proved more committed to the struggle for the start up and consolidation of PB experiments at the local level. To convey the impact of the M5S, the PB experiments in Turin, Monza, Milan and Bologna were, in part, a result of their interest in institutionalizing the kick-off of PB initiatives.

The centrality of PB in the M5S discourse was perhaps most felt in Sicily in terms of scale and impact. In fact, in 2014, the M5S introduced an amendment to the regional framework on local finances, stating that every year a minimum 2% of regional funds devoted to municipalities be allocated by consulting with citizens through forms of participatory democracy. The preliminary results of this law – which poten-
tially affects 390 municipalities with an amount of approximately 7 million euros per year – are controversial. Indeed, more than 75% of the municipalities documented had already implemented participatory processes, and the term “participatory budgeting” is now part of the Sicilian and, more broadly, of Southern Italy’s political debate. However, unlike the experiences in Tuscany, Lazio and Emilia Romagna, Sicilian law does not provide any funding to train local governments for implementing their processes, looking at it more as a burden rather than an opportunity for local authorities. Without a capillary control of the processes’ quality and an aid for training and facilitation, many initiatives rely on simplified and merely advisory tools – hardly consistent with a real PB process (simple proposal submissions via email, una tantum public assemblies, etc.). Moreover, in a situation similar to what happens in Poland with the Solecki Funds, very few municipalities allocate any resources beyond the mandatory 2%, which sometimes corresponds to only a few thousand euros. Despite good intentions, PB risks being depotentiate and seen as very diluted or “decaffeinated” versions of the original concept that had appeared in Italy in the aftermath of World Social Fora in 2002. A similar initiative that was approved in Sicily has been adopted by the M5S at the national level in 2017. In fact, a national bill was proposed aimed at allocating 2% of municipal and regional budgets to projects which emerged and were designed through participatory processes, and at defining a substantial budget towards developing a software platform. The proposal was not enacted into law, and maybe this was not necessarily bad news, considering the need to properly evaluate the scale of the Sicilian contribution in expanding PB; that is, which conception of it has been spread around and how is it to be protected by nepotistic and clientelistic traditional political practices. While the role of the M5S in spreading PB narratives and visibility is unquestionable, its contribution in experimenting and disseminating PB practices through the example of the local governments directly administrated by the movement has been much less impactful. In fact, the numbers of real processes of participatory budgeting directly implemented by M5S are quite low, considering the centrality that PB has had in the discourse of that political force. As a matter of fact, in several cities it leads, M5S never engaged in PB formally, and relies on different geometries and formulas of participatory decision-making. In some cases, PB was just a standard call for projects which are then examined by a technical commission (as in Pomezia, pop. 62,000), while in other cases (as in Mira, pop. 38,000) a vision of PB as a “self-organized process with no costs for the public sector” led to a rather sim-

plified Capannori-like process. A more solid and mature approach is displayed in Venaria Reale (pop. 34,000), where a working group has been set up to screen PB cases nationwide and choose the best-performing model before seeking experts’ advice to implement the process and learn from them. In some M5S strongholds like Livorno there is no trace of the practice, while Turin’s administration has only maintained the experiment started by the previous left-wing administration, and presently has no plans for future expansion.

For 2018, the Municipality of Rome is shaping an experimental hypothesis of PB in order to implement a point of the new reformed Metropolitan Statutes, approved on January 30, 2018 and where participatory budgeting is quoted as a central tool of direct democracy together with prepositive, consultative and abrogative referenda and online petitions. The administration now has three years to implement the reforms to which it self-committed: a deadline that coincides with the new municipal elections.

Today, Turin constitutes the largest and most interesting case of the slow action of the M5S movement in promoting PB. In November 2011 (and then again in April 2012), two M5S councillors presented an official motion to test PB on a borough-scale, and their collaboration with the Budget alderman (of the former left-wing governing coalition), the University of Turin and the consultancy firm CSDP made it possible to test a new model of PB. The latter was termed a “de-liberative budget” because it was aimed at focussing on the quality of drawing alternative projects through gender-balanced planning committees, whose members were randomly-selected within a larger group of self-mobilized citizens of the district (Ravazzi & Pomatto, 2018). The experiment was developed over time, and was twice repeated between 2014 and 2016 in three different boroughs. Paradoxically, despite good results in terms of number of participants and quality of alternative proposals that emerged, the continuity of such experiments was put at risk by the delays in delivering the promised resources for implementing the PB choices when the new political majority (M5S) was elected in 2016, with all boroughs governed by members of the left-wing coalition. In 2018, the problem has been

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13 The Statutes were approved with 27 favourable votes (and only 6 negative) – see: www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2018/01/30/roma-capitale-approvato-il-nuovo-statuto-targato-m5s-ridotte-le-quote-rosa-si-al-referendum-propositivo/412678/

14 Chiara Appendino (recently elected mayor of the city) and Vittorio Bertola.
addressed, but the restart of a new PB process expanded to other boroughs proceeds slowly, and does not appear coordinated, for example, with a new process of PB for Youth that is being promoted by Turin as part of a European project called Com’On Europe.15

Digitalization for internationalization: a new role for Italian PBs?

The most recent Italian generation of PBs came to light around 2014, while the international panorama was starting to experience PB in large cities, with the decisive support of new web-based platforms which spread in small/medium cities as well.16 At the time, in Italy PBs were similarly lacking support: they were still developed mostly offline and in small/medium cities. In 2014, BiPart was the only active platform, hosting three new PBs (Turin’s district 7, Monza and Faenza), while most of the other PB initiatives still set up informative websites and basic online forms – or email addresses – to upload proposals; some still voted only on paper ballots. Today, most of the Italian PBs continue to feature very light technological solutions: for instance, Rescaldina municipality (pop. 14,300) developed its own website with Google suite, while Venaria Reale (pop. 34,000) managed e-voting through the open source software Limesurvey. Campi Bisenzio (pop. 47,000) is one of the exceptions among medium cities since it created its own proprietary platform for connecting PB and other participatory processes. Few cities use digital platforms, which are mostly managed by few consultancy agencies.

The synergy between the CSDP, the Department of Informatics of the University of Milan and the Milan Civic Network Foundation (Fondazione Rete Civica Milano, or FRCM) for redesigning the BiPart platform17 was productive in anchoring the new Italian PBs to international counterparts such as EMPATIA18, a European project studying and developing civic technologies to support participation – specifically PB – and favouring a dialogue with (and a modular connection to)

15 See: comune.torino.it/torinogiovani/vivere-a-torino/progetto-com-on-europe
17 The CSDP platform “BiPart” was investigated by the University of Milan, then redesigned and redeveloped in collaboration with the Fondazione Rete Civica Milano (see: opendcn.org). The platform was then used in the second edition of the Milan PB. BiPart later became the name of an innovative start-up as a CSDP spin-off and of another software platform.
18 See: empatia-project.eu
pre-existing or parallel projects interested in relating civic technologies and participatory devices. It is thanks to a link with EMPATIA that, in 2017, the city of Milan started the second edition of its PB in close relationship with three other pilot cities in other countries.\(^{19}\) Instead, Bologna – which in the same period started its first PB within a larger framework of social dialogue established by the Plan for Civic Imagination\(^{20}\) – chose a more local strategy, valuing the long experience of its civic network Rete Iperbole but counting on its well-connected international experiences and the possibilities they offer for permanent mutual-learning exchanges with other cities.

Interestingly, in both Milan and Bologna, when they decided to rely more solidly on the use of technologies for guaranteeing the involvement of a large metropolitan audience, they also decided to strengthen the relations between PB and the local boroughs, the physical places and administrative institutions where a daily dialogue on the quality of life happens and which had been substantially weakened by the national legal framework in the last few years (Allegretti, 2011). In Bologna, 1 million euros out of the 41 million put under discussion in the first PB through the Neighbourhood Laboratories, were from funding sources related to decentralization (so, spread around the territories of the six boroughs), while the remainder was sourced from a metropolitan fund (PON)\(^{21}\) and concentrated in eleven spaces (often under-used buildings on the outskirts of the city) that needed to be re-purposed for better use. This strategy – managed by the Bologna Urban Centre, then transformed into a Foundation for Urban Innovation\(^{22}\) – aimed at hybridizing PB through balancing online spaces and events for collaborative face-to-face planning, but also at creating a body of resources of different origin which could be used together with other tools of social dialogue more centred around the daily shared management of city facilities, policies and equipment (as the Ruling Document for the Common Care and Regeneration of Commons\(^{23}\)).

In Milan, the radical transition from the first to the second edition of its BP was also focussed on the new role given to the boroughs, which had been partially boycotting the process in 2015. In 2017, the PB fund was reduced from 9 to 4.5 million euros (opting for reusing part of the difference for decentralization), but this time the nine boroughs were formally involved in the implementation of the process, also establishing a “bonus” to reward proposals that could better fit in with their local plans of action. Moreover, while the first Milan PB was based mainly

\(^{19}\) The cities were Lisbon (PT), Wuppertal (DE) and Říčany (CZ).
\(^{20}\) See: comune.bologna.it/pianoinnovazioneurbana/
\(^{21}\) See: comunita.comune.bologna.it/bilancio-partecipativo
\(^{22}\) See: urbancenterbologna.it
\(^{23}\) See: urbancenterbologna.it/images/collaborarebologna/Strumentidicollaborazione_ESE.pdf
on face-to-face meetings and made use of a simple Wordpress website and an e-voting proprietary platform, the second edition featured a relevant technological device for supporting each PB phase. An interesting aspect is that the new open and free platform was built starting from the end of the process, thus structuring the tools for monitoring the implementation of the first edition of PB. In fact, the implementation of the winning projects of 2015 had been overlooked and put aside during the electoral process of 2016 and the first year of the new administration, thus jeopardizing a consistent part of the social capital and the political trust which PB had aimed to shape in the previous edition. Having a complex platform accompanying the whole new PB cycle proved very useful to the Milan alderman in charge of Participation and Open Data; allowing a “just-in-time” readressing of some distortions in the demo-diversity of participants. In fact, when the ongoing monitoring of registrations and first proposals revealed a high average of educational skills and a social polarization of participants, the local administration could immediately readdress its communication campaign and open face-to-face spaces in the boroughs to rebalance the different typologies of participants and their age groups, with ad-hoc measures that proved very effective and contributed to increasing the quality of participation.

**Which reconfiguration for the PB panorama?**

Unfortunately, to date, there has been no in-depth research addressing the transformation of PB in Italy, thus there is no way to assess the overall quality of these many and diversified processes, or their coming out from an “experimental” approach to a consolidated capacity of acting as a central tool for the local government action on the improvement of the quality of life and the planning of urban and metropolitan milieus.

The most consistent studies with a large scope date back to a decade ago (Sintomer & Allegretti, 2009). There is also some recent mapping limited to some areas in Central Italy (Picchi, 2012) or Northern Italy (Stortone & De Cindio, 2015), the latter being mostly focused on the assessment of the relation between online and offline participation. However, the infographic we present below clearly shows the sharp increase in the number of municipalities implementing PBs in relation to the panorama of 2013 which was offered by Allegretti &
Geographically, the majority of PB experiences are located in Sicily because of the above-mentioned normative act, but we have no data to demonstrate how many of them really represent effective PB processes according to the most accepted international definitions (Sintomer et al., 2012).

Apart from these initiatives, Lombardy appears to have the highest concentration of PBs (24), surpassing Lazio, Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna which up until 2013 were the most active regions due to the provision of regional funding to foster and consolidate PBs. What is clear is that, in general, PBs appear to be more evenly distributed around the country today than in the past.

Concerning the Lombardy region, most of the PB initiatives seems to belong to the Milan metropolitan area (18 out of 24). Also, in the past, the contribution of the Milanese territory has always been evident and appears to be long-standing and path-dependent. The high degree of PB-related activities in the city of Milan, as described so far, has positively affected this scenario. Indeed, one of the first
Italian PB was born in 2002 in Pieve Emanuele – in the far outskirts of Milan. Moreover, the highest number of consultancies, cooperatives and facilitation agencies working on implementing PB are hosted in Milan. The University of Milan has also been active in training and their IT department established a specific research group on hybrid PBs in 2012, being then partner of the EMPATIA project.

Several of the above-mentioned consultancy agencies have played and continue to play an important role in the spreading of PB in general – especially in the area surrounding Milan – but also in the consolidation of specific organizational models. In fact, despite the high number of experiences and actors involved, in the last five years a polarization between two paradigms grew stronger, due to the networking effect and the “professionalization” of PB experiences. Thus, on one side, there is a model centred on a “deliberative approach” (initially exemplified by the Capannori example, and today by the Turin example). On the other side, a “participatory” model exists, which tends to navigate in hybrid waters mixing offline moments and increasingly central online tools. The latter is exemplified, historically, by the city of Cane-grate, and today by the city of Milan.

Following Stortone & De Cindio (2015), we could say that – in their differences – the two poles of the Italian development try to represent the ideal proceduralism and the systemic approach to democracy respectively (Mansbridge et al., 2012). If the spread in the use of “minipublic” formats within PB began in 2012 in Tuscany, it then migrated northward, being implemented in Turin’s district 7 (2014) and in Milan (first edition PB, 2015), followed by Rivalta di Torino (from 2013 to 2017), Ancona and Cesano Boscone (2016), Venaria Reale (2017 and 2018). The second reference – coming from CSDP experiences and repeated in later cases by the spin-off
BiPart – was also adopted by other consultancy firms in municipalities like Rho (from 2013), San Donato Milanese (2016), Bollate, Sesto San Giovanni (2017), Carugate (2018) and, finally, in the city of Milan (second edition of PB, 2015). See Figure 2.

In reality, today there is a diffuse trend to a further hybridization that increases with the mix of different funding sources, such as the case of Bologna and the new Youth PB in Turin. Bologna – where the PB final vote represents the first online consultation in the city’s history – has shown that is possible to shape a particular model of PB while transforming a long tradition of practices of social negotiation, and creating PB dialogue with other forms of participatory planning which combined, represent an innovative strategy for valuing the contribution of “social imagination” to the city’s strategic planning and its daily management. Similar to what Madrid does with its Media-Lab Prado, Bologna has bet on investing in the improvement of internal technological skills, to support its multiple channels of participation and gradually coordinate them through an innovative design, the setting of very clear goals and the creation of an external role of “guarantor” of the quality of participation. Bologna has been actively involving local university departments and has received added-value from some national and international consultants and a wide network of exchanges with other cities worldwide.
A final aspect to be stressed about the last wave of PBs in Italy is that – in line with international trends – their methodology is being adapted to different types of institutions of public interest, beyond local and regional authorities. For example, in 2017 PB was used in a high school for the first time. The Institute for Higher Education Cremona in Milan (Istituto di Istruzione Superiore Cremona)\(^{27}\), allocates 10,000 euros to implement projects proposed by its students but unlike other experiments, the school showed autonomous will to experiment, and was not involved in a municipality-led PB. In this experience, pedagogic aspects are emphasized. For instance, collaboration between students is pursued by admitting only proposals coming from groups of a minimum of three persons. Moreover, the role of class representatives has changed radically thanks to the PB process; they are now asked to facilitate their classmates’ participation rather than replace them in the collective decision-making process, as traditionally was the case. This first experiment was followed by two more institutes shortly after: the Istituto Vittorio Emanuele II in Bergamo, Lombardy, (with a budget of 15,000 euros)\(^{28}\) and the Istituto di Istruzione Superiore Capriotti in San Benedetto del Tronto (Marche Region, with a budget of 1,500 euros). In 2017, a regional authority also authorized the experimentation of the first PB in a prison: namely, the penitentiary of Bollate (in Milan province). The main challenge of this experiment lies in the design of a process able to effectively tackle the structural features and the rules and restrictions regulating inmates’ daily activities. The whole process will be disseminated outside through a storytelling production aimed at crowdfunding the budget necessary to implement projects and activities resulting from the process.\(^{29}\)

### An open conclusion

The analysis of PB experiences undertaken in Italy in the last 16 years reveals the existence of four different generations that faced the “democratisation” of choices, transparency, citizen autonomy, inclusion, technical coordination and responsiveness of the experimenting entities with various tools. The first generation, more closely related to the Porto Alegre example, developed from a few scattered cases to mark a “discontinuity” with the past, but was unable to leave a real imprint on Italian political practices: islands in an ocean, these first generation PB experiments were unable to build formulas and strong elements of resistance and originality to avoid the dramatic participative crisis of the subsequent years. The second generation of Italian PBs set less ambitious and more realistic objectives with regard

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27 [iiscremona.gov.it/attivita-e-progetti/bilancio-partecipativo/](iiscremona.gov.it/attivita-e-progetti/bilancio-partecipativo/)
28 [vittorioemanuele.gov.it/bilancio-partecipativo/](vittorioemanuele.gov.it/bilancio-partecipativo/)
29 [bipart.org/bp-carceredibollate](bipart.org/bp-carceredibollate)
to local contexts, by placing limits on expenditures which had to be discussed and linking them to pre-existing participatory paths. There was an attempt to articulate the goals with the administrative decentralisation, but this was done precisely at the time when the decentralized boroughs were being suffocated by the central government’s impositions. This generation of PB felt the weight of the national setting as a burden, which obliged municipalities to waste energy and creativity to survive the budget cuts, stricter rules and the rigors of the EU Stability Pact.

With less confidence in the citizen’s creative role, these experiments advanced cautiously through attempts that “rehearsed” results – expanding much more gradually than in the past. The collaboration with associations, consultancy firms, research institutes and universities accentuated the sense of “experiment” and “pilot tests,” unlike the more intuitive and improvised practices of the past.

While this PB generation was consolidating, the economic crisis and the new political panorama acted against it, making the role of supra-local administrative entities central in the consolidation of experiments. The “jump in scale” of interest in the third wave of participatory budgeting has had positive effects on the consolidation of less cohesive political will and has reinforced the boldness and the quality of experiments. Unfortunately, it also fuelled a series of intermittent processes, which did not guarantee an annual continuity to PB cycles. Provinces and regions – co-funding municipal experimentalism – also played a role as ‘transmitters’ of innovations tested at the local level, to modify the political–administrative culture and transform legislation.

A fourth new generation developed around 2014, rising from the ashes of a general stepping-back of previous experiments which occurred around 2008 to 2010 – at the height of the financial crisis that in other countries had fuelled the multiplication of PBs to face shrinking budgets in a collective way. This new wave arose in a different political panorama, where new political forces started emerging and consolidating; one of them (the 5 Stars Movement) contributed to a goal of fostering more opportunities for citizens to exert direct democracy, thus making reference to PB as a central tool for expanding the citizens’ role in the joint-decision making of public policies. This last generation – which offers a variety of different methodologies – is still ongoing, through experiences that still show an
“experimental approach,” sometimes trying to balance the use of online and offline spaces of social dialogue, sometimes replicating standard and traditional mechanisms. They do not yet appear stable in terms of political motivation and vision, financial dimension and sources to be involved in the funding of the processes. There is the doubt that several of these new experiences (such as has been occurring in Spain since 2015) are proposed by new political alliances, which seem uninterested in looking to the history of Italian PBs before setting their experiences; often the only guarantee for not reproducing past mistakes is in the memory of consultancy firms or universities which are involved in the setting up of each experiment.

As a matter of fact, most of these PBs often seem like the “discovery of hot water” for newly-elected public officials, in a political environment where training and capacity building are very rare investments for parties. Despite the important role of “connectors” with other international experiences that the external skills involved in the new Italian wave of PBs are playing, undoubtedly there is a strong tendency to outsource a huge part of PB processes, which carries the risk of flattening the capacity of public institutions to develop their own autonomous project-design skills. Today, the Emilia Romagna region is one of the few administrative environments where there is no significant development of external consultancy agencies, and PBs (including the innovative model of Bologna) tend to be built and managed using internal resources and investments in the training of local administrative personnel.

To date, it seems that this last wave of Italian PBs suffers from a political fragility, although it tends to be more careful in self-assessing and gradually improving the quality of deliberation and the inclusiveness of the process, as well as in critically facing the risks brought on by a new extended role of ICT technologies in the overall process. Unfortunately, the lack of a networking structure among new PBs (as in the earlier RNM) does not facilitate either mutual learning or the possibility of collecting similar data in each process and promoting comparative analysis of functioning, effects and impacts of Italian PBs.

Undoubtedly, while measures to promote “gender equality” are improving, as well as the creative forms of outreach to address
the participation needs of weaker social sectors (particularly, immigrants and disabled people), objectives of “social justice” are still limited and rarely made explicit, especially because participatory processes seem to be quite limited in their capacity to create and maintain a new generation of technical and administrative structures more sensitive to the need to directly involve citizens in decision making.

However, there is hope that new opportunities to reverse and integrate the above-mentioned concerns could be provided by the ongoing integration of PBs with other forms of shared planning (on topics such as urban redevelopment or sustainable development), by the experimentation of the PB methodology beyond the local communities (like in schools or prisons), by the growing role of universities, civil society organizations and social enterprises in strengthening and spreading this practice, as well as by the growth of multichannel “hybrid” experiments which have been taking shape over the last four years.

At the moment, there is no certainty around the survival of PBs in Italy and even less likelihood of significant expansion in the long term. But there is no doubt that any experimental innovation that will integrate them or replace them in the future will find a profound richness of materials with which to work, and certainly many examples to learn from.
Note from the authors
The authors thank the PB Working Group and the PB Scotland Network for all the shared efforts to think and act together to develop a community of practice and research to inform the development of participatory democracy in Scotland. Oliver Escobar’s contribution is supported by the What Works Scotland program, funded by the Scottish Government and the Economic and Social Research Council UK (ES/M003922/1).
Participatory budgeting in Scotland: The interplay of public service reform, community empowerment and social justice

Oliver Escobar, Fiona Garven, Chris Harkins, Kathleen Glazik, Simon Cameron & Ali Stoddart

Introduction
Scotland has enthusiastically joined the global participatory budgeting (PB) movement in recent years and this chapter offers our take on the story so far. We are a team of co-authors drawn from the PB Working Group¹ and the PB Scotland Network, which brings together government officials, civil society practitioners and academic researchers to inform and support the development of PB. This chapter taps into evidence developed across these sectors. We use data from government reports, as well as evidence generated by NGOs and academic institutions (e.g. Harkins & Escobar, 2015; Harkins et al., 2016; O’Hagan et al., 2017; The Democratic Society, 2018; Escobar et al., 2018). The chapter combines our different perspectives to provide an overview of key milestones and developments. For detailed examples and case studies we encourage readers to visit https://pbscotland.scot.

As this book’s readers will know, PB is a process that involves citizens

¹ This chapter does not seek to represent the view of our employers or the PB Working Group. For information about the Group please see: https://pbscotland.scot/about
in deciding collectively how to spend public money. In three decades, PB has gone from a local innovation in Brazil to a global movement with thousands of processes around the world. Scotland has recently become fertile ground for PB, with growing support across communities, local and national governments and civil society organisations. We chart this history from the community grant-making model that has been prevalent in Scotland so far, to the mainstreaming of PB which will follow from a recent agreement to allocate at least 1% of local government budgets via PB. The chapter seeks to: 1) place PB in its broader political context, including the interplay between government and civil society agendas; 2) take stock of policy developments as well as capacity building and civic infrastructure for PB; 3) and critically assess findings from evaluations of 1st Generation PB (community grant-making) and their implications for 2nd Generation PB (mainstreaming). The purpose is to offer a synthesis that helps to inform research and policy work at the intersection of democratic innovation and social justice in Scotland and beyond.

The political context for PB

The current window of opportunity for PB in Scotland must be placed in the context of various social, political and institutional factors that provide the backdrop for ongoing public service reform and democratic renewal. PB has gained momentum as a response to challenges and aspirations to improve governance and public services and to strengthen local democracy. Let’s start with some important institutional factors. By international standards, local government in Scotland may be more accurately described as regional government. Scotland has the largest average population per basic unit of local government of any developed country (Keating, 2010). The average population per local authority in the European Union is 5,615 citizens (Klobučník & Bačík, 2016, p. 674), compared to 169,500 in Scotland, where 32 councils serve a population of 5.4 million citizens. The ratio of elected councilors per citizens represented is 1:4270 in Scotland, considerably different to countries like Finland (1:500), Germany (1:400) or Spain (1:700) (Bort et al., 2012, p. 8). This is further complicated by the absence of a functional system of community councils (Escobar, 2014). Over the last two decades, various local governance spaces have been developed (e.g. multi-stakeholder partnerships; community forums) to address the disconnect between local communities and authorities. However, current opportunities for public participation are often criticized and one of our recent reviews highlights shortcomings related to equalities in community engagement (Lightbody, 2017). Successive evaluations of Community Planning Partnerships also reflect the weaknesses of community par-

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participation in local governance (Escobar et al., 2018). In addition, the lack of substantial fiscal powers means that governing at local level entails operating without many of the policy options available to local government in other countries. Finally, alongside England, Scotland has some of the lowest voter turnout at local elections in the European Union. These and other factors have led to warnings about a ‘silent crisis of local democracy’ in Scotland (Bort et al., 2012).

This institutional landscape seems at odds with social attitudes towards public participation. For example, a survey suggested that only 35% of Scottish citizens feel part of how decisions affecting their community are made and that 77% would get more involved in their community if it was easier to participate in decisions that affect it (Ipsos MORI, 2014). In the latest wave of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 80% of respondents said that people should be involved in deciding how money is spent on local services; and 96% said that people should be involved in making decisions about how local services are planned and run (Marcinkiewicz et al., 2016).

There is also a growing, vibrant civil society3 organised in social enterprises, community development trusts, housing associations, transition towns, charities and so on (e.g. Henderson et al., 2018; Social Value Lab, 2015). More broadly, survey data suggests that civic participation is on the rise: 55% in 2009; 61% in 2013; 69% in 2015 (Marcinkiewicz et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2013). Altogether, this evidence indicates a substantial level of civic activity and democratic aspiration in Scotland.

The boom of PB has taken place during the span of three Scottish National Party administrations, but PB is also supported by the Scottish Green Party and Scottish Labour – the latter led some of the first PB experiences in local government. This cross-party support may to some extent protect PB from the partisan dynamics that have hindered PB in other countries (e.g. Wampler, 2007; Sintomer et al., 2016). A key contributor to the current emphasis on participatory democracy and democratic renewal was the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. It hailed record levels of voter turnout and national engagement with politics; far higher

3 See for example the Scottish Community Alliance http://www.scottishcommunityalliance.org.uk and Senscot https://senscot.net
than any other election or ballot in the country’s recent history.\textsuperscript{4} Oth-
er recent political milestones such as 2015 UK General Election and 2016 European Union ‘Brexit’ referendum have been described as an
undemocratic representation of Scotland’s political views and major-
ity vote to remain in the European Union (Riddoch, 2016). These de-
velopments have contributed to ignite issues of political sovereignty
–vocalising a dissatisfaction with Westminster politics and current
democratic structures. In the absence of a ‘post-Brexit’ consensus as
to the way forward for Scotland, the increasing profile of PB is per-
haps symbolic of a national drive towards deepening democratic pro-
cesses and increasing opportunities for Scottish citizens to partici-
pate in local decision making. The rise of PB’s profile in Scotland does
however pre-date these political milestones.

\textbf{From the grassroots to the grasstops: The interplay between civil so-
ciety and government}
Scotland is embarked in an ambitious agenda of community empow-
erment and democratic innovation. As this section will outline, this
agenda has been driven by a combination of grassroots / civil society
demands and proposals, and top–down policy action from public insti-
tutions. PB has been at the heart of these developments, and its spread
has markedly accelerated over the past five years; from little more than
a handful of known PB processes in 2010, to at least 200 cases to date.\textsuperscript{5}
Alongside the grassroots growth of PB within Scotland’s communities,
there has also been increasing political, legislative and policy support.
The ripples from early experimentation in Brazil reached UK shores at
the turn of the century (Department for Communities and Local Gov-
ernment, 2011). Interestingly, PB took off in England but not in Scot-
land, despite political leadership by the Labour party in both. A mem-
ber of the PB Working Group shared this testimony reflecting that, 20
years ago, the view from the top was quite different in Scotland:

\hspace{1cm}
\textit{My own wee story relates to a meeting I had with the then Minister for Communities in 1997 having just returned from 3 months in Brazil}


\textsuperscript{5} For a crowdsourced map of PB processes in Scotland see: https://pbscotland.scot/map/
and inspired by the example of Curitiba, which I had visited. We talked about the power of PB as a way of changing the relationship between government and communities. Although the conversation was polite it was clear that it probably was not being enthusiastically welcomed. I remember after the meeting, the civil servant who had attended the meeting with the Minister, telling me that he (the civil servant) wasn’t an enthusiast and that if we wanted to take it forward we would need to get on with it ourselves. I suspect that civil servant (a good friend these days) maybe didn’t realise at the time that that was less of a put down and more of a challenge. He knows now. I suspect that hundreds of these stories exist but there’re a couple of things that I still love about that episode: this was wisdom travelling from the global south to the north (and it took us longer than it should have); this is a tiny example of perseverance, determination and sheer bloody-mindedness.”

Martin Johnstone, Secretary of the Church & Society Council, Church of Scotland

Between 2010 and 2012 the Glasgow Centre for Population Health conducted an evaluation of a PB pilot in Glasgow (Harkins & Egan, 2012). This evaluation was one of the first to make important links between PB and strategic and policy challenges within Scotland. The report made clear the role PB could have in mobilising citizens and community assets, promoting collaborative working and enabling devolved decision making and community empowerment. It recommended that 1% of public sector investment budgets be allocated to PB; this target was in line with the then PB Unit’s (now PB Partners) recommendation as a realistic step towards ‘mainstreaming’ PB without compromising statutory service delivery. As described later, this recommendation has now been taken forward by the Scottish Government. That report gained traction in part because its key messages resonated powerfully with the influential Commission on the Future Delivery of Public Services (Christie, 2011). The Commission has become the landmark reference for public service reform in Scotland. Its emphasis on community empowerment has provided impetus for new mechanisms for public participation. The Commission’s remit was to identify opportunities and obstacles for change and to make recommendations for reform. Its conclusions focused on the need to

6 PB Partners: https://pbpartners.org.uk
develop services with and for people and communities, rather than continuing to take a top down approach simply for administrative convenience. In response, the Scottish Government accepted the four pillars of reform (partnership, participation, prevention and performance) that would underpin an approach to public services which is affordable, rises to the challenge of tackling inequalities and supports inclusive economic growth across Scotland. The ethos, process and objectives of PB could then be mapped onto those four pillars to align PB with the window of opportunity presented by ongoing reforms (Harkins & Escobar, 2015, p. 37):

- **Partnership**: PB requires collaboration across organisational, thematic and geographical boundaries, and may provide new impetus to existing local governance partnerships.
- **Participation**: PB can enable substantial participation by citizens and communities, and provide a platform to channel the aspirations of a citizenry that is becoming less trusting in, and deferential towards, traditional forms of authority and hierarchical decision making.
- **Prevention**: PB can open up space for rethinking priorities and overcome short-term thinking, so that the difficult decisions that authorities often struggle to make can be addressed through open public deliberation and collective action. In addition, PB can mobilise local knowledge that may help to tackle complex and deeply rooted problems and inequalities.
- **Performance**: PB can stimulate effectiveness by increasing transparency, monitoring and scrutiny of how public money is spent. It can also foster local creativity, entrepreneurialism and collaboration in order to articulate new solutions and initiatives.

In parallel to these policy developments, support for PB also gathered momentum from civil society organisations such as the Electoral Reform Society Scotland; the Reid Foundation’s Commission on Fair Access to Political influence, and Oxfam’s and the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations’ responses to consultations for

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a proposed Community Empowerment Bill.\footnote{See for example SCVOs response here: https://scvo.org.uk/post/2014/01/24/community-empowerment-bill} Another milestone was the 2012 Scottish Participatory Democracy Conference, which gathered community organisers, activists and officials (Scottish Community Development Centre, 2012) and where the Minister for Local Government spoke about ambitions for PB in Scotland. A tipping point in the Ministers’ thinking seems to have been a meeting with Alderman Joe Moore from Chicago, who had famously introduced PB in the 49th Ward in 2009.

In many ways, 2014 was the pivotal year when all these developments reached a critical mass, and civil society and government agendas coalesced, particularly in the run up to the referendum on Scottish independence—which put the spotlight on democratic renewal. For example, the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) endorsed the findings from an independent Commission that included PB in its key recommendations (Commission on Strengthening Local Democracy, 2014, pp. 10, 13, 27, 30). The Commission emphasised the connection between democratic deficits and social inequalities and concluded that:

50 years of centralisation has not tackled the biggest problems that Scotland faces. For a country with Scotland’s wealth and strength, the level of inequality is intolerable, and has huge social and financial costs. There is a link between the absence of strong local democracy and the prevalence of inequalities. It is communities that empower governments at all levels, not governments that empower people.\footnote{See the final report on the Commission on Strengthening Local Democracy: https://www.localdemocracy.info/news/final-report/}

In 2014, the pace and spread of activities supporting PB was remarkable. For example, PB featured at the Community Planning National Conference; there was a capacity building programme delivered by the University of Edinburgh for the Glasgow Community Planning Partnership; and PB was a keynote centrepiece at the Scottish Leaders Forum, which brought together 200 public sector leaders. By 2016, PB had become one of the top five commitments in the National Action Plan developed when Scotland joined the Open Government Partnership.\footnote{See: https://www.opengovernment.org.uk/scotlands-2017-subnational-action-plan/}
This section has illustrated the complex interplay between mobilisation by civil society networks and policy action by national and local government. The story of PB in Scotland cannot be understood as the unilateral initiative of a particular player, but as the result of multi-sited action in response to a range of institutional, social and political factors. At the centre of these developments was the idea that communities should be empowered and supported to act collectively; and that public services should be confident and agile enough to act as enablers.

**The Community Choices Fund**
The momentum outlined above provided the foundations for a programme of national investment in PB. To accommodate this, the Scottish Government articulated four policy drivers for PB:

- PB is supported and promoted by the Scottish Government as a tool for community engagement and as a resource to build on the wider development of participatory democracy in Scotland.
- PB supports one of the principles of Public Service Reform, that people should have equal opportunity to participate and have their voice heard in decisions shaping their local community, society and their lives.
- PB complements the Scottish Government’s aspirations for the Community Empowerment Act which will give communities more powers to take forward their own ambitions.
- PB can help deliver the Public Sector Equality Duty by eliminating discrimination, harassment and victimisation, advancing equality of opportunity and fostering good relations between different groups.

This helped to connect PB to two National Outcomes – key policy objectives for the Scottish Government in the next decade: 1) We have strong, resilient and supportive communities where people take responsibility for their own actions and how they affect others; 2) We have tackled the significant inequalities in Scottish society. Legislation  

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12 Source: internal government document accessed by the PB Working Group.
13 The 16 National Outcomes describe what the Scottish Government set out to achieve over a ten years framework: http://www.gov.scot/About/Performance/scotPerforms/outcome
to give communities more opportunities to make a difference on their own terms was passed in 2015. The Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015 provides new rights for community bodies and places new duties on public authorities. Although PB was not explicitly included, it is seen as an important conduit to help deliver its objectives.

Figure 1 Community Choices logo

The Scottish Government’s Community Choices programme supports and promotes PB nationally. It is delivered in partnership with local authorities, communities and civil society organisations, and implemented across policy areas from policing to health and social care, transport and education. Since 2014/15, this has led to an investment of £4.7 million (see Figure 2). Match funding of £1.5 million from a number of local authorities has brought the total to £6.2 million. This breaks down as follows:

- During 2015, 20 of Scotland’s 32 councils accepted the Scottish Government’s offer of expert support provided by PB Partners\(^{14}\) to raise awareness of PB. This was followed by funding in 2016 to those 20 councils on a match funding basis; 14 applied and received a share of £530,267 to help them build on and maintain their PB activity, which resulted in around 50 PB events in the first 3 months of 2016.
- In 2016/17, due to the steadily growing interest in PB, Ministers announced a £2 million Community Choices Fund to support PB. For the first time, the fund was open to all public authorities and communities (not just councils) and 33 organisations secured £1.7 million, while £300,000 was used for the national support programme. This resulted in 122 PB events across the country. Over 39,000 people voted and 1,352 local projects were successful in getting a share of £2.6 million (£1.7m Community Choices Fund plus match funding from local authorities).

\(^{14}\) PB Partners: https://pbpartners.org.uk
• In 2017/18, Ministers announced another £2 million Community Choices Fund; 33 organisations were successful in getting a share of £1.5 million and their events are taking place in 2018. The remaining £500,000 is for the national support programme (see Figure 3).

This funding also supports a three-year evaluation led by Glasgow Caledonian University\textsuperscript{15} to assess the impact of PB on communities, services and democracy, with a particular focus on the relationship between PB and inequalities (O’Hagan et al., 2017). This is taking place alongside other local work to develop bespoke evaluation toolkits, for example in the Glasgow Community Planning Partnership.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Figure 2} Scottish Government investment in PB 2014–2018 (Community Choices Fund; excluding local government match-funding)

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Caption}
\end{figure}

- \textbullet National Support – £1,077,200
- \textbullet Local Authorities Funding – £2,121,267
- \textbullet Funding for Communities – £1,609,900

\textbf{Capacity-building and civic infrastructure for PB}

The purpose of the national support programme is to develop infrastructure and skills across a range of partners to deliver PB successfully (see Figure 3). This includes the evaluation programme as well as: support and advice for PB organisers; producing learning resources; establishing a PB Network; developing digital infrastructure for PB; and maintaining the PB Scotland website as a hub for sharing experiences and resources (see Figure 4). It also includes capacity-building to develop a community of PB practitioners to share learning and develop good practice.

\textsuperscript{15} See: http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2017/11/8658/0
\textsuperscript{16} This is part of a Collaborative Action Research project: http://whatworksscotland.ac.uk/casesites/glasgow/evaluating-the-impact-of-participatory-budgeting/
Figure 3 National support programme for PB

Key to Figure 3

SCDC (Scottish Community Development Centre); GDA (Glasgow Disability Alliance); Demsoc (The Democratic Society);
COSLA (Convention of Scottish Local Authorities); OGP (Open Government Partnership);
EM (elected Members); GCU (Glasgow Caledonian University); CCF (Community Choices Fund); WWS (What Works Scotland).
A PB Working Group works since 2014 in partnership with the Scottish Government to inform the development of PB so that it is scalable, empowering and transformative. The group includes representatives from national organisations working with communities, plus academics, civil society, PB experts, local authorities and central government. Its remit is to oversee the development of PB in Scotland, support its links to other community empowerment initiatives, and advise on the infrastructure required to help its implementation and impact.

Up until the provision of Community Choices funding, PB processes had largely been implemented by public agencies, with the exception of some activity within the faith and third sectors. The Working Group strongly advocated that, if the small grants PB model was to gain traction in Scotland, there was a need for processes to move away from being primarily led by public agencies, to being owned and implemented by communities themselves. The purpose of targeting funds directly at communities was to help achieve a critical mass of local processes to help raise awareness of new forms of participation, and to promote community empowerment and influence. In other words, to help develop a new culture of democratic participation where citizens can expect to have a direct role in the decision-making processes.
It was anticipated that community organisations would be more likely to achieve higher levels of participation and that the capacity of communities to organise and respond to local issues would be enhanced. This rationale led to a 50:50 split of the Community Choices Fund between local authorities and community organisations. Capacity building for PB has therefore been directed both at local authorities and the community sector, with some support tailored to specific needs, but with other forms of support offered on a cross-sector basis. Within the context of PB in Scotland, the term capacity building is used to describe actions which: 1) Increase knowledge about PB outcomes, values and guiding principles. 2) Support the development and implementation of robust local processes. 3) Develop skills and confidence in advocacy, dialogue and facilitation.

From 2016 to the present day, several capacity building measures have been introduced; support and training for local authorities to implement community grant-making processes has continued to be delivered by PB Partners; the PB Scotland website continues to be developed as a hub for sharing practice and learning across the country; and support is available for community organisations to run local events, conduct evaluations, and identify opportunities for developing PB activities from alternative revenue sources.

A key part of this developing infrastructure is the establishment of a national network. The PB Scotland Network currently has 542 members. Half of the members come from the community and third sectors and the other half is made up of representatives from local government, academia and the private sector. Members are spread across Scotland with coverage across 31 of the 32 local authority areas. The purpose is to create a community of PB practice, to offer a locus for the exchange of learning across sectors and communities, and to provide access to tools and research in Scotland and internationally. In 2017–18, the Scottish Government also invested in the training of a group of ‘PB Champions’ across the country in recognition that without practitioners who can provide good quality advice and support on PB, there is the risk of a skills gap to sustain current momentum. The PB Champions initiative is ongoing, and future plans include formalisation of training through developing accreditation. Their role will be to advocate for PB, and to respond to requests for support across Scotland.

Considerable work has also been done to highlight and celebrate progress on PB, and to learn from colleagues across the globe. In 2016, Scotland hosted its first International PB conference, supported by the Minister for Local Government and Housing, and attended by nearly two hundred people from eleven countries. There have also been additional opportunities for international peer-to-peer learning – e.g. What Works Scotland (WWS) funded a study visit to Paris with PB practi-
tioners from Glasgow and Fife. In 2018, a second conference was held, gathering delegates mainly from Scotland and focussed on developing practice. Participants agreed the following actions to extend the impact of PB on increasing democratic participation, advancing community empowerment, and tackling inequalities:

- Training, learning and evaluation with communities, which focus on outcomes as well as process
- Continued capacity building support for community-led organisations and the third sector
- Increased support for equalities practice
- A focus on mainstreaming PB as the vehicle for a move from transactional to transformational practices
- The co-production of a charter of principles for PB in Scotland.

Figure 5 Digital tools for PB in Scotland – Programme Locations

Finally, another key dimension in capacity building has been to explore the potential for digital PB. Some notable examples of early development can be found

17 See Public service reform and participatory budgeting: How can Scotland learn from international evidence?: http://whatworksscotland.ac.uk/publications/public-service-reform-how-can-scotland-learn-from-international-evidence/

18 Some groundwork to strengthen this dimension is being currently developed by the Glasgow Disability Alliance: http://gda.scot
in North Ayrshire. In November 2016, over 5,000 young people accessed Young Scot’s e-voting platform to decide how £60,762 should be allocated to 67 youth projects in six localities.\textsuperscript{19} More recently, Glasgow PB events have had 2791 validated online participants. In 2015, The Democratic Society (Demsoc) was commissioned by the Scottish Government to produce a report on the potential of digital engagement platforms to enhance PB.\textsuperscript{20} This was followed by the creation of the Digital Tools for PB in Scotland Programme. Since 2016, Demsoc has worked with 12 councils and 4 community groups from Shetland to the Borders (see Figure 5) to support the adoption of digital elements in PB processes.\textsuperscript{21} The programme has helped participants to generate over 720 ideas for potential funding and the use of digital tools has enabled 35,000 people to take part in PB processes. These usually work in parallel to face-to-face events. This programme supported staff to gain experience of writing for the web, interacting online with peers and citizens, leveraging social networks for outreach, and managing basic administrative tasks such as collecting and analysing data, structuring information for clear communication, and understanding and prioritising user experience. The programme has also generated considerable learning that will inform the next steps for upskilling and resourcing the workforce to ensure that the potential of digital engagement can be fully realised. Capacity in local authorities may be improved by recent developments such as the creation of the Local Government Digital Office and the Digital First Service Standards, alongside continued exploration of electronic voting, online assurance and verification research. All in all, the future direction of digital PB should be part of developing broader infrastructural foundations for local participatory democracy in Scotland.

\textbf{Analysing the 1st Generation of PB in Scotland}

A crowdsourced map of PB processes in Scotland features over 200 cases to date (see Figure 6). This wave has been characterised by one model, namely, community grant-making (PB Partners, 2016a). In

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{20} The Digital Tools and Scotland’s Participatory Budgeting report can be found online: demsoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/DS-Digital-Tools-paper.pdf
  \item \textsuperscript{21} See: http://www.demsoc.org/digital-pb-case-studies/
\end{itemize}
our first systematic review of 58 processes across Scotland, we called this 1st Generation PB to distinguish it from the 2nd Generation which will entail mainstream budgets, as explored later (Harkins et al., 2016). 1st Generation PB has been supported by the Scottish Government and several local authorities and third sector partners, but can be broadly characterised as organic and grassroots. That is, the majority of early PB processes emerged where there were local champions, appropriate support and opportunities, and a good fit between PB and available funding schemes, local plans and community priorities.

**Figure 6** Crowdsourced map of PB in Scotland

The organic pace of 1st Generation PB is indicative of a PB journey which appears to value grassroots learning. This experience suggests that PB has worked well when processes have been bespoke and tailored; recognising and adapting to community contexts, needs and aspirations. This developmental, iterative growth of PB has proven particularly adept at projects driven by local people alongside services and facilitators, and fuelled by a desire to try this new way of working and explore the potential of grant-making via PB. The effort behind Scotland’s 1st Generation of PB processes and projects deserves recognition, particularly in light of the challenges it faced. The insights, skills and capacity that have been developed across a range of partners and communities represent a strong foundation to build 2nd Generation PB. However, this organic growth has meant that the availability of information across many PB
processes and projects outside the Community Choices programme has been patchy and inconsistent. Despite this limited evidence base, the WWS review (Harkins et al., 2016) provided findings to inform the following recommendations:

• The national policy drive associated with the transition into 2nd Generation PB in Scotland should not undermine what must become an enduring focus on local context involving PB approaches tailored to community contexts and priorities.

• The depth to which PB should be implemented across Scotland (i.e. from grant-making to mainstream budgets), and the impacts expected in tackling inequalities and improving public services, must remain central points in policy discussions in order to frame and clarify the scale and ambition of 2nd Generation PB.

• Rural areas appear underserved by 1st Generation PB and attempts should be made to redress this within the emerging 2nd Generation.

• PB test-sites (e.g. involving mainstream budgets) should be established across different geographies and thematic priorities; these test-sites should be supported through robust evaluation over time, the learning from which should be disseminated through the PB Network and inform future policy on PB.

• Opportunities for meaningful dialogue and robust deliberation between citizens, community organisations, elected representatives and public authorities have not been a central feature in 1st Generation PB. This should feature more prominently in the design and implementation of PB processes, and thus become a key component in the evaluation of the democratic quality of PB.

• There is much scope to improve the use of digital engagement platforms to support PB processes and, more broadly, develop a digital infrastructure for local participatory democracy.

• Evaluation of the 2nd Generation of PB in Scotland should involve developing theories of change, including paying attention to impacts resulting from both PB processes and the resultant funded projects –particularly with regard to the social justice agenda of tackling a range of inequalities.

• Assessing future success in Scotland must entail examining what PB does for people and communities, as well as for the democratic system that binds them together –i.e. is PB contributing to improve participation and generate democratic renewal?
The present juncture of PB in Scotland reflects a transition into an unprecedented policy, legislative, capacity building and investment landscape from which to further develop and embed processes across the country. Findings from an interim evaluation report by O’Hagan et al. (2017) examined the Community Choices programme from October 2015 to June 2017 (final report expected by the end of 2018). The report notes that PB has become a valuable tool to raise awareness of community led activity and there is clear evidence of developing community identity, capacity and social capital. However, it also notes that PB activity is dominated by transactional rather than transformational approaches:

*Changing the relationship between communities and government at the local and national level means establishing a different contract between citizens and the state. The extent to which this leads to a shift from a transactional relationship (whereby councils provide services or resources in response to expressed needs or direct requests) to a transformational shift in power is a question at the core of developments in PB. (O’Hagan et al., 2017, p. 5)*

Towards 2nd Generation PB: Challenges and aspirations in mainstreaming PB

A landmark agreement in October 2017 between the Scottish Government and COSLA, who represents local government, is taking PB to the next level. A framework agreement to have at least 1% of all local authority budgets subject to PB by 2021 establishes the commitment to embed it as a way of working. This is in the region of at least £100 millions of core local government grant funding, both capital and revenue, being influenced and directed through deliberative community participation. A COSLA PB Development Manager is in post to help shape the local government and partnership approach by engaging with councillors, managers and officers to develop and share best practice. Some guidance has been produced to start a conversation about options for mainstreaming (PB Partners, 2016b). The aim of the agreement is to bolster citizen participation in local decision making which goes beyond the current arrangements for consultation. The challenge is to advance cultural change and ensure that this is an approach across the public, third and community sectors that reaches all services that affect communities’ everyday lives. The framework sets out that, done well, and using key social justice principles, the longer term strategic aim of public service reform can be achieved by investing in the areas of greatest need and breaking generational cycles of disadvantage and inequality.

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22 See the press release here: https://news.gov.scot/news/more-choice-for-communities
There have already been at least two cases that have used core budgets for PB and they are informing initial discussions about what mainstream PB may look like in Scotland. They offer examples that go beyond the community grant-making model to one that enhances the interplay of communities, councillors and officers in decision making on far larger resources. The key at this stage is to explore how mainstreaming doesn't simply become an upscaling of grant-making and therefore a process that sits on its own, disconnected from broader local governance. Instead, 2nd Generation PB aims to create participatory spaces where communities actively influence and help reshape current service delivery models to be focused on actual rather than perceived need. This can help not only embed a preventative approach but also ensure sustainability of public services through effective and efficient use of funds. The two cases that have opened the way for initial experimentation with mainstream budgets are:

- **Western Isles 2015–16** (see PB Partners, 2016b, p. 12): It entailed the allocation of a transport budget of £500,000 through PB. Over 200 residents from Barra and Uist, the two southernmost islands, were consulted regarding the existing provision of public buses. The results were then passed on to bus service providers, to inform their tendering process. Tenders were assessed and awarded by resident groups. The process demonstrated that residents are perfectly capable of engaging with complex ‘information sets’ and coming to reasoned, and reasonable decisions. The Council’s Transport Manager, whilst initially sceptical said afterwards that he now supports this way of awarding tenders.

- **Dundee Decides 2018**23 Over 11,000 voters from across the city decided how to spend £1.2 million of the Council’s capital budget through PB. Each of the eight electoral wards was allocated up to £150,000 to spend on infrastructure improvements. Voting was open to residents aged 11 or over through an online platform. The political leader of Dundee City Council who helped launch the process said:

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23 Dundee Decides is a pioneer in the mainstreaming of PB in Scotland: https://pbscotland.scot/blog/2018/4/3-dundee-decides-a-first-for-mainstreaming-in-scotland
“I am absolutely blown away by the level of engagement and informed participation... We are the only place in the country to take a slice of our mainstream budget and hand it over to communities to decide how and where it should be spent.”

These examples are encouraging, but the lessons of the last few years must inform 2nd Generation PB (Harkins et al., 2016; Harkins & Escobar, 2015; O’Hagan et al., 2017). Mainstreaming PB will require commitment by democratic innovators across the country in order to reinvent the relationship between citizens, public services and elected representatives. This may have implications for arrangements in governance, procurement, budgeting and administration, which should be considered in the current Local Governance Review initiated by COSLA and the Scottish Government to provide the groundwork for a new Local Democracy Bill.\(^{24}\) For PB to become central in local governance, and not just an add on, it must become part of how communities govern themselves. This means that participatory processes must be embedded within institutional arrangements, which sometimes requires administrative reforms as learned from international experience (Baiocchi, 2005; Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014). Ensuring institutional fit can entail measures such as designing the PB process so that it works in sync with the overall budgeting cycle for the local authority in question. Another important aspect is the need to develop workforce capacity within local authorities, especially in light of findings from the interim evaluation by O’Hagan et al (2017, p. 17):

\[PB\text{ activities to date represent a significant resource commitment on the part of local authorities, or more specifically on the community development/engagement functions which have been charged with delivering this approach and where no additional staff have been allocated. Existing staff are absorbing considerable additional workloads which represents an unsustainable delivery model.}\]

There are also important considerations to be noted about the type of public participation invited by PB processes. The WWS review of 1st Generation PB highlights the predominance of ‘aggregative’ models

\(^{24}\) See: http://www.cosla.gov.uk/news/2017/12/local-governance-review
of PB, where voting takes place without prior substantial dialogue and deliberation about evidence, issues, priorities, aspirations and trade-offs (Harkins et al., 2016). In contrast, ‘deliberative’ models can increase the democratic quality of PB by allowing exploration, discovery, learning and scrutiny, which in turn can generate more robust, informed and considered decision-making (Escobar, 2011; Harkins & Escobar, 2015; Roberts & Escobar, 2015). When PB provides spaces for dialogue and deliberation between citizens, elected representatives, civil society organisations and public authorities, it creates opportunities for collective reflection, innovation and action. Deliberative quality is important regardless of the PB model, but arguably more so for 2nd Generation PB entailing mainstream budgets and services.

The WWS review also noted that the majority of the 58 processes and projects analysed (for which there was available information) had taken place within disadvantaged areas (Harkins et al., 2016). However, only a minority of 1st Generation PB had been articulated with the explicit goal of improving services, opportunities or conditions within disadvantaged areas and addressing inequalities. The main impacts of the community grant-making model that has been dominant in Scotland and England typically relate to increasing participants’ confidence and social connections, as well as immediate local benefits resulting from the funded projects (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011; Rocke, 2014). If 2nd Generation PB in Scotland is to be mainstreamed according to a more explicit social justice agenda to tackle inequalities, this may require a fundamental shift in how public services are delivered. PB in this form may entail structural and governance changes and redistribution of public resources to disadvantaged regions and communities, alongside tailoring service delivery based on community priorities and contexts. This system-wide approach to PB is long-term and arguably more likely to foster the reduction of inequalities and the improvement of life-course outcomes for disadvantaged communities (e.g. Touchton & Wampler, 2014; cf. Campbell et al., 2017).

All in all, mainstreaming PB will not be a straightforward process and may take years to develop and bed in. There are important considerations in terms of sustainability and how to create a hospitable environment that allows PB processes to become established and effective. Core challenges include:

- **Cultural challenges** PB requires reshaping mind-sets and ways of working, so that participatory governance can take hold. This requires learning and commitment from public and third sector organisations, elected representatives, community groups and citizens. New forms of facilitative
leadership\textsuperscript{25} are also necessary – i.e. the ability to bring people together across divides in order to engage in collective problem-solving, deliberative decision-making and creative co-production.

- **Capacity challenges** PB requires a range of skills including process design, organisation, coordination, knowledge brokering, communication, mediation and facilitation. It also takes local knowledge and the know-how to build trust, negotiate competing agendas and create spaces for meaningful dialogue and deliberation.

- **Political challenges** PB can bring a new type of participatory politics that may clash with established relationships and dynamics and challenge the status quo of existing organised interests in a particular community. It can also clash with party politics and electoral dynamics, and it may be difficult to build the cross-party support that can give PB a stable framework for long-term development.

- **Legitimacy challenges** As with any public participation process, there is the risk of tokenism by which PB may become a symbolic rather substantial opportunity for community empowerment. In the current financial context of austerity policy, there is also the risk of using PB for merely administering spending cuts, and this may undermine its perceived legitimacy. Moreover, PB that fails to mobilise substantial resources to address community problems and priorities may be seen as a distraction from other initiatives, thus losing support from people who want to make a difference in their communities. Consequently, PB must be worth people’s effort, time and commitment.

- **Sustainability challenges** All of the above suggests that PB requires sustainable funding, long-term commitment, on-going learning and adaptation and perhaps institutional reform. Accordingly, it can take years to bed it in and make it work effectively.

**Conclusions**

PB has become one of the most popular democratic innovations of the last three decades (Smith, 2009; Elstub & Escobar, forthcoming). This is partly due to its impact on tackling inequalities, addressing local issues, improving governance and increasing civic engagement, particularly in Brazil (Baiocchi, 2005; Wampler, 2007; Touchton & Wampler, 2014; Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2017). Its global spread has

\textsuperscript{25} On facilitative leadership: http://whatworksscotland.blogspot.co.uk/2017/05/facilitative-leadership-involving-citizens-and-communities-in-local-decision-making.html
been enabled by conceptual and practical malleability, which allowed it to be adapted around the world according to disparate logics and motivations and with varied consequences (Cabannes & Lipietz, 2018; Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014). Its impact beyond Brazil has been less impressive but nonetheless significant (Talpin, 2011; Traub–Merz et al., 2013; Rocke, 2014; Sintomer et al., 2016; Campbell et al., 2017). Scotland is at the start of its PB journey, which may lead in various directions. The next few years offer the opportunity to investigate the social and democratic goods generated by PB in the medium and long term (i.e. most effective models of PB, impact on institutions and public services, outcomes for citizens and communities). This chapter has outlined key lessons from the Scottish experience so far, highlighting how PB has become central to policy action that aims to advance community empowerment and public service reform. We have shown the importance of the interplay between civil society and government in opening a window of opportunity for this democratic innovation. The grassroots growth of 1st Generation PB within Scotland’s communities has now been accelerated by increasing political, legislative and policy support. We want to note the importance of retaining and further developing community led grant-making, which is contributing to democratise the distribution of small grants, thus representing an improvement in comparison to grant allocation ‘behind closed doors’. The mainstreaming of PB now under way carves up space for more complex participatory and deliberative processes to decide on core local government budgets. However, for PB to make a substantial difference in the lives of citizens and communities, democratic innovators (i.e. politicians, activists, public servants) across Scotland will have to overcome challenges related to culture, capacity, politics, legitimacy and sustainability. Two particularly important, and interrelated, areas for improvement in 2nd Generation PB, are the need to increase the deliberative quality of PB processes and to strengthen their focus on tackling inequalities. The transformative potential of PB in Scotland depends to a great extent on those two dimensions. This chapter has illustrated the considerable efforts that are going into developing capacity and civic infrastructure through the national support programme. Nevertheless, we have noted that the mainstreaming agenda is likely to struggle unless public authorities think strategically about workforce implications. PB must be supported by properly resourced teams of participation practitioners and community organisers capable of fulfilling the expectations of their communities, PB policy objectives, and the broader participatory democracy agenda laid out by legislation such as the Community Empowerment Act and the Public Sector Equality Duty. The fate of 2nd Generation PB also hinges to some extent on parallel institutional and political reforms to address the ‘silent crisis of local democracy’ in Scotland (Bort et al., 2012). This may include, for example, considering further devolution of powers to local government (Commission on Lo-
cal Tax Reform, 2015; Gibb & Christie, 2015), developing Community Planning Partnerships as institutions of participatory governance (Escobar et al., 2018), and reforming community councils (Escobar, 2014). The current Local Governance Review, and potential Local Democracy Bill that may follow, present a unique opportunity to think about these potential reforms in systemic terms. This must include careful consideration for the fundamental role of local councillors in facilitating this agenda. There are potential frictions between the democratic innovations of participatory democracy and established institutions of representative democracy, and PB developers must be aware and ready to address them. One of the problems that PB has encountered in other countries is the discontinuation of the process due to changes of administration and lack of cross-party support. In other words, party politics can easily override the community politics of PB and, in this sense, participatory institutions typically remain at the mercy of representative institutions. We must think carefully and strategically about how to couple these different principles and practices in order to strengthen democracy (Parkinson & Mansbridge, 2012; Escobar, 2017).

PB originated from blending two agendas that are prominent in Scottish policy discourse, namely: community empowerment and social justice. Given the current policy context, as well as civil society aspirations, we hope that these two agendas remain at the heart of PB in Scotland. We must pay attention to how inequalities in power and influence result in social, economic and health inequalities—the move from transactional to transformational PB in Scotland depends greatly on addressing this issue: “In order to effect a transformation in relations between communities and local authorities, there requires to be a clear recognition of existing power imbalances between communities, citizens, civil society and that these power relations must change” (O’Hagan et al., 2017, p. 16). This will entail careful consideration for how mainstreaming PB can enable participatory decision making that tackles inequalities by applying redistributive measures to improve outcomes.

In conclusion: a lot has been accomplished in Scotland, but the full potential of PB is yet to be unlocked as mainstreaming gets under way in the next few years, and there are critical choices to be made. We look forward to sharing that story in due course. This chapter is thus to be continued...
Participatory Budgeting in Poland in 2013–2018 – Six Years of Experiences and Directions of Changes

Dorota Bednarska-Olejniczak & Jaroslaw Olejniczak

Introduction

In 1989, Poland entered the path of constitutional-economic changes, one of the effects of which was an introduction of decentralization of state administration. The process of decentralization initially covered the local level (municipalities) and subsequently, in 1998, it expanded to reach the supra-local level (poviats) and the regional level (voivodeships). Local government is in Poland responsible for performing, on its own behalf and responsibility, this part of public tasks which have not been restricted within the Constitution or other Acts by the organs of other authorities [art. 163 of the Act from 2 April 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Constitution)].

The expenses of units of local governments are determined by the statutory competencies and tasks. In general, they are related to securing for the society of broadly-understood technical and social infrastructure, public safety and environment protection [art. 7 of the Act from 8 March 1990 on the Municipal Local Government, consolidated text Dz. U. of 2017 item 1875– (MLGA)]. As a result of searching by local authorities for the possibilities of improving the efficiency and rationality of public expenditure, increase in transparency of public expenses, better governance as well as pursuit of political support among the citizens, the authorities strive to use the existing possibilities of engaging the residents in the planned parts of budgetary expenditure. The Participatory Budgeting (called often in Poland and since 2018 in new law regulations “civic”) as a
voluntary form has been gaining an increasingly large attention in Poland. It is a designated part within the municipality budget which consists of funds allocated for the realization of investment ventures submitted by the residents in the process of consultations, for the realization of which the consent is expressed by the local authorities. One may thus assume PB to be the decision making process “in the course of which the citizens discuss and negotiate the issue of distribution of public funds” [Wampler, 2007]. Sadly, along with decentralization of the system of public expenditure, no clear statutory regulations related to the introduction of the Participatory Budgeting were introduced until as late as 2018, which caused a diverse use of the funds from this tool by individual local governments to various degrees and manners. The hereby analysis is supposed to reveal how in which areas has the role, the scope and the significance of the Participatory Budgeting in Poland changed from the time of publishing the previous issue of “Hope for democracy”.

Legal bases of the Participatory (civic) Budget in Poland until 2018, stemming from the statutory provisions concerning the consultation processes

The provisions of the Polish law until 2018 did not encompass direct legal regulations concerning the formalized aspect of the Participatory Budgeting. The basic provision enabling the engagement of local societies in the process of defining parts of the priorities of budgetary expenditure of the units of local governments were the provisions of article 5a of MLGA, indicating that „local legislative bodies have the power to consult with local residents on major issues for the municipality”. This meant that the procedure of consultations with the residents could be considered as a form of Participatory Budgeting. The basic problems were here:

1. Total freedom of the local authorities in undertaking decisions on the conduct of consultations—it stems from the voluntary nature of these procedures. The municipal council could introduce consultations with the residents into the municipal budget by means of an adequate resolution. The above noted resolution could contain a detailed procedure regarding the budgetary consultations with the residents. Another solution possible for use was the passing of the resolution regarding the mode of works over the draft budgetary resolution and the inclusion within it (and not via a separate resolution) of a description of procedure of submitting motions to the municipal budget in an organized or individual manner or in the mode of handling these motions—thus, introducing the possibilities of participatory submission of projects by the residents and their associations. Also
vogt, mayor or president could, in the scope of their competencies, by way of a regulation, introduce the Participatory Budgeting which consisted of enabling the submission by the residents of tasks to be realized in the subsequent budgetary year [more on this: Nowak, 2017].

2. Great freedom as to the choice of formula of consultations—applied in practice consultations forms—depend solely on the individually accepted solutions by individual local government units [Sześcio, 2015] [Sobol, 2017]. It does not solely involve the manner of voting or the number of possible projects to be opinionated, but it also concerns engaging the residents in specific stages of budget preparation [Krawczyk, 2016]. Additionally, some municipalities expanded the group of entities authorized to submit proposals of projects for realization by non-profit organizations. This could potentially lead to the increase of changes for the selection of such projects.

3. Lack of necessity to realize the selected by residents budgetary tasks for realization in the framework of the budget—it must be remembered that such consultations were solely of opinionating nature according to the binding provisions of the law [Krajewska, Sawicki, 2014]. In order to guarantee the realization of results of consultations, the authorities could publically undertake to (which they frequently did) fully accept the will of the residents. Such manner of handling the matter was targeted at guaranteeing lack of political sanctions in the subsequent elections and thus, contributing to the increase in control by the residents over the actions of their representatives.

4. Participatory Budgeting can also be an element of a political game aimed at convincing voters—it could be “simply a kind of game being played with the public, a ritual and superficial form of social participation giving citizens an illusion of involvement in decision-making and distracting them from the real systemic problems of Polish local finance” [Poniatowicz, 2014].

5. Diverse scale of bottom-up disbursement of funds—first of all this problem is related in a significant way to the structure of budgetary expenses in total in the units of territorial local governments—and in particular, with the significant limitation to the freedom of spending the funds due to the domination of legally determined (permanent/fixed) expenses in the municipal expenditures. Even over 3/4 of the expenses in some municipalities [Kopanska 2016] may stem from the statutory regulations which impose a specific level and direction of expenditure. In Poland, the municipalities are
not of homogeneous nature—they occur both in urban, rural and urban–rural municipalities. The Participatory Budgeting is in fact the domain of urban municipalities, nevertheless, here we may also encounter a diversification as to their size and thus, the financial resources and structures of expenditure. It means that comparing the percentage of the total expenditure to the orders expressed by the residents in various municipalities may be at least unjustified with regards to the different types of municipalities. On the other hand, in case of large cities, this percentage is very low, despite the higher independence in terms of spending due to the budget scale.

6. Lack of formal separation of the citizen budget from the entity budget—which causes the individual investment tasks selected during consultation processes to be often treated by the authorities as elements of more complex tasks. This results in a decrease of transparency of performing the tasks—in particular from the point of view of the costs.

7. Indication of the authorized participants of the consultation procedures—the objective of the Participatory Budgeting is the engagement of all members of the local society in the consultation processes. The indication of the party factually being able to participate in the consultations is somewhat problematic, since part of the self-governments limits such a possibility only to the formally residing persons in a given area—which contradicts the previously cited provisions. Additionally, in some municipalities there is a possibility of participation by the disabled—normally the minimum age which authorizes for participation in the voting is the age of 16 [Martela, 2013; Laskowska, 2017].

8. Defined areas of expenditure—analysis of potential directions of spending of the funds indicates significant diversification of the perception of tasks possible for realization under the Participatory Budgeting by individual municipalities [Kot, Kraska, 2017]. On one hand, in many of the municipalities the tasks of investment nature dominated in the so far budgets which was related to the improvement of conditions of the functioning in local societies. These included bike routes, playgrounds, parking lots, lighting system modernizations, gyms in the parks and estates. On the other hand, “soft” projects appeared—such as sport-leisure classes, cultural, art related or educational classes for children, youth or seniors, festivals, financing associations etc., which are important especially for people who are socially handicapped and threatened with marginalization or exclusion [Leszkowicz-Baczyński, 2016].
Such a diversified structure of the proposed actions to be financed resulted for the most part from the broad competencies granted to the municipalities under the process of decentralization. The already mentioned tasks belong mainly to the competencies of municipalities and thus, it is the municipalities which are free to choose the form and scale of realization of a given task, further to being capable of carrying out consultations with the residents.

The above problems seem to be the most significant from the perspective of approval by the residents of the concept of a Participatory Budgeting. Guaranteeing transparency of the decision-making process as understanding of the residents or objectivity of the criteria for the undertaken decisions as well as ensuring fairness of the division of funds for the tasks selected by the society ought to be the guarantee of success and increase of participation of the residents in the Participatory Budgeting.

**Introduction of the provisions regulating the creation of Participatory Budgeting from 2019**

Introduced by means of the Act of 31 January 2018 changes in the provisions of MLGA concern recognition of the Participatory Budgeting as a “special form of social consultations” [Art. 5a. point 3 MLGA]. In line with the provisions of the act under the participatory budget, the residents decide through a direct voting each year about part of the expenditure from the municipal budget. Tasks selected under a given Participatory Budgeting have been recognized in the budgetary resolution of the municipality. Of significant importance which ensures the reliability of the process is the provision stating that “Municipal Council, in the course of its actions on the draft budgetary resolution, cannot remove or amend in a significant degree the tasks selected in the framework of the civic (participatory) budget”. This means that the selected projects ought to be realized. In addition, regulations concerning larger cities (with poviat rights) have been introduced, in which the creation of Participatory Budgeting is obligatory. The guaranteed minimum amount of funds to be spent under PB should not be less than 0,5% of municipality’s expenditure, contained in the last submitted report from the budget realization. Within the competencies of the Municipal Council remained the right to define, by way of a resolution, of a requirement that should be met by a given Participatory Budgeting project. It means that the Municipal Council specifies the formal requirements which ought to be adhered to by the submitted projects; the required number of signatures of residents supporting a given project, the principles of assessing the submitted
projects as to their compliance with the law, technical workability, fulfilment by them of formal requirements and the scope of appeal from a decision on preclusion of a project from voting as well as the principles for the conduct of voting, establishing the results and presenting them to the public, bearing in mind that the principles of conduct of voting must ensure equality and directness of voting.

The Village Fund (Fundusz Sołecki) as an alternative possibility of participation of residents in establishing directions for public expenditure within the municipalities

A unique form of budgetary participation is the Village (Sołecki) Fund, functioning since 2009 in the rural and urban-rural municipalities. Sołectwo, along with a district and estate, does not constitute a unit of territorial self-government. They are solely the auxiliary units for the municipality the creation of which improves the functioning of a municipality, while not constituting its obligation. Sołectwo as entity of subsidiary nature is appointed for realization of the municipal tasks on the basis of the statute granted to the sołectwo by the municipal council. The decision-making and controlling organ is the rural gathering which may be attended by all residents of the sołectwo. The size of a given sołectwo is not destandardized—normally it encompasses one or more towns. For this reason, the number of resident usually does not exceed 1,000 persons, although there tend to be the municipalities in which this number if much greater. The purpose of the expenditure under the Village fund are ventures which form internal tasks of a given municipality, striving to improve the living conditions of its residents and being compliant with the development strategy of that particular municipality [Wójcik, 2014]. Statutory guarantee granted to the Village funds launched by the municipalities with respect to the minimum funds for expenditure with the possibility of their increase by means of the municipal council’s decision are their characteristic feature. In addition, the guarantee of refinancing from the national budget of the part of incurred expenses by the Village funds may additionally stimulate their creation. From the point of view of social participation the fact that it is the residents of this units who get to decide about the designation of the Village fund during the rural gatherings, by defining the most significant from the local perspective needs seems critical [see eg.: Łukomska-Szarek, 2014]. It is thus the most convenient form solely for the minor societies, enabling direct consultations between all their members [more on this: Ptak, 2015]. In 2014-2016 the number of rural and urban-rural municipalities availing of the possibility of creating the Village fund increased. In 2014 it concerned, according to the data gathered by Central Statistical Office (CSO), 1166 out of 2174 municipalities, while in 2015 – already 1366 municipalities and subsequently in 2016 – 1457 of municipalities out of 2175. Also, from the point of view of the scale of the Village fund one
should note that both per capita and towards the total expenditure there is a large diversification among the municipalities. In 2016, in as many as 417 municipalities the expenses from the Village fund exceeded the equivalent of 10 Euro per capita, while in 562 municipalities their share exceeded 1% of total expenditure.

**Picture 1** Share of means from the Village fund in the expenses and spending per capita from Village fund of rural and urban–rural municipalities in 2016

Source: Own elaboration based on Local Data Bank [CSO, 2018]

**Picture 2.** Share of means from the Village fund in the expenses and spending per capita from Village fund of rural and urban–rural municipalities in 2016

Source: Own elaboration based on Local Data Bank [CSO, 2018]
Accepted Models of Consultation procedure in the Participatory (Civic) Budget in Poland

The procedure of elaborating and realising the Participatory Budgeting in Poland has yet to obtain the formalized model, however, one may indicate several common stages that are followed by the majority of municipalities. The general principle is that the residents are entitled to submit specific projects/tasks to the Participatory Budgeting which are to be funded from a specific pool of funds under the budget. These projects, post verification, are subjected to voting among the residents and the winning projects are realized in the subsequent financial year. The analysis of resolutions undertaken by the municipalities on matters related to introducing “participatory budgets” indicates however the necessity to distinguish several key stages of this process.

The basic issue is the making by a given municipality of a decision as to the introduction of the process of consultations. Such a decision is taken normally once a year for a given financial year. In consequence, procedures and regulations of proceeding under the consultation process are elaborated for the given year. Such an approach enables annual modification of the rules of creating the Participatory Budgeting on the basis of the evaluation of the previous budgets, consultations with residents or other significant factors.

The second stage is the call for projects. Depending on the accepted solution, the call may be preceded by trainings organized for the project “leaders”, general trainings, debates and information meetings for the residents etc. Additionally, in some municipalities apart from the residents, also the associations and other social organizations are entitled to submit their projects. Another solution availed of to a lesser degree was the presentation of draft tasks by the municipal officials—however, from the point of view of the idea of the participatory budget, it had in fact little in common with it. In some municipalities, already at the stage of creating the projects a possibility appeared of consulting formal-conceptual matters related to the contents of the projects with adequate officials in order to avoid creating unachievable or incorrect projects.

Another stage is the verification of the submitted projects for the Participatory Budgeting. It is both conceptual (technical requirements, legal status of a real estate, entity status, types of beneficiaries) and formal-financial (correctness of application, completeness of doc-
umentation, reliability of calculation of funds) in nature. Due to the fact that the applicants tend not to be able to precisely estimated the investment costs at this stage it is often possible to perform changes in calculations of costs related to the task realization in the municipalities. In the subject literature devoted to the analysis of functioning of the Participatory Budgeting in Poland, it is relatively seldom underlined that the stage related to promoting individual projects in local societies is critical for the success of a given project. The basic problem from the point of view of the Polish reality is the relatively low tendency of the Poles to participate in local activities. This results in a rather small group of residents participating in the said debates or consultations at an early stage of submitting the projects. Whilst, in order for the project to be accepted for realization it is necessary to obtain a specific number of votes (depending on the municipality there might be a minimum limit introduced).

The subsequent stage in the whole process is the voting. Depending on the size of the municipality, it may be held in a traditional manner or online. The number of possible votes to be cast is decided by the accepted budget concept. It often occurs that in certain municipalities one resident may cast votes for several different projects. Often, in case of cities the division covers “all-city” projects and “local” ones. Depending on the assumed criteria the projects are placed in rankings which enables the selection of those which have gained the largest interest.

**Picture 3 Cyclicality of the process of participatory based budget**

Source [Bednarska–Olejniczak, Olejniczak, 2016]
The last stage (apart from the monitoring of realization of the selected projects) is the evaluation of the carried out procedure. In practice, one may note that some municipalities carry out both an ex post and on-going evaluation. The result of such evaluation is the indication of possibilities of making changes or corrections by the projects submitted by residents (appearing new areas, changes in the distribution of funds, changes of conditions of submission and selection of projects, changes to forms of consultations or voting) as well as changes in the course of the procedure of selecting the projects (increasing the pool of funds, additional calls at the time of non-used part of the guaranteed funds).

**Experiences of the voivodeship cities in Poland in introducing the Participatory Budget**

In Poland, which is a unitary state, as a result of the territorial reform of 1998, there are 16 voivodships (regions), however, in case of two of them there are two cities that equally function as a capital of the region due to the different seats of the voivodship self-government (Bydgoszcz, Zielona Góra) and government administration authorities (Toruń, Gorzów Wlkp.). These cities, as capitals of the regions, and one of the largest cities in Poland, can be a good example of the diversity and evolution of PB implementation practices in Poland.

The first Participatory Budgeting in Poland was not created in any of the 18 cities mentioned above. This was the city of Sopot that was the pioneer in this area [Kębłowski, Van Criekingen, 2014]. In 2011, a pilot project was developed there based on the bottom-up activities of the Sopot Development Initiative (SDI) – an informal group of the residents of Sopot, established in 2008 in order to search for tools for implementation of sustainable development postulates, acting for the benefit of greater participation of residents in making decisions about city matters [Hope for democracy, 2014]. Following the first successes of the undertaken activity, new projects of Participatory Budgeting appeared in other local self-governments. According to estimates, as official statistics are not kept, in 2013 PB was implemented in more than 50 municipalities, in 2014 it was about 150 and now it is between 200 and 250 municipalities. The estimates were carried out on the basis of the analysis of municipal websites, analysis of the number of Participatory Budgeting fanpages on social media, as well as analysis of data pub-
lished by particular municipalities on thematic sites as urbnews.pl [urbnews] or budzetyobywatelskie.pl [budzetyobywatelskie].

**Picture 4 Inhabitants in surveyed capitals of regions**

The following analysis was conducted using data presented on official websites of individual cities devoted to participatory budgets, as well as on urbnews.pl and budzetyobywatelskie.pl. The problem in collecting data was the nomenclature introduced by particular municipalities. Some cities (e.g. Kielce, Wrocław) do not indicate in the name of the budget the year of spending funds but the year of decision-making. This means that, for example, Wrocław Civic Budget 2013 concerns expenditures in 2014, while Poznań Civic Budget 2014 also concerns expenditures in 2014. In both cases, the selection of projects took place in 2013. The reports unified the data to the years of planned expenditures.

The first results of works on implementing the Participatory Budgeting in capital cities of voivodeships were the most visible in four out of eighteen cities. In 2013, funds were allocated for tasks selected by residents of Bydgoszcz, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Poznań and Zielona Góra. It was from 0.2% to 0.6% of the funds proposed for use within the framework of RB in relation to the total expenditure of these cit-
ies. In 2014, the Participatory Budgeting introduced 9 more cities and the scale of funds allocate for this purpose ranged from approximately 0.1% to over 1% of total expenditure. It should be noted that the value of the proposed funds was not always adequate to the amount used. Some cities provided solutions that make it possible to increase PB by unused funds in the next year. There is also a differentiation of the approach of cities to the implementation of PB for the first time, as they in a way imitate the trend that appeared in capital cities of voivodeships. The group of cities that were the last to implement PB includes cities in which the amount of funds involved is at the level of 0.11% or 0.20%, despite the positive experiences of cities that introduced PB earlier. However, such a situation should not be associated with the reluctance of cities to implement PB, but rather with conditions prevailing in given cities, resulting from implemented investment strategies as well as the scale of budgets.

Picture 5 Share of first PB in total expenditures of surveyed towns

Source Own elaboration based on [urbnews], [budzetyobywatelskie] and [CSO, 2018]
### Table 1 The contribution of usable funds under PB in total budget expenditure in the cities analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Białystok</td>
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<td>0,85%</td>
<td>1,31%</td>
<td>0,49%</td>
<td>0,42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bydgoszcz</td>
<td>0,34%</td>
<td>0,32%</td>
<td>0,31%</td>
<td>0,29%</td>
<td>0,28%</td>
<td>0,42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gdańsk</td>
<td>0,34%</td>
<td>0,43%</td>
<td>0,41%</td>
<td>0,44%</td>
<td>0,41%</td>
<td>0,42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorzów Wlkp.</td>
<td>0,22%</td>
<td>0,42%</td>
<td>0,41%</td>
<td>0,33%</td>
<td>0,61%</td>
<td>0,70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katowice</td>
<td>0,62%</td>
<td>1,24%</td>
<td>1,01%</td>
<td>0,85%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kielce</td>
<td>0,45%</td>
<td>0,46%</td>
<td>0,43%</td>
<td>0,38%</td>
<td>0,36%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kraków</td>
<td>0,11%</td>
<td>0,30%</td>
<td>0,22%</td>
<td>0,22%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0,72%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1,04%</td>
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<td>0,31%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0,31%</td>
<td>0,34%</td>
<td>0,29%</td>
<td>0,23%</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0,39%</td>
<td>0,32%</td>
<td>0,47%</td>
<td>0,51%</td>
<td>0,46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0,58%</td>
<td>0,51%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0,30%</td>
<td>0,28%</td>
<td>0,28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toruń</td>
<td>0,57%</td>
<td>0,62%</td>
<td>0,66%</td>
<td>0,59%</td>
<td>0,56%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warszawa</td>
<td>0,20%</td>
<td>0,37%</td>
<td>0,35%</td>
<td>0,35%</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrocław</td>
<td>0,08%</td>
<td>0,51%</td>
<td>0,51%</td>
<td>0,59%</td>
<td>0,55%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zielona Góra</td>
<td>0,58%</td>
<td>1,08%</td>
<td>0,96%</td>
<td>0,87%</td>
<td>0,70%</td>
<td>0,55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source** See picture 3.

Over the years 2013 – 2018, two stages of PB development in the voivodeship capital cities, which are subjects to analysis, are visible. Before 2016, there was an increase in the contribution of PB in the total expenditure of a large part of the cities (10 out of 18), but after 2016 a decline in the contribution of PB in total expenditure can be observable. In addition, in some other cities, the contribution of PB was already decreasing in previous years. Unfortunately, due to the lack of detailed data on the types of expenditure in individual cities, it is not possible to assess the reasons for this situation. As it has already been mentioned, the lack of a consistent reporting system in the scope of PB is one of the main problems when analyzing this type of spending activity of local governments in Poland.
## Table 2: The estimated value of funds allocated for subsequent editions of PB per capita in the cities covered by the study

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
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<td>354</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>548</td>
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<td>473</td>
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<td>780</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>608</td>
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<td>800</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>392</td>
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<td>374</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>620</td>
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<td>893</td>
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<td>973</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>200</td>
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<td>214</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opole</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>150</td>
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<td>169</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>280</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>305</td>
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<td>380</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>469</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>260</td>
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<td>233</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>300</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>3128</td>
<td>2999</td>
<td>3207</td>
<td>3847</td>
<td>4114</td>
<td>4500</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>808</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>1049</td>
<td>1100</td>
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<tr>
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<td>119</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations based on local governments reports and budget projects and cities’ PB websites (1EUR=4.3 PLN)

The analysis of expenditure under PB per capita results in interesting conclusions. As can be observed, most municipalities strive to maintain a stable or slightly increasing level of expenditure under PB per capita. This may indicate the consolidation of the adopted solutions within PB in the cities covered by the study, as well as reaching the satisfactory level of financing for both authorities and residents. Unfortunately, as regards the participation of citizens in creating public expenditure maps, after a few initial years of increasing interest of citizens in this matter, the situation is worsening. The first years of functioning of PB in Poland brought an increase in the activity of residents in the area of co-creation of local space. Data on participation in subsequent editions of PB in individual cities indicated a gradual increase in the number of voters. In relation to the number of adult residents of individual cities, it can be indicated that a maximum of about 35% of residents voted in the consultations. It should be emphasized that in some cities it is possible for younger residents to vote, provided that they have a consent of their legal guardian (table) and that some
inconsistency of data occurs, which results from the publication of the number of votes and not the number of unique voting residents. In this case, the data was estimated based on the number of votes for individual projects. Also in relation to the level of participation in PB, 2016 seemed the best year as regards voter turnout. In the following years, a downward trend in this area should be noted in most cities.

**Picture 6** The voter turnout in vote on the Participatory Budgeting in relation to the number of adult residents of the city

The research on civil society confirms the waning interest in the participation of Poles in public affairs. The results of the research “The sense of influence on public affairs” conducted in Poland by the CBOS (Public Opinion Research Center) and quoted by D. Bednarska-Olejniczak [Bednarska-Olejniczak, 2018] indicate that there is a clear relationship between the willingness to undertake socio-political activities (such as participation in elections, social consultations, acting in organizations and bottom-up initiatives) and a sense of influence on public affairs – in order for the citizens to want to engage in any form of activity, they must feel that their actions have a real impact on social reality. According to CBOS data (CBOS, 2017), in Poland in the early 1990s, people were convinced that they can influence the public sphere both at the national and local level. Over the next fifteen years, this conviction grew, especially on a local level, however this trend has slowed down in recent years. Currently, compared to the data from 2016, citizens’ sense of influence on state affairs decreased by 7 percentage points to the level of 34%. This means that almost two-thirds of the respondents believe that they have no impact on the
affairs of the country, which indicates a high level of alienation of citizens in the public sphere. A sense of the influence on local community affairs is more experienced – over half of Poles (55%) believe that their actions affect the affairs of the city or municipality (CBOS, 2017).

Table 3 Selected data on PB in the examined cities in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Voting age since</th>
<th>No of tasks to be done in 2018</th>
<th>Types of projects</th>
<th>% share of PB funds</th>
<th>Types of Project</th>
<th>allocation criteria</th>
<th>Initiators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Białystok</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30 70</td>
<td>general urban</td>
<td>for settlements</td>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bydgoszcz</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>general urban</td>
<td>for settlements</td>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gdańsk</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>20 80</td>
<td>general urban</td>
<td>for settlements</td>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorzów Wlkp.</td>
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<td>60 20 20</td>
<td>general urban</td>
<td>for areas educational</td>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>16</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>13 87</td>
<td>general urban</td>
<td>for settlements</td>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kielce</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>70 30</td>
<td>big small</td>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kraków</td>
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<td>92</td>
<td>82 18</td>
<td>general urban</td>
<td>for settlements</td>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lublin</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40 60</td>
<td>big small</td>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Łódź</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>25 75</td>
<td>Intra-settlements</td>
<td>for settlements</td>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>for settlements</td>
<td>Inhabitants or local non-profit organizations</td>
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<td>Inhabitants</td>
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<td>for districts</td>
<td>Inhabitants local public institutions, non-profit organizations</td>
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Source Own elaboration based on [urbnews], [budzetyobywatelskie], PB websites, [CSO, 2018]
Analysis of data regarding PB construction in individual cities indicates the pursuit of all local governments to separate the common part for the whole city (general urban/urban projects) and conducting projects for individual districts/settlements/areas. This is a change compared to the original solutions for which general urban projects were predominating in cities. The experience of Wroclaw may serve here as an example, where the evaluation process indicated the need to allocate funds for individual local communities due to the different number of inhabitants of individual settlements/areas [Bednarska-Olejniczak, Olejniczak 2016]. However, the proportion between the different pools of funds is diversified. In some cities there is a predominance of funds for general urban projects (Kielce, Kraków, Opole, Rzeszów), while in others funds are mainly allocated to local activities. It may result in an increased number of projects that can be implemented under PB, and lower expenditures per one project. At the same time, it indicates that in some cities, apart from the distinction of the urban and district/settlement/area level there is also a separation of micro, educational or pro-social tasks. This demonstrates the diverse perception of the possibility of using PB, as well as diverse needs of individual local government communities. Groups of initiators / leaders, which are defined by particular self-governments and authorized to submit motions can be regarded as another difference. Despite the fact that in the majority of cities these are residents, in Olsztyn and Zielona Góra the possibility of initiating activities by non-profit organizations was maintained (this possibility has been also present earlier in several other cities).

**Summary**

The idea of participation of residents in creating budgets of territorial self-government units in Poland is implemented depending on the legal status of a given local government unit. As it was presented in the analysis, the number of municipalities using the extended participatory budgeting mechanism has been increasing since 2013, however, these are mainly municipalities that do not have the possibility to use the village administrator fund as an alternative. In turn, within 2014–2016, the number of municipalities drawing benefits from the possibility of launching the village administrator fund grew dynamically from 53.6% to 67% of all eligible communes. In the case
of the large capital cities of voivodships, changes are visible both in the scale of residents’ interest in this solution as well as the size of the participative budget itself and the method of its distribution.

An attempt to assess the existing experience of Polish municipalities in the implementation of the Participatory Budgeting shall be accompanied by reflection on factors that can significantly affect the success of this implementation. For example, the impact of public communication on the activation of residents shall be considered [Bednarska-Olejniczak, Olejniczak, 2018]. Consistent implementation of goals related to the promotion of Participatory Budgeting requires skillful selection of communication tools – one type of tools in case of the stage of raising awareness and interest, as well as incitation to submit a project, and different at the stage of urging residents to cast votes for specific projects. These tools shall form part of the municipality marketing strategy, focused on long-term goals, and thus shall be planned in the long-term horizon, integrated with other marketing instruments and verified in terms of effectiveness. It should also be remembered that the promotion of a Participatory Budgeting is an element of the global strategy of promoting the city and shall be part of its stages [Bednarska-Olejniczak, Olejniczak 2017]. Communication activities undertaken at the stage of project collection shall achieve the following goals:

a) presenting the idea of PB and profits from it,

b) delivering knowledge about functioning of PB, as well as technical issues connected with preparing and lodging the application,

c) having inhabitants interested and persuaded to prepare and lodge their projects.

At the voting stage, however, they should allow for:

a) informing inhabitants about dates of voting, possible ways of voting, number of projects they can vote for,

b) encouraging to vote (in general),

c) encouraging to vote for particular project.

In Authors opinion intensification of activities in the area of the policy of municipality communication with residents may probably have a positive impact on their participation in PB.
Participatory Budgeting in Slovenia: A Budding Field

Matic Primc

Introduction
Slovenia is one of the latest countries where participatory budgeting (PB) has taken hold. Citizen participation, however, is not new and PB is a spark that may be rekindling past and almost forgotten experiences of participation and self-management. Even though the PB experience is so new to Slovenia that most of the municipalities engaged in it have barely finished one budget cycle, we can observe and evaluate the models and applications of PB and roughly predict the development prospects.

Historical background
While it is true that Slovenia is among the last countries in Europe to adopt participatory budgeting, it would be a false statement to say that historically Slovenia has little experience in participation. Slovenia is a young country, having obtained independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. With independence it also transitioned from a one-party system of market socialism to a Western-style free market parliamentary democracy. This transition and corresponding ideology shift brought a great change to the system of local self-governance and the way citizen participation is perceived. This is important as participation in the self-management system of Yugoslavia was widespread, mandated by law and extended beyond the scope of even modern PB models. It was one of the most advanced participation systems in the world and, despite its many flaws, inspired many participatory practices throughout the world. It was based mostly on worker participation in public life and less focused on general citizenry; nevertheless, it allowed for direct management of not only
municipal investments but also of health service delivery, education and other public services (Samary, 2017).

However, instead of building up on and improving the participation system of Yugoslavia, reaching independence was understood by the political class and a large part of the public as the complete rejection of the ideology of communism and any structures built by it. Thus, the entire self-management system was disbanded and almost all venues of citizen participation abolished. The passing of the new Local Self-Government Act in 1991 caused a certain degree of centralization of decision-making and consequently also the centralization of resources and spending. Since almost every municipality was composed of several separate towns and villages, it soon came to pass that the more outlying towns and villages were becoming starved of resources. Often, these areas sought to solve the problem by splitting away and forming their own municipality and thus having own budget income. This triggered a tumultuous process of splitting off and joining together, which happened in three large waves in 1994, 1998 and 2006 and eventually stopped in 2011. In 1991, there were 60 municipalities in Slovenia with the largest one having the population of 151,000 people, while in 2011 the last new municipality was created, which put the total number of municipalities at 212 and the biggest municipality has the population of 288,000 people. Many of the new municipalities are very small, comprising as little as 340 people with the majority not reaching the population of 5,000.

Since independence, citizen participation on a municipal level has been defined by law through three legal mechanisms: citizens’ assembly, popular initiative and local referendum, as well as through the expected procedure in forming municipal budgets. In practice, these mechanisms proved mostly ineffective and failed to induce meaningful participation, as we will discuss.

**Administrative framework**

The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (Article 9) guarantees the autonomy of the local government. The basic local government unit is a municipality, which may consist of only one local community or several local communities whose inhabitants are bound together by common needs and interests. Slovenia is divided into 212 municipalities, 113 of which contain more than one local community.
and thus have lower tier elected bodies. There is a special category of urban municipality, of which there are 11 whose populations range between 17,000 and 288,000 people.
The municipalities are governed by three levels of elected representatives, the mayor, the municipal councillors and the local councillors. The latter are only applicable if a municipality consists of more than one local community and decides that the local communities should have elected representatives. The mayor performs the role of the executive of the municipality. He carries out the decisions of the municipal council, presides over the municipal council meetings and is in charge of preparing the documents on which the municipal council decides. The municipal council is the legislative body that approves the budget and other municipal documents, such as strategic guidelines and larger investments. Local councils have no inherent decision-making authority derived from law, but some authority can be ceded to them from the municipal council if the municipal council so chooses.
In practice, the mayor holds most of the power in the municipality. This power stems from the ability to control information and restrict the options that the municipal council can decide between. The mayor is alone in the ability to present budget proposals that the councillors are allowed to amend within certain limits. Many mayors work in good collaboration with their municipal councils, however, there are many mayors who are at odds with the municipal council and who manipulate the council for their own purposes. Such mayors are nicknamed municipal sheriffs, often operating on the border of legality, frequently crossing the border. There have even been instances where mayors spent parts of their mandate incarcerated and nevertheless retained their authority and power.
The local council’s tasks are only loosely defined by law and it is left to each municipality to freely set out the tasks and authority ceded to them. Mostly, these bodies are understood to be the ones in direct contact with the citizens and citizens are generally expected to approach these bodies when trying to influence municipal processes. The role and influence of local councils vary widely from municipality to municipality. In some they are given a relatively autonomous decision-making power on minor or moderate issues that affect the local community exclusively. In these cases they are also provided with finances, which they disburse according to the local council’s decision.
In contrast, there are municipalities where the local councils are given no authority and no finances. In these cases they function as advisory bodies who are periodically consulted about their preferences on larger investment projects and are expected to propose necessary investments during the preparation of the budget. When their role is purely advisory, their opinions and proposals are quite often ignored. The citizens themselves have 3 legal direct decision-making mechanisms, through which to influence municipal policy: the local referendum, popular initiative and citizens’ assembly.

The Local Self-Government Act provides for a consultative referendum on any issue within municipal competence or a referendum subsequent to adopted municipal legislation. The former may only be called by the municipal council and the results are not binding on the council. The latter may be called by the mayor, by members of the municipal council or by 5 per cent of the eligible voters in the municipality. If a referendum is requested by members of municipal council or the mayor, calling it is optional, but if it is requested by the voters, it is obligatory. In practice, the mechanism of local referendum is very rarely used due to its limited utility of after the fact intervention.

Popular initiative is a mechanism through which at least 5 per cent of voters can propose the adoption or revocation of municipal acts. The municipal body, to which the initiative is addressed, is obliged to consider the proposal within three months. In practice, this mechanism is also very rarely used, as it requires significant and relatively large scale organization and investment of time by the citizens for the dubious result of being considered.

Citizens’ assembly is a mechanism where the mayor organizes the meeting open to all inhabitants of the area for which it is convened. The mayor may convene citizens’ assembly at the request of municipal council or the local council and must convene it at the request of 5 per cent of the voters. The exact topics that are allowed to be discussed, the procedure of the assembly itself and whether the decisions reached by the citizens’ assembly are binding or not are all left to each individual municipality to define for itself. Similar to other two mechanisms, this mechanism is rarely used due to its ineffectiveness. Upon reviewing the manner in which municipalities decide to define citizens’ assembly, we have discovered that a large majority of municipalities defines it in one of the two ways. Either it is quite simple to carry out, for example 25 people are already considered a valid
quorum, but the decisions reached are not binding for anyone, or the decisions are binding for the municipal bodies, but it is very hard to organize to the point that there is no case of successful implementation in a decade. In both cases, the citizens’ assembly proves to be a possible but an unattractive option for citizen-driven participation.

There is a fourth “mechanism,” which allows for a form of citizen participation that in law gives the citizens no formal decision-making power, but in practice it allows citizens some, albeit small and unreliable, means to influence municipal spending. This mechanism is the administrative procedure required from the municipality in the process of forming the budget proposal. The procedure demands the municipal level collects investment proposals from local councils before it forms the municipal budget proposal. Often the investment proposals at the local council level arise from active citizens contacting their local councillors about specific issues and these then get added to the local councils investment plan, which has in some municipalities a reasonable chance of getting implemented.

Very recently, May 2018, PB has been added to on the Local Self-Government Act. The relevant text in the Local Self-Government Act reads as follows:

**Article 48.a**

In the course of preparing the budget, the municipality may allocate an amount of funds intended to finance the projects proposed by the citizens. The municipality shall carry out consultations with the citizens about the proposed projects before submitting the budget to the city council for approval.

Due to the recent amendment to the said Act, there has been no impact yet to study.

**Socio-political context**

Slovenia has been suffering through a dual crisis, one of representative democracy and one of worsening economic conditions, which both escalated after 2008. There has been a long time downward trend in election turnout, as parliamentary election turnout has been de-
clining every year since 1992, dropping from 85.6% in 1992\(^1\) to 51% in 2014\(^2\). A similar trend is noticeable in local elections, where the turnout dropped from 67.18% in 2002\(^3\) to 43.63% in 2014\(^4\). Similarly, public opinion surveys follow this trend and show that in the latest Politbarometer survey in 2014 only 8% were satisfied with Slovenian democracy, with a staggering 87% not satisfied\(^5\). These are truly alarming trends, which could be damaging to the idea of democracy itself and which may be resolved in unexpected and extremely dangerous ways, as was the case in a number of countries in recent years.

Similarly, the 2008 economic crisis as well as the austerity imposed, ostensibly to help recover from the crisis, has worsened the economic conditions for the citizenry. The poverty level has risen by more than a quarter from 11.3% in 2009 to 14.3% in 2015 and fell a little in 2016 to 13.9\(^6\). Similarly, the risk of social exclusion peaked at 19.2% of the population and fell marginally with the economic recovery to 18.4%.

In addition, there has been a marked trend towards flexibilization of the labour market, which brought lower work security and an explosion of atypical, precarious employment, especially among the young. Even municipalities were affected. There was an increase in the responsibilities of the municipalities without the corresponding increase in funding. Not only has the government not allocated any new funds or new financial resources to the municipalities, it has not even disbursed the full amount of the funds it is obligated to disburse by law. The municipalities were thus doubly hit by the necessary increase in social expenditures for increasingly impoverished population and by contraction of funding received from the state. They coped as best as they could by finding new sources of funding in selling off their land and housing assets, selling off publicly-owned companies, entering public–private partnerships, borrowing money and concentrating heavily on acquiring funds from the European structural funds. The result was a marked decrease in investment and retreat into mostly performing legally mandated basic tasks of maintaining

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1 National election commission http://www.dvk-rs.si/index.php/si/arkiv/dz1992
3 National election commission http://dvk-rs.si/arkivi/vp2002/udel_ob.htm
the basic infrastructure and social conditions within municipalities. This strained situation remains unresolved in 2018, even though an increased economic activity relieved some of the financial pressure. An important reaction to the aforementioned situation were the so-called Slovenian uprisings that started in the winter of 2012. They began as local protests in Maribor against the mayor because of the mismanagement of the municipality and suspected criminal conduct. They quickly grew and the mayor and the government of the then Prime Minister Janša tried to quash the protests by violent police repression for the first time in Slovenia. This, however, backfired spectacularly and protests continued to grow until they included up to a quarter of the population of Maribor, which on several occasions engaged in running battles with the police across the city. In the end, the mayor announced his resignation and the protests slowly died down. However, during the Maribor protests, other regions took up protests against the government. Those protests also grew and on 27 February 2013 forced a parliamentary vote of no confidence that ended the Janša government. Out of the protest movement, a number of citizen movements and initiatives were born, some of which formed into parties that entered the parliament and various municipal councils.

**Genesis of PB in Slovenia**

Slovenia was among the last European countries that implemented PB with the first pilot implementation in 2015. The implementation and spread of the PB mechanism is also atypical due to its first implementation being a grassroots demand, while the further spread was the result of the top-down decisions of mayors. The initial pilot project is almost a direct result of the aforementioned Slovenian uprising. During the uprisings in Maribor, a grassroots organization called the Initiative for City-wide Assembly (IMZ) was formed based on the principles on direct democracy, egalitarianism and non-hierarchical organization. Soon it transformed into an assembly movement, organizing citizen assemblies in different city districts, which met regularly every few weeks and operated on the basis of consensous decision-making and direct action principles. As citizens became engaged in the assemblies, it quickly became

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clear that there are no effective legal mechanisms for citizen participation in municipal affairs and the tactics of pressuring the mayor and municipal council, for every single issue is hugely ineffective in the sense of effort required. Shortly after the start of the assemblies in April 2013, the IMZ came up with a concrete proposal and legal solution for the implementation of participatory budgeting and demanded that the municipality implement it. The model developed by the IMZ was a co-decision model of the participatory democracy type (Allegretti, Herzberg, Röcke, Sintomer, 2014), in which citizen deliberation and direct decision-making is the deciding factor.

The new mayor Fištravec, himself originating within one of the uprisings movement groups, publically supported the proposal, yet the municipality hid behind legalistic objections and was unwilling to go forward with the implementation. The demand got stronger traction in the 2014 election period when the IMZ collected thousands of signatures of support and virtually all the candidates were compelled to publically support PB implementation. In addition, several national political parties included PB implementation in their party program, none of them however were part of the government. The mayor won his reelection bid and PB could move forward in a limited way. The mayor only agreed to try PB along the participatory democracy model that the IMZ proposed in only one of the 17 city districts and pledged €100,000 (0.1% of the budget) for the projects selected by the citizens. Citizen deliberation, organized by the citizens themselves, and voting, carried out in a manner similar to election and with citizen volunteer support, took place between September and December 2015. The citizens’ response was good with 78 proposals being proposed and 10.8% of the population taking part in the decision-making. A total of 14 investment projects were selected for implementation. However, the mayor did not faithfully implement the citizens’ decisions and, even though all investments were supposed to be implemented in the 2016 budget period, only the smallest 4 were implemented by the end of the 2017 budget period, with the mayor citing budgetary constraints as the reason for non-implementation, and with that PB has effectively ended in Maribor until political will is found again. Demands by citizens and the IMZ for a faithful implementation of the PB project and continuation and expansion have so far not been met with success. Instead, in 2017 the mayor, over the objections of the IMZ, instituted a new process...
of consultation in 6 districts, which is completely opaque, arbitrary and in which citizens have no decision-making power and no money is pledged to implement the results of the process. The mayor insists that this process is also PB even though it is flatly inconsistent with PB as defined in the Local Self-Government Act.

Despite the regression of PB in Maribor, the example of the pilot PB project was enough to inspire PB implementation in several other municipalities. Almost all of these municipalities used the participatory democracy model developed by the IMZ to a large extent, some with active support of IMZ activists and many through self-initiated good practice sharing.

In May 2016, the mayor of Ajdovščina adapted the IMZ model slightly and implemented its own PB. The mayor, saying he would like to engender as much direct democracy as possible in his municipality, pledged €360,000 (1% of the budget) for the two-year budget period 2017–2018. The municipality used NGO assistance in organizing public presentations, deliberations and voting. Voting was done in a manner similar to election with a lowered participation age as it allowed participation at 15 years of age and up. The process resulted in 101 investment proposals, out of which 31 were selected for implementation with a 12% voting turnout. The mayor successfully implemented the proposals with all investments carried out within the prescribed time frame. The mayor and the municipal council were very satisfied with the PB process and incorporated it into the city statute, which now mandates spending between 0.5–1% of the total budget for PB projects. In May 2018, Ajdovščina was the first municipality carrying out its second PB cycle for the 2019–2020 budget period. In the evaluation of the first cycle, the municipality estimated that youth participation was lower than desired and sought to increase youth participation in the second cycle by introducing a second PB aimed at youth only, along with regular PB. The deliberation part is still ongoing and it is too early to evaluate it.

In September 2016, the Municipality of Komen followed, also using the participatory democracy model with the assistance from the IMZ in adapting the model. The mayor was the initiator and pledged €120,000 (1.3% of the budget) for the PB projects in the two-year budget period 2017–2018. Komen also organized public presentations and put considerable effort into motivating citizens to participate in the deliberation and gathering of proposals. This effort was very suc-
cessful and resulted in 156 proposals, which is one proposal for every 23 citizens. Out of these, 22 were selected by election the like voting process where anyone aged 15 years and up was able to participate. Overall, 21% of the population took part in the vote, with some areas registering an almost 80% participation. The selected proposals were faithfully implemented within the time frame. The mayor was very satisfied with the PB process, citing very large citizen activation that persisted long after the deliberation phase was concluded. The citizens actively helped with the implementation of the selected projects, on some occasions adding value to them through volunteer work or other contributions. He aims to increase the size of the budget devoted to future cycles of PB to 3% of the total municipal budget.

Both municipalities of Komen and Ajdovščina were perceived as good practice examples of PB and the practice spread to neighbouring municipalities. First to follow them was the Municipality of Nova Gorica which adapted a participatory democracy model along the lines of the one used by Ajdovščina. The deliberation process started in May 2017. The municipality pledged €250,000 (0.8%) for the one-year budget period 2018. There as well, the citizens’ response was good, with 120 proposals being made and a 11.4% turnout for the voting process. The age of participation was set at 15. Eventually, 19 out of 120 proposed projects were selected for implementation, all set to be completed by the end of 2018. The implementation seems to be proceeding on track. The deliberation process was less robust due to the fact that once proposals were gathered they were not publicly presented and thus could not be the object of a self-initiated discussion.

A special case is the Municipality of Ankaran with its PB model of proximity democracy (Allegretti, Herzberg, Röcke, Sintomer, 2014). It is the most recent new municipality in Slovenia that grew out of a citizens’ initiative to split away from the larger municipality of Koper. The civil initiative ran a successful referendum initiative in 2009 and, even though it won the referendum, the parliament refused to implement the result. The initiative then fought a legal battle before the Constitutional Court, which in 2011 ruled that Ankaran can become a municipality but that it can elect its first mayor and municipal council in the 2014 regular local elections. Thus, the municipality was run very informally for the first several years and in that time developed very inclusive participatory processes in urban planning and budget formation. The municipal staff point out that they
adopted some ideas and techniques from the IMZ in Maribor. The municipality practices participation by calling citizens’ assemblies several times a year, with attendance at over 10% of the population, where among other things they discuss budget priorities, project proposals, spatial planning, etc. Even though project proposals are voiced at these meetings, there is no decision-making process in place for the citizens; however, the municipality claims they include practically all of the proposals, together comprising over 50% of the total budget. They also include unelected citizens’ representatives in working groups and technical bodies that implement the municipal policies and projects. The process is not very transparent and the follow-up on the completion of projects is hard, as most project proposals are merged into larger and long-term programs and the implementation can happen over several years. They recognise this weakness and are developing IT solutions that would allow the citizens to better follow the implementation of their project proposals. They also recognize the superiority of the co-decision model and have stated that they are considering a move towards the PB model of participatory democracy in future years.

**Lessons and prospects**

The lessons learned from existing PB implementation are limited within the single cycle that has been carried out in municipalities so far. Nonetheless, we can conclude that PB is a process that the citizenry is relatively keen to participate in, as evidenced in the fact that even first time implementation of a process hitherto unknown in Slovenia has at a mimimum motivated 10% of the population to participate and in some cases significantly more. Even though none of the municipalities conducted any demographic studies of participants, it is observable that young people are underrepresented, especially in the deliberation phase. Another observation we can make is that populations in the outlying and rural parts of municipalities participate at significantly higher rates in both deliberation and decision-making. All municipalities noticed least participation in the central, most urbanized and highest population density parts of the municipality, sometimes barely reaching a 3% turnout for voting participation, while the outlying and rural areas record much higher rates of participation, reaching up to an 80% turnout for voting. The participatory democracy PB model in Ajdovščina, Komen and Nova
Gorica seemed to be accepted by the citizenry, recording no complaints at any point in the process, including implementation. All three municipalities included citizens in most process stages. The process of communication between the proposers and the municipality was de-bureaucratized and took form of informal or semi-formal telephone, in person or electronic communication, including in the implementation phase where, when desired, the citizen who proposed a selected project could have a strong voice in terms of the specifics of implementation. The only part where none of the three municipalities included citizens was in the creation and evaluation of the PB model itself.

The example of Maribor, however, shows a bad practice to be avoided. In Maribor, the implementation of the same participatory democracy model resulted in angry citizen reactions, a number of public letters of protest, even citizens attending city council sessions in protest and the discontinuation of PB. That was an unpredictable development as the mood during the project proposal, deliberation and the voting phase was extremely positive, with people, unprompted, bringing home-baked pastries and food to meetings, even showing up hours before the voting stations opened in order to be among the first to cast a vote for the first PB in Slovenia. Public outcry occurred only at the point when it became obvious that the mayor misled the citizens and did not intend to faithfully implement the projects selected by the citizens and responded to citizen concern with a series of PR manipulations and outright lies. Nonetheless, it is evident that citizens viewed PB, when properly implemented, as very positive and continue to campaign for the implementation of it as well as for the implementation of the investment proposals selected in 2015 but that have never been implemented.

At the national level, PB has gained recognition and a certain degree of support among the political parties and within the relevant ministries which included PB in the Development Strategy of Local Self-Governance until 2020. Several parties added PB implementation to their national political program. In May 2018, a formulation about PB was added to the Local Self-Government Act. The wording itself is very vague and curiously does not include the words “participatory budgeting”. However, it does specify that funds must be

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set aside for the implementation of projects and that consultation should be concluded before the budget is presented to the municipal council for adoption. This formulation seems to allow advisory models, while in no way preventing the co-decision models of PB that have proven to be superior. Clearly, the regression of PB, which occurred in Maribor, is inconsistent with the new legal framework. Aside from adopting a legal framework, there is yet no financial, technical or organizational support from state-level organizations for municipalities that implement PB. The municipalities themselves on the other hand have begun a networking process within the Association of Municipalities and Towns of Slovenia (SOS), which is a member organization connecting 177 municipalities and through which they aim to exchange best practice examples and assist other municipalities with implementing PB themselves. Several new municipalities have already announced PB implementation, while many are actively seeking information and know-how about PB, therefore it is safe to assume that PB will spread further and more rapidly. Due to the fact that the Act specifies that deliberation should be concluded before the budget is adopted and that in November 2018 regular local elections will be held, it is reasonable to assume that the real expansion of PB will occur in 2019 as mayors are now faced with the uncertainty of their reelection and cannot guarantee implementation, thus making it less likely to follow through with the implementation in 2018. Despite the vague wording of the Act, new experiments in PB are likely to follow the co-decision model due to the fact that the mayors of municipalities with active PB are both very likely to win reelections and are at the same time very vocal and principled advocates of the co-decision model. The co-decision model is also the only one promoted by NGOs and grassroots organizations like the influential IMZ. In fact, all the announced new implementations are planning on using the co-decision model.

Laboratory of Democracy
One of the most important aspects of citizen participation is its pedagogical potential (Shugurensky, 2010) though which more significant societal changes can arise. Participatory processes are often described as a two way pedagogy (Santos, 2005) between the citizens
and the municipal staff and elected officials which offers significant opportunities for departure from bureaucratic culture. Despite very short time, a single completed cycle, there is already a noticeable trend in debourocratization in the municipalities with successful PB experiments. From the get go the implementations were designed with a minimum of bureaucracy necessary on the part of the citizens while a significant degree of formal procedure was retained on the side of the municipality with the aim of providing total transparency. Two of the municipalities, Komen and Ajdovščina, report significant activation in the population through the implementation PB as well as some self-organization outside of the municipal run procedures and events relating to PB. Elevated activity was noticeable even during the 2 year period between deliberation phases, when the selected investments from the previous phase were being carried out. The increased activation and a possibility of two way learning is a hopeful sign that transformative learning may take place in the future. The greatest potential however, perhaps counterintuitively, is to be found in the one municipality where the PB process collapsed, Maribor. It is often pointed out that participatory democracy can promote transformative learning, however the process works the other way around too, namely that transformative learning can promote participatory democracy (Schugurensky 2002). That has evidently been the case in Maribor where after the uprisings in 2012 Initiative for city-wide assembly (IMZ) formed, a robust self organized assembly movement of citizens. This movement activated approximately 1% of the city citizens and engaged them in horizontally organized assemblies which function on direct action and consensous decision making principles. The assemblies are organized on the geographical limits of city districts with some variation. They occur roughly every 2 weeks in each of the eleven districts. In over five years there have been close to 1000 assemblies and they continue unabated. The participants in these engage with the municipality and sometimes the state on a variety of topics on any scale. The issues tackled by the assemblies range anywhere from mowing the grass on public land, traffic, investment projects and all the way up to implementing or changing municipal ordinances or national laws. Not insignificantly out of this movement arose the demand for first implementation of PB in Slovenia an idea which was fought for and won. Frequently citizens engaged in assemblies and/or IMZ reach outside of the borders of
their own municipality as when they convinced 108 mayors across the country to demand Slovenia does not sign up to CETA treaty or when they assist other municipalities with their own PB implementation. Such a long and sustained activity offers a plethora of opportunities for learning by doing in a Freirian sense, even though, or perhaps even because, these activities enjoy no municipal support and are often actively hindered. Pedagogic effect on the participants has been studied in depth (Jelenc Krašovec and Gregorčič, 2017) and has shown that indeed self-transformative learning has taken place and there were noticeable changes in the way participants perceived themselves and the society. It shows that there is significant improvement in community skills and perceptions with people valuing participation more, being more confident of their ability to resolve conflicts, increased respect and tolerance for others, increased self confidence, increased concern for the community as well as increase in technical and organizational skills (Jelenc Krašovec and Gregorčič, 2018).

The activities of IMZ/assemblies have already grown far outside of the scope of a typical PB and should they successfully prevail on the municipality of Maribor to open itself up to genuine participation and two-way learning we may even be witnessing unique ways of public life being opened up for participation.
A third wave of Participatory Budgeting in France

Gil Pradeau

When participatory budgeting travelled from Brazil to Europe, many scholars pointed that some initial goals and features of this democratic innovation had disappeared (Baiocchi and Ganuza 2016; Ganuza and Francés 2012; Porto de Oliveira 2017; Röcke 2014; Sintomer, Röcke, and Herzberg 2016). The Porto Alegre model was distinct from what European cities were trying to implement and a much smaller portion of capital expenditure was really discussed within European participatory budgeting. While participatory budgeting used to be one of the first step towards a much bigger discussion about local assets and source of incomes, comparing open data initiatives related to local budgets to participatory budgeting reveals distinct patterns. Since the last local elections in 2014 in France, a new increase of PB cases has emerged after Paris decision to start one in 2014. Paris was the second capital in Europe to adapt participatory budgeting after Lisbon (Alves and Allegretti 2012). Even if participatory budgeting is not compulsory by national law, many new cases went down the road of Paris, and the French capital city claims the biggest participatory budgeting experience in the world.

This chapter focus on the different ways this participatory device travels in France. Before the last local elections in 2014, only 4 cases were active. In 2018 more than one hundred are being now implemented. I shed light on existing differences between the various participatory budgeting waves in France and argues despite new formal rules, that the current wave might have very little impact in order to “democratize democracy” (Santos, 2005).

This chapter analyses 107 active cases of PB in 2018 based on web mining and found occurrences in a French newspaper database. Based on this selection, regulations and website functionalities (if
online process) were analysed for 61 cases considered as active only if the collecting phase was happening in 2017. Future cases weren't not considered because their procedural rules are not known yet. The procedural rules are decided by the French city councils and use the following steps:

1. Defining rules for public participation;
2. Collecting proposals from citizens;
3. Reviewing cost and feasibility for each proposal;
4. Organising vote;
5. Implementing winning proposals.

In order to select many examples, this study hasn’t used any of these criteria, because it targets all participatory processes that are self-labelled “participatory budgeting,” following Porto de Oliveira’s strategy (2017).

**Three waves of participatory budgeting in France since 2001**
First cases of participatory budgeting were not created after the last local elections (2014) in France, when “in a determined context followers emerge who rally around the same path,” following the leadership of an innovator (Porto de Oliveira, 2017).

The first wave appeared after World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, where personal networks were linked to the French Communist Party and a small NGO called “Démocratiser Radicalement la Démocratie.”
These French networks were essential in order to translate documents and train people based on the principles seen in Porto Alegre. Local implementers’ speeches were as radical as in Porto Alegre, as it has been documented by Nez and Talpin (2010). A dozen of cases were active before 2008 in cities such as Saint-Denis, Pont-au-Clai, Mon-sang-sur-Orge,... These cases were linked to cities where the Communist Party was elected for decades. Nez and Talpin explain how those processes are framed in a way that prevents marginalised groups from any political affiliation, despite the very fact that these groups are the target groups in political discourse from the elected officials. Electoral support was not massively gained in a context where the Communist Party influence was fading away, due to change in demographics and a global ideological crisis after 1989.
The literature is not clear about how much money was spent through PB during the first wave. At the city level, its political impact was quite limited: Sintomer's team only listed a dozen of cases. They pointed out different similarities between these experiences and they seem to share the same framework they called “proximity democracy”.

Röcke (2014) explains that French PB were not the results of bottom-up initiatives and are very similar to “Neighbourhood councils”. These councils were compulsory for cities above 80,000 inhabitants and created by officials from City councils (officers or politicians) and they were merely consultative instruments, letting space for “selective listening” or cherry-picking.

Sintomer et al, (2016) describe other permanent features such as these PB were about mainly neighbourhood allowing funding for micro-local projects and limited independence for civil society was also constrained by a poor deliberative quality. At the local level, Röcke (2014) described how “local politicians (whose power position is that of ‘local kings’) dominate the meetings in that they chair the discussions and resume their results.”

Most of these experiences ended before 2010, Grigny near Lyon and Divion near Lille were still active between 2010 and 2014 before executives lost in local elections. Only Firminy (near Lyon) and Jarny (near Metz) were active before 2014 elections and continue.

A second wave aimed after 2005 to diffuse participatory democracy to high schools, in Poitou-Charente region (Mazeaud, 2011, 2012). 10 millions of euros were dedicated to regional high schools and secondary institutions for specific training (Établissement Régional d’Enseignement Adapté) and every high school was letting the school community (teachers, students, cleaners,...) decide about how to spend 100,000 euros for each school, based on two meetings. The regional council used to hire professionals for facilitation during the whole year. Röcke (2014) also argues that “the organisers of the participatory school budget independently determine its rules, cherry-picking proposals from participants”.

From 2010 to 2015, other regions led similar experiments but on a smaller scale such as Nord-Pas-de-Calais (O’Miel et Mongy, 2014), Bourgogne and Paris region (Ile-de-France). Only a small portion of high schools were involved and the regional councils were not providing any support for deliberative events.

This wave in high-schools also disappeared after the 2015 regional
elections, due to major political shifts. During the 2014 political campaign, Mayor of Paris Anne Hildago who was inspired by other cases like Lisbon and New York, decided to implement participatory budgeting after re-election. Many national newspapers broadly covered this pledge. During other campaigns, local leaders from the Socialist Party decided to make some identical pledge, when it did use to be a policy only supported by the Green and the Communist Parties. When local coalitions had to merge their political manifesto during the 2-round election, participatory budgeting was pushed in cities such as Metz, Rennes and Grenoble. In less than 4 years, there were in 2017 more than 4 millions people are able to have a say about local budget through participatory budgeting in 61 cases: beside city councils, PB also exists at the university level, in social housing, at different infra-national levels and a national climate strategy discussed as participatory budgeting. The fair spread of this trend is embodied by the creation of two clusters, one in Northern France and the other one in Île-de-France (Paris regional district). A third of these cases are related to consultative neighbourhood committees which play some role during the process. This also means that most cases are not built upon former participatory processes. Nearly 50 new cases are about to start in 2018 and are not taken into account in this paper.

Every case starting after 2014 has happened in a territory that did not have PB during the 1st or 2nd wave. Paris had an early experiment between 2005–2009 in a specific district, but the link between the district experiment and the city-wide experience starting in 2014 is not clearly documented. The phase for collecting proposals is much broader than a decade ago, as the early experiment was only dedicated to local pavement infrastructure ("voirie"). If there is a link to former cases, that would be the only exception. Because these cases are not related to previous waves, it could easily be imagined that they wouldn’t follow any path dependency. 10 years ago, Sintomer’s team was labelling french PB as typical of “proximity democracy”. If the lack of precise rules and the omnipresence of elected officials were prominent in the first generation of PB in France, most of these processes are now more formal and we might wonder whether “selective listening” or cherry-picking typical from that time are still occurring as budgets get bigger. For example, Parisians are voting for a €100,000,000 budget each year and Paris City
Council claims to have created the biggest PB in the world. Still, cases are only discussing less than 1% of local budgets when Paris, Jarny and Firminy are allocating less than 2% of overall budget through PB.

Picture 1 Active cases after 2014 are in green with two clusters (more than 4 cases) in northern France and around Paris. New cases about to start PB in 2018 are in yellow.

If most cases were implemented in small-sized cities during the first wave, the current wave is much more diverse: 57% of cities above 100 000 inhabitants are organizing PB. Smaller cities have much less PB cases in proportion to the number of existing cities.

Table 1 Proportion of PB cases implemented by city councils related to population size (including future cases for 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Number of cities</th>
<th>Number of PB</th>
<th>Percentage of cities with PB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+100 000</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>57.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 000–100 000</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~40 000</td>
<td>35742</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stronger interest for biggest cities could be explained by the current amalgamation of cities in metropolitan areas, with a new law creating new metropolitan local authorities. With this new law, metropolitan central cities transfer part of their administrative duties and prerogatives to this new entity and mayors could feel agap be-
tween citizens’ expectations for the former powerful actors to the real governing authorities. Participatory budgeting might be a way to connect with citizens needs even if the administrative capacity is under pressure because of amalgamation.

It would be interesting to see what are the main trends and differences in these cases. Are they still related to proximity democracy featuring no formal rules and low deliberation?

A third wave of participatory budgeting increasing the scope of proposals

Different features show that current cases in France are less related to proximity democracy. Most cases have published public regulations online, which means a greater procedural clarity.

When the first wave was only allowing district-level proposals, there is a clear change because 76% cases allow voting at the city-level while only 24% allow only district-level proposals.

Only 33% are related to institutional neighbourhood committees (compulsory by public law for cities above 80 000 inhabitants), which means most cases from the current wave don’t rely on former participatory institutions. The first wave that was not relying on digital platforms. Nowadays, more and more digital tools are made available for city councils to use, especially for the second phase (collecting proposals) and for the voting phase. Most cases allow online submission (63.93%), whether it’s a specific platform or a simple form to email. Digital vote happens in 44% of cases and fraud is not controlled. Only 6 cases could ask for ID check in order to prevent multiple votes.

If city councils provide a list valid projects for vote for 47.54%, most of cases do not publish online the individual reasons why a proposal could be rejected (13.11% only do). This paper will explain why this unsatisfactory justification is essential in a further section.

Only 31% involve compulsory face-to-face meetings, which also indicates digital tools are getting part of the mainstream procedural definition. But deliberation appears to be very weak, even for online PB. Only 13% cases allow citizens to comment on proposals, whether in order to express support or concerns. Many PBs are claiming at improving social capital (“préserver le lien social”), but it’s not always clear how website design or the way public meetings are organized are really bonding between citizenry.
Figure 1 Procedural models of cases in 2017 in a bipartite graph (using Gephi, Force Atlas 2, 0.9.2) in order to relate French cases to institutional design features:
The lack of transparency goes beyond the technical review when few cities really explain motives of rejections. Website provide poor information about implementation rate. Only 6 cases with online single proposal monitoring. Face-to-face meetings are not organized in order to allow any citizen overseeing. This is very different from monitoring mechanisms in Brazil based in «controle social» like for example the duty of comissão de obras in Porto Alegre to audit how works are delivered. There is not a strategy to link participatory budgeting to a broader budgetary discussion. The proportion of overall budget discussed through PB is less than then 2% are really discussed through PB. Most cities are below 1% which fits into the narrative of marginal power given to participatory device, far from being an “exclusive conveyor belt” as Baiocchi and Ganiuza described for Porto Alegre (2014: 36). Even if current trend relies on online platforms, PB is far from being linked to some open government strategy: less than 10% of cases are implementing both PB and open data for finances. Indeed, only 5 cities have published their budget using open data standard, while 37% local authorities are at least providing some basic financial data. French PBs are not about raising awareness about finance constraints or making budgets more transparent.

With social network analysis software, detection of communities based on nodes and edges could help to identify 4 families based on procedural rules:

a) proximity democracy in orange (i.e. Bar le Duc);
b) city-level process with face-to-face meeting in purple (i.e. Grande-Synthe);
c) IT-mixed processes in yellow (for example Avignon);
d) more online deliberative PB with a greater level of transparency in green (for example Montreuil or Paris).

**Picture 2** Type of online interaction for French PB
• online-submitting (online possibility to submit proposals),
• city-level (vote for city-wide proposals),
• listing_submitted (online listing all proposals before technical review),
• listing_valid (website listing all valid proposals after technical review),
• comment_proposals (possibility to comment proposals online),
• comment_rejection (possibility to comment rejection motives online),
• rejection_explained (online explanation for individual rejection),
• digital (only online vote),
• both (mixing online and ballot paper),
• ID-control (controlling identification of unique voter),
• budget_info (information for overall city budget),
• existing_PI (link to existing participatory institutions such as neighbourhood committee),
• district-level (vote for district-level proposals),
• face2face (compulsory face-to-face meetings),
• open_data (open data for budget issues),
• online-monitoring (regular update about proposals implementation),
• political-filter (official selection made elected officials),
• ranking_vote (ranking voting method).

**Potential for cherrypicking**

French cases were often described as weak and leaving a space for “selective listening” (Sintomer et al., 2016). But the third wave shows a true formalisation of regulations. Objective criteria are found in regulations and they define what is the scope of proposals citizens could propose in order to make this proposal adequate to be formally put to the vote. I’ve found 22 types of criteria, and the 10 most common ones are:

a) Common good (32 cases);
b) Within city jurisdiction (30);
c) Investment (26);
d) Limited operating budget (25);
e) Cost limit per proposal (23);
f) Exhaustiveness for proposal data (19);
g) specific policies areas that are excluded (15);
h) No discrimination (15);
i) Specific time frame for delivery (15);
j) Localised on city territory (14).
At least 2 criteria are problematic because they allow room for discretionary selection. Defining why a proposal doesn’t fit common good is nothing but a political stance. Calculating what is a “limited” operating budget is also very difficult. Latest research about Spanish cases suggests that cherry-picking is happening in much participatory processes. Font, Fàbregas, Smith, Galais & Alarcón (2017) show how a “challenging proposal” has a 40% chance of being rejected and only 26% of being fully implemented. A “non-challenging proposal” has a 42% chance of being fully implemented, and only 24% of being rejected.

I’d like to suggest cherry-picking could also happen during negotiations between citizens and administrative staff when proposals are being reviewed in order to assess their feasibility based on “objective” criteria. There are at least 3 variations of cherry-picking in current French PBs: informal moulding, evaporation and lack of accountability.

In some cities such as Paris, 81% of proposals are declared unfit for the vote. In other cities, such as Avignon, only 50% are rejected before the vote. This shows how essential is to understand what is happening in the black box of discretionary review.

Further discussion could happen between city staff and citizens in order to make the proposal “tick the boxes” or there is no contact with citizens and only proposals fitting staff expectations are expected. One assumption could be that a process which sees 90% initial proposals being funded would give more satisfaction than a process where only 20% are validated during the discretionary review.

The discretionary review of proposals is based on objective criteria. Criteria are usually mentioned in regulations such as “the proposal should be completed within 2 years” or “the proposal should not discriminate anyone” or “the proposal should not lead to big operational expenditure”. The appreciation of these objective criteria are not precise for each proposal and city staff could for example reject a proposal in a district because of one of the criteria while the same staff could approve a similar proposal in a different district. That’s a kind of informal moulding but formal moulding could also happen when city officials are allowed to veto proposals.

Proposals are evaporating through the process, but they could follow a different track: proposals could be arbitrarily merged by city officials, or they could be merged through deliberation in public forums. Merging two similar proposals could allow city staff to pick from each proposal which features to implement.

Then the third variation of cherry-picking in french cases is related to low level of accountability. Justification is very rarely provided by city councils when they reject proposals during the technical review. Only 13% of cases are explicitly describing the motives for proposal rejection. Paris examples shows that even when they do so, there is some credibility gap between justification for rejection and facts about other similar
proposals that were allowed. There are not any case in France when citizens could appeal city decisions, which is different from other european countries (such as Portugal)

Conclusion: Let’s be modest!
Can French cases be really described as part of any “democratic innovation” (Avritzer, 2003 ; Smith, 2009)? This chapter doesn’t present an optimistic conclusion of the potential of actual French PBs. Engaging citizens in a local debate about spendings could have walked on two legs, such as transparency and priority-setting. The current wave of PB doesn’t help to foster accountability and appears unlikely to increase citizenry trust.

The new generation of participatory budgeting in France, which started after local elections in 2014, are less and less related to “proximity democracy” (Sintomer et al, 2008 ; Rocke, 2014). The processes are being more clear about their rules, even if there is still room for “selective listening” in most cases before the voting phase based on a great rate of rejection before voting phase and poor justification about why projects are rejected.

Few are using deliberative methods and most of them address small urban needs, while most of capital expenses are decided through traditional decision-making. Eventually, there is no clear link between PB and open budgets, which means french PB in France are not aiming at politicizing budget debates. This would confirm the key argument of Avritzer (2017): “most of the political system is closed to political innovation or accepts only token or symbolic aspects of important political innovations such as participatory budgeting” (p.25).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Creation</th>
<th>1st wave</th>
<th>3rd wave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td></td>
<td>Top-down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Decisive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberation</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>wLow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical scope of projects</td>
<td>Micro-level</td>
<td>City-level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedures</td>
<td>Weak clarity</td>
<td>Clear regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherry-picking</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Charlotte Fouillet

The participatory budgeting in Paris (PBP), emerges in a largely commented “crisis of representation” context, and participates to the proliferation of devices that reveals a “rise of deliberative and participatory imperatives” (Blondiaux, Sintomer, 2002, 2009) of public action or a “new spirit of democracy” (Blondiaux 2008). As an “innovative tool for participation” (Sintomer, Röcke, Talpin 2009), participatory budgeting may respond to the crisis of representation by articulating to representative democracy in crisis elements of direct democracy. Unlike the experiences that have been developed in France since the early 2000s and are mostly consultative, the PBP is a decision-making device. Driven by a strong political will combined with a quality and convinced technical team the BPB gained a certain hegemony and participated to a noticeable renewal of Participatory Budgeting that have multiplied in the country since 2014. Although originally left-wing and often carried by the left, this new experiences are also increasingly being carried by the right and center as well. Implemented by socialist Mayor of Paris Anne Hidalgo, the Parisian participatory budgeting gives the opportunity to Parisians to choose how to use 5% of the investment budget of the city (1% of the total budget of the city) and up to 30% of the investment budget of each district (arrondissement). Thus with a budget of 426 millions euros from 2014 to 2020, a city population of more than 2 millions (in an urban area of 12 millions people).

We will give an overview of the Parisian participative budget in presence since 2017 and on the digital platform since 2015. After a quick presentation of the context of the citizen participation in Paris we choose here to detail the design and the calendar of the device.
We will then present the evolution of the participation and open the discussion of the potential for deliberation within the device.

Citizen participation in Paris: from decentralization to participation

Paris has a unique administrative situation in France. Since 1860, the city has been divided in 20 districts. The Parisians could choose the mayor of Paris for the first time in 1977.

Map 1 The 20 parisiens districts and their political “colour” after the municipal election of 2014

The Loi de décentralisation, which modified the territorial organisation and the repartition of competency between communes, department, regions and state concerned Paris in every scales. In December 1982, the creation of a city hall with its mayor in all twenty district of Paris is inscribed in the law. The creation of the Comité d’initiative et de consultation d’arrondissement (CICA) the same year offered a first space for citizen expression in Paris. However, the participation on this Comité is limited by the condition of being part of a local NGO. In practice Par-

1 Correspond to three divisions of the French territory, territorial collectivities which are managed by their own council. Their fields of competence are modified following the adoption of the NOTRe law of August 7, 2015. In the case of Paris, the only city to be both a department and a commune, the corresponding councils are united in the Council of Paris.

2 LOI PLM : Loi numéro 82-1169 du 31 décembre 1982 relative à l’organisation administrative de Paris, Marseille, Lyon et des établissements publics de coopération.

3 Committee which meets periodically, on a theme set in advance, the local elected representatives and the representatives of associations exercising an activity on the district: local associations, members of federations, confederations or professional unions.
is remains consequently very centralized around the main city hall (Nez 2008). The idea of participation was mostly enhanced by the left party which won 6 mayors of districts after President Jacques Chirac’s mandate in 1995. This idea find some materialisation with the first experimentation of participatory budgeting in the 20th, and the first conseils de quartiers (neighbourhood council) created in the 20th then 19th in the first times of the socialist’s mandate.

After being dominated by the right wing (Chirac 1977–1995, Tiberi 1995–2001), the campaign and election of Bertrand Delanoe (French socialist (center left) Party) in 2001 is marked by a real gain of interest in the citizen participation in the city. And the theme of the participative budgeting for Paris emerged quickly during the first turn of the campaign of the socialists and the greens (Hammo 2001, Nez 2008).

The first bodies in citizen participation in Paris was induced by a national law. In 2002 la loi relative à la démocratie de proximité (law on proximity democracy) imposed the creation of neighbourhood council (conseil de quartier) for all communes of more than 80 000 habitants4.

Following this law, the Council of Paris, regularized the creation of the neighbourhood councils in the twenty districts in July 2002. The organisation and role of this council depends of each mayor. Therefore they can take different forms. According to the situations, they may bring together elected representatives of the district, chosen personalities, representant of association. The neighbourhood councils have an informative and advisory role especially regarding urban local developpement. In 2014, another dispositif, the citizen councils (conseils citoyens) was created for the districts that were considered as “priority districts” regarding to their poverty rate (8 districts have priority districts in Paris). Their goal is to participate in the town policy. The members of these councils are chosen per sortition. Although they have a mission and a composition written down in the law, they are autonomous to choose their internal organisation.

The socialist candidate, Anne Hidalgo, who campaigned for the municipal election in 2014 and was elected, brought the wish to “reinvent the citizen participation”. Her program linked participatory budgeting to the aims of “more transparency”, “collaborative de-

4 LOI n° 2002–276 du 27 février 2002 relative à la démocratie de proximité
mocracy” and the “efficiency of the administration”5. And more or less described the first sketch of what will be the PB in Paris after her election as the first woman mayor of Paris in April 2014: “Despite the crisis of political trust, the democratic appetites of citizens do not fade away. On the contrary. Parisians want to participate, co-develop, but also follow the projects and evaluate them. I give them the means to invest at all scales and at all times. I will be Mayor of the Parisians with the Parisians. The metropolis is the ideal laboratory for collaborative democracy: everyone can concretely change their street, their neighborhood, their favorite place”6. After her election, the first PB at the parisian scale was implemented very quickly, in a constrained calendar, imposed by the Council of Paris which should validate the budget allowed to the project selected in PB in December, when it votes the budget of the city. This first Participatory Budgeting was adopted during the Paris council of 7th and 9th July 2014. Its implementation is based on the report of Jean-François Martins “Participatory budget, a major democratic innovation world-wide”, and draws also from the previous Parisian experiences, that of the 20th, but also the more recent experience of the 12th district.

It was announced in September 2014 by the mayor Anne Hidalgo, who proposed to Parisians to vote to prioritize 15 projects, which largely reflected the main thrust of her political program. At launch, this first edition was known to be an incomplete experimentation that will conduct to a second edition already planned. The second edition of the participative budget, which we consider to be really the first expression of the Paris Participatory Budgeting project, is adopted following the debates of the Paris Council of 17th, 18th and 19th November 2014. This second edition went further in opening the device to the citizen participation and allowed the Parisian to propose the projects which would then be put to the vote. It also created the possibility of a Participatory Budgeting in each district. Gradually, the idea of a systematic participation of the citizens in the policies of the city is imposed. Thus in Paris along the 123 councils of districts, the 8 councils citizens, and the recent participative budget numerous space and tools for citizen participation coexist: the Parisian council of Youth (2003), citizen conferences (1998), council for nightlife (2014), Coun-

5 Programme électoral du Parti socialiste, Oser Paris, 2014
6 Programme électoral du Parti socialiste, Oser Paris, 2014
cil of Parisian Students (2009), Council of Future Generations (2014), Citizen Kiosks (2014), Citizen Card (2017) or the recent opening of the Civic Hall (2018)... In December 2017, the vote of the Paris Citizen Participation Charter, reaffirmed the will of a citizen participation project for the city, so that “elected officials and agents of the City of Paris, the Parisians” and the actors of civil society can exchange, debate, cooperate and co-build in a clear framework and incentive.

In 2016 is created the participatory budgeting for school and in 2017 the participatory budgeting for social landlord. The three participatory budgeting in Paris are often presented together and do have some porosity. We are here only focusing on the Parisian participatory budgeting.

A hybrid device with multiple scales

From 2015 (2nd edition), the parisian participative budgeting (PBP) is available in 21 territories, at the scale of the city and of the districts. The 20 districts voluntary ratified the “Charter of participatory budgeting in Paris” and implemented a participatory budgeting. The PBP is coordinated at the municipal level. However each district keeps a certain autonomy in the way they deploy it in practice. The budget dedicated for the PBP is fixed each year. In the limit of the general envelope (planned for 2014-2020) for the parisian level, and each district can, according to their will, use up to 30% of their annual budget of investment for this purpose. The City Hall of Paris adds 2 euros for each euro dedicated to the PBP and increases by this way the investment budget of the districts. At the City hall of Paris scale, the cabinet of the Deputy mayor handle the political aspect while the “mission du budget participatif” take in charge the administrative aspect of the design. This separation is find in each of the district however in the PBP the separation between this two aspects is tin.

Budgetparticipatif.fr is the digital platform which centralises all the projects. The “1st edition” of the participative budget was only an online platform that does not rely on a on presence device. From the second edition, the participative Paris budget tends to be a more hybrid device. It is supported by on presence meetings and workshops that especially impact the design of the projects submitted online.

The Paris Participatory Budgeting is an annual process that runs from January to December. The different phases of the device take place at different but nested levels: at the city or district level, in
presence and online, on the web platform. The operating rules of the Participatory Budgeting are not co-managed with citizen participants and rely on the Executive. Without a clearly defined procedure for changing the rules of the participatory budget, it is the “selective listening” (Sintomer, Röcke, Talpin 2009) mode that dominates the consideration of participants requests. The procedure runs through 7 phases described in the following table.

Table 1 Involvement of different types of place/“citizens” participants, and mediation at the different stages of the project concerning the “citizen” participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Ideation/co-construction</th>
<th>Submission</th>
<th>Feasability</th>
<th>Co-construction</th>
<th>Commissions</th>
<th>Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Hall of Paris</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City hall of district</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood council</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digital Platform</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>X,S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On presence</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A phase of ideation or co-construction organized by neighbourhood councils, local ngo, individuals, or the city halls is a moment of reflection around the projects to be submitted. Participants and potential participants gather together either to discuss on the project they already have, and the best practice to be successful with the PBP or to transform an idea into a project. It is a first occasion for “citizens” participants to work together on a project. These workshops all take very different forms depending on their purpose, their facilitator and the participants.

This first step is not strictly included in the Participatory Budgeting calendar, which begins with the voting phase. They may be linked to the launching event of the participative budget in the district in January or begin as early as September. The formal process begins with projects submission phase. It allows, between January and February, each resident of Paris to submit one or more project proposals at the Paris scale, or in one or more district. This project may have been prepared during the precedent phase or not. This proposal is done on the cen-
tralized digital platform. An online account is mandatory to access this function. This proposal must consist of a title of 60 characters maximum, a description of 1200 signs maximum, the location of the project (Paris, district, street) and a cost (this mention is optional). However the opportunities to make a proposal in paper format, which will be copied later on the platform, by the dedicated departments of the districts, or more frequently the associations accompanying the authors of projects multiply. Once submitted the project becomes, according to the participatory budget’s user manual, a “common good”.

The projects are divided into 4 categories of authors “Individual,” “NGO,” “neighbourhood councils,” “Other” and 12 themes between which the author must make a choice when submitting his project (14 in 2015 summarized in 12 since 2016).

In 2018 the projects of redevelopment of the public space, which concern the theme “Living environment” are not admissible, because the services are already overcharged and to prioritize the realization of the projects already voted. This rule is reminded in every launching meeting of the participatory budgeting in the different districts and in the workshop of creation of projects organised by local NGOs. Thus from 2017 to 2018 the quantity of projects in this category decreased by 53,7%.

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7 Translated from the french.
8 According to the aggregation of the data made available on the digital platform of the Participatory Budgeting https://budgetparticipatif.paris.fr (last update of the data set the 23.04.2018)
Pre selection according to the specific criteria of the PBP. After the submission, projects are being preselected by the team, dedicated to coordinate the participatory budgeting at the city scale. This team is employed by the City Hall. The specific standards of the PBP are: it must concern the «general interest», depends on the City hall of Paris, and concern an investment budget. Some projects, on a thematic or territorial criterion, may be proposed directly by the main or district city halls, for co-construction at the level of the district or at the parisian level. The main City Hall sends to each district the projects that concern them, upon which then can decide to organise workshops or not. However the City Hall handles the invitations of the authors from the digital platform.

Co construction: The co-construction workshops on the preselected projects aims to merge several projects which concern the same thematic or territory in one. When it concerns a project of district, workshops are always held on presence, while the workshops for projects at the Parisian scale are either on presence or online. A project submitted in an district can be selected to be merged with other projects at the Parisian level if it is part of a theme that may concern several districts or concerns a Parisian space considered emblematic or for the use of all Parisians. The high cost of a project can motivate its transition to the Parisian scale.

- On presence co-construction workshops bring together project authors, city services concerned, and representatives of the town hall or the participative budget (in charge of mission, member of the cabinet of the mayor or more rarely an elected representant). Each district has its own arrangements for organizing these workshops. The mode of decision is consensual.
- Online co-construction workshops take place on the Participatory Budgeting web platform. The online procedure is clearly defined, a first phase allows everyone to comment on a synthesis of the projects proposed for co-construction, alternatives texts are then proposed to the vote of the participants.

At the end of a co-construction workshop, a new project is proposed. A project can be integrated into a co-construction without its author being present at the workshop. Authors then eventually merge their project onto the new one on a voluntary basis. Formally they can keep their original project.
One of the displayed purpose of these workshops is to reduce the number of projects on the voting lists, in a concern of legibility, as many participants note (town hall, coordinator, “Parisians” authors or project holders) “people usually don’t take more than five minutes to vote”. The reduction in the number of projects also plays an obvious role in avoiding the dispersion of votes, and swelling the campaigning team, composed in the first place of the authors of projects and their supporters.

**Feasibility** is evaluated by the city technical services. The city services conduct a study of the cost and implementation of the project. Projects may involve several directorates in the city that would have to work together. The results of this study are likely to increase the expected cost and complexity of the realization. Certain projects concerning “protected” buildings, which is the case of a large part of Parisian buildings, require the obtaining of a special approval. It is thus not excluded that some voted projects are abandoned after a deeper study. This however would have affected only 2.8% of the projects voted (according to Pauline Veron).

The projects are then **Selected** by the major in front of an ad hoc Commission. When a project went successfully to the phases of selection, a specific Commission for each district and the Parisian Commission set up the final list of the projects to be voted at their scale. The ad hoc commission, at the level of the district, is composed of: the mayor or its representative, elected from the majority and the opposition, representative of the central major, members of the neighbourhood council, representatives of local NGO, services of the city. At the Parisian level, it is composed of: three deputy mayor of Paris in charge of the main issue regarding the BP (respectively in charge of local democracy, citizen participation, associative live youth and employment; culture, heritage, crafts, cultural enterprises, the night and relations with the arrondissements; finances, semi-public companies, public contracts and concessions), one representative from each political group in the Paris Council, a representative of the Parisian Youth Council, a representative of the “Students of Paris – Council,” and eight persons chosen by sortition among the Parisians registered on the Participatory Budgeting digital platform. Formally gathering
different “interests”; however, this commission in the 4th edition of 2017 is more a place of information than a place of deliberation. Despite the participative procedure and the formal implication of “citizen” participants in each phase, the elected representant has the final word. In 2016 and 2017, more than the half of the submitted projects are not validated after the phase of pre-selection, feasibility and selection. If the project is not retained, on the comment section, a message from the city hall of Paris will motivate the rejection. For the current edition and to answer the requests of the authors of projects (5th edition) a contact mail will allow to request additional information in case of refusal. The final list of projects is then propose to vote on the platform and in paper.

**Vote:** each “Parisian” may vote for up to 10 projects: 5 projects at the Parisian level and 5 projects in one district in accordance to his residence, workplace or preference. Voting is possible on the platform connected to an account and in the various physical, fixed or mobile urns present throughout the Paris territory and mandatory in town halls. The votes follows a prioritizing logic: the voters are invited to classify the projects proposed. The first ones in the rankings, and that until exhaustion of the envelope, will be realized. This phase crystalise the critics of lobbying and lack of democracy. Indeed, some critics point that the most organised groups can mobilize for the vote better than individual citizens. However, no formal procedure insures the unicity of the votes.

Once selected, projects are approved by the Council of Paris when the budget of the city is voted in December each year. The projects are then implemented, and the platform makes it possible to follow the realization of the projects in progress. Projects created in the public space must bear the mention “participatory budget” thus generating visibility for the device. This phase can be the occasion of new concertation with the inhabitants to precise the project and choose how to implement it. It can go from choosing a color of a wall to taking part on the building.

During the whole process, the online platform is at the heart of the Parisian participative budget and an almost unavoidable element for the “citizen” participant. This choice is part of a broader trend towards the

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11 According to the collection of the data made available on the website of the Participatory Budgeting https://budgetparticipatif.paris.fr (last see the 23.04.2017)
“digitalization of municipal services” and a desire for transparency, marked by the debut of the public open data in 2011. All projects are centralized on a single platform. Everyone can view the submitted projects and comments, anyone who has opened an account on the platform can submit a project, join a project, like a project, comment on a project and vote when the voting phase begins. These ancillary functions have however no formal impact. Choose to “associate” allows to be kept informed of the progress made to the project, the incentive to this action is stronger than the one for “like”, but its concrete purpose is not mentioned before the click.

**Renewal of participation and inclusion of new audiences**

**Chart 2** With each edition of the participative budget, the number of voters increases$^{12}$. At the same time the number of authors and project decreases. From 2016 to 2018, while individual participation decreases the most, the participation of neighbourhood council and NGO stay relatively stable.

$^{12}$ Aggregate from the bilan of the PBP available on the website budgetparticipatif.fr and the study « Budget Participatif : qui sont les parisiens qui y participent », Notes 123, APUR, Directrice de la publication : Dominique ALBA Note réalisée par : Émilie MOREAU (Apur), William ARHIP-PATERSON (DDCT – Ville de Paris/CESSP).
In Paris the participative budget, relies not only on the expertise but also on the creativity of the Parisians and gives to them a decision-making power. In this way it tends to exceed the speech of the participation reduced to a proximity democracy. The local level through the neighbourhood council remains important. But their role remains ambiguous: identified as key actors in the different phases of the device, they have not been formally included in the Participatory Budgeting process, with individuals and especially associations. Too present for some who wish to see the emergence of the participation of new unorganized public, not enough for others who claim a special label for the projects carried by the neighbourhood councils, judging themselves more representative of the will of the inhabitants, especially on the project concerning local development. However, the neighbourhood councils got extensively involved in the Participatory Budgeting tool. In some neighbourhoods, this has renewed the composition and purpose of council that where struggling to do so. However this general trend of reductions of project’s proponents does not correspond to a “routinization” of participation and a stricter division between “creators” proposing projects, and “consumers” finding their voice in the offer. Indeed, only 9 % of the authors that submitted a project online on 2016 did it again in 2017. And 14% of the new authors of 2017 submitted a project again in 2018. Considering

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According to the aggregation of the data made available on the digital platform of the Participatory Budgeting https://budgetparticipatif.paris.fr (last update of the data set the 23.04.2018)
this three years, in 2017 close to 70% of the authors are new. In 2018 72% of the authors are new ones. If authors do post several projects, and post year after year, however the population of “persistent au-thors” (which submitted at least two years between 2016 and 2018) concern only 12.7% of the total of authors from 2016 to 2018.

The authors present at co-construction workshops or workshop have several motivations to participate and see the PBP either as one more tool to obtain support in the realization of projects, a space listening, a way to make things change, or event a space of criticism or of confrontation with the mayor. For the Participatory Budgeting promoters, the device should constitutes the occasion to reach new publics. Their strategies are addressed in particular to two audi-ences: the inhabitants of poorest neighborhoods and young people. However, at the formal opening of the “no age, or nationality,” is opposed the practical imperative of a sufficiently precise project to be understood and validated. The notion of idea of the first slo-gan” make Paris your idea “ has been gradually supplanted by that of “project” that implies that proponents take into account the constraints imposed by the device. This ambiguity is found in the voting phase as well, when the project becomes a “common good”. According to this statement a project can be modified by others, especially during co-construction workshop, even if the author is not present. The authors tend to be informed of the following real-ization of the project without being part of this realization. Howev-er, the authors are responsible for mobilizing around their project. Their position is thus ambiguous: are they simple authors or project holders? how much do they “own” their project? Especially on the scale of the districts, this opens up the question of fairness and the lobbying effects of the best-organized authors, “I have seen this many times, I have supported projects carried by one person, but I knew it would not work” testifies the member of an association who accompanied project authors/holders during the mobilization. To answer this need to fit the device, the city hall launched in 2016 an appeal to local NGOs to support the authors, in the mobilization phase, for a phase of emergence of idea and translation of these ideas.
into project before the submission of projects. Implemented from the 2016 edition, the next editions of the participative budget provided in addition a specific envelope of 30 millions euros for the so called “popular neighbourhoods”. These neighbourhoods correspond to neighbourhoods defined as priorities by the city’s policy, but also to so-called “active wake” neighbourhoods (formal “priority district”) located between these neighbourhoods. This envelope allows from the edition of 2016 a greater geographical homogeneity concerning the neighbourhoods that deposit projects.

Online, if the web platform presents the benefits related to the internet in terms of cost reduction in particular, it is also removing some type of social selection (Cardon 2010). Online vote has allowed to reach new publics. Especially among the “youths” (25–39 years old): indeed, they represent 41% of the voters and 26% of the parisian population (APUR, 2018), whereas they are relatively absent of the workshops and the citizen council. Work schedules, especially for young workers, is one of the reasons invoked for the promoters of the PBP, for their low attendance. Accessible 24/7 the digital platform solved this access difficulty. In this regard, low participation could be offset by the multiplication of online workshops. However, if digital includes, it also excludes and the same promoters are really aware of this issue. In the interests of inclusion, the participative budget is experiencing a “re-materialisation” movement and more and more paper supports are proposed to accompany the use of the web platform, including the distribution of a guide which details step by step the different moments of the platform, and the possibility of depositing his project on presence on a paper support. However, the paper version is destined to be transcribed online. This work is notably performed by staff of the city hall of district and neighbourhood associations, that have responded to the call for tenders of the town hall to support the emergence of projects. In doing so they include citizens excluded by the digital platform. Since 2017 the number of physical votes has exceeded the number of online votes, confirming the interest of the approach. The online participation, crystallizes many hopes regarding the potential porosity of position between “creators” and “consumers” (Monnoyer Smith 2011). Online, the secular citizen would be—

15 L’Atelier parisien d’urbanisme (Apur), NGO created by the Paris Council on July 1967, proposes analysis and document of the urban in Paris and its urban area.
come amateur and provider of ideas. However, despite minimal and _a posteriori_ moderation, its participation in the Participatory Budgeting platform remains highly regulated and its actions limited. To “like,” to associate or comment on a project does not have a direct impact on its acceptance, the platform thus escapes the logic of ratings such as they can develop online. A project not consulted is not less likely to be validated, it is at the time of the vote that the logics of ratings come into play, however the algorithm of the platform do not favor the projects according to the activity they generate online. The role that these functions fill is thus unclear. The asynchronous comment space of the platform offers a space of discussion. The discussion is, however, weak. Nevertheless, since 2018, people connected to the platform can contact the project leaders, this added function responds to a strong demand from the participants at the level of the district (on the side of elected representatives, services and “Parisians”) and thus open a new space, private, of confrontation between “Parisians” and reinforces the possibility of a horizontal exchange between citizens that was previously possible only on the occasion of the events organized by the town hall, or more likely outside the PBP.

**Deliberation in a constrained calendar**

In the two key moments of the online and on presence workshop, the participation in the Paris Participatory Budgeting is not very formalized. Online, the workshop of co-construction follows two phases, 1) comments of the authors or “associates” on a synthesis of several projects, 2) vote on the synthesis of comment proposed by the City Hall. The co-construction there is purely aggregative, and the mode of decision is the vote. On presence, on the opposite, the consensus is the mode of decision. Divergences, or confrontation of ideas commonly occurs during this workshop, a consensual common project is achieved using two techniques: idea aggregation in list form, and imprecision or generalisation. To pass the preselection and to leave the opportunity of reaching new supporters, the form of the project proposal should find a balance between lack of information and too detailed, the example given by the city is: “too evasive: the city should mobilize its resources so that young people access the Internet” “too much Accurate: Install at least 10 X-branded computers, with X software in
the 3 floor room on Labat Street”. The facilitator, with the agreement of the participants, commonly take in charge to summarize the discussions following the workshop. This charge can also be taken by a participant. An exchange of mail between all the authors invited will confirm the last version. During this workshop, the lack of clear procedures to guide the deliberation, is partially compensated by the competence in terms of animation of debate of the animators/facilitator: in the distribution of the speech, the consensual proposal of synthesis or the request for precisions of the technical services specialized vocabulary. However, the procedure is at the end very similar to the one used on the platform. In a case where a consensus cannot be find, the final vote by the parisian will decide.

We see that whatever the mode of decision announced, it is the vote which remains central. The resultant text of the workshop is published, but not the discussion that lead to it. In comparison on the digital platform, the “comments” which took the place of the discussion are visible, here the platform do play the better role of publicisation.

Regarding the criteria of discussion, inclusion and publicity, the deliberative quality (Habermas, 1997, Talpin 2007, Sintomer Y., Herzberg C., Röcke A, 2008) of these bodies seems largely underutilized in practice, the low participation of the authors of projects and the exclusion of individuals likely to be concerned related to the non-publicization of these workshops that work by invitation, and the topics covered which non-competitive often allow a quick consensus. A closed-door trend that would have the effect of limiting confrontation (Elster, 1994) undermines participation and has an effect on deliberation, which is often reduced to a minimum. Despite two very different types of procedure, formal online and less formal offline, it is the mode of aggregation and consensus “fuzzy” or minimal synthesis that resolves the discussion. The idea that a deliberation of quality is the condition for a reasonable choice, as is the case in the participative budget of Porto Alegre is not as compelling in the instances of the participative Parisian device. More than choosing a strong orientation, it is a question of finding a mean between different aspirations. Although even limited areas for exchange have been planned in the design of the participatory budget, its legitimacy is based on the register of quantified participation. Project numbers, number of voters, quantity of money are at the heart of the annual budget of the Participatory Budgeting. However the phase of realization as the potential of developing another kind of discussion, not constrained by the very short calendar of the BPB, but constrained by the need of finding the best common unique solution.
At this stage, the PBP seems to keep the objectives summarized by the Deputy Mayor in charge of issues relating to local democracy, citizen participation, community life and youth, Pauline Veron: “This participatory Paris budget will strengthen the links between citizens, institutions and their elected officials, and it will also contribute ensuring ever more transparency in the management of public finances, more pedagogy of public action and will allow the City to benefit from the expertise and creativity of Parisians”. However, keeping the filiation with what stay as the 1st edition of the BP in Paris introduces what would be the logic improving, iterative logic of the PBP, of a tool improving “in the field” thanks to the strong implication of the municipal team. Although it is too early to recognize a trend, we observe a reciprocal and iterative process where each participants adapts to real or supposed constraints of explicit or implicit demand, in a device where “haziness” guarantees consensus it also open an opportunity for qualitative deliberation out of the calendar of the PBP, on the implementation of the project. Although PBP in the some districts is sometimes object of strong critics on its implementation and the process of selection and vote, especially regarding the potential lobbying of groups and city hall on the PBP it also carry on great enthusiasms.

In the acknowledge crisis of representation, the participatory budgeting of Paris emerges as an intermediary (Bondiaux, 2008) not only between represented and representatives, but also within these two groups. It putted into light the process of project elaboration and may works as an “airlock” for citizen participation. Supported by the strong implication of political and technical teams, the devices seems to slowly enters the customs of Parisian public action and participation, and now overcome the right/left splits. The interweaving of the scales, and participants to whom it is addressed or whom promoted it – political representatives, service of the city civil society – is part of the complexity of networks that the PBP helps to reveal and may participate to reconfigure. While Participatory Budgeting seems to lend better to quantifiable participation, as a basis for legitimacy, it opens at its margins and out of its official calendar, as many interstices and opportunities where a more deliberate form of appropriation of the tool seems possible.
Oceania
Australian Participatory Budgeting

Janette Hartz-Karp, Robert Weymouth

Introduction: Participatory Budgeting the Australian Way

Australian Participatory Budgeting (PB) constitutes a significantly different branch from the tree of participatory budgeting initiatives world-wide. It remains a democratic process, of course, but goes beyond what has come to be expected in participatory budgeting initiatives. Ordinary citizens still provide input into the allocations of a government budget. However, rather than dealing with only a small proportion of a given budget – typically around 10 percent (Avritzer, 2006) – in Australia, citizens have allocated up to 100 percent.

Given the complexity of budgeting for an entire city or region, following the typical PB method of relying on civic groups to develop projects (with citizens voting on their priorities) could prove unworkable. Ordinary citizens are unlikely to understand the complexity of government budgeting; they have limited and often inaccurate information; and they seldom have sufficient knowledge of the risks involved in failing to maintain or invest in new infrastructure and services. Voting typically is determined by individual opinions, and occurs without careful consideration of alternative viewpoints and reliable factual information. Taking responsibility for 100 percent of a budget requires a deep understanding of the budgeting system, underlying principles, and the inevitable trade-offs.

Australian PBs endeavour to balance people’s desire to express their opinions (‘having one’s say’) with (open-minded) listening for learning. They also challenge participants to ‘think slow’ (consciously, logically, deliberatively) rather than ‘fast’ (reactively, emotionally, often stereotypically) (Stoker, Hay, & Barr, 2016). Australian PBs also set aside the principle of majoritarianism, with its ultimately coercive and mechanical character, in favour of reflec-
tion, reason-giving, and consensus. The short term for this methodology is ‘deliberative democracy.’ It emphasises the values of representativeness, active participation, deliberation (i.e., weighing of costs and benefits, advantages and disadvantages), and citizen influence in the policy-making process (Carson and Hartz-Karp, 2005). Experience with deliberative democracy across the globe has revealed other benefits as well, including an improved sense of political efficacy, increased civic-mindedness, higher levels of mutual trust between government and people, and increasing the legitimacy of decisions (Fung and Wright, 2001).

In the Australian PB, the task of non-expert participants is similar to that normally reserved for elected representatives. Importantly, though, the Australian PB does not eliminate elected representation. Rather, it brings citizens into the realm of sharing problems and opportunities with elected governments and thereby brings community values to the fore in decision-making about principles and trade-offs. As a result, the Australian PB helps restore public trust in our democratic institutions (Weymouth & Hartz-Karp, 2015). Affording everyday people such influence is the archetype envisioned by various democratic reformers (Burnheim, 2006; Gastil, 2000; Carson & Martin, 1999).

The extent of civic responsibility required to allocate 100 percent of a city-region budget is substantial and cannot be fully achieved through the straightforward totting up of participants’ likes and dislikes regarding various projects. Such simple registering of people’s preferences requires only a few minutes of a large number of people’s time. In contrast, the deliberation characteristic of the Australian PB involves careful deliberation over five to eight days, albeit by a much smaller number of people. For example, a typical ‘People’s Panel’ consists of a descriptively representative group of 25–50+ persons selected through stratified random sampling, so that participants mirror the demographics of the larger population.

Proponents of participatory budgeting understandably take great pride in how PBs frequently elicit higher participation rates than the elections of government officials. In contrast, however, the Australian PB assumes that increasing the number of participants may not be the best or only way to empower the people to make decisions.¹ The recruitment process for Australian PBs is inspired by the model of ancient Athens, which relied on sortition (Ober, 2008; Van Reybrouck, 2016). In sortition—better known as random selection or a lottery—every person has an equal chance of being selected. The Australian PB, however, employs ran-

¹ This is exemplified by Australia’s compulsory voting system, seen by many to be a preferable system, which does not guarantee thoughtful choices, as connoted by the number of purposely spoilt ballot papers.
dom selection in order to create a group whose members collectively are representative of the larger population. Those selected understand they are to speak for the citizenry as a whole (Riedy, 2017). When given the time, support, and expert advice they need to understand and resolve a tough issue, they almost invariably act accordingly².

This chapter describes four Australian PBs — two in Western Australia, and two in the eastern states of New South Wales and Victoria — in which citizen participants were given authority to allocate 100 percent of their respective city-region budgets. The processes are described as well as the results. The two in the eastern states were inspired and overseen by the not-for-profit foundation, newDemocracy (https://www.newdemocracy.com.au/). The two in Western Australia involved the authors from inception to conclusion.

**Australian Participatory Budgeting: City of Greater Geraldton (CGG), Western Australia**

The city-region of Greater Geraldton, located around 400 kms north of the capital city, Perth, Western Australia, has a population of approximately 40,000. The region once had a thriving fishing industry and a strong agricultural base, with some mining. Following significant declines in fishing and agriculture, however, sustainability became a critical issue for the region. One response was a four-year action research partnership between the city-region and Curtin University’s Sustainability Policy Institute, which was established to identify and implement people-centred sustainability outcomes. Towards the close of this period, economic problems were exacerbated when a short-lived mining boom turned into a mining bust.

**CGG PB Panel Context and Process**

The prior edition of *Hope for Democracy* (Dias, 2014) reported on the four-year deliberative democracy initiative in the city-region

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² In China, (Fishkin, He, Luskin, & Siu, 2010) a variation of participatory budgeting using sortition was used to select local government projects. Called a Deliberative PollTM, it involves surveying randomly selected people prior to and after respondents have spent a day or more learning, questioning and considering the issues. However, in our view, decisions made from the aggregation of survey results, as compared with the collaborative problem solving of Australian PBs, does not fully leverage the collective wisdom available.
of Greater Geraldton (CGG). In that process, citizens were placed at the front and centre of problem-solving and collaborative decision-making to create a more sustainable city-region. Two small-scale PB pilots were conducted in the final stage of regional planning, commencing in the poorest socio-economic precinct. In each instance, AUD$40,000 (plus city support) was secured for prioritised projects. Groups of local residents developed project proposals, which community residents prioritised subsequently. Participants volunteered to take part in the government’s tendering processes for those projects and later in their operationalization.

After the community’s initial experience with a ‘traditional’ style of PB, the CGG afforded residents an opportunity to allocate 100 per cent of the city-region’s budget. The CGG’s economic situation had worsened in the mining bust and, as in many if not most city-regions in the country, the demand for services had increasingly outstripped the government’s available funds (Dollery, 2012). Over the course of almost four years, deliberative democracy exercises often had been conducted to resolve complex problems and opportunities (Weymouth & Hartz-Karp, 2015) As a result, CGG residents had become accustomed to community-centric problem solving and decision-making. But when the CGG elected officials realised that their budget was going to be seriously in deficit, they raised taxes and rates substantially with no citizen input (ABCNews, 2012). Outraged, some citizens combined to hire a lawyer to take the city to the local government administrative tribunal for not involving the people in such a decision. Through a mediation process, the city pledged in the forthcoming budgetary processes to hold a Participatory Budgeting initiative. Two Australian PBs were implemented, one to allocate the City’s long-term (10-year) infrastructure budget, the other to set the city-region’s 2014/15 operational budget.

The Infrastructure PB Panel was charged with reviewing the city-region’s planned capital works for the next ten years; requesting and considering citizens’ additional suggested works proposals; creating a rating system; and using it to prioritise these works. The Operational PB Panel was charged with reviewing and rating the range and level of the services in the CGG operational budget; maintaining a break-even budget, recommending whether service allocations should be reduced or ceased, remain the same or be increased; and providing reasons for the decisions. In the Infrastructure and Operational PB Panels
respectively, a random stratified sample of 30 – 40 residents participated in five to eight days of deliberation to understand the budgeting processes, develop funding options, assess them, and make recommendations. These recommendations were then submitted to elected officials who had already publicly agreed to the maximum degree of influence allowable under local government regulations. The Council would seriously consider all the recommendations, implement them where possible, and provide a public explanation if they could not.

To ensure the representativeness of these two Panels, or ‘mini-publics,’ an independent local demographer was asked to create a random sample stratified by age, gender, indigenous and multi-cultural background, and residential location (as a proxy for socio-economic level). Participants received expenses for their participation and a small stipend as partial compensation for their time. The time demands were clarified at the outset (five Saturdays for the Infrastructure PB; eight Saturdays for the Operational PB) and were strictly adhered to.

The process consisted of the following basic steps:

1. Explanation of the PB’s ‘charge’ and of participatory budgeting, deliberative democracy, and quality deliberation;
2. Explanation of the City’s overall budgeting process and those aspects most relevant to the PB’s charge (supported by briefing materials, short presentations, continuous question-and-answer sessions, and continued availability of ‘experts’ when needed during small group deliberations);
3. Clarification of the common values of the Panel and the Strategic Community Plan, followed by determination of the criteria for assessing options;
4. Assessment of options and calibration of findings between small groups;
5. Prioritisation of options, if needed (including weighting of the assessment criteria);
6. Determination of recommendations;
7. Writing of the Final Report, and subsequent formal presentation to the City, the Council, and the media.

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A mini-public is a microcosm of the wider public, usually a random sample, that indicates what the broader population likely would decide if given the same information and opportunity to deliberate (Riedy, 2017).
An Independent Review Committee (IRC) made up of prominent community figures was formed at the outset of each Panel to ensure transparency concerning the representativeness and deliberativeness of the Panel by reviewing the design at each stage of the process, direct observation throughout each day of deliberation, and conducting private question-and-answer sessions with participants at the conclusion of each day’s deliberation (in order to provide an official but independent sounding-board for any problems, suggestions, and opportunities for improvement). The IRC also played the role of ombudsman for Panel members if issues arose.

Analysis of Representation, Deliberativeness, and Influence of the CGG PB Panel

Our analysis of each PB Panel was based on their legitimacy in terms of three key criteria required to achieve ‘a fully democratic deliberative process’: inclusion, deliberation\(^4\), and influence (Carson & Hartz-Karp, 2005: 122). Each of these criteria is considered necessary for the success of the process, and the three are jointly necessary for a process to be ‘fully democratic.’ The supporting data that follow were gathered through a combination of researcher observation, quantitative surveys, qualitative interviews, and public documents (primarily the reports of the Infrastructure Panel (CGG, 2014b) and the Operational Panel (CGG, 2014a)).

A. Representation

Representing the entirety of the community and its views was understood to be critical, given the task and process involved. Representativeness was achieved primarily through stratified random sampling to create two deliberative democracy mini-publics. That is, the Panel did not attempt to mobilise the mass of local residents, but instead sought to assemble a descriptively representative group of residents mirroring the demographics of the larger population. Descriptive replication of gender, education, country of origin, and percentage of residents living in suburbs (as proxies for lifestyle and

\(^4\) Another valuable approach is Graham Smith’s use of ‘democratic goods’ to evaluate innovations. (Smith, 2009: 12-13).
socio-economic status) was approximated by comparison with regional census data. The percentage of young people and indigenous people was smaller than in the population at large. To avoid under-representing these groups, additional young people were recruited through schools and youth groups, and additional Aboriginal people were ‘snowball sampled’ through their communities. Finally, to ensure the recently amalgamated small town of Mullewa had a voice, several Mullewa residents were added. The Independent Review Committee certified that the selection process was fair and unbiased, and that the Panels were representative of the larger community.

The broader community was included at various points in both Panel deliberations. Panel participants selected two different face-to-face routes to achieve this. Both Panels included traditional and new social media to promote the Panel process and invite interaction, using newspaper articles, local radio, Twitter, YouTube and Facebook. For the Infrastructure Panel, as well as comment facilities typical to these media, the community was invited to submit infrastructure proposals for Panel assessment alongside the Council proposals. Community proponents submitted proposals and presented them in person to the Infrastructure Panel, responding to Panel members’ questions and suggestions. The Operational Panel selected members to present their preliminary recommendations to a large, open community forum for feedback. Panel members then gathered views from the attendees through small group discussions, which Panel members facilitated. The separate PB Panel session that followed this forum discussed each group’s feedback and suggestions.

B. Deliberation, including information, decision rules, and decision-making

Deliberation consisted of Panel members discussing an issue; viewing it from different perspectives, including the facts and data; creating options that could resolve issues; adopting criteria with which to assess each option; weighing the options against the criteria; and choosing the best way or ways forward. For the Operational Participatory Budgeting Panel, getting facts and data that participants could

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5 A snowball sample is a nonprobability sampling technique in which existing participants recruit additional subjects.
readily understand required the City Administration to find new ways to present that data. Government budgeting is highly complex, with numerous departments responsible for different aspects of a given service, confounding a holistic understanding. Participants requested this information on one page, specifically in the form of a pie chart that clearly depicted the total cost of each service. After many weeks of work by the Administration, the pie chart was provided to the Panel. 

Throughout the deliberation, independently facilitated small-group discussions used a new software platform to input the table participants’ ideas, including majority and minority viewpoints, to networked table computers. The room’s suggestions were then themed by an independent theme team, almost in real time. The themes were projected back into the room and amended by Panel members to better reflect what was said. Where needed, the themes were prioritised using multi-criteria analysis or, more simply, through weighted voting, in which participants could indicate their priorities by allocating 100 points or ‘dollars’ to various items. Individuals submitted their priorities to the computers, with the online platform immediately computing the room’s priorities.

Panel members rated the quality of the deliberations very highly. For example, 97 percent said they understood the issues under discussion very well; 93 percent said they learnt about the issues and got new information very well or quite well; and 100 percent said they heard from people with differing viewpoints very well or quite well. Table facilitators noted significant contestation and dissent in small group discussions during the phases of clarifying common values and prioritising projects and service. This came to the fore during the Operational PB, when emotions rose, and two participants withdrew temporarily from the room, returning soon thereafter when they felt able to continue with the deliberations. Yet interviews indicated participants felt that, despite emotional tensions, they were able to hear strongly held views and express their own. Moreover, they believed their voice had been heard and agreed that dissent was important for all perspectives to be seriously considered. At the end of both Panels, the Independent Review Committee certified that the Panel members were given the time, information (in an understand-

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6 The chart later became the accepted way for the City to present its budget to the public.
7 WhatDoWeThink (current beta version)
able format), and support to execute the ‘charge’ before them.\(^8\)

Decision rules were proposed either by participants or by the lead facilitator together with the organising team. All such suggestions had to be discussed, changed if needed, and finally endorsed through participant consent. The criteria for judging a service or piece of infrastructure were generated by Panel members through extensive deliberation and endorsement. The discussions regarding criteria were the most contested component of both deliberations. For example, despite the City’s commitment to the PB’s independence, the CEO visited the Infrastructure PB mid-process and told the Panel that the criteria they had developed were not useful and that the Panel should instead conform to the City’s pre-existing sustainability framework of separate pillars: social, cultural, economic, environmental, and governance. During follow-up discussions, Panel members were reluctant to dispense with their criteria, which they valued highly, particularly since it had taken two days of difficult deliberations to develop them. Consequently, Panel members and teams undertook calibration testing to determine the reliability and validity of their criteria. The results showed that the Panel’s criteria had high levels of reliability and validity. The Panel decided, therefore, to retain their own criteria. Similarly, in the Operational Panel, disagreement arose between several Panel members concerning whether the indigenous community should be given preferential treatment in assessment criteria. As the discussion became very heated, the Panel decided to maintain momentum and delegate wordsmithing and decision-making on this narrow issue to a smaller group of Panel members who had volunteered to work at night between meetings to come to an agreed position.

Deliberative elements such as reflection and justification in the service of the common good were built into the process through the generation of the Panel’s value-based criteria and through the request that participants give reasons and reveal their motivations for each service or improvement to infrastructure they supported (see Table 1, below). The criteria developed by participants demonstrated their awareness of tension between competing goods, and hence the inescapability of trade-offs — a fact of life typically obscured by categoris-
ing costs and benefits as economic, social, or environmental. The criteria developed by these everyday people reflected a more thoughtful recognition of conflicts between discrete values and the need to reconcile them than do criteria developed by experts and technocrats. In our view, the generation by participants of values-based criteria has several important advantages in 100 percent PBs:

a) It allocates resources that align with community expectations in a more sophisticated way than an opinion poll, which assumes citizens are fully cognisant of their values and do not need to reflect on them, nor on those of others involved, prior to making important decisions.

b) Considered deliberation helps people recognise values they hold in common. It also helps them understand and acknowledge values they do not share. Further, deliberation requires people to justify their views of the priority they believe their values ought to be assigned relative to other values. It impresses upon people the inescapability of trade-offs and the need to consider whether the expected benefit is worth the cost in terms of other values that must be deemphasised. Value-based criteria can be weighted to incorporate the relative importance of each to the community.

c) Openly discussing and determining the importance of a service or project fosters transparency with regard to participants’ interests and motivations. (The scores on each criterion for each project are open to inspection.) In addition, deliberation exerts social pressure on participants to be logically consistent from one project to another. In our experience, such pressure is positive in that it tends to elicit more rigorous thinking from people. This does not mean that other members of the public will necessarily agree with the rationale the mini-public provides. Rather, it means the group’s reasoning is more likely to be more internally consistent and to relate clearly to the values and priorities the group recommends.

d) Carefully deliberated and weighted criteria with coherent (reasoned) recommendations increase the accountability of participants to each other and to the larger community.
Table 1 Operational PB Panel: Criteria applied to assess each service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Benefit Versus Cost:</strong></th>
<th>Community benefit compared to financial cost, taking into account who will benefit (for example: whole population? specific groups? future generations?)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economy, thriving sustainable population:</strong></td>
<td>The service contributes to our healthy, thriving economy that provides diverse employment opportunities and affordable living that will retain and attract new residents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment, living sustainably:</strong></td>
<td>The service contributes to the environment — both natural and built — and our ability to live sustainably, balancing the protection of nature with community requirements/accessibility, and future requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social/sense of community lifestyle:</strong></td>
<td>The service contributes to our sense of community, big city amenities while retaining a small-town feel, with friendly, accepting, safe, outdoor, sporting, recreational, bushland, and coastal lifestyle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture, creativity, learning:</strong></td>
<td>The service contributes to our cultural heritage, our Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander and multicultural communities, our creativity, and our lifelong learning opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Involvement:</strong></td>
<td>The service (information, awareness education and support) includes community involvement in and support for that service and its planning.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Influence

The CGG Council endorsed the Report of the Infrastructure Panel and instructed the CEO to implement the prioritisation and to utilise the rating system9 created by the Panel for future assessment of infrastructure. The Operational PB report was also endorsed by Council and was used to form the budget for the 2014/2015 financial year. At the Council’s Special Budget Meeting, the final budget passed with an absolute majority. Supporters without exception referred to the Panel report as the basis for the legitimacy of the budget and as the justification for their vote. Councillors speaking against the motion (in all instances those elected on a platform of rates reform) did not question the legitimacy or value of the Panel’s solutions, but only objected to internal efficiency deficits on the part of the CEO. Additional recommendations for reconvening the Panels in the future were only partially realised.

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9 This rating system was recommended by the Panel as being a normalised combination of the Panel’s criteria and the City’s criteria.
**CGG PB Panel Results and Outcomes**

**Infrastructure PB Panel Results**

The criteria generated by the Infrastructure Panel were used to rate 70 projects put forward by the City, plus an additional 45 projects put forward by the local stakeholders in response to invitations for community-generated proposals. Listed below are the projects that received a weighted score of 80 percent or higher, indicating a strong consensus or ‘mandate’ for the project:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Panel Rating (weighted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Mobility impaired access upgrades</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Mullewa Youth Centre</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Youth Hub</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Upgrade to Mullewa In-venue Family Day care Service</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Aboriginal Cultural Centre Mullewa</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Extension Runway 03/21, Taxiway Alpha and Apron including Runway Lighting</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Rural Road Upgrades – Annual Program</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tennindewa Bush Fire Brigade</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The prioritised projects reflect the effort of Panel members to find common ground and to identify the public good. All except the road upgrades and runway extension evince concern and respect for the traditionally disadvantaged segments of the Greater Geraldton community: the mobility-impaired, Aboriginals, youth, and smaller communities (Mullewa and Tennindewa). The results suggest that Panel members set aside any predispositions they might have felt to privilege majoritarianism, individualism, or self-interest. Had they not done so, support for projects would have been distributed in direct proportion to the numerical strength of either the various demographic categories (young, old, singles, families, rich, poor, etc.) or voting blocs reflecting the varying priorities of different locations (e.g., the 35000 residents of the Geraldton centre versus the 400 residents of Mullewa township, of whom 90 percent are white Australian and 10 percent are indigenous people).

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10 Due to the length of the full set of recommendations, only some are reproduced here for the purpose of conveying the breadth and depth of the thinking and decision-making of the Panels.
These results contradict the contention that the ‘demos’ is by nature self-centered and ill-informed (Carson, 2009). While human nature might encompass such traits, the Panel recommendations suggest that everyday people are capable of critical thinking and acting in the public interest if they are given the opportunity to do so in conditions that encourage cooperation and public-mindedness. Notably, the Panel resolved their disagreement with the City over use of the criteria they had developed rather than the City’s. They accomplished this by recommending a statistical method (see Table 3, 1b and 4a) that balanced the integrity of their value-based criteria with an acknowledgement of the experience and expertise of the administration criteria.

Table 3 Infrastructure PB Panel Report Recommendations

1a. We recommend that Council adopt our Community Panel criteria and ranking of the 10 Year Capital Works projects.

1b. We recommend that both City Executive and Community Panel criteria be applied separately to each project. Each project then be assigned a City rank and a Community rank, presented in separate columns. The scores of the top ranks then be normalised to be equal and the statistical normalisation process then be applied to the full list of projects. A new set of ranks be created from the combined scores of City and Community scores added together to give final ranked list. Allow Council to view both City and Community and total scores side by side to facilitate debate in the decision-making process.

4. We support the City’s Executive Management Team response to the criteria our Panel developed:

4a. That the City will revise their own criteria to rate the 10-year capital works projects, so the City’s criteria will focus on those areas not covered by the Community Panel criteria, for example, governance, availability of external funding, safety and other issues.

4b. That the City will create groups of capital works projects where feasible (e.g. parks), allocating a pool of money for each grouping.

Services PB Panel Results

This Panel’s charge was to make recommendations about the range and level of services provided by the Council, but they also made recommendations for future Budgetary Decision-Making Processes. Table 4 includes examples from the extensive list of Service Panel recommendations about services to be increased; decreased; remain the same but with a different focus; or remain the same. The recommended actions for each area are listed, along with the reasoning behind each action.
Elucidating the reasons for recommended action served a dual purpose: First, because each recommended action needed to be verified and voted on by all Panel members, the results showed that panel-lists clearly reflected upon and justified to each other their points of view in both their small group discussions and with the whole Panel. It was agreed that all actions would be refined or rejected by the whole group, and each action would be assessed according to each of the agreed criteria. Second, since under the WA Local Government Act an elected Council cannot legally delegate budget-making, it was important for Panel members to make their reasons for each recommended action highly transparent in order to maximise the likelihood of acceptability to the Council. This added layer of transparency and accountability is a key advantage of the Australian PBs.

Table 4  Service Level Recommendations from the Operational Panel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Area</th>
<th>Specific Action</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Example of services to be increased.</td>
<td>Proactive rating system of assets which more accurately targets maintenance and replacement needs thereby reducing costs. Monitor assets appropriately. Improve information entered into the asset system to save costs right across city operations and be proactive on projects.</td>
<td>More accurately target maintenance timing and replacement needs thereby reducing costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Management</td>
<td>Review of the number of vehicles required. Endorsement given to the new car pool system. Family Day care Service</td>
<td>As service levels change in other departments fleet requirements will vary. Operations support requirements are heavily dependent on staffing levels within the other service areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example of services to be decreased.</td>
<td>Increase: Spend more on marketing/advertising for Civic Theatre events. Decrease: Remove the box office attendance during the day at the Theatre and move the ticket sales to the City front desk/library. Open box office an hour prior to shows.</td>
<td>More marketing exposure would increase ticket sales and attendance. By closing the box office would save money as the service is already being provided at the Civic Centre.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Two Eastern States Australian Participatory Budgeting Initiatives

Canada Bay, New South Wales (NSW): The first Australian Participatory Budgeting

Context

Canada Bay is located in Sydney’s inner west, and was described previously in the first edition of this book (Dias, 2014). The elected Council was facing the tough question of whether to increase taxes to pay for the services the residents wanted or to cut back on some of those services. In 2012, on the advice of newDemocracy (https://www.newdemocracy.com.au/), a research foundation based in NSW, the Council decided to take the unprecedented step of holding Australia’s first Participatory Budgeting Panel on 100 percent of the budget. NewDemocracy outlined the Canada Bay Panel objectives as follows:

1. Make an insightful and innovative set of prioritisation decisions as to the desired range and quality of Council–provided services.

2. Deliver widespread public confidence and acceptance of the priorities, trade-offs, and funding models used as being equitable and based on merit.

This first Australian PB Citizens Panel was differentiated from the typical PB model in three ways:

1. the use of a randomly selected, stratified sample of citizens;

2. the role of the newDemocracy Foundation as a ‘nonpartisan intermediary organisation’ (Kadlec and Friedman, 2007); and

3. the engagement of Council staff through a parallel process convened by the Council, using a randomly selected staff panel. (Thompson, 2012, p. 1)

This PB initiative differed from other City community consultations in the following ways:

1. The City administration opened all budget information to the panellists.


In contrast, this PB reflected one of the highest levels of public empower-
ment: ‘collaborate’. Though the Council agreed that this PB Panel would set the level of service to be provided, according to local government legislation, the final approval to the plan had to be given by the elected Council.

3. Randomly-selected participants received a personal invitation, and those selected in the final stratified random sample were given a relatively small daily stipend to cover expenses.

A. Representation
The random sample generated under the auspices of newD-democracy was stratified to reflect the demographics of the city population. Notably, very few of 36 local people who agreed to participate had ever been involved in Council affairs before.

B. Deliberation
The Panel process lasted over five days and involved five stages:

1. Learning about the remit, authority, issue content, how to deliberate, and online tools to be used by participants and the broader community.

2. Understanding and exploring the issues, the public submissions, and Panel ideas, plus expert presentations followed by question-and-answer sessions.

3. Reflecting and deliberating in small groups and commencing the prioritisation of issues.

4. Reaching consensus (but with reporting of minority viewpoints) and delivering the prioritised list of SMART (Specific, Measurable, Actionable, Realistic, and Time-delimited) services, their frequency, and the preferred service model

5. Presenting the recommendations to the Mayor, followed by a post-event debriefing. (Thompson, 2012)
C. Influence
The final report delivered to the City was comprehensive in scope and specific. (Full report is available on the newDemocracy website: https://www.newdemocracy.com.au/our-work/192-city-of-canada-bay  Executive Summary is included below.) Some significant points:

a) The Panel recognised a significant shortfall in funding for long-term maintenance and renewal of infrastructure, (e.g. roads, storm water drains, and seawalls), which will impact future generations if not addressed.

b) The Panel identified a number of reductions to services, including frequency of street cleansing, frequency of park mowing, and special events.

c) The Panel found some new sources of revenue: limited use of parking meters, user-pays services for non-residents of Canada Bay.

d) After new revenue and cost savings, the Panel accepted that raising rates was necessary to address Council’s funding shortfall and to meet community expectations. It concluded that a rates increase of up to 9 percent could be tolerated, especially because this made it possible to minimise the impact on those least able to pay.

e) The Panel also concluded that the Council needs a fundamental rethink of transparency and communication.

Melbourne, Victoria: Australia’s 100 percent PB in a Capital City
Context
With over four million residents, Melbourne is Australia’s second largest state capital and its fastest growing city. Melbourne is perennially ranked as the world’s most liveable city, rating highly on social, cultural, economic, and environmental aspects of urban life. For a number of years, the city had pioneered inclusive, empowered public participation regarding issues of importance to the public. Even so, it was particularly courageous to give a Panel of randomly-selected ordinary citizens such influence over the city’s first 10 Year Financial Plan, which involved around AUD$400 million annually and roughly AUD$5 billion over 10 years. The challenge for the Panel was to close an AUD$1.2 billion gap between what the Council had committed to deliver and its capacity ability to fund those commitments.
A. Representation
Under the auspices of newDemocracy, a stratified random sample of 43 residents, students, and business owners were selected and participated throughout the process. Although as an Australian-style PB its focus was mini-public deliberation, the Panel also engaged in outreach through broad invitations to workshops, online budgeting and discussion groups. The Panel met six times during August to November 2014.

B. Deliberation
Like the Canada Bay PB, the Melbourne process involved five phases, though over six days of deliberation:

1. Learning: understanding the Panel’s remit and authority; deliberation briefing; agreeing to participation guidelines; listening to expert presentations with question-and-answer sessions; identifying further experts to present; and agreeing to use and learning about online tools.

2. Continued learning and deliberation: exploring content from background materials; generating further requests for information and expertise; briefing sessions with Councillors; and ongoing online Panel discourse.

3. Further deliberation: Developing and agreeing to the structure of the Panel’s report and presentation to the Council; additional speakers and question-and-answer sessions; developing the Council proposal; and determining whether more time would be needed to complete the task.

4. Reflecting, deliberating, prioritising: small group work followed by establishing priorities from a long list of reform recommendations and possible funding structures; agreeing to an Executive Summary of five to seven top priorities; finalising the SMART recommendations, with Councillor feedback if desired.

5. Reaching consensus and finalising the report; delivering the prioritised list of reform recommendations to the Lord Mayor and Council; Council and Panel discussion following Council’s review of Panel report; and Council publicly announcing their decisions regarding the Panel’s recommendations.
A study (Clear Horizon Consulting, 2015) evaluated the extent to which the engagement process adhered to the principles and core values of the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2). It found the process to be both highly effective and appropriate, with all seven IAP2 Core Values (https://www.iap2.org.au/About-Us/About-IAP2-Australia-/Core-Values) being well expressed throughout the community engagement process. In addition, the process was highly effective according to other good practice community engagement criteria, including the adequacy of engagement scoping and planning, and the usefulness of community input received through the engagement process. Also highly rated were the influence of engagement on the decision-making process, and the impact of the engagement on the reputation of the City of Melbourne. Finally, it was deemed good value for money.

C. Influence
The Panel acknowledged that rate rises were required in order to meet both operating and capital budget requirements. In light of this, the Panel recommended that rates be increased by CPI plus up to 2.5 per cent per annum for the next 10 years. The Panel gave several reasons for these recommendations. It recognised that increases were supported by an expected rapid growth in population, substantial new infrastructure, and desired responses to climate change. It also recognised that new infrastructure primarily benefits new population and it is inappropriate for existing ratepayers to bear the full costs when there are means by which the costs may be shared, such as increased developer contributions or debt funding (Melbourne City Council, 2014). Council endorsed these recommendations and has committed to using them to build its 10 Year Financial Plan. Some additional recommendations of importance are summarised below:

a) Developers should contribute more, akin to that paid in the Australian capital cities of Sydney and Brisbane;

b) The City’s non-core assets should be sold, but the privatization of core infrastructure or services was not supported because of an expected rapid growth in population;

c) Debt financing to fund infrastructure projects was supported as long as it was not above the AAA credit rating;
d) Because of high cost and low returns, redeveloping the Queen Victoria Market was not supported.

An evaluation study on the impact on governance was conducted by the Electoral Regulation Research Network. The finding most relevant to the PB was that the democratic principle of ‘responsive rule’ is not fulfilled simply by the periodic election of the Lord Mayor and Councillors. Participatory practices such as deliberative democracy have the potential to be applied much more extensively than the forms of consultation and participation adopted to date (EERN, 2015).

Conclusion
Since the first edition of *Hope for Democracy*, the Australian Participatory Budgeting has grown both in numbers and size of budget while retaining its character of representative, deliberative, influential participation. This style of PB enables everyday people to deal with the complexity of 100 percent budgeting and encourages elected governments to share responsibility more confidently with their constituencies. The difficulty of allocating resources in contemporary government budgets at all levels requires the best individual and group decision-making methods and tools available. While it is true that mass voting is a solidly entrenched practice valued for its ability to aggregate preferences and maintain a minimum of democratic legitimacy, it is ill suited to the task of making value judgments about priorities and trade-offs—something only the public as a whole has the responsibility, the democratic political authority, and the capacity to make.

In our view, the Australian PB brings significant added value to government decision-making concerning one of its most basic and politically divisive functions: determining what to spend public money on and how much. The efforts by PB participants to justify their proposals, assessments, and priorities with reasons greatly enhance democratic transparency and accountability in a time of worryingly diminished trust in government and democratic political process. Through its representativeness, deliberativeness, and ability to tap into the ‘wisdom of the crowd’, the Australian PB boosts the stature of PBs world-wide, and in so doing offers hope for the renewal of democracy everywhere.
3. Scaling Up Dynamics
Developing Participatory Budgeting in Russia

Ivan Shulga, Vladimir Vagin

Origin and evolution of Participatory Budgeting in the Russian Federation

The history of participatory budgeting (PB) in Russia dates back to 2005 when the Local Initiatives Support Program (LISP) was launched in Stavropol Krai with the support of the World Bank (Shulga and Sukhova 2015). LISP was based on the methodology developed by World Bank experts specifically for Russian regions to combine key principles of PB and community-driven development (CDD). In subsequent years, LISP was implemented in several more regions of the Russian Federation in parallel with the development of PB practices based on methodologies other than that of LISP. In 2015–2016, the results and effects of the regional PBs drew the attention of the national Ministry of Finance (MoF) which led to the establishment of a separate area of state support and regulation that received the name of ‘initiative budgeting’ (IB). Due to this national level support, by 2018, more than half of the Russian regions had introduced various practices of citizen engagement in the budgeting process.

The design of Russian PBs and the logic of their development were strongly affected by the institutional and social context in which they took shape. First, PB in Russia developed under conditions of a highly centralized system of intergovernmental fiscal relations in which a substantial part of financial resources is accumulated at the federal and regional (subnational) levels and then redistributed down to the municipal levels of the budget system. It should be noted that most municipalities in Russia are heavily subsidized and have limited possibilities in developing and financing their own programs (including PB) compared to the regional level.1 Second, when the first PB practices emerged, the situation in Russia was characterized by noticeable differences in the social and economic situation between the urban and

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rural areas. In contrast to the cities, problems with quality and access to the basic social infrastructure and communal services such as water supply, roads and waste water disposal continued to persist in many rural municipalities. Municipalities had a shortage of their own funds to address relevant issues, while centralized state programs often did not ‘capture’ such problems because they were geared toward larger infrastructure facilities of national and regional significance. As a result, a great number of ‘minor’ issues extremely important for the population remained unresolved in many populated centers undermining citizens’ trust in local authorities. Third, when PB developed in Russia, citizens’ involvement in local self-governance was not a well-established regular practice. And while by the early 2000s Russia had the legislation framework which provided for various forms of citizens’ involvement in self-governance (public meetings, gatherings, conferences, and so on) put in place, as a rule, relevant tools were not used in practice. Decisions on spending budget funds were made in a centralized way, while feedback from the population were not used explicitly in prioritizing needs. This context prevailing in the mid-2000s predetermined distinctive features of Russian PBs in the subsequent 10 years. First, a two-tier system of PB implementation developed. Most Russian PBs were initiated at the regional level and were financed from the regional budgets in the form of subsidies granted to municipalities. At the same time, it is the municipalities that played a major part in organizing citizens’ participation and implementing projects. Second, a great number of earlier Russian PBs had a salient social focus and were oriented to addressing basic social issues, mainly, through development of the local level social infrastructure. Third, many earlier Russian PBs relied on direct participation of the population in determining the areas for spending budget funds. In this case, a preferred option was ‘physi-

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cal’ citizens’ participation in gathering proposals and voting rather than the use of online forms which was a deliberate strategy aimed at forming the habit of making collective decisions among the citizens in the absence of a regular practice of local self-governance.  

An important outcome of the first Russia PB (Stavropol Krai LISP) was showcase of the possibility of actually involving citizens in discussion of priorities and through this enhancing quality of the dialogue between the authorities and the population and increasing citizens’ satisfaction with, and trust in, local self-governance procedures. It is this aspect related to the possibility of improving the dialogue between the population and the authorities through citizens’ involvement in making decisions that turned out to be most attractive for other Russian regions which began to launch their own regional LISP type PBs. In later Russian PBs the aspect related to bridging local authorities and citizens came to the forefront and became even more important than the initial focus on developing social infrastructure. By 2015, the World Bank LISP had been successfully implemented in a dozen Russian regions. In parallel, some other PB models based on the methodology different from that of LISP (for example, a PB model developed by a design group of the European University in St. Petersburg (EUSP) supported by the Kudrin Fund for the Support of Civil Initiatives was developed and successfully tested in several Russian regions. At the same time a broad public discussion on a need to support practices involving citizens at the national level was launched and the term ‘initiative budgeting’ which means a set of various Russian participatory practices in conjunction with their state regulation and support was coined (Shulga et al. 2017).

4 For example, the LISP in Stavropol Krai was initiated by the regional government (the Ministry of Finance of Stavropol Krai) to quickly identify, prioritize, and address the most urgent issues of the rural population through involvement of citizens in making decisions related to allocation of funds from local budgets. The LISP in Stavropol Krai was meant to complement conventional infrastructure programs developed with the use of the top-down approach with financing of the microprojects selected directly by citizens. Basically, it was planned that the priorities would turn the spotlight on those issues which the population perceived as extremely urgent and through this reduce tensions in the dialogue between the population and the authorities as well as increase the level of mutual trust. The LISP in Stavropol Krai had a salient social focus: the so-called eastern part of the region with predominantly rural population, its closeness to the post-conflict areas of the North Caucasus, a heterogeneous ethnic context, low quality of the social infrastructure, and less favorable conditions for economic development compared to other areas within the region was selected as a pilot.

The period from 2015 to 2016 when the Russian MoF took note of PB development became a turning point. The MoF interest was mainly related to the opportunity of achieving a more efficient use of budget funds through PB mechanisms, first, because of better focus on the issues perceived by the population as top priority, and, second, because of the reinforced mechanism of public oversight and monitoring through local participatory decision making. The MoF expressed interest in dissemination of PB processes across Russia. To this end, the Center for Initiative Budgeting (in the Scientific Financial Research Institute [NIFI] of the MoF) was set up in 2016 and a joint project of the World Bank and the Russian MoF on Strengthening Participatory Budgeting in the Russia Federation in 2016–2020 was launched (Shulga 2017). This started the currently experienced rapid growth of Russian PBs. According to the data of official monitoring conducted by the Russian MoF, 8,732 PB projects were implemented in 35 Russian regions in 2016. The total budget of the Russian PB projects in 2016 was about USD 116 million (compared to USD 40 million in 2015). Total co-financing from the sources other than regional budgets (such as municipal budgets, citizens, and business) exceeded USD 30 million.

### Table 1 Key Russia PB Figures in 2015–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of funds</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USD (million)</td>
<td>RUB (million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total budget of PB projects, including:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>2,394.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional budget funds</strong></td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>1,375.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Co-financing from other sources, including:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federal budget</strong></td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Municipal budget</strong></td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>614.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>205.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business</strong></td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>182.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>other</strong></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>16.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Vagin and Shapovalova 2018.

It is notable that most of the Russian PB projects are small in size and focused on renovation and refurbishment rather than on construction works. The average size of the regional subsidy for the PB project barely exceeds USD 8,330, while the average actual project cost taking into account co-financing from local sources and cost reduction through bidding is close to USD 13,330. However, the project budget significantly varies from region to region and may even exceed USD 1.5 million (that is, in Sakhalin PB).
The typology of PB projects reflects the high demand of citizens for territorial improvement and improvement of the local level infrastructure (primarily roads, water supply systems, and educational and cultural institutions) – Table 2. In some regions the number of projects referred to the ‘other’ category was quite high. Such initiatives included sophisticated and expensive projects such as communications channels; repair of bridges and dams; engineering network facilities (heat supply, waste water disposal systems, and gas pipelines).

### Table 2: Typology of PB projects implemented in Russian Regions in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Type of PB projects</th>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Territorial improvement and recreation facilities</td>
<td>1,673</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Roads and roads infrastructure</td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Educational and cultural institutions</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Water–supply</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Children playgrounds</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Street lighting</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Solid municipal/domestic waste and garbage collection</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fitness and mass sport facilities</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Event projects (festivals, festive occasions)</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Cemeteries</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Primary fire-fighting appliances and measures</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Cultural heritage (sites and museums)</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Libraries and library centers</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Centers for consumer and personal services</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Other facilities</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total projects:</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,260</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Vagin and Shapovalova 2018.

**Methodological approaches used in Russian PB (Russia LISP vs. PB EUSP)**

The evolvement of PBs in Russia was mostly influenced by two models: World Bank LISP and PB EUSP.  

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6 Besides LISP and PB EUSP, certain regional practices are also developed within the IB framework. Thus, based on the LISP methodology and proprietary developments, a number of Russian regions and big cities backed by the political party ‘United Russia’ and All-Russian People’s Front (ONF) implemented the ‘People’s Initiative’ and ‘People’s Budget’ programs in 2010–2011. Most sizeable are the programs in Tula, Irkutsk, and Tambov Oblasts. The abovementioned practices have some common features: distribution of budgetary funds on the basis of citizens’ proposals, embedding of citizens’ participation procedures in the budget process in the regional and local levels, participation of citizens in the delivery of microprojects, and public control of physical security of assets and facilities. Furthermore, some practices rely on co–financing by citizens, local business, municipalities, as well as subsidies from regional budgets.
LISP is the most widespread PB model in Russia that also has the longest track record among the Russian PB practices (Shulga and Sukhova 2016). With the support of the World Bank, LISP was implemented in Kirov, Tver, Nizhny Novgorod, and Sakhalin Oblasts; Stavropol and Khabarovsk Krai; Jewish Autonomous Oblast; as well as in the Republics of Bashkortostan (Shulga, Fadeeva, and Sukhova 2017), North Ossetia–Alania, and Sakha (Yakutia). Since 2007, LISP in these regions has supported over 6,000 microprojects in more than 1,000 municipalities. Annually, around 300,000 people take part in over 2,000 community meetings. Now, the LISP model is actively used in over 20 regions of Russia, often without the direct participation of the World Bank. The LISP methodology is based on the following key elements:

a) **Direct and broad participation of citizens.** LISP projects are directly selected by residents at community meetings, rather than by a budgetary committee or community delegates, as in some other PB cases. The direct involvement of locals in LISP preparation and implementation assures high awareness of its goals, objectives, and mechanisms among the population; contributes to rethinking of citizens' role in local development; bolsters confidence in the existing local self-governance mechanisms; and ensures positive perception of the program results by the population.

b) **Competition of municipalities for LISP resources.** The projects identified and voted by the population at the community meetings in municipalities are then assessed by the regional level tender committee against a set of formal criteria. These selection criteria are aimed at assessing the actual demand for the project and the degree of its support by the given community. It is important to note that majority of the microprojects (60–80 percent on average) voted by the population...
ulation finally receive financing from the regional budgets. So, the system of selection criteria does not create disincentives, but rather motivates the municipal authorities and communities to strengthen their joint efforts to increase the chances to win the competition and get funding.

c) **Co-financing of microprojects by local communities.** LISP microprojects are to be co-financed by the community population and, optionally, by local businesses. The level of community co-financing is used as one of the selection criteria at the stage of project approval by the regional level tender committee. The main purpose of the co-financing is not to raise additional resources but rather to improve prioritization and create right incentives for the participants (Belenchuk, Vagin, and Shulga 2017). First, co-financing helps to prioritize actual needs and supports those communities that are ready to contribute to solving their own problems. Second, co-financing strengthens community ownership over the microprojects. In particular, at the implementation stage local communities take an active part in monitoring, keeping a watchful eye on the quality and timeliness of the work done by contractors; the emerging sense of co-ownership assures sustainability of the infrastructural facility after completion of the works, and so on. The actual level of LISP co-financing by local communities is quite high—40 percent, including 21 percent from municipal budget, 11 percent from population, and 8 percent from local business.

The LISP implementation mechanism is as follows. At the general community meetings in participating municipalities (mainly small and medium-sized), direct voting of the meeting participants is used to identify the most significant microprojects aimed at solving high-priority local problems. Such microprojects can include repairing roads, water supply facilities, and community centers, landscaping and territorial improvement, as well as other matters within the competence of local authorities. Then the municipality together with a group of civic activists (elected at the general community meetings) develops the microproject proposal to submit to the regional level competition. The selection of the proposals is based on formal criteria that allow the municipality to assess the level of de-
mand for each microproject. Based on the competition results, most of the project proposals get financing from the regional budget and the actual implementation starts. At all stages of LISP implementation technical support including awareness, training, and consulting is provided to the program participants. The entire cycle of LISP implementation—from holding community meetings to the handing over of facilities—as a rule does not exceed one year.

**Figure 1 LISP Cycle**

The PB EUSP model has been promoted in Russia since 2013, when its pilot projects were launched—’People’s Budget’ in the city of Cherepovets and ‘I plan the budget’ in Sosnovy Bor city. Starting in 2014, the experiment was spread to a number of municipalities in Kirov Oblast. Since 2016, PB has also been functioning in St. Petersburg. By now, this practice has been implemented in 13 cities and urban settlements of Leningrad, Vologda, and Kirov Oblasts. Unlike LISP, PB EUSP implies the distribution of funds allocated from the municipal budget on the basis
of decisions made by a budget commission comprising citizens selected by way of random draw, and municipal officials. Any resident has the right to apply for participation and to be selected through random draw for participation in the budget commission and therefore to have a chance of putting their initiatives into effect. The commission can take budgetary initiatives within the powers of the municipality where it operates. The practice is focused on citizens’ immersion in budgeting procedures and direct training of citizens in the fundamentals of township or municipal administration. The PB EUSP cycle can be summarized as follows.

Figure 2 Implementation of PB EUSP Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Administrative Bloc</th>
<th>Budget Bloc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1. Awareness campaign and recruitment Due Date: March</td>
<td>Surplus funds Due Date: February (decision is made)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2. Random draw for the budget commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>3. Budget commission meetings Due Date: April–May (1–2 times a week)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4. Task: execution of the project objectives, developing the general decision of the commission on the spending of funds, training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Work group meetings Due Date: June–October</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>5. Task: project finalization within the administration; supporting and discussing the details of project estimates and documentation, coordinating the activities of different divisions and committees for the inclusion of initiatives in the draft city budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>6. Draft city budget for the next year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Accepting the budget application Due Date: October–November</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>7. Accepting/executing the budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>8. Budgets of specialized committees Due Date: June–September Task: preparing a budget application from the specialized committee, containing initiatives put forward by the budget commission members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The initiatives of the budget commission members pass through expert evaluation at the city administration by specialized divisions (these are normally, territorial improvement, sports, culture, education, roads, housing, and utilities). The initiatives put forward by the members of the budget commission are finalized through voting by the commission members, but only initiatives that pass expert evaluation are put up for voting. Expert evaluation actually means that the city administration agrees to realize an initiative (direct consent or the one stipulated by certain conditions—for example, demarcation of the bounds or appointing an operator of the property). During the time of the PB EUSP program implementation in Russia, the percentage of declined initiatives at the stage of expert evaluation never exceeded 30 percent, that is, about two-thirds of the initiatives are accepted by the city administration as feasible. This shows a rather deep level of elaboration on initiatives at the stage of budget commission meetings—a clear evidence of the effectiveness of public discussions organized in this format. The differences in the methodology of World Bank LISP and PB EUSP are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3 Conceptual Differences between World Bank LISP and PB EUSP Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LISP</th>
<th>PB EUSP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Local community</td>
<td>Individual (citizen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submitting ideas/</td>
<td>All local residents (through surveys, meetings)</td>
<td>Members of the budget commission selected by way of random draw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proposals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project selection</td>
<td>Voting of the population + additional criteria (turnout at the meetings, co-financing of the population and business, number of beneficiaries)</td>
<td>Decision of the commission in a dialogue with the municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-financing by</td>
<td>Yes (population and business)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects</td>
<td>- Increased trust in local self-governance</td>
<td>Development of active citizens and improvement of their financial and legal literacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Increased trust in local authorities</td>
<td>- Improved management in the administrations, including inter-agency interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Higher satisfaction of the population with quality of the social infrastructure</td>
<td>- Support of citizens’ creative ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Awareness of importance of the citizens’ role in local development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In spite the methodological differences, PB EUSP and LISP generate synergy effects in case they are implemented in parallel in the same region. For example, in Kirov Oblast the two programs function in parallel at the regional level, complementing each other. First, together these programs offer wider fund-raising opportunities for involved municipalities. Second, discussing the initiatives of local communities in the PB EUSP program results in creating a pool of projects that can be delivered within LISP. For example, the initiatives that do not pass voting in budget commissions can be realized under LISP, specially because all estimates are ready as well as a positive expert opinion from the city administration, which significantly simplifies the process of further elaboration upon the initiatives in LISP. In other words, PB EUSP programs generate good ideas for LISP, accelerating the process of discussion and support of the initiatives within the LISP framework. Third, the participation of local communities in LISP gives them the essential experience of public discussions and joint work, which considerably simplifies the implementation of PB EUSP programs—for example, the work of budget commissions (instead of eight standard meetings, they need four to six meetings for making a decision).

Institutional arrangements to support scaling up PB

In April 2016, the Russian MoF launched a joint project with the World Bank, aimed at scaling up PB in Russia. The main goal of the joint effort was development of PB practices on a large scale in Russian regions through replication of the most successful regional PB models, support of regional pilots, strengthening capacity of local stakeholders for implementing PBs, and the formation of institutional infrastructure and a system for information exchange (including at the international level). It was assumed that about 30 Russian regions (that is, slightly more than a third) would participate in the project, however, the demand for the project activities was so high that by the end of 2017, the number of participating regions reached 45 and in May 2018 – 50 regions (that is over a half of Russian regions).
As the first step in the formation of the PB institutional infrastructure, the national Center for Initiative Budgeting (CIB) was established in the quarters of NIFI of the MoF, which was assigned the role of coordinator in the development of PB processes in Russia. The project team included World Bank experts and CIB staff who jointly design and implement the project’s activities. One of the World Bank’s tasks at the initial stage of the project was passing to the CIB certain proven technologies and experience on LISP and other PB models related to population involvement, development of local communities, and organization of PB on a global scale. Together with the World Bank experts, CIB representatives participated in field training and awareness-raising events in regions, development of methodological documents, monitoring of regional programs, and planning and conduct of research works.

In parallel, the project supported creation of regional project centers to coordinate and support PB activities at the regional level through facilitating the meetings of local communities, consulting local stakeholders at all project stages, and monitoring project implementation. In particular, over 20 regional project centers for IB were shored, with various organizational models shaped within the project framework serving as the underpinning of the project center.8 The general logic of the project can be split into two stages. At

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8 Thus, in the Republic of Bashkortostan, the project center was established at the Institute for Strategic Research under the Bashkortostan Academy of Sciences; in Altai Krai, Republic of Sakha-Yakutia, and Orenburg Oblast, it was hosted by the regional finance ministries; in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, the project center was established by the ministries of economy and local self-government; in Novosibirsk Oblast the project center is administered by the state public institution ‘Regional Information Center;’ and so on. Employees of the project centers received additional training and methodological and consulting support within the project.
the first stage (2016–2017), the primary focus was on the replication of successful Russian PB models (primarily LISP) through providing methodological, information, and educational support to regional stakeholders. At the second stage (2018–2020), awareness and educational events as well as methodological support for Russian regions will continue, but the focus will partly shift to analyzing the outcomes and effects of Russian PBs, generalization, systematization, and demonstration of accrued experience both in Russia and abroad, as well as hands-on study of the best international practice.

One of the project’s first-stage achievements was building an effective system of interregional exchange of information, experience, and best practices. For these purposes, a variety of activities were used, including national level conferences, information seminars, thematic workshops (on PB awareness-raising campaigns, urban PB practices, engaging business in PB), and so on. Overall, over 40 field regional events were conducted in 2016–2017. Over 3,000 participants were involved in regional seminars, with about 50–70 people attending each one. The participating regions were provided with appreciable methodological support aimed at replicating best practices. In particular, standard methodological materials were developed (including the Initiative Budgeting Operational Manual: Local Initiatives Support Program case study (Khachatryan et al. 2016), standard normative-legal documents, training modules, standard forms, and so on), which are actively used by the regions implementing PB programs.

The main event of the first stage was the international BRICS Forum held in Ufa, Russia during September 21–22, that was attended by official delegations and leading international experts in the area of PB as well as by representatives of many Russian regions implementing PB programs. The next international event on citizen engaging in decision making is scheduled for September 7, 2018 in Moscow.

**Outcomes and effects of PB in Russia**

To measure PB outcomes and effects, a sociological survey was conducted in 2016. The survey compared responses from the treated and non-treated groups of respondents in the regions with the most extensive experience in PB project implementation. The treated (experimental) group included representatives of settlements where PB
(namely, LISP) programs had been implemented for at least 2–3 years. The non-treated (control) group was selected based on similarity with the treated group with the use of key characteristics (size, budget) other than LISP implementation. The total size of the sample was 3,000 respondents. All results provided below are statistically significant.

The survey demonstrated that the PB (LISP) not only (a) helps address direct needs of the population, but also (b) contributes to development of local self-governance institutions and, through this, (c) increases trust of the population in local authorities and changes attitude of the residents to their role in local development.

a) **Addressing direct needs of the population**

People believe that PB practices provide an opportunity for them to address issues relevant for the population. For instance, respondents from the experimental group more frequently report that quality of life in their settlements has improved (see Figure 4). Besides, the rate of satisfaction with municipal services is noticeably higher (see Figure 5).

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**Figure 4** Do you think the quality of life in your settlement during the recent 3 years has improved, has deteriorated, or remained unchanged?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Without LISP (control group)</th>
<th>With LISP (experimental group)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deteriorated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remained unchanged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5** Are you satisfied with the way the issues of territorial improvement and housing and communal services are being solved in your settlement?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Without LISP (control group)</th>
<th>With LISP (experimental group)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completely satisfied</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat satisfied</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
A similar difference is observed in the assessment of conditions of specific social infrastructure facilities by the experimental group and the control group (water, roads, community centers, and sport facilities). For example, 60 percent of the respondents from the experimental group reported improvement of the water supply facilities (against 52 percent from the control group); 28 percent reported improvement of the roads (21 percent from the control group); 45 percent of the respondents from the experimental group noted improvement of community centers (20 percent from the control group); 44 percent noted improvement of sports facilities (21 percent from the control group).

b) Development of local self-governance institutions

It is important that PB practices help not only address direct social needs but also make local self-governance institutions more meaningful, useful, and relevant, bringing the interaction between citizens and local authorities to a different quality level. For example, at settlements where PB models are implemented, community meetings are held more often (Figure 6), and their residents can meet easily and discuss issues directly with a representative of the settlement administration, if necessary (Figure 7).

**Figure 6** Does the administration of your settlement hold community meetings with residents to discuss the local issues?

**Figure 7** Is it true that it is possible to meet with the representatives of settlement administration, if needed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement Administration</th>
<th>Without LISP</th>
<th>With LISP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(control group)</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(experimental group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement Administration</th>
<th>Without LISP</th>
<th>With LISP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(control group)</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(experimental group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source** Sociological survey in Russian Regions to measure social effects of PB, 2017.
It is important that this dialogue between the population and the authorities, that is strengthened by the PB practices, leads to better mutual understanding and contributes to actual solving of issues. The survey found that at the settlements where LISP is implemented, the administration takes into account the opinion of the residents in addressing local needs more often (Figure 8). Local problems are resolved much more effectively if they are raised at public meetings (Figure 9).

c) Changed level of trust and citizens’ attitude to their role
The survey reported that if the PB program is implemented for a long period (two years and more), its effects go beyond purely institutional framework. The trust in the mechanism and procedures under the program gradually enhances trust of the population in local authorities. The key institutional result of the PB practice implementation (which differs from the overall Russian trend) is increased trust in the heads of the settlement. The survey showed that the heads of the settlements who ensure that the residents are engaged in discussions and resolution of local issues under the PB programs enjoy greater citizens’ trust (see Figure 10).

Finally, citizens change their attitude to their own role in local development. First, citizens develop a sense of responsibility for what
happens in the place they live (Figure 11). Second, people report their readiness to invest money in socially significant sub-projects (the function of interpersonal trust) - see Figure 12.

In many respects, readiness to invest own money is associated with citizens’ trust in LISP mechanisms and procedures, though this readiness goes beyond this project. People are ready to invest in public projects even outside LISP, implementing in this way their demand for citizens’ participation which has so far been blocked by the inadequacy of civic society.

**A way forward: a national policy to support PB in Russia**

At present, citizens’ participation in the implementation of the project aimed at addressing local issues, beautification of urban and settlement areas has become in Russia an integral part of the political agenda, and an element of state policy for a more efficient use of public funds and improvement of urban environment quality.

In December 2017, the Government Commission on Open Government of the Russian Federation approved the Program for Developing Initiative Budgeting in Russia. The main provisions of the road map for developing IB became a part of the subprogram on Ensuring Openness and Transparency in Public Finance Management, which forms part of the State Program on Public Finance and Public Debt Management

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**Figure 10** To what extent do you trust the head of the settlement?

- Without LISP*: 59%
- With LISP**: 67%

**Figure 11** To what extent do you consider yourself responsible for what is happening in your settlement?

- Without LISP*: 42%
- With LISP**: 31%

**Figure 12** Are you ready to invest your personal money to the public project?

- Without LISP*: 45%
- With LISP**: 29%

*Source* Sociological survey in Russia Regions to measure social effects of PB, 2017.
in the Russian Federation. The program includes the development of the regulatory and legal framework for regulation of PB practices; support and regulation of the IB development process; creation of the institutional infrastructure for development of IB at the regional and municipal levels; information support for the process of IB development; organization of monitoring and evaluation of development of PB programs and practices in the Russian regions. Development and approval of programs (activities) for developing IB by the Russian regions is the main outcome of this subprogram implementation.

In parallel, more state programs and priority national projects with citizen engagement are developed at the federal level. For example, the Federal Targeted Program of the Russian Ministry of Agriculture for 2014–2015 allocated USD 2,283,330 for financing grant programs with the citizen engagement component using the proceeds of the federal budget. However, a genuine breakthrough occurred when the priority project on Creation of the Comfortable Urban Environment was developed. This project plans to allocate USD 416,660,000 annually for beautifying the urban landscape in Russian cities and towns. Citizens’ engagement in this priority project is based on participatory planning principles and citizens’ voting to select alternative projects. A number of regions have been applying experience gained under the PB projects, helping citizens articulate priorities for implementation of beautification projects.

Several Russian regions have been developing their own legislative framework for IB. For example, the Law of Perm Krai on Implementation of Initiative Budgeting Projects was approved on June 2, 2016; based on this law, a PB program was launched in 2017. The first regional IB law became a legal precedent for other Russian regions. Legislative formalization of IB expenditures guarantees stable financing and annual implementation of the program across the Russian region. At presently, similar legislative initiatives are being discussed in the Moscow, Ulyanovsk, and Kirov Oblasts.

Another management innovation of 2016 was the formalization of IB issues in strategic planning documents at the regional level. One of the indicators set forth in the adopted Strategy for social and economic development of the Republic of Bashkortostan for the period up to 2030 is ‘Percentage share of the Republic of Bashkortostan consolidated budget expenditures through the mechanisms of initiative budgeting’ (10 percent by 2030). This decision can also support sus-
tainable implementation of IB at the regional level in the midterm. In 2018, discussions of amendments to the federal laws of the Russian Federation began. Financial participation of the citizens in the implementation of initiative projects and separation of co-financing from public budget funds are to be subjected to state regulation. This was reflected in the new proposed wording of the Budget Code of the Russian Federation which proposed that ‘initiative payments’ (cash funds) be included in the nontax revenues of the budgets along with citizens’ self-taxation.

In addition to that, draft amendments to Federal Law No. 131–FZ ‘On General Principles of Local Self-Governance Organization in the Russian Federation’ submitted to the Government of the Russian Federation propose that citizens’ initiative groups be entitled to come up with an initiative project aimed at addressing specific local issues in the municipality (part of the area of the municipality) which are priority issues for the citizens. In this case ‘initiative payments’ are taken to mean cash funds and other property and/or intangible investments of citizens, solo entrepreneurs and organizations made for the purpose of implementation of citizens’ initiative projects to address specific local issues.

The size of initiative payments (cash funds) and other property investments of citizens, solo entrepreneurs, and organizations made for the purpose of implementation of such projects is voluntary and cannot be set forth by a regulatory and legal act of the Russian municipality or the Russian region.

Overall, state regulation of IB in the Russian Federation aims to systematize and regulate financial procedures used to allocate public funds from the budget and co-financing rather than restrict citizen engagement in addressing local issues and developing the public infrastructure. At the same time, determination of the procedures for citizen engagement in the projects is a prerogative of regional IB programs to the maximum extent.
The National Participatory Budgeting in Portugal: Opportunities and Challenges for Scaling up Citizen Participation in Policymaking

Roberto Falanga

“Participation, which is also a form of intervention, is too serious and ambivalent a matter to be taken lightly, or reduced to an amoeba word lacking in any precise meaning, or a slogan, or fetish or, for that matter moly an instrument or methodology. Reduced to such trivialities, not only does it cease to be a boon, but it runs the risk of acting as a deceptive myth or a dangerous tool for manipulation.” (Rahnema, 2010, 138-139)

Introduction
Discussing the scaling up of Participatory Budgeting is a long-standing and challenging issue in this field of study and practice. The implementation of the first edition of the National Participatory Budgeting in Portugal (NPB) in 2017 provides some key insights which will encourage future debate. With this in mind, the chapter firstly provides an outline of the scholarly debate about scaling up citizen participation in policymaking. Some important contributions in this field of study focus on the deliberative system of participatory institutions and the State Participatory Budgeting in Rio Grande Sul, in Brazil, whose experience is considered paramount worldwide. Literature on Brazil helps untangle some of the challenges that scal-
In 1989, the municipality of Porto Alegre designed and implemented the first Participatory Budgeting (PB) in the world, providing citizens with the opportunity to have their say in the allocation of a share of the municipal budget. The PB was included in the local political agenda by the Popular Front (“Frente Popular”), a party coalition led by the Workers’ Party (“Partido dos Trabalhadores”) and the former Brazilian Communist Party, currently the Popular Socialist Party (“Partido Popular Socialista”). In subsequent years, as argued by Souza (2015), the PB became one of the most important political platforms for the political campaign of the Workers’ Party. Beyond that, PB became an international reference for those thinkers, practitioners, and politicians that were advocating for innovations in democratic governance at large (Avritzer, 2006; Smith, 2009).

Praised during the World Social Forums that took place in the early 2000s in Brazil, and acknowledged as an effective practice in operationalising goals of social justice through the redistribution of socio-economic resources to the most disadvantaged sectors of civil society, PBs were spread by post-communist and alter-globalist movements.
SCALING UP DYNAMICS

worldwide (Baiocchi, 2005). At the beginning of the 2000s, transnational and international agencies also paid a great deal of attention to the potential for PBs to support new patterns of governance for democracies affected by the spread of citizenry distrust. The World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations, and the European Union incorporated PBs, and the whole package of participatory methods, as one of the key pillars of a new age for local governance (WB, 1994; EU, 2001; OECD, 2001; UNDESA, 2008). The convergence of these agencies over PBs raised interest and concerns among scholars, as the extensive dissemination of new guidelines and toolkits, together with the compilation of comprehensive lists of good participatory practices around the world, unveiled risks of political co-optation. More pointedly, some scholars argued that the convergence of transnational and international agencies aimed to make the “invisible hand” of neoliberalism manipulate participatory processes to the detriment of goals of social justice and economic redistribution (Dagnino, 2004; Baiocchi e Ganuza, 2016). Evidence of the alleged shift from the original goals promoted in Porto Alegre to the instrumentalisation of PB in favour of economic and political elites was, according to some thinkers, the neutralisation of the political debate within participatory arenas and the reduction of deliberation around governance issues (Leal, 2010).

The worldwide dissemination of PBs relies, therefore, on the actions of both left- and neoliberalist agents. From this controversial convergence, PBs have been designed and implemented mostly on a local scale, due to the proximity between electors and elected (Pateman, 1980). However, concerns have been raised about risks for the instrumental reduction of the potential of citizen participation in policymaking (Avritzer and Ramos, 2016). Whereas local democracy is celebrated by political scientists as the most adequate setting for public deliberation, scholars increasingly recognise the need to reflect upon concrete opportunities for crossing the boundaries between neighbourhoods and cities (Fung, 2015). Brazil, and more recently Portugal, prove that scaling up mechanisms of citizen participation is not merely a question of theory. Scholarly debate on the “deliberative system” of participatory institutions in Brazil has highlighted some main features for mechanisms that aim to include citizen voices within decision-making at different levels of governance. While this is true, the scaling up of participatory budgeting in Rio Grande do Sul at the state level further provides insights for the discussions around the NPB in Portugal.

Learning from Brazil

In Brazil, the deliberative system of participatory institutions provides mechanisms of citizen participation aimed at influencing policymaking at the local, regional, and federal levels. The three main participatory institutions – the National Councils, the Regional Conferenc-
es, and the PBs – were designed and took place during different historical phases, therefore playing different roles for the participation in decision-making. The (i) National Councils gather organised actors from civil society, together with decision-makers, to formulate, implement and monitor public policies from the (ii) Regional Conferences, which collect societal inputs from the regional scale. Lastly, (iii) PBs are implemented at the local level and, out of formal interaction with Conferences and Councils, provide mechanisms of both direct and representative participation. The articulation of participation in the deliberative system on different scales is aimed at ensuring that citizen voices in decision-making can be effectively driven up to the federal system. Towards this aim, participatory institutions rely on the interplay of direct and representative forms of participation (Cambraia, 2011). Likewise, citizens are allowed to elect delegates and councillors to represent their voices in local PBs. The articulation among the participatory institutions where elected delegates aggregate citizens’ claims at each level to intermediate with governments, becomes more valuable when it results in local claims being escalated to the federal system (Pogrebinschi, 2013). Circulation of social agents among the participatory institutions and other informal arenas further ensures the interconnections among participatory institutions, as well as between them and the representative democracy system. Almeida and Cunha (2016) argue that informal arenas can, on the one hand, effectively integrate different points of view but, on the other, prevent the most marginalised sectors from full participation. For similar reasons, Mendoça (2016) argues that the potential “connectivity” among arenas should be improved through the circulation of key actors. The author (ibid.) advocates that civil servants should defend the voice of the most marginalised; mass media should make public announcements on deliberation and its outcomes; and activists should supervise the performance of decision-makers and highlight contradictions that emerge. The role of these key actors should guarantee the fair development of the deliberative system at large. Towards this end, Avritzer and Ramos (2016) acknowledge the need to scale out participation by ensuring institutional inclusiveness as discussed above, and in addition, scale it up. Scaling up, according to the authors (ibid.) can either consist of citizens invited at the local scale to deliberate over national issues (weak version) or cumulate and replicate the outcomes of deliberative meetings at the local level in order to constitute a new national public sphere. Considering the framework established by the deliberative system in Brazil, and on the basis of the sound experience of local PBs, the State of Rio Grande do Sul conducted a PB at the state level. The Workers’ Party State governor Olivio Dutra, former Mayor of Porto Alegre, capital city of the State, initiated the process in 1998 (regional law 1179/1998) which was labelled “Popular Consultation” and aimed at including the voice of the peo-
ple into the allocation of a share of the state budget. The leading role was played by Municipal Development Councils called “Comudes” and Regional Development Councils called “Coredes”. The Comudes were required to organise local meetings and invite citizens to elect their delegates. The Coredes were composed of citizen delegates and political representatives, who informed the state government on the outcomes of the Comudes and supervised the implementation of the projects agreed by the community, which were included in the state budget. As pinpointed by Linke (2009), the election of Tarso Genro in 2011 as governor of the state further led to the creation of the new State System of Citizen Participation, which aimed to provide a comprehensive platform of participation. However, the change of political leadership in 2015 had controversial consequences as, according to some scholars, it led to the slow dismantling of the system of participation in the state (Carbonai et al., 2017).

Insights from the deliberative system in Brazil and the implementation of the state PB in Rio Grande do Sul can help reflect upon the recent implementation of the NPB in Portugal for at least two reasons. The first reason is that they provide a considerable amount of theoretical reflections and evidence that are worthy learning from. The second reason, related to the first is that the State PB in Rio Grande do Sul represents an international comparable case of PBs on a larger scale, and its actions can be positively understood within the framework of the abovementioned participatory institutions, although out of formal relations.¹ Four insights about scaling up can be identified accordingly:

- Scaling up citizen participation in policymaking should rely on a system of institutions on different scales;
- Scaling up citizen participation in policymaking should allow citizen claims to grow from the local to the national scale;
- Scaling up citizen participation in policymaking should rely on different approaches to participation, namely direct and representative;
- Scaling up citizen participation in policymaking should take advantage of the knowledge transfer & production in informal arenas.

¹ Further international examples of participatory processes on larger scales are provided in chapters 3 of this book.
The National Participatory Budgeting in Portugal
In Portugal, the dissemination of PBs has grown extensively at the local scale in the last fifteen years (Dias, 2013). The country currently holds the world record of PBs when considering the ratio between number of PBs and number of local authorities (308 municipalities and 3092 parishes). In a recent search conducted by the author of this chapter on the national observatory of participation website in August 2017 (website: www.portugalparticipa.pt/monitoring), more than 180 ongoing PBs were identified at both municipal (around 80%) and parish levels (20%). Although the majority of PBs have opened the deliberation on all the policy areas managed by city councils and/or parish governments, a substantial number of the PBs have constituted their public on the basis of age cohorts, as around 20% of the ongoing PBs are designed to exclusively engage young people.
Against this background of diffuse implementation of local PBs, the NPB was included in the Portuguese Socialist Party programme for the most recent national elections held in 2015. The elections represented an historical turn for national public agenda, as between 2011 and 2014 the conservative coalition leading the national government agreed with international lenders (International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, and European Commission) on a bailout of seventy-eight billion euros and an austerity-driven agenda as a condition to this bailout. The Socialist Party, supported by the Communist Party and the Left Block, issued the NPB under the Law 42/2016 (Art.3) out of alignment with trends of economic retrenchment, and aimed to recover the growing citizenry disaffection towards political institutions and representatives. More specifically, the NPB covenant issued by the national government lists the following goals (Diário da República nº 21/2017, Série I de 2017-01-30):

- Reinforce the quality of democracy by means of participatory democracy, consistent with the Portuguese Constitution;
- Engage citizens in decision-making by promoting active and informed participation;
- Promote economic and social cohesion by implementing projects able to link people from different areas of the country.

Towards the same end, together with the NPB, the national government also implemented two further Participatory Budgeting at the
national level: the PB for youth, with an amount of three hundred thousand euros, and the PB for schools with tailored budgets allocated to public primary and high schools in the country (Falgana, 2018). The former was coordinated by the State Secretary of Youth and Sport, while the Institute for Financial Management of Education in partnership with the General Direction of Schools was in charge of the latter. The PB for youth aimed at engaging young people between the ages of 14 and 30, and its institutional design reproduced the key pillars of the NPB (more information at: www.opjovem.gov.pt). The three PBs implemented at the national level were implemented for the first time in 2017 and were all confirmed for their second edition in 2018.

Figure 1 Logotypes of the three PBs implemented at the national level in 2017


Focussing on the NPB, the first edition was conducted in 2017 under the supervision of the State Secretary for Administrative Modernisation (hereinafter: Secretary). The NPB was provided with three million euros to be allocated to national and regional projects. The distribution of the budget covered three hundred and seventy-five thousand euros for one or more national projects; three hundred and seventy-five thousand euros for each one of the five continental regions (North, Centre, Lisbon and Tagus Valley – AML, Alentejo, Algarve); and three hundred and seventy-five thousand euros for each one of the two autonomous regions (Madeira and Azores). Citizens

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2 NP for schools distributed the budget to public schools as follows: (i) 500 euros to schools with fewer than than 500 inscribed students; (ii) tailored amount calculated from one euro per student in schools with more than 500 inscribed students (more information at: www.opescolas.pt)

3 One main difference between NPB and PB for youth regards the criteria for budget allocation to the regions. Whereas NPB defined a minimum budget for the seven regions, the PB for youth allocated the budget for national and regional projects without defining a minimum corresponding amount.
were invited to participate in open meetings organised by the Secretary in all the regions of the country between January and April 2017. Collected proposals were analysed by government ministries and appointed institutional bodies according to the corresponding policy area. The analysis was run throughout May 2017 and aimed to assess whether the proposals matched the criteria of availability, which were made explicit in the NPB covenant. The criteria imposed the identification of the scale of implementation, which should either be national (i.e. involving more than one region) or regional (involving more than one municipality), and one of the predefined policy areas: culture, science, education and adult learning, and agriculture for continental regions; justice and public administration for autonomous regions. The criteria also regarded the exclusion of proposals that were: about infrastructure building; in support of private service delivery; in contraposition to the national government coalition programme; technically unattainable; impossible to transform into a project; in excess of budget for each single project (two hundred thousand euros maximum).

After the collection and analysis of the proposals, citizens had the opportunity to request further explanations regarding the exclusion of their proposals. This stage altered the final list of the proposals to be put to the public vote, which remained open for approximately three months.

Government declared that approximately two thousand and five hundred people took part in the fifty open meetings organised throughout the country (Diário da República nº 245/2017, Série I de 2017-12-22). The collected proposals amounted to 973, and their assessment resulted in 567 accepted (and 406 rejected) proposals. The requirement for further explanation provided the op-

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4 Each one of the two national projects amounts to two hundred thousand euros, which requires an adjustment to the budget allocated for national projects that exceeds three hundred and seventy five thousand euros.
portunity to review rejected proposals, resulting in the re-inclusion of 32. The final list of 599 proposals to be put to the vote covered almost two-thirds of regional projects and a third of national projects. In particular, from the 350 proposals received for projects at the national level, 202 were finally accepted, while from the 623 proposals received for regional projects, 397 of them were put to the vote.

Public voting was opened through ID identification via website and SMS, providing each citizen with two votes: one for regional and one for national proposals. The identification of 38 projects resulting from voting corresponded to around 4% of the received proposals. National and regional scales were covered by respectively two and 36 projects to be implemented within 24 months (tab.1).

Table 1: Received proposals, accepted proposals, and projects won at national and regional scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Received proposals</th>
<th>Accepted proposals</th>
<th>Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algarve</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AML</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alentejo</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azores</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madeira</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s own work

Considering the policy areas covered by the 599 accepted proposals, culture received the highest number of proposals (=370), resulting in the highest number of winning projects (=13), including the two projects to be implemented at the national level. Conversely, the public administration policy area received 24 proposals, resulting in five winning projects. This data, however, should be interpreted in light of the criteria for budget distribution and the predefinition of policy areas. The distribution of the budget in the NPB supplies each region with the same amount of public funding. Against this backdrop, however, the regions have very diverse sociodemographics – with the largest population in the North region (3.818.722), followed by the metropol–
itan area of Lisbon (2,808,414) and the central region (2,348,453) – edu-
cation and socioeconomic rankings, whose disparity has been ag-
gravated by the implementation of the austerity agenda (OECD, 2015).
In addition, the predefinition of the policy areas also comprised the
distinction between continental and autonomous regions. The public
administration policy area consisted of autonomous regions only, and
the rate of success from accepted proposals to projects was anything
but low, as five projects won out of seven accepted proposals.

Table 2 Received proposals, accepted proposals, and projects won according to
policy areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy area</th>
<th>Received proposals</th>
<th>Accepted proposals</th>
<th>Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source author’s own work

The high rate of proposals received and projects funded in the cul-
ture policy area can be connected to at least two contingencies. The
first concerns the effects that budgetary cuts in this policy area
have had on a national scale. For example, in 2013 this policy area
covered 0.1% of the national GDP, lower than the 1% international
average as recently claimed back by spread protests in the country
due to 2018 State budget cuts. Another piece of evidence is related
to the predefinition of the policy areas, and more pointedly to the
difficulty that citizens may have had in classifying their proposals
into a specific area. As the Minister of the Presidency and Admin-
istative Modernisation declared during the public announcement
of the 38 projects, the majority of the received proposals addressed
borderline and crosscutting issues that could potentially cover
more than one policy area.5 The high number of proposals in the
culture policy area may have been biased by this limitation, which

5 The announcement of the 38 projects took place on the 14th of September 2017 in Lisbon.
could suggest the potential for NPB to reformulate the “boxes” of policy classification in future editions.

**Table 3 Distribution of the projects according to the seven regions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy area</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Centre</th>
<th>Alentejo</th>
<th>Algarve</th>
<th>AML</th>
<th>Azores</th>
<th>Madeira</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source author’s own work**

Of around eighty thousand possible votes, 12406 votes were cast for projects at the national level and 24127 votes for projects on the regional scale, making a total of 36533 votes which decided the final list of 38 projects. This data shows that not all the people who voted used the two available votes (one for national and one for regional projects), and that a higher proportion of votes were cast on regional projects than national ones. Unfortunately, disaggregated data on votes for national and regional projects, as well as geographic origin and sociodemographic characterisation of voters was not made available by the Secretary. A final consideration regards the final budget allocated by the national government for the implementation of the projects, which exceeds the initial amount of three million euros, and comprises a total of 3.2 million euros.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Name of the project</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Culture for all</td>
<td>6614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bullfight, cultural heritage of Portugal</td>
<td>5792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>North</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National network of toy libraries</td>
<td>8373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agriculture and culture: a promising relation</td>
<td>1436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tales and legends from Trás-os-Montes</td>
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Source author’s own work

Scientific analysis of the NPB is necessary given the impact of the first edition on the implementation of the 38 projects with public funding, and the decision to proceed with its second edition in 2018, which was being conducted at the time this chapter was written. The second edition has been provided with an increased budget of five million euros distributed for projects on national and regional scales: six hundred and twenty five thousand euros for national projects; six hundred and twenty five thousand euros for each one of the five continental regions; and six hundred and twenty five thousand euros for autonomous regions. Unlike the first edition, there is no predefinition of policy areas and each project can be funded up to three hundred thousand euro. In addition, proposals can be made in open meetings as well as via the website.

Analysing the NPB
Considering the institutional design described above, the following analysis contrasts the four insights on scaling up retrieved from literature on existing participatory practices in Brazil, and adapts them to the Portuguese context to understand if and to what extent the first edition of the NPB:

- Relied on a system of participatory initiatives on different scales
- Allowed citizen claims to grow from the local to the national scale
- Adopted different approaches to participation
- Took advantage of the knowledge transfer and production in informal arenas
The analysis takes into consideration the socio-political context wherein NPB was designed and implemented in order to provide insights for situated improvements and broader debate. The analysis is based on the review of scientific and grey literature in this field of study, and relies on the collection of data about the NPB (official documents, website, and social networks), fieldwork, and a personal interview with the Secretary (on the 31st of October 2017). Limits of the discussion should be considered due to some data that had not been made publicly available, namely: number and sociodemographic characterisation of participants in each open meeting; model of participation adopted in each open meeting; geographical origin and sociodemographic characterisation of voters; disaggregation between votes for national and regional projects. Lastly, as the implementation of projects funded in the first edition of NPB was being run at the time when this chapter was written, no evidence can be shared on this stage of the process.

**Did the NPB rely on a system of participatory initiatives on different scales?**

The national government based its decision to promulgate the NPB on the extensive dissemination of PBs at the local level, as confirmed by the Secretary (personal interview). Dissemination was further supported by the recent constitution of the network gathering local authorities that implement PBs and/or other typologies of citizen participation in policy-making (more information at: www.portugalparticipa.pt). From this background, the national government issued the NPB together with two additional PBs on a national scale: the PB for youth and the PB for schools. Both PBs were implemented in 2017 and, like the NPB, were confirmed for their second edition in 2018.  

Despite the flourishing of PBs on both local and national scales in the country, formal connections among them were not unleashed by national and local governments. The three PBs at the national level were managed separately by State Secretaries and other governmental bodies. Compared to the deliberative system of participatory institutions in Brazil, there were no links between national PBs and other participatory initiatives that, in the Portuguese case, could be represented by local PBs. Although the Secretary sought wide agreement with governmental bodies on the institutional design of the NPB, and received support from the Regional Commissions for Coordination and Development (CCDRs) in the dissemination of the process with local authorities, the reproduction of some Portuguese political/administrative legacies was evident in the design of the process.

In particular, the echo of national centralisation and local dispersion of political powers (Ruivo et al., 2011) emerged from the management of the NPB. The

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6 The autonomous region of Azores further announced the implementation of a regional PB in 2018: https://op.azores.gov.pt/
assessment of the proposals was exclusively conducted by ministries and other appointed governmental bodies for each one of the six policy areas. Local authorities only played a marginal role, essentially concerned with the organisation of the open meetings. As regards the implementation of the projects, no available information was provided by the Secretary on the ways in which different agents and agencies should be engaged and coordinated. The plausible involvement of CCDRs and local actors, including their proponents, lacks public guidance in the NPB covenant. In fact, no common rules were shared on the establishment of public–public and public–private partnerships for the implementation of the projects. As proof of this, the governmental bodies devoted to the analysis of proposals in the science policy area opened a call for the implementation of the three winning projects (more information at: www.cienciaviva.pt/concurso/oppciencia/). However, this was not the case for the projects in the other policy areas, corroborating a lack of common rules at this stage.

In summary, the centralisation of management by the national government, and the marginal role of regional (CCDRs) and local authorities in the NPB reproduced historical legacies of national centralisation and local dispersion of the political/institutional system in Portugal. Despite the extensive dissemination of PBs at the local level and the enactment of three national PBs, these initiatives were legally issued, politically managed and institutionally designed out of a comprehensive system that could articulate agents and agencies of participation.

Did the NPB allow citizen claims to grow from the local to the national scale?

The first edition of the NPB relied on the organisation of fifty open meetings around the country where citizens were invited to present their ideas. The strategy for dissemination incorporated a wide range of channels and actions, including a bus that travelled around the country to advertise the NPB ahead of the open meetings. The selection aimed to include both urban and rural contexts, as well as both interior and coastal cities. The implementation of local PBs in the cities that hosted the open meetings was not considered as a criterion for the selection. Meetings were coordinated by the Secretary in partnership with local authorities and/or other local agencies, and were announced, in advance, on the NPB website and social networks, supported by additional dissemination made at the local level. The locations for the meetings were identified according to criteria of public visibility and accessibility.

Each open meeting allowed citizens to present their ideas according to a variable model of participation. Both one-off presentations and/or round-tables were set up at the meetings. The former relied on the expertise provided by “Ignite Portugal”, an NGO contracted to assist citizens in briefly presenting their ideas to
other participants. While citizens were often required to provide online presentations about their ideas, implying some preparation prior to the meeting, round-tables did not require any particular training and rather relied on the sharing of lay knowledge. The model of participation was variably implemented, and no official information was made available on rules and outputs at each meeting.

After the proposal stage, citizens were encouraged to campaign and get support from other citizens in order to get funding for their projects. Focus on the competition of non-organised citizens’ ideas has been greatly emphasised by the Secretary through mottos like «Do not let the others decide for you», which appeared in NPB social networks. The Secretary further provided a standard kit for citizen campaigns. The kit included standard images to be used by citizens to publish, in their personal online campaigns, the name and code number associated with their proposals.

Figure 3 – Sample of materials provided with the kit for citizens’ campaign

Source: www.opp.gov.pt

Considering the model of participation promoted by the first edition of the NPB, some considerations should be made as to which version of scaling up was actually promoted. According to Avritzer and Ramos (2016) a strong version of scaling up allows the construction of an enlarged sphere of deliberation, while a weak version of scaling up reduces such
potential by transferring citizen claims from the local to the national level without intermediation. The implementation of a model of participation focussed on the competition of ideas that were not processed from the local to the national scale through other participatory initiatives and/or intermediating figures, configured the scaling up of the NPB as a weak version. Considering that weak versions, according to the authors (ibid.), may decrease the chances of creating an enlarged public sphere on a supra-scale, the NPB may use the opportunity to improve additional mechanisms of deliberation in future editions.

Did the NPB adopt different approaches to participation?
The NPB drew inspiration from the key pillars of the institutional design of PBs implemented at the local level. More pointedly, the PB implemented in 2007/2008 by the Municipality of Lisbon was the main source of inspiration for other municipalities in the country, as well as for the NPB. As with local PBs, non-organised citizens were invited to submit and campaign for their ideas in order to find support in the voting phase. Unlike Brazil, no intermediation of delegates or councillors was included in the model of participation either at the local or national level. PBs were rather disseminated throughout the country by putting emphasis on the provision of power to propose and vote ideas, according to the framework discussed above.

The Secretary confirmed the centrality of citizens in the NPB by arguing that the main goal of the process was to strengthen citizen trust towards the government, rather than improve associated forms of active citizenship (personal interview). The centrality of non-organised citizens requires, however, more understanding on the societal dynamics engendered within and produced by the model of participation. Whereas in local PBs citizens mainly rely on proximity networks to seek wider consensus on their proposals, different forms and extents of support are needed on larger scales. Most probably, NPB-driven campaigns relied on either existing groups or on new networks created in support of the proposals according to the capacity – and the “social capital” – of the proponents.

On the one hand, the creation of new networks has provided great opportunities for the NPB to induce social mobilisation around the process. On the other, the constitution of strong networks could work in detriment to the full participation of all citizens, and potentially hijack the NPB thanks to large bases of support. Scholars confirm that the constitution of similar coalitions carries risks of marginalisation of citizens with reduced access to socioeconomic resources, possibly resulting in the exclu-

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8 Notably, this transference was also made possible by substantive contingencies as the head of the Secretary was the political councillor in charge of the PB in the Municipality of Lisbon (2009–2015) and, seemingly, the current Prime Minister was the former mayor of Lisbon (2007–2015).
sion of large sectors of civil society from the process (Swyngedow et al., 2002). In the first edition, an indication was given of the need to reinforce the debate on such risks because there was some discontent with one of the two winning projects at the national level, regarding the promotion of the Portuguese tradition of bullfighting as a cultural heritage, which saw the opposition of environmentalists and animal protection groups. In summary, further discussion is needed on the model of participation enacted by the NPB. Great emphasis on the competition of ideas among non-organised citizens has encouraged the self-organisation of networks. Although self-organised societal dynamics could positively feed NPB with new ideas, the risk that strong networks might shadow the full participation of all citizens – specially those with fewer socioeconomic resources and the opportunity to perform successful campaigns – should be more attentively considered in future editions.

Did the NPB take advantage of the knowledge transfer and production in informal arenas?

Previous discussion has made clear that the emphasis on the participation of non-organised citizens relies on citizen capacity to mobilise their groups or create new networks. This capacity stems from their socioeconomic resources, opportunity to devote time to campaigning, as well as to their social capital (cf. Putnam, 1995). From the conception of ideas to the final stage of voting, such “informal arenas” were originated, fed, and possibly dissolved without any formal interaction with the NPB. Although influencing the entire course of the NPB informally, those arenas lobbied their outputs and never formally intervened before, during, or after the process.

The creation of such informal arenas around the NPB should be more attentively observed. On the one hand, the Secretary encouraged people to connect with each other and virtually cover long distances across the country on behalf of common projects to be implemented. On the other, the achievement of this goal was not consistently supported by the institutional design of the NPB, and there was no strategy for the sustainability of this (new form of) social capital. However, the creation of new alliances among citizens implied circulating knowledge and information that could be beneficial to the NPB, and to the government at large.

9 The project aims to catalogue and classify bullfights in Portuguese municipalities, while promoting the reestablishment of the national culture of bullfight (more information at: https://opp.gov.pt/winners2017)
As pointed out by Mendoça (2016), the improvement of the connectivity between informal and formal areas of participation could rely on the role of figures devoted to transferring knowledge within and between groups, networks, and coalitions. However, the lack of formal intermediators in the NPB may have reduced the chances of dialogue between informal and formal arenas. The role of intermediators could be of help in addressing this goal, and could further make sure that these arenas fairly attain goals of social justice within, against the use (or abuse) of discretionary powers that could generate the exclusion of the most disadvantaged sectors of civil society.

In summary, the constitution of informal arenas that influences the course of the NPB has opened the doors of knowledge transfer and production among citizens that were not adequately incorporated by the NPB. One of the reasons this did not occur was the lack of official intermediating figures between citizens and national government. The inclusion of these figures in future editions could increase the chances of connectivity between formal and informal arenas, and decrease the risks related to discretionary powers played within them.

**Conclusions**

NPB represents a sound attempt to scale up PB and contribute to the expansion of the culture of citizen participation in policymaking in the country. There is evidence that confirms the existence of a fertile ground of local PBs in the country, currently reaching world records when considering the ratio between number of processes and number of local authorities. Furthermore, the implementation of PBs at the national level — the NPB, the PB for youth and the PB for schools — proves that Portugal is today one of the most vibrant contexts in this field of study and practice.

In order to contribute to the ongoing debate on scaling up citizen participation in policymaking, the analysis of the institutional design of the first edition of the NPB was contrasted with literature on the Brazilian deliberative system, and on the state PB in Rio Grande do Sul. More pointedly, the analysis of the NPB aimed to understand whether and to what extent the process relied on a system of participatory initiatives on different scales; allowed citizen claims to grow from the local to the national scale; relied on different approaches to participation; took advantage of the knowledge transfer and production in informal arenas.
The discussion shed light on opportunities and challenges retrievable from the first edition of the NPB, which aim to foster larger debate in future editions. Formal articulation of the NPB from national to lower scales was limited, while the role of CCDRs and local authorities was reduced in the management of the process. The lack of democratically elected governmental bodies between municipalities and national government eventually reproduced legacies of national centralisation and local dispersion of power. The absence of a comprehensive system where PBs implemented on both national and local scales could find common institutional arrangements is challenging for future editions.

The lack of formal intermediating figures between citizens and national government could help balance the role, over the course of the NPB, played by informal arenas, which are constituted in support of citizen proposals. Furthermore, and despite the support provided by the Secretary to the creation of such arenas, opportunities to take advantage of knowledge transfer and production within them could be improved through such figures. Increasing the connectivity among informal arenas, as well as between them and the government, may result in greater supervision over the discretionary power held by informal arenas, specially with regard to the full inclusion of all citizens.

If the NPB is addressed to reinforce the quality of democracy, then future debate should focus on what the quality consists of and how its attainment is operationalised. As the insights discussed in this chapter confirm, the improvement of the NPB cannot help but reflect on the effective capacity to promote economic and social cohesion through its model of participation, as stated in its goals. More pointedly, the main argument defended in this text is that without the constitution of intermediating figures between citizens and the NPB, within a reframed strategy of interconnections with governments on lower scales (as well as with other participatory initiatives), risks of social exclusion are likely to continue to be underestimated.

Great opportunities for the NPB to develop changes in the future should not be undertaken without further research on new evidence and additional comparisons with international cases. Beyond sharing knowledge about the NPB with the international community of researchers, decision-makers, and citizens, the insights shared in this chapter will hopefully contribute with new evidence from Portugal to the scientific debate on scaling up citizen participation in policymaking.
The Schools Participatory Budgeting (SPB) in Portugal

Pedro Abrantes, Alexandra Lopes & José Manuel Baptista

The Schools Participatory Budgeting (SPB) was a political measure, announced by the Portuguese government in March 2016 and implemented, for the first time, in the network of public schools during the school year of 2016-17, in order to promote:

1. Democratic practices, values and skills;
2. The sense of school belonging, responsibility and well-being;
3. Financial literacy and entrepreneurship.

This measure acknowledges the young people’s right to be involved in community life, and the need of innovative actions to assure this right, reinforcing skills, trust and participation in democratic institutions. Such involvement shall start at school, where young people spend most of their time in our societies and where they must have an active voice in the management decisions and project development. As established in the Portuguese National Strategy for Citizenship Education, also launched in 2017, this policy considers that it is not sufficient to learn citizenship and democracy by the books, through traditional methodologies, but that it is fundamental to experience it in concrete mechanisms of the institutions where young people take part, first of all, at school. In order to achieve this goals of citizenship and democracy, the role of educators is fundamental to support students’ participation, but, and as defined in SPB, proposals shall be developed by students, according to their own ideas, preferences and needs. Besides, this measure is also a path to engage students and foster their sense of belonging and responsibility at their own schools.
and communities, promoting de-centralizing policies and specially school autonomy, linking students to the decision-making in their own school. Therefore, each school have its specific Participatory Budgeting, expressing its particular reality, and students’ proposals shall be oriented towards their own schools improvement and regulations have some flexibility to be applied by each school according to their specific characteristics.

This programme also contributes to an increasing concern about the development of financial literacy skills. By taking part in the management of the school budget, students not only develop citizenship values and practices, but also deal with the concept of budget, as well as other associated concepts as expenses, revenues, priority or efficiency. And actually one of the interesting dimensions of this initiative is exactly to raise awareness among young people that political–civic participation and economic management are not worlds apart, but they are intertwined in current (democratic) societies.

Although interesting experiences were already developed in early ages in a smaller scale, this measure was oriented towards young people, aged 12–18, that is, the 3rd cycle of basic education (7th to 9th grades) and secondary students of all educational pathways (10th to 12th grades), since it is based on students’ autonomy and some basic skills previously acquired. Still, one important principle was to include, under the same rules, students from all tracks of secondary education, including both vocational and scientific–humanistic paths.

**Procedures**

After listening the educational administration services and a sample of school headmasters, the main procedures of the School Participatory Budgeting were defined for all public schools with lower and/or upper secondary students in Portugal (around 1200 schools), by the Dispatch 436-A/2017, from January 6.

The main rules defined in this procedure are the following:

1. Each public school budget has a supplementary amount provided by the State, calculated according to the number of students in the 3rd cycle of basic education (7th to 9th grade) and in the secondary education (10th to 12th grade) and only able to be used if the SPB rules are followed;
2. This amount may be complemented by school own funds, municipal or other community contributions;

3. All students from the 3rd cycle of basic education and in the secondary education (in many countries, designated lower and upper secondary) shall be informed, by their schools, about the initiative and supported in their will to develop proposals and to vote on their preferences;

4. Proposals to use this budget must be designed, submitted and voted by the students in the abovementioned levels (elections shall be held in the Students’ Day, on March 24, or in the nearest possible day);

5. Proposals shall benefit school services, equipment and/or educational activities, being a resource for the whole school community;

6. These proposals have to be viable, considering the budget available, the existing rules and the school projects, and they shall be endorsed by at least 5% of the students in the referred education levels;

7. The proposal with more votes shall be selected and implemented (if the budget enable it, the following more voted ones may be also selected).

In order to accomplish this rule, the following steps shall be followed in each school:

**January**
- **SPB launch**
  - Launch event in school
  - Information to all students
  - Budget amount definition
  - Local coordinator assigned

**February**
- **Proposals development**
  - Debates in classes and other school spaces
  - Students signatures collected
  - Proposal written and submitted assigned

**March**
- **Election**
  - Election commission assigned
  - Proposals improvement
  - Campaigns and debates
  - Elections (on March 24)

**Apr. – Dec.**
- **Implementation of the winning proposal(s)**
Local and national structures
The local coordinator (the school principal or a teacher designated by him/her) has a key role:

a) promoting students' and teachers' involvement and overcoming issues and doubts raised by them, in the first stage;

b) analysing the proposals presented by students, if necessary, supporting them to improve their proposals (for instance, making them viable and/or merging similar proposals) and excluding at the end those proposals that does not meet the minimum requirements, in a second stage;

c) assuring – with the support of a group of students assigned by the school board – that elections take place, and all students may vote according to the democratic SPB rules;

d) supporting the implementation of the winning proposals, in the last stage.

There is also a national supporting structure, composed by the following services of the Ministry of Education:

a) DG Schools (DGEstE), responsible for schools information, orientation and monitoring concerning the SPB;

b) Institute for Financial Management of Education (IGeFE), responsible for providing and supervising schools budget, including the amount devoted to the SPB;

c) General-Inspectorate of Education and Science (IGEC), responsible for the schools evaluation, including a particular procedure to evaluate the SPB in a sample of schools.
To disseminate this initiative it was also created, in 2016–2017 for the first edition, a national media campaign, specially oriented towards students, including:

- a Facebook page – www.facebook.com/opescolas – enhancing students’ participation and disseminating good local initiatives;

- an Whatsapp account – 910106937 – in order to contest to students’ doubts and concerns;

- a webpage – www.opescolas.pt – to inform all interested people, including students, teachers, parents, journalists, etc.

**School Participatory Budgeting in Portugal (first edition, 2016–17): key figures**

The first edition included two monitoring procedures developed by the DG Schools and involving all public schools, in February and in May 2017, in order to assess the implementation of the process. In October, Inspectorate–General for Education and Science included some questions about the implementation of this measure in the sample of schools regularly analysed in the programme for Organization of the School Year Assessment (OAL). In November, there was a third follow–up procedure, run by the Institute for Financial Management of Education, focused on the administrative and financial transference held during the year according to SPB rules. Finally, in the first semester of 2018, the Inspectorate–General for Education and Science developed a specific programme to evaluate how this measure was implemented, including visits to a random sample of around 20% of schools to a more in–depth analysis.

This measure aimed to involve:

- 1 127 schools (all public schools with lower and upper secondary)
- 530 853 students (all students in public 3rd cycle of basic education and in secondary education)
- 720 710 € available for schools
The monitoring survey carried out in the beginning of May 2017 has shown that, in this first year, at least:

- 1,046 schools implemented the SPB (93%)
- 4,371 proposals were submitted by students (80% considered acceptable by schools)
- 1,021 schools democratically elected students’ proposals (91%)
- 221,063 students have voted for SPB (46%)

A key element of the process was the diversified ways used by schools, specially during January and February, to disseminate information and involve students. Almost all schools (85%) requested that teachers inform students about the initiative and used flyers and posters in visible areas of the buildings. Most of them used also the school website, social networks and e-mails to spread information on this initiative (74%) and involved students through special sessions and debates (64%). Many schools used also classes for the proposals development and debate (47%) or involved students’ association in the dissemination process (41%).

Proposals were mostly focused on the acquisition of equipment and improvement of leisure and sociability spaces for students within schools (51%), although there were many proposals also on sports equipment (20%), improvement of school services (13%), educational resources (12%) and extracurricular activities (12%).

According to IGEC assessment on the Organization of the School Year, in October 2017, around half of the schools already had implemented the winning proposals from the election in the end of March. And the IGeFE supervision developed in November observed an execution rate of 95% of the available funds, not meaning that all measures were fully implemented, but that financial resources were already transferred and allocated to planned interventions.

Another interesting figure: from the 4,371 proposals submitted by students, 1,436 (around 1/3) were actually updated by the authors with the support of the local coordination, improving its quality, clarity and viability, while 883 (20%) were excluded by the coordin-

1 The reference “at least” is due to the fact that schools that not answer to the survey (around 3%) were considered as not developing the SPG, which may be not always the case. For instance, these schools may have experienced electronic problems not allowing to answer before the deadline.
nation before the election, due to not meeting the SPB requirements. This is important in order to assure quality standards, concerning particularly the viability of the proposals, and therefore assuring that voted proposals are actually clear and able to be implemented, but also because the involvement of students in the improvement of their own proposals are very important opportunities to develop skills in negotiation and project development.

Finally, regarding the impacts of this initiative, according to the DG–EsTE monitoring procedure, 82% of the principals considered that “SPB contributed to the awareness and civic education of many students” and 69% stated that “SPB meant an effective improvement on students’ rights and participation in the school life”.

Media coverage

There was a good media coverage of this initiative, highlighting the ability of students to participate in the improvement of their own schools, the main rules of the initiative, and some debates and proposals developed in schools (see some of the main news published in Portuguese newspapers in the annex “caderno de imprensa – OPE2017”). There was a significant interest in the beginning of January, when the initiative was officially launched by the government and all schools were invited to participate. A new interest was raised in mid–February with the symbolic presence of the Minister and Secretaries of State of Education in some schools, to attend to debates among students about their needs, preferences and how to elaborate proposals. Some reports were also broadcasted in national TV and radio channels. Finally, some news were published since the end of March with references to public sessions where the winning proposals were introduced.

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Concluding remarks

The introduction of the School Participatory Budgeting in the Portuguese educational system, in 2017, was an innovative and successful experience, generating an effective opportunity for students’ democratic participation and development of civic (and financial) skills, as it was observed in the monitoring outcomes, briefly presented in this chapter.

It is important to stress that this was not an isolated measure, but it is integrated with other related initiatives as the elaboration of the Students’ Profile at the End of Compulsory Education, the National Strategy for Citizenship Education or the replication in thousands of schools of the Students’ Voice initiative. In different and complementary ways, these measures are improving the democratic character of our schools and creating effective opportunities for young generations to develop civic and democratic skills. This is established as one of the core goals of our educational system but it was until recently left to the voluntarism of some teachers and students, in many schools understood as a vague and declared aim, but actually only converted in concrete actions in occasional events, in contrast with the compulsory and routine activities focused on the learning of specific subjects, as Mathematics, Portuguese, etc. Consequently, the current initiatives are very significant, since they aim to include all schools and students, putting democracy at the heart of the school life.

Currently, the second edition is taking place and it will be interesting to observe if the effect of novelty is progressively adopted in the regular life of the more than 1,000 schools of the public network offering the 3rd cycle of basic and/or secondary education.
Youth Participatory Budgeting – Portugal

Carlos Paz

Introduction
When we speak about young people, we are referring to a diversified and heterogeneous group in society that gathers several identities and educational experiences. However, the distinction between youth and adulthood is culturally defined and changes across time.¹ Youth participation promotes a sense of citizenship and makes political decision-making processes more accountable to young people. At the same time, it helps young people to strengthen up their self-confidence, to develop creativity and to develop skills that matters in the labour market, such as communication, negotiation and teamwork, in a practical environment.
Youth participation patterns vary across cultures, times and places. Almost all the Participatory Budgeting in Europe, back in the 90s, had a top-down root, which means they were promoted by political power or public administration, aiming to establish new alliances and partnerships between organizations of proximity and social fabric, as well as new cross-sectorial ways of governing.
In several cases, Participatory Budgeting, are limited both in thematic and territorial scope.
In the majority of European Participatory Budgeting, participants just had margin to propose new investments or changes in public policies but not deciding on how public resources are invested.
Mostly of these European Participatory Budgeting set a limited number of specific goals and do not aim to reduce traditional limitations of democratic life, as in: the lack of coordination between the different public sector branches, the lack of confidence in politicians, the marginalization of young people and immigrants in

political life, the growing inequality between territories and social groups and the lack of environmental awareness of citizens.

The first Portuguese experiences of Participatory Budgeting have always been labelled as tools towards the promotion of a democracy based on proximity.

Nowadays, one can speak about a second generation of Participatory Budgeting that emerged after 2008, giving visibility to experiences and typological families that go beyond the ideal of “democracy of proximity”. Nowadays’ state of art of Participatory Budgeting, in Portugal, does not limit to the promotion of public consulting mechanisms and it has a majority of co-decision-making experiences in order to suggest other forms of definition of public policies, in collaboration with citizens.

The Youth Participatory Budgeting Portugal (YPBP) is a process of democratic participation. It was stated by the State Budget Law and the 1st edition was organized in 2017, aiming to:

a) Improve the quality of democracy and its tools, valuing participatory democracy within the Portuguese Constitution framework;
b) Foster active and informed participation of young people in decision-making processes, favouring the existence of a strong and active civil society towards cohesive economic and social development and the subsequent life quality improvement;
c) Promote young people’s participation in the definition of the public policies that met their needs and are responsive to their opinions;
d) To reinforce education for citizenship and the sense of belonging to community, fostering responsible citizenship through making public administration closer to young people and involving them in the continuous definition of the res publica.

This initiative is a tool to stop the progressive and growing gap between young people and public participation, particularly regarding political participation, fostering the involvement of youth in political processes. YPBP aims to raise the perception of young people as an active part of society which benefits with policies that make young people to commit with collective decisions and to be watchdogs of political decisions. YPBP also intends to develop citizenship’ skills, in order to increase a sense of belonging to the whole society, as well as to contribute to literacy regarding financial and bureaucratic procedures regarding
the proposal, the decision and implementation of projects. Fed by several local Participatory Budgeting experiences, as well as innovative initiatives like the Participatory Budgeting Portugal – the legal basis for the Youth Participatory Budgeting Portugal, as well as the Schools Participatory Budget, and despite other several international experiences, YPBP is the first national Participatory Budgeting at a national level, specifically targeted to young people, globally speaking. Portuguese Republic was, then, a pioneer nation in the global plan, since there was never a project like this applied to the whole territory in any other nation. Actually, encouraging practices of young people’s participation are of great added value for society and YPBP is one of them, since it is a process to deepen participation, democracy and the informed choice of young citizens, taking into account their bigger spontaneity and creativity. For many, it is also the first time that are in touch with a decision-making process.

Methodology
Generally speaking, we will sum up the rules of this process in 2017 in the following topics:

a) YPBP was applied in the whole national territory;

b) The overall budget was of € 300.000,00. In 2018, the budget will be of 500.000,00€;

c) The proposals in 2017 respected the following criteria:

1. To fit in the thematic areas of inclusive sport; science education; social innovation and environmental sustainability;
2. To have a budget until the maximum ceiling of € 75,000,00;
3. Do not require the building of new infrastructures;
4. Do not ask for subsidies or involves a pre-established service supply;
5. To benefit more than one municipality;
6. To be concrete and applied in national territory;
7. To be technically feasible;
8. Do not go against the Government’s policy, or projects and programs already in course in the different policy fields;
9. To be proposed and voted by young people between 14 and 30 years old as long as they are national citizens or foreign citizens legally living in Portugal.

The 2017 edition of YPBP had the following calendar:

**Phase I – Proposal submission**

Young people could submit their proposals from 2nd October and 29th October 2017, in the Participatory Meetings and online in the website [opjovem.gov.pt](http://opjovem.gov.pt). The participatory meetings were organized in partnership with the National Youth Council and the National Federation of Youth Organizations.

**Participatory Meetings**

There were organized 20 Participatory Meetings, one in each district capital as well in the Autonomous Regions of Madeira and Azores. The designed methodology was shared with all the regional teams of IPDJ, I.P. and it was based in the following phases:

a) Participants’ reception, which was endured by two officers of the regional services of IPDJ, I.P.;
b) Introducing the Youth Participatory Budgeting Portugal – methodology and themes;
c) Group working – participants discuss and present their ideas or look for answers for their doubts about YPBP or their proposals;
d) Proposals’ submission – participants are invited to introduce to the plenary a summary of their ideas.

Evaluation – participants filled a survey about their engagement in the process. Young people that submitted their proposals online
also answered this survey. The data was used to profile participants in the edition of 2017 of YPBP.

Besides these participatory meetings, self-organized meetings, promoted by youth organizations, were also encouraged.

Participants in Meetings

Young people from 142 municipalities participated in the 20 Participatory Meetings, which represent 46,1% of the overall Portuguese Municipalities. Faro and Funchal represented 1/5 of the total participation in the meetings. The districts of Faro, Viana do Castelo, Porto and the Island of Madeira were the territories that were able to mobilize a great number of participants but that were also able to assure the presence of young people of more than a half of the municipalities in each district/Island.

The average age of the participants in meetings was 23 years old and the average age of the participants that submitted proposals was of 17 years old. In the districts of Santarém and Faro, the average age of the participants was below 20 years old. Concerning participants’ sex, there is no profound difference between sexes, with males representing a little more than half of the participants (52%). More than 2/5 of the participants has a university degree and 45,2% have a high school diploma. Most of the participants were students (61%) and ¼ has a job. The great majority of the participants are members of non governmental organizations, 61% being active in those organizations and 3% with no relevant role.
This fact was probably due to the communication channels that were used to disseminate information among young people – through youth organizations. The number of youth organizations that were targeted with information regarding YPBP is impressive and underlines the solid network between regional structures of IPDJ and youth organizations.²

Participants in Online Assessment

There were 1440 persons that have answered the online assessment. Participants live in 142 different municipalities and 1/3 are from districts of Porto and Lisboa. The average age was of 22 years-old and the majority of participants were from 18 years old to 21 years old. There were differences in participation according to sex, with the slight majority of participants (57%) being female (the opposite of what happened in the participatory meetings). In the online participation, 45,3% of participants had a university degree (more than the ones in the participatory meetings) and 42,8% had a high school diploma. More than 2/3 of the online participants are still studying and 20,1% are employed. 71% of the participants did not belong or participate in any youth or non-governmental organization, the opposite of what happened in the participatory meetings, which demonstrates that online participation contributes to the diversity of the targets.

Online participation also helps to widen the public participation of young people, since 12% of the participants in the YPBP have never or barely voted in local, regional or national elections. Concerning European elections, 27.8% of the participants answered that have never voted for European Parliament.  
YPBP can, thus, be seen as a tool that helps to strengthen up the relations between the elected politicians and young people, rebuilding trust and increasing the levels of democratic participation. Getting to know YPBP through internet is more frequent than other sources, such as the mobilization for the participatory meetings. Schools and universities remain important spaces for awareness. 1/5 of the online respondents report schools as the source of information about YPBP.

**Phase II – Technical analysis**

From 30 October until 06 November of 2017, public administration services in the four thematic areas, endured a technical analysis, taking into account the predetermined standards and specifications. The selected proposals were the ones that could evolve into projects to be voted by young citizens.

**Submitted proposals**

Young people could submit proposals in www.opjovem.gov.pt or in the regional services of IPDJ, filling the form. 424 proposals were submitted. The majority of the proposals were about social innovation (40%), a quarter was about environmental sustainability, followed closely by inclusive sports (21%) and 14% were about education for sciences. There were selected 169 projects.

**Selected projects**

The final list was published with 167 approved projects to be voted. The majority of approved projects (40%) were in the area of Environmental Sustainability, followed by Education for Sciences (28%), Inclusive Sport (19%) and social innovation (14%).

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The majority of the approved projects (29%) were designed to be implemented at a national level and 1% intended to involve 2 or more regions. 19% of the projects were approved for the Centre Region and 16% for the North Region.

The biggest approval rate was in projects to be developed in Azores, with 56%, followed by the North Region (48%), Centre (44%), Algarve (38%), Alentejo (37%), Lisboa and Tagus Valley (30%) and Madeira (30%).

Concerning budget, the majority of the approved projects was between 12.000 and 20.000€ (32%), followed by the ones that represent a budget between €22.000 and €41.000 (25%). The projects between 6.000 and 10.000€ and also the ones between 50.000 and 60.000€ represents 13% and the ones below 5000€ and above 70000€ represent 9%.

Phase III – Public Consultation
The provisional list of the projects to be voted was published online, so that the results could be known by the parties concerned. This phase had the following calendar:

06 November – provisional list published;
From 07 until 16 November – period for complaints and appeals;
From 17 until 24 November – reevaluation and possible rectification of the proposals;
27 of November – publishing of the final list of projects.
Phase IV – Voting
From 27 November until 22 December 2017, voting was opened at a national level. Young people could vote in the YPBP website and through a free of charge SMS system. About ten thousand of young people have voted during the process. There were seven winner projects, which summed 4000 votes, with a rate approval about 44,5%.

Phase V – Presentation of the outcomes
The ceremony of presentation of the outcomes took place in 8th January 2018, at the Lisbon Youth Centre, one of the 11 awarded centres with the Youth Quality Label of the Council of Europe. It was an informal moment, targeted at young people, in the scenario of the online show “Maluco Beleza” presented by a well-known entertainer, Rui Unas. The show counted with the participation of João Paulo Rebelo, Secretary of State of Youth and Sports and Tiago Brandão Rodrigues, Minister of Education, as well as the young winners of this Youth Participatory Budgeting Portugal.
The winner projects

In this first edition of Youth Participatory Budgeting Portugal, that counted with a budget of 300,000€, there were the following winners.

a) Liga–te à Pateira (“Connect yourself to Pateira”) – a project to be implemented in the municipalities of Águeda and Aveiro, in the field of environmental sustainability;
b) Arribeirar – a project to be implemented in the municipalities of Águeda, Aveiro and Oliveira do Bairro in the field of environmental sustainability;
c) O Grande Livro do Parque (“The great book of the Park”) – a project to be implemented in the municipalities of Águeda, Aveiro and Oliveira do Bairro in the field of environmental sustainability;
d) Banco de Ajudas Técnicas Desportivas (“Technical and Sports Aid Bank”) – a project to be implemented at the national level.
e) Minhotacleta – a project to be implemented in the municipalities of Viana do Castelo and Caminha, in the field of environmental sustainability;
f) App Caderneta do Aluno (‘App Students’ Book) – a project to be implemented at a national level, in the field of education for sciences;
g) Gym4All – a project to be implemented in the municipalities of Seia, Oliveira do Hospital and Gouveia, in the field of Inclusive Sport.
The municipalities of Águeda and Aveiro were the most benefited, since 3 of the winner projects are to be implemented there. The Region that benefited more in what concerns budget was the Centre Region, with 51% of the total budget (152,000€) in the projects to be implemented there. The projects to be implemented at a national level were granted with 83,000€ and the ones that benefited more than one region have been granted 20% of the overall budget (60,000€).

**The young winners’ profile**

The 7 winner projects were submitted by 10 proponents – 8 female and 2 male – between 15 and 28 years-old, with the average age being 22 years old. Concerning the education level, 2 of them had a bachelor degree, 1 of them a master degree, 2 had a high school diploma and 2 had completed the 3rd cycle of the Basic Education. Half of the proponents were from the municipality of Águeda, 2 of them from Viana do Castelo, and Torres Vedras, Abrantes and Seia had one proponent living in each municipality.

**Analysis on the future**

United Nations promote democratic Governance as a set of values and principles that must be followed towards a greater participation, equality, safety and development. This position is founded in the freedom of expression of the people and it is deeply connect to the rule of Law, as well with human rights and fundamental freedoms. Democracy and democratic governing practices mean that human rights and freedoms are respected, promoted and assured so all can live in dignity. People have a say in the decision-making processes that influence their lives. Democratic Governance is the process of creating and sustaining an environment for inclusive and responsive political processes. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of United Nations in 1948, had set the concept of democracy saying that the “will of the people must be the basis for authority of a Government”. People between 15 and 25 years old represent 1/5 of the entire world population. In the developing countries, the numbers are even bigger, since the majority of young people live in countries of low or average income.
Nevertheless, studies show a decrease of interest of young people in political issues, decrease of the levels of participation in elections, political parties and social organizations world-wide. This is true both for mature democracy as well as for emerging democracies.

Concerning this question, the former Secretary-General of United Nations, Ban–Ki moon, in 2016, had targeted young people in his speech:

“Take control of your faith and transform your dreams in a better future for all. To contribute and to build better democratic societies. Work together, use your creativity and become architects of a future that does not leave anyone behind. Help your world to start a path in direction of a brighter future”.4

Life–long learning and education perform an important role in the improvement of participation in democratic life. Young people learn about democracy in non–formal activities, engaging in a cub of young people, a youth centre or a sports club, developing skills that contribute to their employability. Although the ability to adjust and reform a participatory cycle in time has to be considered a key component of resilience and durability of a participatory budget, that does not always live side by side with the maximization of possibilities to contribute to the root of the participatory institute.

A Participatory Budgeting should be understood as a process in continuous evolution, prepared to correct what needs to be corrected and to transform challenges into opportunities. The Youth Participatory Budgeting Portugal had contributed with the innovation of being a national–level activity, pioneer in the whole world, what reinforces the need of keeping itself as a dynamic public policy, open to the progressive introduction of reforms that help to strengthen up its deliberative dimension and institutional sustainability. That requires a very careful attention by the promoter, maintaining a system of evaluation of the different phases of the Youth Participatory Budgeting Portugal, so they can provide evidence that could feed political decisions.

Considering the very positive experience of the first edition of Youth Participatory Budgeting Portugal, it is expected a greater participation from young people in the second edition. The Youth Participatory Budgeting Portugal is a fundamental tool of civic and democratic participation of young people, contributing, thus, with its ideas and projects, for the local and national development as well to the modernization of Public Administration.

Democratization of the public investment in Chile: The case of the participatory budgeting in the region de Los Ríos, Chile

Egon Montecinos

Abstract
The participatory budgeting born in Latin America, specifically in Brazil in the year 1989, expanding gradually along the continent. Its implementation has been variable, so much between countries as also to the inside of each one of them. The Chilean case has been characterized for that the experiences of participatory budgeting, have been in municipalities, not existing up to the date experiences in other levels of government. There are more than 40 municipalities, of different political affiliation and it has supported from the year 2001 up to the date. Experiences have not existed in regional governments. For this reason, it is relevant to know the dynamics of this unpublished experience of participatory budgeting to regional scale. So, this article describes and analyzes the only case of participatory regional budgeting in Chile, developed from the year 2014 in the region de Los Ríos. The purpose the this paper is to explore the institutional design in order to identify the factors that influence in detonate democratic processes of the public investment to regional scale. The principal result the analysis of this case, is that as in the municipal experiences of participatory budgeting, the predominant factor for the origin and development is the political will of the leader or mayor. However, is observed the particularity of which the
initial empowerment of the social leaders, was determinant in order that this participatory mechanism has not been used as a strategy of cooption or of renovation of the political clientelism to territorial scale, since it has been demonstrated in most cases of this nature both in Chile and in Latin America. The used methodology was the study of case. The methodological used categories was on the origin and conditions of the participatory budgeting that elaborated Goldfrank, (2006), and Cabannes (2004) and that later is fused in Montecinos's work (2012 and 2014).

Key words: citizenship participation, participatory budgeting, democracy, decentralization, territory

Introduction
Chile, is one of the most centralized countries on the planet, in fact, together with Turkey (OECD members) share, at least until 2017, that their regional authorities are appointed and not elected by the citizens. Even in this centralist context, since 2001, various citizen participation initiatives have emerged, particularly participatory budgeting, but mostly in municipalities (Montecinos, 2012, Delamaza, 2010). In these cases, the political will of the mayors has been decisive for the origin, development and sustainability of the mechanism (Goldfrank, 2006, Montecinos, 2014 Delamaza, 2010), observing in some situations a pre-eminence of the cooptation of mayors over participatory processes, or a strategy of renewal of clientelism between authorities and citizens. Extremely influencing, specially the leader that drives it, in the groups to which the initiative is directed, the projects that can be chosen, or the way in which those projects are selected. At the regional level, in Chile there have been no experiences with participatory budgeting until 2014, when the first initiative of this nature was promoted in the Los Ríos Region. From the description and analysis of this experience, it is expected to identify the most influential factors to trigger democratic processes of public investment at the regional level, and to explore if there are any particularities that the process acquires at this level of government. In order to study the case, the methodological proposal on categorization of “origin and conditions” of the participatory budget, which was elaborated by Goldfrank (2006: 6), and Cabannes (2004: 30)
and which is subsequently merged into the work of Montecinos (2012: 72; 2014: 358). In this methodological proposal, the main variables that are considered in Participatory Budgeting studies are identified. The Participatory Budgeting implemented in the region of Los Ríos is an initiative that does not arise from a national public policy of citizen participation, but emerges as an initiative promoted from the regional level and that considers the decision on resources of that level of government. Hence, it allows evaluating the fundamental conditions for its development, in contexts of high administrative, political and fiscal centralism such as Chile.

The article is structured as follows. In the first part, some theoretical background is given on the participatory budgeting mechanism in Chile and Latin America. Subsequently, the subnational institutional design of Chile is characterized, to then go on to describe the case of participatory budgeting developed in the Los Ríos region, emphasizing in its main characteristics, regulation and operation. In the following section an analysis is made of the most relevant determining factors that determined the origin and development of the case in Chile, emphasizing the political will and the role of organized civil society.

**Participatory Budgeting in Chile and Latin America**

As is well known, the Participatory Budgeting emerged in Latin America, specifically in Brazil in 1989, gradually expanding throughout the continent. It went from being an experience led exclusively by leftist political parties, to being a tool used more broadly by governments from practically the entire political spectrum. Its implementation has been varied, both between countries and also within them. Most of them have been implemented in municipalities, with fewer cases at the regional level, mainly in Peru and Brazil. Regarding the normative scheme, in some cases it is constitutionally enshrined as in the Dominican Republic, in others national framework laws have been created as in Peru, as well as local regulations designed to regulate a process in a timely manner as in Chile, Colombia, Mexico among others (Montecinos, 2014: 362). Regarding its implementation, it ranges from consultative to other deliberative schemes. The Chilean case is more of a predominantly consultative nature, marked until 2014 by being applied only at the communal scale (Montecinos, 2011), without exploring another alternative be-
The Chilean case is more of a predominantly consultative nature, marked until 2014 by being applied only at the communal scale (Montecinos, 2011), without exploring another alternative beyond that level of government. The most outstanding cases in Chile are those of San Pedro de La Paz, Quillota, San Antonio and Villa Alemana. The first 3 for sustained progress in deliberative and municipal participatory management, and the fourth for the number of voters who call the process, arriving in 2016 to call more voters than in the election of mayors.

Research in Latin America on the factors or conditions that have favored its development, are focused on the communal sphere and leave the political will as the main determining factor for its origin, development and sustainability over time. Likewise, there is evidence that in some cases, specially when there is no empowered civil society, participatory budgeting is used as a strategy to renew political clientelism, rather than as a strategy to deepen democracy at the local level (Montecinos, 2014). The main characteristics of how this phenomenon is expressed in the local space, is that mayors have a great impact on the design of the mechanism, without leaving space for other political actors or civil society to build mechanisms aimed at deepening democracy. They guide the participatory process, mainly towards populations or sectors where they have greater political support, and impact on the projects that the community can decide.

On the other hand, with the exception of Brazil, there are few studies that address the regional level, given that regional experiences have been focused particularly in that country and in Peru. On the other hand, in Chile, the experiences of participatory budgeting have been mostly in municipalities, with no experiences to date at other levels of government. Hence, it is relevant to know the dynamics of this unprecedented regional Participatory Budgeting at the regional level.

**Institutional context in subnational governments in Chile**

Chile has historically been characterized as a highly centralized country. Municipalities are the only subnational level run by authorities elected by citizens. After the military dictatorship, as of 1992, mayors and councilors were re-elected as local representatives directly. Despite being effectively a case of political decentralization,
the lack of fiscal autonomy suffered by the municipalities is transformed into an important barrier to speak in ownership of an effective decentralized model (Montecinos, 2007). This translates into an important constraint for the inclusion of participatory innovations in management, as it can not satisfy the expectations generated by the processes, and can even become an element that plays against the possibility of re-election of the incumbent.

Even with this adverse institutional context, the first Chilean municipal experience of participatory budgeting was developed in the commune of Cerro Navia in the year 2001. From then on, the process has progressed slowly, reaching in 2016 a total of 40 communes, equivalent to less than 10% of the total number of municipalities in the country that have developed this mechanism. Of all of them, only 13 have been able to advance in a certain degree of institutionalization, by implementing them for for 3 consecutive years (Montecinos, 2014).

The other subnational level in Chile is that of the regional governments, (hereinafter gore), created in 1992 through the Constitutional Law No. 19,175 of regional government and administration, whose main source of project financing is the national fund for regional development. (hereinafter fnrd). Gore were initially proposed as a decentralized institution, with legal personality and its own assets. They are integrated by a regional executive, represented by the regional mayor, who is the direct representative of the president of the republic in the region. In addition, it is composed of a regional council, made up of regional councilors who until before 2013, were elected by the councilors of each commune, that is, indirectly by the citizens. The main function of the regional councilors is to approve projects that request financing from the fnrd. As of 2014 they are elected by universal suffrage.

From 1992 to 2013 the regional councilors were not elected by the citizens, which meant that the regional governments were transformed into a body of low political representation before the electorate, acting in practice as a project financier through the fnrd. In practice, with the creation of the regional governments in 1992, an attempt was made to carry out an administrative decentralization exercise and in a certain fiscal way, since the gore was granted the ability to decide about 10% of public investment total in the region. The remaining 90% is still invested in a region, through decen For example, only the ministry of public works in the region of the Riv～ers invests twice as much resources as the regional government.
While the fnod in 2016 invested just over 52 billion pesos, the public works ministry exceeded 107 billion. Tralized ministries or public services, such as the ministry of public works, housing, health, education, among others. For example, only the ministry of public works in the region of the Rivers invests twice as much resources as the regional government. While the year in 2016 invested just over 52 billion pesos, the public works ministry exceeded one billion.

Change in subnational institutional design

Since of 2014, a substantial change in the regional level of Chile is provoked. The regional councilors were elected directly by the citizens, which meant a great advance in democratization of this level of government. In short, this implied that from this date the citizens could choose the collegial authority, but not the regional mayor, which is the executive authority designated by the presidency of the republic. All this context, makes democratic or participatory innovations, such as Participatory Budgeting or other initiatives, practically null in this administrative unit.

The Participatory Budgeting at regional level: The case of the Los Ríos in Chile.

Chile has 345 municipalities and 15 regions. The Los Ríos region is one of the fifteen regions of Chile, located 800 kilometers south of Santiago, bounded on the north by the Araucanía region, on the east by Argentina, on the south by the Lagos region and the west with the pacific ocean. It has an area of 18,429.5 square km and a population of 384,575 people. The region is composed of the provinces of Valdivia and del Ranco, the regional capital is the city of Valdivia.

The Region of Los Ríos arose from the segregation of the province of Valdivia of the Los Lagos region on October 2, 2007, preceded by a social movement of more than 30 years that demanded to be a region. It has 12 communes: Valdivia, Corral, Mafil, Mariquina, Paillaco, Lanco, Panguipulli, Los Lagos, Rio Bueno, Lago Ranco, Futrono and La Union.

In 2014, a mechanism for participatory budgeting at the regional level was initiated in this region. The initiative sought to directly link citizen participation with the allocation of regional resources. This was how citizen participation was incorporated in the distribution of resources associated with a part of the fnod, which is the
main budget that the regions have for public investment and that is decided by the regional councilors. Specifically within this fund, there is a budget item called the local initiative regional fund (hereinafter fril), which was democratized and opened to the organized community. This modality was called “Fril Participativo”.

The local initiative regional fund: FRIL

What is the FRIL fund? For the year 2008, the law of budgets of the public sector, contemplated the creation of these funds, so that they finance projects presented by the municipalities of each region with a maximum investment of up to 2,000 monthly tributary units (approximately 92 million pesos, almost 140 thousand dollars). This fund was created to respond to the economic crisis of the country and maintain quick sources of employment, with the passage of time this budget item remained, being current to date.

There are two main characteristics of this fund. The first is that it finances projects that do not enter the national investment system, therefore, they do not require sectoral technical evaluation by the Ministry of Social Development. Second, they are projects approved by the regional council, which is quickly implemented and community infrastructure is financed, such as headquarters, squares, fields, sidewalks, rural medical stations, etc.

The FRIL fund is regulated through a regional regulation, which must be authorized by the regional comptroller of the republic. The regional executive, that is, the mayor, submits to the regional council (CORE) the proposed fril regulation, through which the mechanisms of resource distribution, types of projects to be financed, administrative procedures to regulate the investments, among others. The executive also raises the amount to allocate, whose minimum floor is determined in the budget law, being able to increase the corresponding line item by virtue of the agreement that the mayor can reach with the regional councilors. For example, the year 2014 in Los Ríos was allocated 5 billion pesos to fril, while in 2016 it was increased to 6 billion pesos. After deciding the amount destined to fril, the municipalities present their projects to the regional government, an organization that carries out a technical analysis of each of the initiatives. After this analysis, the initiatives declared feasible are presented to the regional council for approval or rejection. After that decision, the resources are transferred to the municipalities for execution.
Some of the criticisms that are made to this fund, is that it provides a window of opportunities for the development of clientelistic links, given that the main actors around these projects are the mayor, regional councilors and mayors, (to a lesser extent councilors). Many of the projects financed through this channel are focused on infrastructure that favors groups considered sensitive to clientele practices, such as neighborhood associations, groups of elderly people, rural groups, among others.

These funds and projects, regularly operate under a client logic. The decision on the works that are financed are highly arbitrary, and is subject to the will of an Intendant, or regional councilor or the type of relationship that these authorities have with mayors, councilors or social leaders who make requests for financing directly to these authorities. The projects that are financed have a high impact on citizens because they affect their immediate environment, which is why the value of these instruments is that they become a quick, cheap and effective mechanism for relations between the ruler and the governed.

Being a fund in which the projects presented by the municipalities are approved by the regional council, the representatives of this collegial body (today elected by the citizenship) become important veto players before mayors, councilors, social leaders and citizens. The substantive difference is that before the year 2013, when entering the initiatives to the core, each councilor became a veto player but to fulfill the commitments made with the councilors of each commune, since they elected them (also with the mayors). At present, this relationship of regional councilors is not mediated and is direct with the citizens.

Democratization of public investment: The proposal of “FRIL Participativo”

As of March 2014, the decisional structure of the fril was altered by this democratic innovation that modified the incentive system, but in favor of citizenship, and at the expense of the traditional clientelist structure. In 2014, the representative of the president of the republic in her capacity as regional mayor, expressed her interest in implementing a participatory budgeting mechanism at the regional level. It was in this region and in this institutional framework that a series of stages were implemented to materialize a mechanism of these characteristics, whose main objective was to make public investment transparent and democratizing, incorporating a new decisional actor: organized civil society.
The stages to incorporate a new institutional design, which did not have legal protection, and whose only sustenance was political will, began with the analysis of the current institutional context, where the windows of opportunities existing in the institutions of the current regional governments were reviewed. Thus, it was concluded that the most viable alternative to implement the Participatory Budgeting methodology was deep down, given that the amounts for each project were mid-range, thus making it easier to achieve regional piloting in a minor item amount. This is how the concept of participatory fril emerges.

After this decision and before being presented to the regional councilors, the proposal was presented to the organized civil society. A presentation of the initiative was made to the representatives of civil society organizations in the region. In this it was incorporated to representatives of the communal unions of the neighbors’ meetings and to representatives of the councils of the civil society of each commune, and to other social, union, sectoral and territorial representatives. In parallel to this process, the unit of citizen participation and Participatory Budgeting within the regional government This creation was made by administrative act of the intendant¹, and with the objective of giving an institutional design to the initiative.

This unit had as its main task to elaborate the participatory fril regulation which in its original version contemplated that 50% of the total fril resources would be decided and prioritized by the organized community. This proposal was widely rejected by the regional councilors in the session corresponding to the month of May of the year 2014, who considered that allocating 50% of traditional fril resources to participatory fril was too much for a participatory mechanism. After a political negotiation, and following the presence of the social leaders in the session of the regional council where this issue was addressed (those who widely supported this proposal), the approval of the regulation was achieved, finally remaining at 30% of the total resources destined to finance projects under the modality of FRIL participative.

After this proposal was approved, the regulation was sent to the regional comptroller of the republic for the taking of reason. This pro-

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¹ Exempt resolution, administrative act of the Regional Executive that may be repealed or replaced by another through the mere decision of the same actor. The approval of the organizational chart of the Regional Government by the Regional Council in 2016 allowed granting the Unit the status of permanent, thus ensuring its institutionalization, being modifiable only by agreement of the Council and the Regional Executive.
cess was not minor since it was an unprecedented institutional innovation at the national level. Therefore, it should be stated that the decision on the part of the citizens would have the status of advisory and that the binding sanction would be carried out by the municipal council, thus guaranteeing the agreement with the current legal system. Subsequently, the regular procedure for a regional regulation continued, that is, it was published in the official gazette, and came into force around August 2014. An important aspect of this stage was the dissemination of the new regulation to the relevant social actors, grouped together through the communal unions of neighborhood associations, and the communal councils of civil society organizations COSOC\(^2\). This, with the objective that they know it in depth and in this way, can make use of it in an empowered manner and avoid distortions in the implementation of this new mechanism.

**Design and implementation of participatory FRIL**

The new regulations approved considered the central elements of the old fril regulations: typology of projects, requirements for admissibility, administrative procedures for the transfer of resources, among others. The innovation incorporated was that 30% of the resources would be regulated by a special section called as a methodological annex for citizen participation, maintaining the rest of the articles without modifications. The implementation of the new mechanism began with the definition of resources by commune, that is, the distribution of 30% of the participatory fril among the 12 communes of the region, so that the participatory process is carried out within each one of them. With the aim of guaranteeing territorial equity in the allocation of resources, a formula was applied through which resources were allocated to each municipality considering variables arranged as compensatory mechanisms around the conditions of vulnerability of the respective territorial units. The variables were: common base, participation in the municipal common fund, rurality index, population of indigenous peoples, communal isolation, number of inhabitants, distance from the communal capital to the regional one, efficiency of fril spending in the previous year. The consideration of this point was fundamental

\(^2\) The COSOC Communal Councils of Civil Society Organizations were created through Law 20.500 of Citizen Participation in Public Management, designed to represent organized civil society within the structure of the municipality. It has functions mainly of a consultative and proactive nature.
given that it is a region where there are important gaps between communes in areas such as rurality and population.

Subsequently, the definition of the elector body and territory was considered: The approved regulation empowered the mayors so that, together with the municipal council, they can define the territory in which the participatory process will be developed, and who will be the ones who will take the decision of the participatory FRIL resources assigned to the commune. In this context, the commune could be considered as a single district, or focused on one or several localities, as well as defining a constituent representative body of civil society (which could be the council of civil society or the communal union of juntas of neighbors or both instances that decided the resources) or to the citizenship through popular vote.

Once the constituent body is defined, the initiatives that will be financed and decided by the community are defined. The initiatives can come from previous requirements formulated by the citizenship to the communal authorities, or from requests that arise during the participatory process itself. The initiatives decided by the community are ratified by the municipal council, which sends them to the regional government.

*Execution and main results of the participatory FRIL*

The participative FRIL debuted in the process of presenting the initiatives of the year 2014 to be executed in 2015. As can be seen in detail in table 1, in the two years of execution they were approved more than 3,319 million Chilean pesos (almost 5 million dollars). With this, 79 projects distributed in the 12 municipalities were financed. The average cost of each project approved in participatory FRIL was 42 million pesos (equivalent to 63 thousand dollars).

**Table 1 Number of projects and investment in participatory FRIL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of approved projects</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources intended</td>
<td>1,564,298,126 (US 2,3 millones de dólares)</td>
<td>1,754,827,247 (US 2,6 millones de dólares)</td>
<td>3,319,125,373 (US 4,9 millones de dólares)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source* Own elaboration based on information from the Regional Government of Los Ríos

The projects decided by the organized community of each commune, and approved by the regional council, can be grouped into social headquarters for neighborhood meetings, senior citizens, sports clubs; improvement of public lighting, improvement of drinking water network, rural medical station, improvement of squares and squares, construction of green areas, among others.
Regarding the type of citizen participation and decision modality, it can be seen that none of the municipalities opted for universal voting throughout the territory. The majority did so under the modality of decision by means of representatives of civil society (either through cosoc or from the communal union of neighborhood associations). Table 2 shows a summary of how each of the municipalities implemented the initiative.

Table 2 Number of projects and investment in participatory fril

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Mayor’s political coalition</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Origin of the initiative</th>
<th>Decision-making body</th>
<th>Non-traditional decision makers</th>
<th>Territory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corral</td>
<td>Chile Vamos</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Listado SECPLAN</td>
<td>COSOC</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Comunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Asamblea territorial</td>
<td>Sufragio universal</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>Dos localidades rurales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Futrono</td>
<td>Nueva Mayoría</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Listado SECPLAN</td>
<td>COSOC</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Comunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Unión</td>
<td>Nueva Mayoría</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Listado SECPLAN</td>
<td>COSOC</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Comunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanco</td>
<td>Chile Vamos</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Listado SECPLAN</td>
<td>COSOC</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Comunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lago Ranco</td>
<td>Nueva Mayoría</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Asamblea territorial</td>
<td>UNCO</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Comunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Lagos</td>
<td>Nueva Mayoría</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Listado SECPLAN</td>
<td>COSOC</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Comunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Máfil</td>
<td>Nueva Mayoría</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Listado SECPLAN</td>
<td>COSOC</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Comunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariquina</td>
<td>Nueva Mayoría</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Listado SECPLAN</td>
<td>COSOC</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Comunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sufragio universal</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>Dos territorios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paillaco</td>
<td>Nueva Mayoría</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Listado SECPLAN</td>
<td>COSOC</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Comunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panguipulli</td>
<td>Chile Vamos</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Listado SECPLAN</td>
<td>COSOC</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Comunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Río Bueno</td>
<td>Chile Vamos</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Listado SECPLAN</td>
<td>UNCO + COSOC</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Comunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valdivia</td>
<td>Chile Vamos</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Listado SECPLAN</td>
<td>COSOC</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Comunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sufragio universal</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>2 unidades vecinales</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COSOC consejo de la sociedad civil regido por la ley 20500; UNCO unión comunal de juntas de vecinos, regida por la ley 19.418. Source Own elaboration
In reviewing the previous table, it can be deduced that the political coalition to which the mayor belongs does not exert influence or does not establish a relationship with the modality for deciding participatory fril resources. Therefore, it can be affirmed that the ideological variable is not the one that explains the participative fril modalities selected by the mayors in the Los Ríos region.

Regarding the origin of the projects, in its great majority (in 10 of the 12 communes) the municipalities used as a proposal a previous list of projects, prepared by the communal planning secretariat, based on requirements formulated before the mayor by different Social Organizations.

In only two communes, territorial assemblies were held, thus exploring a modality of deliberative character. Within them, it is necessary to make the distinction in the commune of Lago Ranco, a commune in which its municipality in the two years facilitated the necessary logistical elements so that the board of the communal union of neighbors could meet; meetings could visit each one of the boards of neighbors, raising with their directives the most urgent requirement that could be covered by a participatory fril initiative (similar to the one used in Brazil known as the caravan of priorities).

In the case of the Municipality of Corral, the second year the mayor defined the use of the territorial assembly as a mechanism for raising requirements. We worked in two sectors of the commune, in which the majority organizations are sports clubs and neighborhood associations.

Most municipalities chose to present the community with a closed list of always. On the one hand, not to lose control of the political agenda of the participatory process, and on the other hand to save time, human, logistic and monetary resources for the lifting of initiatives. Many municipalities in the region with the exception of the largest ones (Valdivia, Panguipulli, Río Bueno and La Unión) do not have enough staff to raise and formulate initiatives in the same calendar year.

Regarding the decision-making body, in 2014, the municipalities requested the Gore to collaborate to implement the modality that would allow rapid decision-making. In this sense, the recommendation was to resort to the COSOC, an existing instance guaranteed by the law of municipalities and that was present in practically all the communes, which is representative of civil society but whose agenda is determined by its president, the mayor. In fact, it was this...
authority that directed the voting process but with prior agreement of the organized community that participated in the process. Thus, it represented the lowest economic cost of implementing the process for the municipality, so its use was the predominant one.

In the case of Lago Ranco, on both occasions a communal union of neighborhood councils was resorted to, as there was no COSOC constituted, with the president of said organization, who coordinated the voting, having a relevant role in defining the options. In fact, in 2015 the mayor raised the possibility of selecting the projects by universal vote, but the leader expressed a categorical rejection with his organization, mainly to not lose control of the process, for which the initial modality was maintained.

In the case of Corral, in 2015 the mayor raised his preference for the universal mechanism but not for the whole territory, but he has it for the municipality, making himself present during the voting days through which the process is carried out. The same situation occurred in the community of Valdivia where the mayor chose to carry out a direct vote in only one sector of the city. The same situation happened in the commune of Valdivia where the Mayor opted to carry out direct voting in only one sector of the city. In the case of the municipality of Río Bueno, the mayor decided to merge the council of the cosoc civil society with the communal union of urban and rural neighborhood boards, and thus form a kind of electoral body where the members of these organizations would vote to define the projects.

Regarding the territory in which to implement the decision on participatory fril, in most cases it was decided to consider the commune as a single unit. Among the exceptions noted, are the communes of Corral, Mariquina and Valdivia, in them it was the mayor who made the selection of territorial units. In the case of Valdivia, the sectors where there was greater need were decided, in Corral the sectors were selected according to the decision shared between the mayor and the communal union of neighborhood associations; in Mariquina it was proposed as part of a common geographical division of the commune: Valle y Costa, envisaging a rural–urban compensation mechanism, through which there were three alternatives of initiatives, with the elector having two preferences to mark. Thus, the execution of the rural proposal was assured (with less population in the area of influence).
Key determinants for the development of participatory fril in Los Ríos: political will and regional civic capital.

To analyze the key conditions that influenced the development of this mechanism on a regional scale, the works of Goldfrank (2006), Cabannes (2004) and Montecinos (2014) were taken as reference. In these works, a category and typology of conditions is made that help to understand the origin, institutional design and the most relevant conditions that the Participatory Budgeting have had in Latin America. The following table summarizes the methodological proposal of these three authors and that was used to analyze the case of participatory budgeting in the Los Ríos region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Preconditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Will</strong></td>
<td>High intensity of preferences on the part of the Regional Executive, by promoting it from the beginning of its management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social capital</strong></td>
<td>High social capital, with comprehensive regional organizations that promote initiatives of this type. Region with high valuation of democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competent staff</strong></td>
<td>Present in the Unit created to implement this process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Small size</strong></td>
<td>does not apply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sufficient resources</strong></td>
<td>Allows implementation of mechanism throughout the territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal platform</strong></td>
<td>Founded in regional regulations that encourage participation. In case of not respecting it, resources are not transferred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political decentralization</strong></td>
<td>Intendant not democratically elected. Regional Councilors yes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seven are the variables that Cabannes and Goldfrank, point out that are determinants for the development of the Participatory Budgeting. In this case, two were fundamental to explain the implementation of the Participatory Budgeting at a regional scale in Los Ríos. On the one hand, the
political will of the regional authority (regional mayor) who was the driving force of this initiative. But on the other hand, and the most relevant of all the conditions, is the high social capital and regional civic capital existing in Los Ríos.\(^3\)

With respect to the political will to promote this initiative, it was the regional executive, who proposed from the beginning of the government period the need to have a Participatory Budgeting mechanism at the regional level. Although there was no explicit and public opposition from the regional councilors and mayors to the initiative, there was also no overwhelming enthusiasm to support the development of this innovation. The main and explicit opposition to the process was given by the discomfort expressed by the regional councilors due to the high amount that would be allocated to the participatory fril, originally the initiative contemplated 50% and as a result of the political negotiation between the mayor and the councilors it was 30%. This was because the regional councilors lost control over these resources and they were at the expense of the decisions that mayors would take along with the social leaders of their respective communes.

In the case of the mayors, and because they are resources that did not correspond to their municipal budget, the existence of support was evident the first year, specially to make them walk in their communes and demonstrate willingness to their social leaders to promote participation initiatives citizen. In the second year it worked as part of the traditional devices of the regional public administration, which is part of the rules of the game that the municipality and mayors must comply with in order to finance their local projects.

In the case of the role played by organized civil society, it is possible to indicate that in the region of Los Ríos there existed from the origin of this initiative, an explicit support from the social leaders. Mobilized and organized at the regional level, specially the members of the civil society councils of each commune, put pressure on the regional councilors so that this initiative could be approved as a regional regulation, proposing that 50% of the fril resources be allocated to the participative modality. To this group, communal unions of neighbors such as Mariquina, associations of communes such as Mariquina,

\(^3\) In this case, and only for the purposes of this article, civic and social capital is understood as the high value of democracy, and the capacity of association and organization of the representatives of social organizations that exist in the region in comparison with other regions of the country, which is based on this section.
Futrono, Los Lagos, Valdivia, Paillaco, were actively added. Later in each municipality, negotiations between mayors and among the main social leaders were carried out to define the rules of the game that would govern the decision process of the resources assigned to each territory.

Why did this happen in Los Ríos Region? One of the explanations is that the region of the Rivers, presents a high level of appreciation of democracy as a form of government, which far exceeds the existing assessment in other regions of the country. This can be seen reflected in the following chart constructed on the basis of the regional barometer of the University of Los Lagos.

**Table 3 Compared on the valuation of democracy as a form of government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Democracy is preferable to any other form of government 2011</th>
<th>Democracy is preferable to any other form of government 2013</th>
<th>In some circumstances, authoritarian rule may be preferable to a democratic one 2011</th>
<th>In some circumstances, authoritarian rule may be preferable to a democratic one 2013</th>
<th>People like you do not care about a democratic government that authoritarian 2011</th>
<th>People like you do not care about a democratic government that authoritarian 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Región Los Ríos</td>
<td>88,7</td>
<td>82,1</td>
<td>5,6</td>
<td>7,1</td>
<td>5,7</td>
<td>10,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Región Bio Bio</td>
<td>72,4</td>
<td>68,4</td>
<td>10,6</td>
<td>15,0</td>
<td>17,0</td>
<td>16,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Región Los Lagos</td>
<td>66,2</td>
<td>63,2</td>
<td>15,0</td>
<td>14,5</td>
<td>18,8</td>
<td>22,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Regional Barometer of the Center for Regional Studies of the University of Los Lagos 2011–2013

In this table, it can be seen that in terms of the assessment of democracy, the Los Ríos region clearly shows percentages that are much higher than those of the Los Lagos and Bio Bio regions. In the Rivers, democracy is preferable to another form of government by almost 89% of the respondents, while in Bio Bio it reaches only 72% and in Los Lagos (region from which the Los Ríos region fell) valuation falls to 66%. Likewise, and as can be seen in the table, the occasional preference for authoritarian governments or the indifference to democracy or authoritarianism as forms of government is much lower in the Rivers compared to the other regions that the study considered.

This somehow finds its explanation with the history of the Los Ríos region. Its creation as administrative political unit in 2007, was the result of a social movement that advocated for more than three decades, after the loss of the regional capital with the regional reform promoted by Pinochet through the national commission of administrative reform (CONARA) in 1974. From that moment the Valdivian community began a process of mobilization and
permanent citizen participation to recover the quality of regional capital. The fact of having managed to be a region, as a result of a broad process of citizen participation, implies learning about collective action after a common objective. This becomes an important precedent that facilitates the implementation of participatory mechanisms from the public administration, since this initiative has found a correlate and counterbalancing capacity in civil society. Similarly, the existence of a high degree of identity and bond of citizens with their organizations must be borne in mind. This is reflected in active coordination among civil society organizations, as there are channels that link them beyond the communal level. An example of this is the creation of the year 2015, “in view of the beginning of participatory fril”, of the regional association of community councilors of civil society organizations, it was the first to be constituted and it became a model for the rest of the country, being imitated later in other territories like Bío Bío. In fact, this regional instance of civil society has exercised the voice of organized citizenship in front of the media on topics of regional interest during the years 2014 and 2015, such as, for example, the construction of a toll road at the entrances from the regional capital Valdivia, or the rise in electricity prices, among others. Also, this regional group is the one that makes the spokespersons and monitors the initiatives approved under the participatory fril mode.

Conclusions
Based on the description and analysis of the case, it can be confirmed that the political will of the initial decision-maker was decisive for this initiative to be implemented at the regional level. There was also a high initial commitment of the social leaders, so that this initiative has been developed with social counterweight in the region. However, this enthusiasm of the leaders for taking an active part in the participatory process also served to co-opt, or prevent this space from considering a direct vote of the projects by the citizens. Unlike other experiences of participatory budgeting, this active role that organized civil society has had since the beginning of the participatory fril can be explained by the previous history and the high value of citizen participation that exists in this territory. We must specify that yes, it is an assessment of a representative type of de-
mocracy focused on the social leader, rather than a participatory democracy that focuses on assigning a leading role to the citizen in public decisions. The concept that would best explain this situation is representative community democracy raised by Ives Cabannes (2004: 6). The participatory fril managed to democratize the investment and distribute power and influence of decision from the political representative to the representatives of the civil society, or to the intermediate levels between the political representative and the citizens. As proposed by Delamaza and Ochsenius (2010: 216), this case would be an initiative in which most of those involved in the participatory process are represented by representatives of civil society organizations – to whom in this case the mayors are added – with a certain power of veto and management of the agenda, as a result, the decision-making participation of only a segment of the population of the commune is enabled.

Hand in hand with the confirmation of the classic hypothesis about the political will as a trigger for Participatory Budgeting, it can be seen that the cooptation or use of this mechanism as a strategy of clientelistic renewal of the ruler with the ruled, became more complex, specially because since the genesis of the initiative there has been an active participation of civil society. The articulation capacity of social organizations, coupled with a high leadership of its leaders, facilitated this mechanism does not have a clientelist use by regional political authorities, but there were glimpses of cooptation of the process by some social leaders, specially when it comes to expanding the participatory process to all citizens. What is undeniable is the counterweight and correlate that the experience had on a regional scale in the representatives of civil society.

The participatory fril is a recent initiative, which is in its third year of execution, therefore, it is still premature to raise hypotheses about its future and sustainability over time. In any case, it can be stated with certainty that it is an advance beyond the classic informative models of citizen participation that have predominated in Chile at a regional, sectoral and local scale. Civil society organized since the beginning of participatory fril has played a leading role, even at a level of community representative democracy and with the rubrics described in the case. Even with the presence of these distorting elements of the process, it remains the certainty that the mechanism has been installed in the territory beyond the traditional political
elite, and has allowed citizen participation to deepen at a binding level, causing the entry of a new elite social of the decision-making process of public resources at the regional level in Chile. Multiple municipal experiences, and now this regional experience of participatory budgeting, confirm that in a centralized country like Chile, the political and social dynamics in the territory also matter, and often they are more determining than those legal variables of a national nature, or global processes of democratization that are raised at the country level, with a logic of top-down. When there is a territory composed of citizens and social leaders who exercise an active citizenship, getting involved in public affairs, it contributes to the strengthening of democracy endogenously, without the need for external stimuli to wait for that to happen. Consequently, democracy can be strengthened with these initiatives, but its full exercise depends on the citizens and their territories.
4. Thematic Dynamics
Porto Alegre, from a role model to a crisis

Tarson Nuñez

I. Porto Alegre, from a role model to a crisis

In March 2017 the recently elected mayor of Porto Alegre, Nelson Marchezan announced in a seminar with academics and community leadership the suspension of the Participatory Budgeting. After 28 uninterrupted years, one of the most remarkable experiences of participatory democracy at the local level is no longer functioning. There is an extensive literature about the effects of Porto Alegre PB, most of what describes it as a model of success. The theoretical reflection on the subject highlights the potential of PB as a tool to renovate the democratic process. For some authors this experiment represented a significant step in the direction of a new participatory form of democracy (Cabaness 2004, Sintomer 2002) that could overcome clientelistic relations between the state and the citizens (Abers, 1998), others stand out the dimension of empowerment and the protagonism of the citizens and social movements (Fung and Wright 2001, Wright 2003, Wampler 2007, Baiocchi 1999, Silva 2003) and others put their focus on the distributive dimensions of PB (Santos 2003). But they all coincide that PB is a strong element of renovation of democratic politics. PB “increases civic participation, reduces corruption, makes government more accountable, and implement projects that benefit the public” (Menser, 2017:67). How come such a successful experience like that ended up being suspended without much resistance of its beneficiaries? This question is still more astonishing if you consider that this decision got the support of those who are part of the maximum deliberative space of the process, the Council of PB (COP, on its Portuguese acronym). The municipal government discussed
with the members of the COP that agreed with the decision of suspending PB. The justification was the financial crisis that restrained the investments of the city hall. Having no money to invest, according to the mayor, there is no use to keep on discussing and deciding through PB. When the situation gets better, eventually PB can be resumed. And the COP, without any kind of public consultation to its constituents, simply agreed with the mayor’s arguments. How was it possible to the mayor to even have the support of the members of the council to stop doing PB? How come a process that revealed such resilience through 28 years and seven different administrations and was worldwide recognized as a success story end up like that?

In fact, it is important to understand that the suspension of PB is not just the result of an isolated political decision of a mayor that eventually doesn’t like participatory democracy. It is also the result of a long process of wear and bureaucratization whose roots are also linked with some of the characteristics of the institutional design of Porto Alegre’s PB. This article aims to analyze the trajectory of PB in the city from its heights of participation and power, in the middle of the nineties, to its melancholic suspension in 2017. The limits of space in this article doesn’t allow to explore all the aspects of such a complex process, but the idea is to highlight the most important ones, in order to see what happened, how and why.

The so called “Porto Alegre model” has been a reference to people that want to build participatory experiences all around the world. Because of that, understanding the problems that led to the suspension of the PB in the city is very important in order to avoid the reproduction of the same problems elsewhere. The two central aspects of this process were the political changes that reduced...
the commitment of the city government with PB and, at the same time, some organizational characteristics of the PB Porto Alegre that allowed it to progressively be emptied by subtle changes in its rules of functioning. The first point, the commitment of the leadership, depends essentially on the political field, but the second one, the mechanisms of functioning of PB, don’t. So if we manage to understand these problems, it is possible to design alternatives that can prevent the processes to follow the same path.

The first step to understand this process is to establish a theoretical framework for the analysis, some conceptual instruments and categories that can help us capture the complexity of this reality. According to Avritzer (2003), there are different variables that can be important to understand participatory democracy processes. Two of the most important are the ones that will be used from now on: the political will of the leadership and the institutional design of the process. Of course there are others, as the organizational infrastructure of the society and the overall level of democratization in the country. It is important to mention too that there were also some aspects related to the financial sustainability of the process, as the shortage of financial resources caused by the changes on federal regulations that led to the re-concentration of the finances on the federal government, or the economic crisis of 2015 that reduced the amount of money available for PB. All the latter, however are external dynamics that influenced the scenario, while the former are related to the actors, the rules and procedures of PB.

These other aspects are important as well but the option in this study is to focus on the aspects more directly related to the points in which it is possible to find alternative paths. Our effort is to analyze those that can point to concrete measures to prevent the problems. First, the political will, the commitment with democratic procedures and second, the institutional design, the rules and procedures that establish the mainframe of the functioning of PB in the city. Although in terms of analysis those are two different dimensions, in the real life they are interconnected. The changes in terms of political will led to changes in the rules, and these changes in the rules led to changes in the power relations, and in the end to the overall loss of quality of the whole process.
II. The political will: conservative governments and participatory democracy

In terms of political will, the landmark of the changes related to PB is the election of 2004. In this year, the Workers Party (PT) was defeated by a broad coalition of 12 different parties in a wide political spectrum that went from the extreme right wing to the center-left. This coalition won the elections with the explicit commitment of maintaining PB (Núñez, 2010).

After more than fifteen years of success in the city and all over the world, PB was so popular in the city that even their former opponents were forced to change their position on the issue. This trend that led the traditional politicians toward accepting PB practices was already in course since the end of the 90’s. “There were different incentives for the adoption of PB during the 1997-2004 period as the potential gains for politicians to enhance their reputations as innovative and groundbreaking ... attempting to draw on the national and international prestige associated with PB” (Wampler, 2009:15-16).

So maintaining PB was less an effective commitment with participatory democracy but more a contingency of the political dispute. From the beginning on the new administration there were no major explicit changes in the formal procedures of PB with the new government. The whole scheme of regional and thematic assemblies, the election of delegates and counselors, the calendar, they all were maintained as they were being done in the previous years. The administrative structure of PB was also maintained, only with the changes of the politically appointed officials. But very soon changes started to happen, in an incremental process that led in the end to very significant changes. And in this case, the dimension of political will tends to blend with that of institutional design.

The first major change that the new government promoted was related to the status of PB inside the administration and it was very important. Until 2004, PB was at the center of the administration, directly linked to the office of the mayor. The managers of PB were part of the coordination of the government, above all the other power structures in the government. The coordinators of PB, in the Office of Planning (GAPLAN in the Portuguese acronym) were part of a commission that supervised and decided all the investment of the municipal government. No investment decision was made without the participation of those who were the responsible for the PB process. After 2005 PB was linked to the newly created Municipal Secretary of Local Governance, which was one among other more than twenty other secretariats. PB was no longer at the center of the municipal power structures and consequently tended to lose much of the ability to impose its decisions on the other structures of the government. After the change in the government PB started...
to be “one of the 21 structuring programs around which government action was organized” (Núñez, 2010:147). In other words, PB was downgraded from a central strategy of the government to a program inside one secretary. This loss of power very soon led to a situation on which the financial resources for PB started to be reduced. While in 1994 the amount of the investment plan of PB was 74.6% of the total investments of the municipal government and 16% of the total budget, in 2008 those figures had declined, the PB investment plan was to only 9.6% of the investments and 1.3% of the total budget. This trend of reducing the resources for PB remained and in the last years they were almost symbolic. For the 2016 budget the investment plan of PB was equivalent to 5.4% of the investment and only 0.6% of the total budget.4 This numbers show consistently that PB totally lost centrality for the city government in the last years. And it is also important to consider that the deterioration of the fiscal situation of the municipal government affected the city’s investment capacity. While in the 1995 Porto Alegre was able to allocate 30.7% of the budget to investments, this amount started to fall in the PT years. In 2001 the investment fell to 14.7% of the total budget and PB’s investment plan. And in the subsequent years the fall was even more intense. For the 2016 budget the estimate of investment was only 11.6% of the total budget. But the problem was not only the shortage of resources. The implementation of the decisions of investment from PB was already a problem since the turn of the century. One of the reasons of the defeat of PT on the 2004 elections was the fact that at that time there was a significant amount of investments decided through the PB that had not been complied. And this trend intensified after that.

“The percentage of the Investment Plan (IP) that has been implemented has dropped continuously since the early years of the OP process. This percentage determines, in a relatively simple manner, whether budgeted investments were effectively concluded within the forecast time frame and whether all of the demands included in the IP were effectively carried out. Whereas between 1990 and 1999, approximately 90 percent of IP projects were finished before the forecast date, since the year 2000, this percentage has fallen significantly. In 2004, it was forecast at little more than 60 percent, falling even more in 2005 and 2006” (WORLD BANK, 2008, p.47)

4 All the data in this section come from the Investment Plans of Porto Alegre PB, available online at http://www.observapoa.com.br/default.php?reg=2&p_secao=24
The capacity to deliver is decisive in any case of PB experiences. Many participatory experiences failed exactly because of this reason (Goldfrank and Chavez, 2004). And the data presented by the mayor himself on the seminar in 2017 are eloquent about the process in Porto Alegre. Between 1990 and 2004, 17.7% of the works weren’t delivered on time. In the 2005 to 2016 period this percentage raised to 58.3%. And this was a progressive trend if you look inside this time frame. Between 2005 and 2008 21.5% of the works were late, in the 2009–2012 this percentage raised to 47% and in the last period 2013–2016, 91.4% of the investment wasn’t completed. Part of the delay was related to technical problems, but other part, as we saw before, was a political trend to make budgetary decisions outside PB. In other words, this doesn’t mean that the municipal government wasn’t making investments, only that most of what was being done was decided in other spaces.

It is important to notice that these changes in terms of political will are not only related to the government itself. In political relations, the interaction between the different actors in the scenario is what produces the outcomes in terms of institutional change. So we must also consider that the political will of the PB leadership inside the COP counted as well. There was only a little isolated resistance from some of the counselors against this trend. As we will see in the next session, the changes on the institutional design of the process since 2008 allowed to the government to have some consent and support among the members of the COP. There was only little and isolated pressures from the bottom up to prevent the emptying of the powers of PB. And this lack of pressure from the bottom and from outside in the state structures is not only linked to the cooptation of the community leadership. The political opposition also retreated. After losing the local elections in 2004, the PT, now in the opposition, tended to abandon PB. With the argument that the whole process was being rigged, the strategy of the left in the city was to denounce the changes without trying to fight against them. It is also important to consider that, from 2003 on, PT won the national elections and most of its energy was now directed to the changes at the national level. By 2008 only the organized social movements were still fighting to have space in PB and after the 2012 elections they also left the scene. So in terms of political will it is important to consider not only the actions of the incumbents but also the lack of reaction from the opposition. And both processes went on the same direction, the emptying of PB in Porto Alegre.
III. Institutional design – rules and procedures matter

However, the decadence of PB in Porto Alegre was not only a matter of political will of the parties that led the process since 2005. Beyond the political changes there were also some characteristics of the institutional design that also led to the weakening of the process. Most of them were already present during the PT years, so they are part of the “Porto Alegre model”. Therefore it is important to look more carefully to these characteristics in order to understand the degree of influence that they had in the decadence of PB in the city. Understanding the role of these aspects of the institutional design in the decay of PB is crucial in order to allow that the new experiences don’t repeat the same mistakes.

Some of the rules and procedures themselves caused problems, and others not, but were used in the process of neutralizing the power of PB inside the administration. In the first case there were three main problems, the yearly basis functioning without mechanisms to avoid the pilling up of non-executed demands, the lack of institutionalized mechanisms of transparency and the limited efforts in dealing with the pedagogic dimensions of the participatory process. In the second case we have the self-regulation of the process when associated to the presence of mechanisms of representative democracy inside PB.

By understanding the real dynamic of the functioning of PB, and its failures, we can be able to formulate alternatives to avoid the problems generated by these aspects of the institutional design.

The first problem was the yearly basis process without mechanisms to deal with the demands that, for one reason or another were not executed during the period of the budget. Sometimes because of technical problems, others because of the lack of resources or bad planning, the fact is that in many cases part of the investment plans jumped from one year to the next. And there was a commitment that they would be executed anyway. But the discussion of the next investment plan usually didn’t take it into account and new demands were piled up over the previous ones. And, as part of the same process, the costs generated by some of the investment made also weren’t taken into account. If you build a new school or health facility, you generate costs that reduce the capacity of investment for the next period. The result of this procedure was the trend of accumulation of undone investment decisions of PB as we saw in the previous section.
The second one was the absence of effective institutionalized mechanisms of transparency related to the municipal finances. Those mechanisms were informal, and without any real control from outside the administration. There were no effective tools to guarantee the access to the actual data about the financial situation of the municipal government. The dynamic of transparency was unilateral, the government was committed to “open the black box,” but there were no formal rules for that. There was an informal relationship of confidence between the city hall and the citizens, built by the fact that, until then, most of the decisions of PB were actually put into work. This confidence was reinforced by a systematic debate about the public finances in the assemblies of PB.

Prior to 2003 there were two regional and thematic assemblies. On the first one the government reported the previous year’s investments, priorities were voted and delegates elected. This was a moment of accountability. The data about the public finances were provided through documents with the numbers and with the presence of the mayor and the Secretary of Finances in all the assemblies. On the second round the government presented the data about revenues and expenses, the available resources and proposed criteria to the distribution of investments. The community presented the demands that came from the regional meetings and the counselors were elected. With these procedures there was more space and time for the participants to discuss financial issues, and there were documents with the numbers that could be analyzed by the participants. After 2004 this two meetings were turned into one, reducing the time and space for the discussion of financial issues. In the next years the accountability was reduced to a powerpoint presentation of the numbers, without any document or access to the actual data of the municipal finances. The lack of transparency increased with the years. According to the records of the meetings of the COP, for some time there had been complaints over the quality of the data and the lack of accountability, but not more than that.

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5 Along with the counselors that compose the COP, that were two for each regional and thematic assembly, the participants also elected delegates, in a proportion of the number of people in the assembly. But these delegates had only the role of making a liaison between the PB structure and the communities they represent, having no deliberative power. So we won’t focus too much on their role on the process, although from 2008 on you could not be elected counselor without first being a delegate.
These failures in terms of transparency weren’t related only with the numbers of the budget, the investments and the fiscal situation of the city government. Also the accountability of what was decided by PB also got worse. For some time there were still public mechanisms of control of the works of the investment plan. In 2006 the city hall launched a system in the PB webpage where any citizen could control the status of each of the works included in the investment plans. But after few years this mechanism was abandoned. Until today the system still exists, but covers only until the year 2010–2011.

The result of these failures in terms of providing quality information about the public finances and the works of PB was increasingly clear to all the participants. Surveys applied on the assemblies show the evolution of their perception about the issue. Faced to the question “the information and rendering of accounts about PB by the officials of the municipal administration are satisfactory?” the answer in 1995 was yes for 80.7% of those who answer. This figures got down to 63.8% in 2000 and to only 40.1% in 2009. And the percentage of those who answered “sometimes” and “never” was only 4.1% in 1995, raised to 18.3% in 2000 and to 39.1% in 2009 (Fedozzi et all, 2013:65). So it is possible not only to identify a trend towards less transparency on PB as time passed but also see that the participants themselves resented that.

The third problem in the institutional design of Porto Alegre’s PB was the fragility if the efforts in terms of capacity building for the participants. All the process was designed as if all the participants were equally capable of dealing with the complex problems of the administration. Of course every citizen has the potential and the right to demand, discuss and decide over politics and public policies. And participation itself is a learning process. Through participation people get information about how the state works, develop skills in terms of expression, negotiation and organization. In this process the individuals learn how to “take in account wider issues than their own immediate private interests … and are tought to distinguish between their impulses and desires, learning to be a private and public citizen” (Pateman,1992:38). But as much as participation itself can be a learning process, it is also evident that the managers of the participatory processes can help to make this learning process more effective.

6 http://www.portoalegre.rs.gov.br/op_prestacao/acomp.asp
And through all the years of PB in Porto Alegre, there were only isolated efforts to work in terms of capacity building for the participants and the public in general. The educational dimensions of PB weren’t taken into account, because the focus of the process concentrated in the deliberative process. On the first years of PB there was more information and more space and time to discuss the issues, but it was treated as if only by providing the information, it automatically would be understood in a comprehensive way. The interaction between the participants and the municipal officials was more intense. But as the time passed, the fact is that the technical dimensions of budgeting and all the complexity of public administration were not object of a permanent and systematic process of capacity building. Especially after 2005, the effort to allow the participants to be more capable to deal with all the information almost ceased. The methodology of PB in Porto Alegre disregarded the importance of working towards building capabilities for the participants to exercise their deliberative powers. Some efforts were done, through the action of NGOs and some academics, but the city government gave little attention to this dimension.

The fourth and maybe the most important flaw in the institutional design of Porto Alegre’s PB was the coexistence of mechanisms of representative democracy, namely the COP, inside the participatory process. The COP, as the core of the decision making process in PB, ended up consolidating as a power space. The counselors, even though having no revenue or a formal power inside the administration, are the ones that effectively deliberate on the investments. They are the ones who discuss and negotiate with the administration in the name of their constituencies. The combination of the self-regulation mechanisms\(^7\) to decide the rules of functioning of the process with the consolidation of a representative space, open way to a political action in which the counselors tended to amplify their own power and reduce their accountability. They started to deal with the government looking more for their own local or personal interests rather than representing their constituencies. This led to a process of incremental changes that, step by step, undermined the operation of PB as a whole.

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\(^7\) The self-regulation is usually seen as one of the most important characteristics of Porto Alegre’s PB. All the rules and procedures are discussed yearly and the COP can change the regiment that defines the functioning of PB for the next year.
IV. The changes in the rules of the game (representative dynamics on a participatory process)

The distance between the counselors and their constituency grew as the years passed. The first important change was the end of the preparatory meetings prior to the assemblies. Until 2005, these meetings were part of the participation process, being prepared and held with the support of the municipal officials on the neighborhoods. Through that meetings PB acquired capillarity and openness, in a sense that the debates over the priorities and demands got a far wider public than those who attended only to the regional and thematic assemblies. Being formally a part of the process, these meetings allowed to overcome eventual difficulties in terms of time, resources and distance to many people that otherwise could not participate. In a survey made for the Word Bank it is possible to measure the meaning of these meetings. At that time, 20% of the respondents said that they had at least once attended a PB meeting (World Bank, 2008). Considering the representativeness of the sample, this would mean that at least 200,000 citizens would have participated in PB. Taking into account that the numbers of participants in the assemblies was ten times less per year, this means that most of the people that said that participated in PB did it in these preparatory meetings and not in the assemblies.

At the same time, these meetings established a space of accountability of the delegates and councilors within their constituencies. From 2006 on these meetings started to be an attribution of the delegates and members of the COP, that may – or may not – do it in their regions if they want to be accountable. The government does not play any role on this process, arguing the autonomy of the counselors and the regions. This reinforced the crescent lack of accountability of the counselors. According to a survey made with the participants on the assemblies, the relationship of the delegates and counselors with their constituencies deteriorated constantly. In 1995 50.7% of the participants said that the counselors and delegates always answer their demands and consultations while only 11.7% said they did it few times or never. In 2015 only 28.3% answered yes and 27.3% answered that they never or just few times answer the demands (Observapoa, 2016:31).

But the most significant shift came in the year 2008, with substantial changes on the mechanisms of election of the members of the
COP. The COP is the higher deliberative body of Porto Alegre’s PB. The counselors, elected in the regional and thematic assemblies, not only represent the communities but are the ones who deliberate about the investments. The first big change in this field was on the mandate of the counselors. Until 2007 they were not allowed to have more than two consecutive mandates. With the change in the article 6th of the regiment in 2008 indefinite re-elections were allowed. But this was not the only major change in the way the COP was composed. There were also changes in the article 4th that established mechanisms that tend to favor individuals that already are part of the process, preventing outsiders to access the council. The new rules stated that in order to be elected counselor all the candidates must already have participated as delegates for two years with at least 60% of presence in all the meetings on this years.\(^8\)

The changes in Article 4th establish mechanisms that tend to privilege individuals that are already participants, inhibiting substantially the possibilities of renovation of the COP. This means, in practice to reduce the space to the emergence of new leadership. The idea of participatory democracy as an open space to all citizens, in a spontaneous and inclusive way, which is one of the greatest innovations of PB (Santos, 1999 e 2003) is replaced by the creation of a kind of “participatory filter”, in which the condition to access the deliberative spaces is not associated to the representation of legitimated demands or any concrete social base but conditioned to having years of prior engagement on the process.

With that the current participants, specially the counselors, reduce in a significant amount the contingent of competitors, as well as block any possibility that eventual outsiders can dispute the spaces of power inside PB. Therefore the control of the rules of the game was used in this case in a discretionary way in order to reinforce those who are already part of the process. This kind of mechanism is contradictory with the ideals of participatory democracy as “a process by which we try to operationalize the equality of all the members of the group” (Menser, 2017:77). In this case a rule that apparently has the goal to reinforce the participation process had the consequence to turn it rather inaccessible to the ordinary citizen.

In this same year, a second change in the regiment had a direct impact both on the election of the counselors and in the assemblies of PB. The assemblies were the main democratic moment of PB, a space to exercise open debate, negotiation and deliberation, where the demands of the ordinary citizens were vocalized and openly discussed. By the new rules, the lists of candidates for the COP must be registered 48 hours before the assembly, forcing a trend to turn the assembly into a dispute of pre-organized groups.

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8 PMPA, OP Regimento Interno 2008, article 4th. p7
Until then, the assemblies were open spaces, where people could discuss and articulate in a more open dynamic. With this new mechanism, the assemblies were emptied as democratic instances of discussion. Its role as a space of debate, negotiation and deliberation was blocked. The groups tended to get to the assembly with closed positions, supporting pre-defined proposals and lists of candidates. The assemblies turned from a potential space of debate, negotiations and rational discussions into a space of confrontation of pre-established loyalties. And by establishing rules that prevent outsiders to get in the process, these changes strengthened the position of those who control the process.

The changes on the rules of the election led to the consolidation of the same groups on the COP. The percentage of renovation on the COP fell from an average of 78% on the 90’s to around 30% in the second decade of the century. In the last composition of the COP, the ones chosen in 2016, 78.2% of the counselors have been reelected or have once been counselors on previous years. In this period each one of them had in average been elected five times and four of them have been elected more than 10 times. In most of the regions the same group of people tended to reproduce its presence in the council, year after year since 2008.

Table 1 Composition of the COP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average of counselors reelected from the previous year</th>
<th>Average of reelected + people that had already been counselors</th>
<th>% of renovation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993/1996 Tarso Genro (PT)</td>
<td>18,20%</td>
<td>22,0%</td>
<td>78,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/2000 Raul Pont (PT)</td>
<td>22,60%</td>
<td>39,9%</td>
<td>66,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/2004 Genro/Verle (PT)</td>
<td>18,90%</td>
<td>38,4%</td>
<td>61,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/2008 Fogaça (PPS-PMDB)</td>
<td>25,90%</td>
<td>52,2%</td>
<td>47,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/2012 Fogaça/ Fortunatti (PMDB-PDT)</td>
<td>43,40%</td>
<td>64,6%</td>
<td>35,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/2016 Fortunatti (PDT)</td>
<td>50,00%</td>
<td>70,1%</td>
<td>29,9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Investment plans 1993/2016 (http://www.observapoa.com.br)

The final result of these procedural changes is a process in which the administration fostered the powers of the council over the internal processes of the PB, obtaining in exchange more flexibility from the COP to accept the emptying of the powers of the participatory process in the overall investment decisions. In the investment plans of PB since 2008 many decisions are being made.
directly on the COP, that is, without being demanded on the assemblies by the communities. This empowerment of the upper echelons of the participatory process and its autonomy from their constituencies tend to turn the COP less resistant to the loss of space of PB in the context of the municipal administration decision making process.

It is important to see that all these changes were done inside (and according to) the rules of Porto Alegre PB. So it is possible to say that the mechanisms that allowed the reducing of the powers of PB to happen were part of the institutional design of the process. The existence of the COP, with its elected representatives, established a representative democracy device inside the participatory democracy process. This situation opened way to the cooptation of the community leadership inside the COP that led to the paradoxical situation where the decision of suspending PB was taken with the support of the main decisional body of the process. It was a decision taken according to the rules of Porto Alegre PB itself, a kind of participatory democratic suicide.

As it was already said, the changes that led to the decay of PB in Porto Alegre were decided by the participants themselves and were part of the “rules of the game”. That takes us to one last important issue: one of the biggest problems in the institutional design of Porto Alegre’s PB was something that was apparently one of its main virtues: the self-regulation of the process. First of all, self-regulation meant that the participants themselves must discuss and decide the rules of functioning of PB, which is a virtue. Letting the rules be decided by the participants is really very democratic. Furthermore self-regulation provided flexibility and the capacity to qualify the process according to the experience.

But the experience in Porto Alegre also shows that, in certain circumstances, self-regulation can also be a tool for the setting up of some rules that benefits the ones who are making the rules. While the counselors progressively lost their ties with their constituencies and the new government officials didn’t have a real interest on radical democratization, the self-regulation opened space to a movement towards the conservation of the political spaces conquered by the ones who were already there.

This situation shows that in order to preserve the positive dimension of the self-regulation it must be done in a wider dimension, publicly, with the participation of all those who are part of the process. The flexibility is important, but some values must be the core principles that guarantee the democratic content of the process. And an open and wide participation is the condition to guaranty this democratic content. The represent-
ative dimension of the COP led to the use of self-regulation as a tool to empower a leadership that was able to direct the process to its own self-centered interests.

V. Lessons learnt
For all we seen in this brief description of the trajectory of PB in Porto Alegre some lessons can be learnt. First of all democracy and participation can never be taken for granted. They are always possibilities of manipulation and top down control of the processes. We also saw that the quality of the democratic experiences relies much on the autonomy and organization of the citizens. Without it, the top down trend tends to emerge. Every time that a participatory process depends exclusively in the political will of the government, even the best institutional designs can be transformed in tools to bureaucratization. But rules matter, the institutional design can be modeled to prevent, as much as possible the decay of the quality of the participation. And in the end, the suspension of PB in Porto Alegre is just one more chapter on a long struggle for more democracy at the city level. PB was built from the bottom up from the beginning, and its flaws and subsequent defeat is only a part of an ongoing history. What can be learnt from the Porto Alegre experience? After describing the trajectory of PB in Porto Alegre, from a very strong, innovative and dynamic participatory process to something so weak that its suspension didn’t cause much conflict, our effort must be to identify the most important lessons. And, more than that, to point possible alternatives that could eventually avoid the problems lived in the Porto Alegre. As we saw, there was a combination of the changes in the political will of the municipal government with some of the characteristics of the institutional design that caused the decline of PB in Porto Alegre. The tacit alliance between municipal governments that didn’t have a real commitment to participatory democracy and the counselors, those who were at the center of the process “representing” their communities, led to the progressive weakening of PB in the city. The path followed meant that even before being suspended, Porto Alegre’s PB had reduced substantially its role in terms of the decision making process and democratic content. In terms of political will, there is not much that can be said. It is a matter of politics and can only be solved through the elec-
tion of mayors whose commitment with participation is real. This is somehow ambiguous, because participation can be seen in many different ways regarding the objectives of who is in the government. As a public policy tool, PB can fit the expectations of very different political perspectives. Some authors identify “highly divergent logics underpinning PB experiments in practice... political (for radical democratic change), managerial and technocratic (to improve municipal finance transparency and optimize the use of public resources for citizens’ benefit) or good governance driven (to improve links between the public and citizens spheres) (Cabannes and Lipietz, 2015:10–12). In a very similar approach Menser states that PB can be seen through three different “normative perspectives: neoliberal efficiency, good governance and participatory democracy” (Menser, 2017:67). In other words, the PB experiences can be implemented from a wide range of different political perspectives, from changing society to prevent for change, according to who is leading the process.

The trajectory of PB in Porto Alegre went down from intense participatory democracy to what could be called weak good governance. In a sense we could say that we went down some steps on Arnsteins ladder of participation, going from citizens control and power delegation to partnership and then to placation (Arnstein, 1969). In their latest works, Cabbanes and Lipietz present “an analytical grid to help to discern among the great diversity of PBs around the globe” (Cabbanes and Lipietz, 2015:5). That categorization establishes what they call “minimum arrangements, intermediate arrangements and maximum arrangements”. And looking at the situation in Porto Alegre it is possible identify, according to these criteria, that PB in the city transited to a maximum arrangement to the minimal one.

In the participatory dimensions many changes are evident. According to this criteria, in terms of the forms of participation it evolved from direct democracy to community based representative democracy, with the COP counselors acting almost like the traditional politicians. In terms of the degree of information sharing and dissemination, it went from limited dissemination (an intermediate arrangement) to secret unpublished information. In terms of the degree of completion of approved projects it went from over 80% to less than 20%. In the financial and fiscal dimension the PB in its last years discussed less than 2% of capital budget and has no discussion about taxation policies. All this characteristics point to the
same direction, the fact that even before being suspended Porto Alegre’s PB was already been reduced to a minimum arrangement according to this typology. Its meaning as a tool to “democratize democracy” (Santos, 2003) vanished, turning the process more into an instrument to allocate a tiny part of the budget with some public participation.

All these changes were a matter of political will, and depend fundamentally on who is in charge in the city government. But it is possible to deal with the other variable, the institutional design, analyzing the changes in the procedures and rules that reduced substantially the quality of the participatory process on PB. And in this case it is possible to point some questions that can be universally useful for those who manage participatory processes. For all we described here there are some aspects of the institutional design that can be addressed in order to avoid the downgrading of the quality of participation that we’ve seen in the case of Porto Alegre.

1) Mandatory rules on transparency Quality information is decisive, and the processes might guarantee in a formal way that all the data is available and reliable. It is fundamental that everybody knows what is really at stake and what are the potential and the limits of what can be decided. And beyond the political commitment of the local government with the participatory process it is important to institutionalize mechanisms to prevent the asymmetry of information between the government and the participants. The data about the municipal finances must be accessible to everyone.

2) Mechanisms to prevent the representative dynamics Equal participation is at the core of participatory democracy. And the example of Porto Alegre shows that if the rules allow it, there is always a possibility that some of the participants try to amplify their powers inside the process. So if there are power spaces in the process, it is fundamental to have also mechanisms to prevent the appropriation of these spaces by any kind of particular group. In the case of Porto Alegre, the COP was clearly a space that allowed the municipal government to establish a trade-off that exchanged the power of all the participants PB for the power of some of their representatives.

3) Systematic capacity building As we have seen, the participant’s knowledge and capabilities cannot be taken for granted. Even though it is evident that every person has enough knowledge to formulate
their own demands and proposals, this is not enough to avoid manipulation. Taking in account that the more the people know the better will be their decisions the pedagogic dimension of participatory budgeting must be treated in a more systematic way. In that sense, pedagogic efforts in terms of budget literacy, communication, organization and public management are very important to foster the quality of the process.

4) Rules and procedures to foster the quality of participation The building of deliberative spaces does not necessarily guarantee equality to all those who want to participate. The procedures can be built in order to reinforce the quality of this participation. The rules of the assemblies must be designed to reduce the inequalities in terms of the different skills of the participants. The setting up of different participatory methodologies, the continuous effort to allow a real participation of all, the transparency and the access to information all this can be fostered in order to have really meaningful participation.

VI. But the seeds planted are still there, and when it rains…
This effort to describe the trajectory of Porto Alegre, from a role model in terms of participatory democracy to the suspension of PB in the city can eventually sound pessimistic in terms of the prospects of political participation in the city. And this can eventually lead to more skepticism about the role of PB as a tool to “democratize democracy”. But it is also important to notice that, even though the current political situation shows a retreat in terms of democracy in the city, much of the dynamics that characterized the better moments of PB in the city are still present. There’s still a significant grassroots movement reclaiming the PB and the suspension of the debates on the budget doesn’t mean that the citizens are totally passive and demobilized. An investigation made in 2003 about the role of Porto Alegre’s PB as a tool to tackle poverty (Núñez, 2003) it was possible to see that through participation the citizens also develop capabilities and skills and acquire knowledge and experiences in dimensions that go beyond the PB process itself. This is a learning process that provides them tools that are used in everyday life. The experience and the capabilities already developed in this almost thirty years are still present. In many of the city’s regions the social movements relate with the city hall rescuing the language and the institutional frame-
work of PB, even though it is suspended. The organic social base of PB is still a relevant social actor in the city. Being “the people from PB” provides an identity that legitimates their struggles. Political articulations as the “Popular Council of Lomba do Pinheiro” in one of the most mobilized regions of PB are still very active and see themselves as the heirs of PB on its heights. The difference is that their repertoire of social action now retreated to the pattern of the social conflicts of the 80’s (Baierle, 2005). Closing streets, barricades, the dynamics of contention were again dislocated to the streets. As PB is closed as an institutional space, the “PB people” is now acting in other political spaces. And their displacement from the organized, formal and institutionalized space that was PB is forcing them to establish new links with the social movements that had left PB.

On the debate about the new urban plan that is being discussed in 2018 the PB activists are acting in an organized way, occupying the participatory spaces that are still opened. And they do it around an identity build through decades of collective participation. The experience of PB provided a common ground that widened the perspectives of the participants and the communities. They evolved from isolated and local demands to a debate about public policies, democracy and urban planning. They realized that organization and mobilization is better than building clientelistic ties with traditional politicians or making deals with the local government. This resilience of the social movements shows that, even with all this problems described in this paper, citizen’s participation is really a learning process.

So, even though the experience of PB in Porto Alegre ultimately led to the suspension of PB, the overall result is not totally negative. The organizational infrastructure of PB is rather intact, it is only suspended. A significant part of the community leadership is still organized around PB as delegates and counselors. More than that, the communities that elected them still see them as a channel to deal with the local authorities. The pressures are great. The institutional framework provided by PB still remains as a channel of participation recognized by the people of Porto Alegre. According to the outcome of the current political disputes, the participation process can once again recover its strength. Of course there are many other variables influencing this context. The overall political situation in Brazil is not favorable to democracy. Political polarization, the sharpening of social conflicts, radicalization are the prevailing patterns of the current civic life in the country as a whole. Authoritarianism is on the rise in Brazil. But the democratic energies that come from bellow, the notions of citizenship that grew on this almost thirty years of participation are certainly a fundamental part of any process of democratization in the country.
Participation of Children and Young People in Local Governance

Patricia García-Leiva & Andrés Falck

Introduction
Political participation of children and adolescents in local government institutions is the subject addressed in this chapter. The text deals with a new phenomenon that has been spreading at a faster pace since the 1990s. During this period the initiatives devised to incorporate the voice of young people into local government have been wide-ranging, as seen in scientific literature review, in which it is possible to distinguish two major goals prompting local authorities to undertake plans of this type: participatory democracy, and the rights of children, as specified in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Global consensus has been generated around each of these paradigms, reflected in the form of statements, roadmaps and agencies that monitor progress. They address different concerns and goals, as will be discussed in the following pages, but they also show a common field of interest: that of local policies that make possible significant participation of children and adolescents as part of a general programme of open and participatory government.

1 The dimension of the global consensus on the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN, 1989) is well known, as well as its monitoring by UNICEF. It may be more unexpected how participatory democracy has penetrated, in a more or less explicit way, the agendas of multilateral bodies like the EU, UN and World Bank. For example, the Open Government Partnership brings together 70 countries signing a public commitment: We value public participation of all people, equally and without discrimination, in decision-making and policy formulation. Public engagement, including the full participation of women, increases the effectiveness of governments, which benefit from people’s knowledge, ideas and ability to provide oversight. We commit to making policy formulation and decision-making more transparent, creating and using channels to solicit public feedback, and deepening public participation in developing, monitoring and evaluating government activities.
Exploring this common space, we will examine several participatory experiences that involve children and young people, associated, to varying degrees, with one of these paradigms. This examination will be based on a series of criteria previously defined from the perspective of participatory democracy, and will have a purely exploratory nature, as there is a lack of specialised literature and public evaluations. Despite these limitations, an attempt is made to provide a snapshot of the state of affairs in order to facilitate some reflections encouraging the incorporation of children and adolescents into local politics and, at the same time, promote more open, transparent and democratic government.

**Participatory democracy and childhood**

The enhancement of the prevailing democratic system is a political and social goal that has taken on special importance in the last 30 years as a consequence of political disaffection. The estrangement between representatives and their constituencies, and vice versa; the lack of trust in political organisations and government institutions (Lerner, 2014, Cain, Dalton and Scarrow, 2003, Norris, 2002, Pharr and Putnam, 2000), together with the difficulties citizens experience when attempting to influence decisions once they have already cast their votes, have given rise to a crisis of the representative model. Hence, in recent decades mechanisms have been sought that ensure greater understanding between the general population and those elected for their political representation. In this effort the focus has been put on participation, through which there has been
attempts to develop initiatives ensuring people's active role, and to reduce their political apathy by allowing them to influence and be part of public affairs. The bulk of these innovations have focused on how to participate and how decisions are made, a large number of them stressing deliberation, understood as in-person discussions (Pateman, 2012). Deliberation opens up the possibility for analysis from different perspectives, at the same time it allows for the construction of new common realities, and favours empathy with the situations faced by others. There are, basically, two objectives pursued through these new forms of participation: 1) To allow citizens to decide directly on some issues, such as a part of a budget or a policy and 2) To ensure that anyone can participate (Ganuza, 2017). Some examples of these tools are deliberative surveys, citizen panels, and Participatory Budgeting – innovations that have spread around the world and that, for many, fall under the common category of “participatory democracy”.

Within participatory democracy, participatory budgeting (PB) has been one of the most widespread initiatives, and has been largely studied by scholars. The central idea on which it is based is ensuring that non-elected citizens have direct decision-making power at the local level and supervisory capacity at all levels in everything related to the allocation of public funds (Sintomer, Herzberg and Röcke, 2014). PB explores the links between civil society and democracy, thereby taking it to a deeper level through new institutional designs (Avritzer, 2007). From the first PB experience in Porto Alegre in 1989 until the present, two major phases can be identified. The first phase (1989-2006) is defined by the leadership of the political Left and civil society organizations mainly from Latin America and Europe, who have taken the Porto Alegre model as a reference point and tried to adapt it local conditions. The second, from the year 2007 to the present, is characterised by the global networking efforts of cities running PB experiences, and a diversity of ideologies and models. At the same time, in this period, an effort has been made to implement Participatory Budgeting within broader local participation structures (Dias, 2014)
In the first decade of Participatory Budgeting a lack of participation of young people was already evident, leading, in the second half of the 90s, to different mechanisms (López, 2012) to incorporate children and adolescents. At the end of this decade some pilot experiences were documented, such as the case of Icapuí, in Brazil; and Cotacachi, in Ecuador (Cabannes, 2006). Some five or six years later experiences in Europe involving children and adolescents would begin to expand, with Spain and Germany being the main reference points during this period, still considered experimental and inspired by the Brazilian model. As in many of the adult processes, an emphasis was placed on the construction of citizenship, endeavouring to overcome the model of a democracy based on just voters, and to achieve one based on a democracy of citizenship (Dias, 2014), with a special attention on young people’s evolutionary cycle. These experiences share with those of adults a dependence on political will, running the risk of disappearing when government teams change. During a second period Portugal, Sweden and England were incorporated into this process. As a global assessment, it can be stated that these initiatives have not managed to equal the acceptance enjoyed by Participatory Budgeting involving adults, and are usually promoted at a level subordinate to the process with adults, and without an appropriate and specific methodological design (López, 2012). Both in political and academic forums, participatory processes involving children occupy a secondary place, lacking the level of methodological and evaluative debate that there has been with adult processes. A result of this is the scant academic literature regarding children’s experiences, together with an absence of comparative measurement tools making it possible to identify factors affecting success and failure in accordance with the objectives pursued. Therefore, greater follow-up of these experiences, based on the participatory democracy paradigm, is necessary.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Child Friendly Cities Initiative

Coincidentally, the same year when the first Participatory Budgeting experiences took place in Porto Alegre, the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child was approved. This international agreement establishes the right to the full physical, mental and social development of persons under 18 years of age, and is binding on the signatory countries, as each State must submit a report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child regarding the measures taken to ensure the implementation of the Convention (UNICEF, 2006). It is the first international regulation governing children’s rights, and marks a break with hegemonic visions by establishing children and adolescents as subjects of law that must be taken into consideration in the design of public policies (Bloj, 2016).

The Convention’s 54 articles include various political and social rights, including the freedom of expression and worship, and the right to participation. Its Article 12 specifically indicates that countries endorsing it shall guarantee the right of all children who are capable of making their own judgements to express their views freely regarding all matters affecting them, with their opinions to be duly taken into account, considering their age and maturity. To this end, the signatory countries undertake to provide ways for children to have opportunities to be heard, which is binding on all levels of public administration. This legal umbrella has favoured the advent of experiences featuring participation of children and adolescents, including their voices in the decision-making of municipal governments, with advisory bodies of various kinds proliferating in on a local level. These councils, commissions and forums are representative bodies for the children of the municipality, who choose a group of representatives, to whom they delegate. In this way an effort is made to convey the opinions, needs and concerns of children to local officers (Már-mol and Serrano, 2014). This model is inspired by initiatives from the 70s (Children’s Master Plans and Municipal Councils), and grows as a result of the Convention (Allegretti, Luz da Silva and Freitas. 2012). However, even in the cases in which children have been actively deliberating and generating proposals, they are rarely granted the capacity to truly impact decision-making (Subirats, 2007).
UNICEF’s role in promoting partnerships and commitments for the inclusion of minors in the public sphere has been particularly significant, raising awareness among local authorities of an agenda that, despite having been around for three decades, remains ground-breaking (Falck and Morillas, 2016). UNICEF’s global Child Friendly Cities Initiative covers 31 national networks tracking the criteria required of a municipality for it to be formally recognised as child-friendly. These requirements go beyond the sphere of children’s participation and address general issues of institutional support for the Convention agenda, namely (UNICEF, 2018):

- Results in the pursuit of specific goals that improve the situation of children’s rights;
- Relevant and inclusive children’s participation;
- Steps being taken by the local government to remove discriminatory policies and actions towards children.

UNICEF’s support for guidance and training has been remarkable and allowed a dissemination of these practices, as well as certain common criteria regarding its methodology.

**Five experiences for the discussion**

A set of experiences featuring participation of children and adolescents will be described in the following pages. The absence of a unified global registry prevents the carrying out of a representative sampling from a statistical point of view, such that the data collected here are of merely exploratory value. In any case, an effort has been made to diversify the selection by considering different types of experiences, from four different countries and on two different continents. The selection has been based mainly on two criteria: their continuity over time, their evolution over the course of their existence, and the possession of academic literature making it possible to access reliable information on them.
Table 2 Basic data of the experiences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the experience</th>
<th>Municipalities</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Starting Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth and Children's Councils</strong></td>
<td>24 municipalities in 2018</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ayuntamientos Juveniles e Infantiles</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Children's Forum &amp; Youth Forum</strong></td>
<td>Rivas-Vaciamadrid</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Foro Infantil &amp; Foro Juvenil</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth Participatory Budget</strong></td>
<td>Rosario</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Presupuesto Participativo Joven</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth Participatory Budget</strong></td>
<td>Trofa</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Orçamento Participativo Jovem</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Children's Agora</strong></td>
<td>16 municipalities in school year 2017-18</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ágora Infantil</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to understand the examples selected and their *modus operandi*, information was collected on a set of aspects based on both academic and political typification and definition of participatory democracy, especially Participatory Budgeting. Specifically, the proposal by Sintomer, Herzberg, Röcke and Allegretti (2012) was consulted, along with the Declaration of Malaga of the FAL Network\(^2\) (FAMSI, 2007) and the Declaration of Bogotá of the International Participatory Budgeting Platform (FAMSI, 2011), selecting those elements in which the various proposals tend to coincide. These are:

1. Who initiates the process? Where does it take place? Is there any external technical support? Through all this an effort is made to ascertain, in depth, the role of the political team, as well as that of other relevant agents.
2. Rules of the participatory process. Specifically, the instruments put in place to ensure knowledge of the rules and the transparency of the process are analysed.
3. Who participates and how? Who can participate in each stage of the participatory cycle, and how can they do so? There is also a desire to identify the strategies put in place to ensure democratic inclusion. A common problem with this type of policy is the self-selection of the participants; that is, children with better social skills will participate more. The analysis will register what resources are used to favour the inclusion of those who do not usually participate.

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\(^2\) The FAL Network (Forum of Local Authorities for Social Inclusion and Participatory Democracy) was created in 2001 under the umbrella of the World Social Forum held in Porto Alegre. During a decade it promoted an active political dialogue on participatory democracy among cities of Latin America, Europe and Africa.
4. Decision-making, topics and procedure. Do children speak about budgets or policies? Finally, the consultative or binding nature of the decisions taken is identified.

The experiences studied coincide in being initiatives conceived by adults, but aimed at including the voice of young people on local agendas. These are participation initiatives by invitation (Ibarra, 2007), in which children and adolescents are incorporated into processes that have already been designed and delineated. There is often, however, an alliance of adult entities involved in the management of and support for the initiative: multilateral organisations (UNICEF, EU), academia, and international cooperation and civil society organisations. The experiences analysed are launched with external support, and governments continue to provide technical input in subsequent years through the alliances. These are collaborative efforts that take the form of external evaluations and consulting on methodological design, mainly. Of particular interest is the Red Dominicana de Asesores de los Ayuntamientos Juveniles e Infantiles (REDAJI; Dominican Network of Advisors to Youth and Children’s Councils) with the municipalities participating in the programme. REDAJI brings together volunteers former young participants from the Youth and Children’s Councils (AJI), that today play a role assisting the next generation, thereby providing external assistance that, strictly speaking, is a result of the initiative itself, thereby establishing a cycle of participatory cogeneration.

A necessary partnership, in all cases, is that which is established with local schools. The government officials rely on schools to get information out about the participatory process, as registration point and, frequently, as a venue for the execution of the initiatives themselves (assemblies, workshops, elections). In the municipalities that host the experiences of this study, schools are a daily meeting point for children of diverse social and personal situations. Through schools, municipal staff can engage children and adolescents who would not otherwise be exposed to political initiatives, thereby mitigating the effect of participant self-selection. The Ágora Infantil programme bases its design on this fact, and is held in classes chosen through random sampling, while paying special attention to children and adolescents who are isolated or excluded in the classroom (Coglobal, n.d.). Collaboration with schools also entails some disadvantages, however, and sometimes interaction with the faculty becomes a filter that alters the results of their participation. Both aspects of the government/school partnership were probably taken into account by city staff of Trofa when they organised a training programme for local teachers titled Education and Citizen Participation (Allegretti, Luz da Silva and Freitas, 2012).
When working with participatory processes, clear rules are essential. According to Josh Lerner (2014), the designing of citizen participation processes can be compared to designing a game. Seen from this angle, the success of the game (process) and the engagement of the player (participant) will be inextricably linked to the clarity of the rules and the accessibility to information regarding the game’s status at all times (transparency). This comparison, thoroughly set forth by Lerner, is especially attractive when we refer to children’s participation. Browsing the webpages and public documents of the five study cases, basically two information formats are found, constituting polar opposites. On the one hand, formal regulations written in legal terms or guides and plans presenting the complex strategies of local policies in relation to children and adolescents. On the other, there are brochures or sites with information that clarify partial aspects of the process, such as where to sign in, how to register a proposal, or election calendars. Undoubtedly, transparency is more complex in processes involving children and young people, than in those of a general nature (and, therefore, more resource demanding), as it must be tailored to the particular perspectives of children and adolescents, parents, teachers, and any citizen concerned about the allocation of public resources.

Making up for this is the fact that in all these processes there is plenty of direct oral communication between city staff and participants; for example, through informative meetings prior to the start of each participation cycle. In the children’s and youth forums in Rivas Vaciamastrid, the rules governing day-to-day functioning are established at the first meetings with the participants themselves, though always taking as reference point a pre-established guide used by government staff. This is possible because these are processes featuring an extensive design, in which smaller groups (30-50 participants) work in sessions every 15 days throughout an entire academic year. Even in the processes that enable the entire population of children and young people to participate beyond the election of representatives (the youth Participatory Budgeting of Trofa and Rosario particularly conform to this criterion), there are phases whose designs hinge on

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3 The reader only needs to imagine playing a game in which he does not understand how to win, or whether he is about to lose; or, even worse, whether there is another player capable of arbitrarily modifying the game’s rules.
working with small groups, such as the monitoring of prioritized proposals, and participatory evaluation. Work in small groups during all or part of the process can be justified based on methodological concepts, or merely logistical issues, but it becomes a weakness when the institution lacks a powerful transmission mechanism to convey what is worked on in the small groups to the large group; that is, the young population as a whole.

In the experiences there is a common age bracket of the participants (10 to 18 years), which then features particular variations. The Foro Infantil (Children’s Forum) de Rivas Vaciadamadrid initiates its activities at age 6, while the Orçamento Participativo Jovem (Youth PB) in Trofa extends it up to age of 30, which definitely no longer corresponds to the children category. Among the processes studied, there are notable differences when it comes to describing which are de participatory bodies designed by the local government, what characterizes them, and how they are accessed, as can be seen in Table 3.

**Table 3** Participation bodies and stages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the experience</th>
<th>Participation bodies and/or stages</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth and Children’s Councils</strong></td>
<td>The presentation of candidacies for Youth and Children’s mayors and councillors of the AJI. The election of mayors and councillors.</td>
<td>Universal suffrage in each municipality</td>
<td>10–18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ayuntamientos Juveniles e Infantiles</strong></td>
<td>AJI. Daily management, deliberation, designing, planning and execution of activities</td>
<td>Youth and children mayors and councillors (elected)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Children’s Forum &amp; Youth Forum</strong></td>
<td>Children’s Forum. Deliberative work group.</td>
<td>Voluntary registration</td>
<td>6–12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Child and Adolescent Participation Commission</strong></td>
<td>Child and Adolescent Participation Commission. Body for liaising with the institution.</td>
<td>8 representatives of the Children’s Forum and 8 representatives of the Youth Forum</td>
<td>6–18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth Participatory Budget</strong></td>
<td>Neighbourhood &amp; school assemblies Identification and drafting of proposals. Election of representatives to the Participatory Council</td>
<td>Open call</td>
<td>13–20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presupuesto Participativo Joven</strong></td>
<td>Participatory Council. Deliberation, submitting of projects and monitoring of the process.</td>
<td>Elected representatives of the Participatory Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voting for the prioritisation of the projects drafted by the Participatory Council</strong></td>
<td>Voting for the prioritisation of the projects drafted by the Participatory Council</td>
<td>Universal suffrage by districts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of the experience</td>
<td>Participation bodies and/or stages</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Age</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth Participatory Budget &lt;br&gt; Orçamento Participativo Jovem</td>
<td>Project proposals</td>
<td>Open call. Proposals submitted by self-organized groups</td>
<td>10–30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assembly for project deliberation and voting</td>
<td>Voluntary registration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s Agora &lt;br&gt; Ágora Infantil</td>
<td>Children’s Agora Group &lt;br&gt; Deliberation, drafting of proposals and, in many cases, execution of them</td>
<td>Randomly selected class in a local school</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring Commission</td>
<td>Commission of students (partly elected and randomly selected from the Agora group)</td>
<td>8–18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forum. Coordination of various Agora groups in a single municipality</td>
<td>Representatives (partly elected and randomly selected) of various Agora groups in a municipality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Allegretti, Luz da Silva y Freitas (2012); Berreta, Turra, Ferrero and Lasaga (2005); FAMSI (2013) and George and Lee (2013), and the authors’ own elaboration.

Based on who participates, the processes could be identified as follows: representative (AJI), direct (Trofa), direct and representative (Rosario), by volunteers (Rivas Vaciamadrid) and random sampling (Agora Infantil). These labels are faulty, however, as they may tell the truth, but not the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Some examples:

- The Youth and Children’s Councils are based on a clearly representative model, a direct translation of the adult world local government. However, the operational AJI Guide, establishes as one of their responsibilities to encourage fellow young people to get involved in municipal Participatory Budgeting (legislated as mandatory for all the municipalities in the Dominican Republic). In cities such as Baní, it has been verified that the AJIs played an active role in bolstering young people’s presence in these processes (Falck and González, 2012). In this way, in addition to ensuring the connection between participation systems, the AJIs facilitate the activation of a community-based, participatory process, where a representative level is ultimately reactivated for the final decision-making (see Chávez, 2012 on the operational structures of Participatory Budgeting in the Dominican Republic).

- With regards to the Youth Participatory Budgeting of Rosario, although it grants a significant role to the Participation Council (a representative body) in the final drafting of the projects, they are submitted to vote by universal
suffrage. This is a process that features massive involvement by children and young people, as can be seen in Table 4. According to the Rosario Youth PB website, in 2017 5,000 young people participated in 104 assemblies in schools and community venues, in addition to nearly 27,000 young voters.

Table 4 Voting in Rosario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>76 (only one district)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>26,933</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources International Observatory on Participatory Democracy (2010), and the authors’ elaboration

All this illustrates the tendency towards hybridization, using different strategies at the different participatory design levels. In any case, it is not the aim of this text to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the different models in a comparative way. It can, however, uphold the value of disseminating in-depth knowledge of this diversity of designs for child and youth participation. As already indicated, work remains to be done analysing, comparing and systematizing public policies to engage children from the perspective of participatory democracy.

Finally, it should be emphasized that not all the processes described in this text lead to decisions of the same nature, nor in all cases do these decisions have a binding character for local governments, as can be seen in Table No. 5. Non-binding participation processes run the risk of being sterile and frustrating if the participants have devoted a considerable amount of time to producing proposals to improve their environments, but they are not taken into account by the same institution that asked them to participate. An extreme example was reported by the evaluation team of the AJI initiative at Ryerson University in Toronto (George and Lee, 2013), citing situations in which this body did not receive any funding from the mayor’s office to carry out its projects because the groups of young participants were identified as offspring of members of the local opposition party.
Table 5 The nature of decision-making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the experience</th>
<th>Scope of participation</th>
<th>Are decisions binding?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Youth and Children’s Councils  
Ayuntamientos Juveniles e Infantiles | Awareness Campaigns  
Charitable actions  
Thematic diagnoses | No |
| Children’s Forum & Youth Forum  
Foro Infantil & Foro Juvenil | Thematic diagnoses  
Leisure and culture programmes  
Others, as organised | No, barring exceptions |
| Youth Participatory Budget  
Presupuesto Participativo Joven | Assignment of a budgetary item by district (€6,000,000 pesos in 2017) | Yes |
| Youth Participatory Budget  
Orçamento Participativo Jovem | Assignment of two budgetary items:  
School projects (€7,500 in 2017)  
General projects (€17,500 in 2017) | Yes |
| Children’s Agora  
Ágora Infantil | Awareness Campaigns  
Leisure and culture programmes  
Outfitting of municipal facilities | Yes |

Sources the authors’ elaboration

Some reflections
A first reflection that this account yields is the insufficient attention that children have received from the participatory democracy scholars. The search for solutions to narrow the gap between citizens and government through democratic innovation has received a lot of attention in the case of adults, but far less so for young people. It does not seem that the construction of a permanent democracy (Morell and Subirats, 2012) can be put off until young people become adults. The socialization of children in democratic culture, and the abilities, values, actions and reflections that this entails, is necessary. In fact, in current adult democratic innovations it is often noted that people who come to these spaces possess certain skills, and that those who do not are self excluded, thus generating a participatory cycle of exclusion, in which only some perceive themselves as capable. This gap could be reduced in a society in which democracy begins in childhood.

After studying the experiences covered here, some useful lessons can be highlighted, in order to foster a democratic society throughout the life cycle.

The first of the lessons is that child and youth participation processes benefit from collaboration between municipal governments and alliances of agents. Schools stand out for their dual role as...
places that concentrate young populations with which government officers strive to establish communication, and places encompassing the territories’ diverse populations.\(^4\)

Inclusive work acquires a specific weight in children’s participatory processes, and can be strengthened through specific school staff training programmes. Other alliances that reinforce the processes are those with multilateral organisations, international cooperation (which frequently support pilot experiences until they show signs of consolidation), academia (which plays a central role in obtaining and systematizing knowledge about the processes) and civil society organisations. Finally, alliances for child and youth participation initiatives should be viewed along with an overall open government plan, as part of a local participation system in which children have instruments adapted and relevant to their interests.

The \textit{transparency} of the process has also been identified as a central component, above all the search for mechanisms that ensure equal access to information about rules and their global understanding. Likewise, the hybridisation of models and work with both small and large groups is a constant. This architecture requires the development of instruments and procedures that allow for interconnection between the different levels of participation to guarantee the process’s transparency and legitimacy. This aspect still calls for new innovations, and some solutions can be found in ICTs.

As indicated, the alliances and transparency of the processes facilitate their inclusive nature, allowing the involvement of children and adolescents, both under the law and in practice. It has been observed that the cases analysed are \textit{universal} (aimed at all local children and young people), at least during some stages of the participatory cycle. But it is clear that participating is not equally accessible in all cases, due to the individual dynamics of self-exclusion aforementioned.

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\(^4\) This characteristic arises in geographic contexts in which there is a widespread public school system, and in which schooling is mainly based on criteria of residential proximity, and, much less, socioeconomic status.
tioned. The objective of mitigating political disaffection through new cultures of citizenship requires not only that potential participants be invited, but also that they perceive themselves a relevant part of the initiative.

It has been shown that, in relation to how decisions are made, there are consultative and binding experiences. But it has also been seen that bodies designed as advisory entities may participate in concrete actions of a binding nature, a permeability that can be appreciated as a form of convergence with the ways of understanding participatory democracy advanced in this text. Exclusively consultative processes are vulnerable due to their explicit dependence on the political will of government officials. This endangers the institutional standardization of the participatory initiative, which, as has been stated in previous pages, can be subordinated to party agendas, thereby breaking the cycle of trust necessary to narrow the gap between the government and citizens.

Observing the balance between ambition and the feasibility of execution (Font, 2017), and adaptation to the institutional cultures of each territory, it is worth commencing a global dialogue on the active role of children in local governance from the perspective of participatory democracy, in the same way that this has been done with regards to adult Participatory Budgeting for more than a decade. There is a need for and the possibility of multiplying institutional political participation processes for young people at the local level, reconciling a general view of children’s rights with the emerging agenda of institutional innovation for participatory democracy.


Note from the authors
We would also like to thank the Mayor’s Office in Paris for providing the data.
Policy Preferences at Different Stages of Participatory Budgeting: The Case of Paris

Tiago Peixoto, Fredrik M. Sjoberg, Bruce MacPhail & Jonathan Mellon

Abstract
A detailed examination of the Paris City participatory budgeting (Paris PB) process suggests that the voting stage is the most important stage for shifting the agenda, but that consultative and bureaucratic stages are also important for determining the final policy outcomes. Theory stipulates that the less participatory stages, such as when bureaucrats filter out projects during feasibility assessments, tend towards the status quo of spending, while we find the opposite. In Paris PB the initial proposals (that can be submitted by anyone) were relatively similar to status quo spending. However, the filtering stage, where projects are shortlisted to be included on the ballot, moves the agenda away from status quo spending. In the end, the PB vote moves the proposals closer to status quo spending yet again. These findings call into question the idea that participatory institutions necessarily promote different spending patterns compared with the standard ways in which government spends money. Our results also highlight the importance of accounting for the whole of the decision process when examining participatory budgeting and other direct democratic institutions, rather than focusing on a single stage, which can miss the most important parts of the decision process.
Introduction
Participatory budgeting (henceforth PB) aims to give citizens control over how their government spends their money. However, in practice the PB system is complex, involving many stages where proposals can be filtered. Some of these stages are clearly the direct result of citizen input (e.g. voting) but in others the decisions about filtering less clearly result from this input (e.g. screening for technical feasibility). This study asks three questions: 1) where do decisions in Paris's participatory budgeting process get made; 2) how do the outputs of the process compare to municipal spending more generally; and 3) does the availability of online voting have a substantial impact on the outcomes of the PB process?

We make use of detailed administrative data on the 2016 Paris participatory budgeting process that tracks the progress of the Participatory Budgeting proposals through the PB system, including during the vote (online and offline), and compare this with spending data from the Paris municipal budget. Our results highlight the importance of accounting for the whole of the decision process when examining participatory budgeting and other direct democratic institutions, rather than focusing on a single stage, which can miss the most important parts of the decision making process.

Online Voting in Participatory Budgeting
We particularly focus on whether or not the inclusion of online voting leads to a different pattern of participatory budgeting outcomes in terms of the projects that were chosen. Internet voting has become more common in a number of areas (Alvarez, Hall, & Trechsel, 2009; Bélanger & Carter, 2010; Bochsler, 2010; Trechsel, Schwerdt, Breuer, Alvarez, & Hall, 2007), but has been particularly linked to voting in the final stage of Participatory Budgeting (Peixoto, Sjoberg, & Mellon, 2017; Vassil & Weber, 2011). There has been significant discussion over whether online voting improves outcomes (Magleby, 1987; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993) by reducing the cost of voting and therefore widening the pool of potential voters (Alvarez & Hall, 2004; Carter & Bélanger, 2012; Trechsel et al., 2007) or whether it instead skews access towards the most privileged groups (Spada, Mellon, Peixoto, & Sjoberg, 2016) whose preferences and interests empirically differ from the rest of the population (Baker, 2003; Gilens, 2012; Gillon, Ladd, & Meredith, 2014; Page, Bartels, & Seawright, 2013a; Page & Seawright, 2014) (Baker, 2003; Gilens, 2012; Gillon et al.,
Despite the hopes of the techno-optimists or the fears of the techno-pessimists, previous research has found little evidence that online and offline voters in final stage of the Rio Grande do Sul Participatory Budgeting process voted in a systematically different way from each other (Mellon, Peixoto, & Sjoberg, 2017), although the online voters were sufficient to change which proposal received the most votes in a small number of districts (Haikin, Sjoberg, & Mellon, 2017). It is therefore an open question whether we should expect the availability of multiple modes of voting to affect the final stage of the Paris participatory budgeting process.

Participatory Budgeting from Belo Horizonte to Paris

Representative democracy has been the dominant form of citizen participation over the last century. In this view citizens’ role in government is limited to choosing appropriate people to make relevant policy decisions. However, various forms of direct democracy have become increasingly popular in recent decades. However, there has been substantial criticism of direct democratic institutions such as referendums because they do not engage citizens at the proposal creation stage and do not encourage deep engagement with the issues. Participatory budgeting is designed to increase citizen engagement in all stages of the policy process from designing proposals through to deciding on which proposals to go ahead with.

Most of the PB innovations come from cities around the world, many of them in developing countries (Peixoto & Sifry, 2017). In recent years the PB phenomenon has also spread to the developed world (Hagelskamp, Silliman, & Schleif, 2016; Harkins, Moore, & Escobar, 2016). As of 2016, more than 3,000 cities have tried some form of PB (Pape & Lerner, 2016).

The Paris Process

In March 2014 Paris elected a new mayor, Ms. Anne Hidalgo, who, during the campaign, had promised to introduce participatory budgeting in the city. Later that same year Paris’ participatory budgeting (Paris Budget Participatif, henceforth the ‘Paris PB’) was introduced, with the stated objective of letting citizens decide on 5 percent of the capital investment budget over the course of the mandate, estimated
to be a total of 500 million euros over the period. This 5-year commitment has made the Paris PB the largest in terms of the investment budget allocated to PB.

Following a quick introduction in 2014, the features of the PB process in Paris have evolved as the system has been adjusted. Here we focus on the 2016 Paris PB process. The Paris participatory budgeting process goes through several steps. This study follows the policy agenda as it changes at each step to look at where the outputs of the system shift most substantially.

Stage 1: Project proposals (January–February).
The first stage of the PB cycle is for project proposals to be submitted. Project proposals were received in a month-long window between January 19th and February 19th 2016. Proposals could only be submitted through a dedicated online platform (budgetparticipatif.paris.fr). Proposals could be submitted by all Parisians, irrespective of age and nationality. The proposals could be submitted by individuals or groups.

Stage 2: Project screening (March–August).
Upon submission of projects, they were made available for online consultation on the Paris PB online portal. The projects undergo a 3-stage screening process before they are submitted to voting.

Screening 1: Conformity with requirements.
A first screening was carried out for projects to meet the eligibility requirements which were 1) being within the mandate of the City 2) not have significant maintenance costs, 3) be part of the capital investment in public spaces and 4) being in the public interest (cannot be illegal, defamatory or discriminatory activity). Those submitting proposals deemed not in conformity were informed that their proposals were removed, with a justification.

Screening 2: technical feasibility and merging of similar proposals.
Project must then undergo a technical feasibility by the City of Paris. In parallel, the project submitters which have submitted similar projects are invited to discuss to merge projects. Projects that are not technically feasible can be excluded at this stage. The combination of several
proposals is done through neighborhood meetings for neighborhood projects or on the website for citywide projects. From March to May, neighborhood co-creation meetings are held to merge similar proposals in the same areas or themes. The neighborhood co-creation meetings are in-person physical presence meetings and those for citywide projects are held online.

**Screening 3: Consultative Selection Commissions.**

The last screening stage takes place through ‘selection commissions’. These commissions are established in each borough for neighborhood projects and at the city level for citywide projects. The commissions are chaired by the Borough Mayor for borough commissions and the Mayor of Paris for citywide projects. The borough commission includes participation from technical services, elected councilors from the governing party and opposition parties, and members of citizens’ groups and a representative from the City of Paris. The commission for citywide projects includes City of Paris administration, elected councilors from different parties and representatives of citizens including project sponsors. Upon the deliberation by the selection commissions, the final list of projects to be submitted to vote is approved by the Borough Mayor for neighborhood projects and the City Mayor for citywide projects.

**Stage 3: Voting (September).**

Voting for the 2016 Paris PB was done over a 14-day period between September 16th and October 2nd 2016. Voting was done online or at physical voting booths. The physical voting was done at the borough council building or at the City of Paris. All Paris residents could vote irrespective of age and nationality. For neighborhood projects, each resident casts votes in either her neighborhood of residence or neighborhood of work. Voters can vote for multiple projects.

**Stage 4: Budget Approval (December).**

Winning projects are voted in the Municipal Budget at the Council meeting.

Stages 1 and 3 are clearly participatory stages, as they involve only citizens. Stage 2 is more ambiguous. On the one hand it clearly includes participatory input through the consultations but also includes screening steps with significant latitude for city officials to make decisions.
**Data**

Here we use administrative data from the Participatory Budgeting process in Paris. The data is provided by a) the responsible unit in the city administration; and b) Open Data Paris. The data covers the first three stages of the Participatory Budgeting process but does not distinguish the three screening phases within stage 2. The data on projects proposed for the 2016 process contains 3,703 observations, submitted by 1,849 unique individuals (either representing themselves or an association). The data on user interactions contains 26,995 observations, recording the interaction with the platform by 7,628 unique individuals. The data on voting covers both online and offline voting results for each proposal on the ballot from each of the 20 arrondissements and for the city-wide vote, a total of 1,327 observations. The data on voting in the September 2016 Paris PB vote includes the summaries for each of the 624 unique project proposals that were on the final PB ballot. 92,809 voters took part in the vote, casting multiple votes. In total, 278,132 offline and 229,293 online votes were cast.

**Results**

Our results show that just 6.9 percent of the initial proposals are eventually implemented (although the merging stage does combine some of these so the proportion that succeed in some way is higher). It is therefore useful to know where the losing proposals are removed or merged in the process. Figure 1 shows the number of proposals remaining at the end of each stage. The earlier stages remove more proposals in absolute terms, but the later stages remove proportionally more of the remaining proposals, with the voting stage removing 64.9 percent of the remaining proposals. In total, 37.5 percent of all proposals are removed during a participatory stage of the process (consultation and voting) and 55.6 percent of all proposals are removed at a non-participatory stage (conformity and technical screening).

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2 Dossier De Presse, October 5, 2016, Paris City Hall.
Although more proposals are removed at the non-participatory stages it is not clear how much this changes the types of projects that are put on the ballot. Table 1 shows the percentage of proposed spending on different stages of the PB process (and the Paris budget more generally) that relate to each spending area.

**Table 1** Percentage of Total Value at Each Stage and in Paris Budget more widely.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spending area</th>
<th>Proposals</th>
<th>Ballot</th>
<th>Final chosen</th>
<th>Paris budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Services and Environment</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Support and Solidarity</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth and Sports</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, Training, Family</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Services</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note* the spending areas are taken directly from the data. No additional processing was done.

But how does the proposed spending at different stages compare to the Paris Municipal budget more generally? To look at this we recoded the Paris budget and participatory budgeting proposals into a comparable
set of policy areas. The last column in Table 1 shows the proportion of spending in the general Paris budget. Importantly, the Paris budget has a large allocation for housing, which is not addressed within PB. The PB itself falls into the “General Services” category. Cultural projects also had less money spent on them through the PB budget than the Paris budget more generally.

The table shows that the PB results of the PB differ most from the general Paris budget in spending money on projects in the category of “Social Support and Solidarity”. This category is quite diverse including projects such as homeless shelters, playgrounds, and community gardens. But why is so much of the PB budget spent on this category? One reason is that the social support & solidarity category contains relatively expensive projects. It has the third highest mean value of projects on the ballot (after economic development and youth and sports). Additionally, the projects in this category that were chosen were particularly expensive (mean value of 2,781,849, compared with 1,552,353 for all successful PB projects). Spending in the PB and general budget was actually fairly similar for “urban services and the environment”, education, training and family services and security.

Table 2 shows the difference in the agenda (calculated by taking the sum of the absolute differences of the percentages in two columns) across the different stages. A score of 100 means the two agendas are entirely different and a score of 0 means they are exactly the same. Despite the filtering stages removing many proposals, the difference score between the proposals and ballot stage is actually relatively small. The difference between the ballot and the final chosen proposals is significantly larger and also greatly increases the gap between the original proposals and the final chosen projects. This suggests that the participatory budgeting vote at the end of the process is having the largest effect on the agenda rather than the pre-filtering stages at least in terms of which issue areas receive funding.
Table 2 Difference in issue choice between different stages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1</th>
<th>Stage 2</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proposals</td>
<td>Ballot</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposals</td>
<td>Final chosen</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot</td>
<td>Final chosen</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposals</td>
<td>Paris budget</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot</td>
<td>Paris budget</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final chosen</td>
<td>Paris budget</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 also tells us that the original proposals have the most similar distribution of proposed spending to the Paris municipal budget. The filtering stage makes the balance of expenditure very different to the Paris budget, although the voting stage actually brings spending slightly closer to the Paris municipal spending. Interestingly this means that the less participatory stage of the process is actually the one that moves spending away from standard municipal spending and the participatory voting stage moves spending closer to distribution in the Paris budget.

Another reason for the outsized success of certain categories of spending is the popularity of proposals in these areas throughout different stages of the PB process and among the online and offline voters. Figure 2 shows that generally speaking there is a strong correlation between the choices of online and offline voters. Figure 2 shows that generally speaking there is a strong correlation between the choices of online and offline voters in a neighborhood (dots are sized by the cost of the proposal) although there are some notable outliers.

Figure 2 Strong online and offline correlation in terms of vote choice (Arrondissements level).
The results show that social support and solidarity over-performed in votes compared with the proportion of the propositions in that category. Note that all these differences are statistically significant at the 5-percent level. Because of the voting system, this over-performance further translated into more success in terms of the proportion of propositions in that category that won. Online voters have a slightly stronger preferences for proposals about social support and solidarity but the difference is not large. The largest difference between online and offline voters' preferences is for cultural projects, which offline voters chose more often.

Table 3 Percentage of total proposals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spending area</th>
<th>Proposals</th>
<th>Ballot</th>
<th>Final chosen</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Online</th>
<th>Offline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Services and Environment</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Support and Solidarity</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth and Sports</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, Training, Family</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Services</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusions
Our analysis of the Paris participatory budgeting data suggests that the participatory budgeting vote is the most important stage for changing the agenda in terms of the categories of spending (in absolute terms the bureaucratic stages exclude more proposals). While we might expect that the less participatory screening stages would tend towards the status quo of spending by the Paris municipal government, we actually find the opposite; that these stages move spending away from the status quo. We find that 1) the initial proposals were relatively similar to status quo spending, 2) the bureaucratic stages move spending away from the status quo and 3) the participatory budgeting vote moves the proposals closer to the Paris municipal government’s distribution of spending. In other words, every time the citizens of Paris have a say in spending during the process, they move it closer to the distribution of municipal spending more generally. Our results do suggest that even in a process designed specifically to be max-
imally participatory such as Paris PB, the majority of proposal filtering is done during non-participatory stages of the process. However, whether this non-participatory filtering is considered non-democratic is somewhat debatable. A positive account of this process would argue that the filtering stages are removing proposals that would be impossible to implement or are such low quality that no voter who knew about them would actually choose them. On this view, the filtering stage is acting to reduce the cognitive complexity of the participatory stages by presenting voters with a narrower choice set which allow them to find ones they actually support and consider the smaller range of options more carefully. One finding of ours that supports this interpretation is that online and offline voters differ in their issue preferences suggests that voters are actually able to link their preferences meaningfully to their choices. Similarly, the fact that the bureaucratic filtering has less of an impact on the categories of spending than the voting stage also supports this view.

A less positive interpretation of the filtering process would point to the fact that the filtering meaningfully affected the balance of policy areas offered to voters in the final stage. While this was probably not an intentional goal of the filtering, a full understanding of Paris PB, needs to recognize that the bureaucratic filtering is an active part of the process as well as the participatory sections. This fits with previous literature pointing to the importance of who gets to decide which proposals are put on the agenda in direct democracy settings (Arrighi, 2017; Breuer, 2008; Hug & Tsebelis, 2002; Setälä & Schiller, 2012).

Our findings call into question the idea that participatory institutions will necessarily promote very different spending patterns compared with the standard ways in which government spends money. However, more research will be needed to examine whether spending is similar within the broad budget categories we have examined so far.

One open question is why the bureaucratic stages tended to push the agenda away from the status quo in terms of spending. One possible reason is that bureaucrats may use the opportunity to push different spending priorities than are generally considered in city budgeting. Alternatively, it may simply be that the quality of proposals differs across issue areas and that some proposals might
have duplicated existing investments by the government. We also find more support for differences among online and offline voters than previous research (Mellon, Peixoto, & Sjoberg, 2017) on participatory budgeting has shown. There are several possible explanations for this difference. First, the Paris Participatory Budgeting provides considerably more information to voters than the Rio Grande do Sul PB process, which may allow voters to make more informed decisions which in turn may strengthen the link between demographic factors and vote choices. Second, the Rio Grande do Sul process strongly emphasised making all proposals economically redistributive during the deliberative phase. This may have dampened the opportunities for economic interests (which may be correlated with the types of people who choose Internet voting) to affect peoples’ votes in the Brazilian context. By contrast, there may have been less of an emphasis on making proposals redistributive at the consultation phases in Paris. This study makes a contribution to the emerging field of quantitative analysis of PB processes. Given the increased use of technology throughout the different stages of PB we anticipate a lot more studies that can shed light on the opportunities and challenges with PB.
Note from the authors
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Introduction

Can gamification support the dissemination of participatory budgeting (PB)? And, more generally, to what extent can games help promote democratic values and citizen participation in the real world? This chapter aims at contributing to answers to these questions starting from the analysis of the well-established experience of the role-playing game Empaville, recently created within a wide inter-European project for simulating a gamified participatory budgeting process in an imaginary city. The reflection seeks to highlight some of the opportunities and challenges of using gamification techniques and specific games in citizen participation settings, particularly in renewing the way in which participatory budgeting is envisaged and promoted.

As Allegretti (2012) and Cunha et al. (2010) underlined, PB – as a specific “technology of participation” (Nunes, 2006) – often has proved to have tense relations when dialoguing with other technologies, which (in the perception of its participants) tend to encumber it with stiff rules driven more by technological constraints than by leading visions of democratic potentials. But it also showed interest for cou-
pling with other tools that aim at mobilising practical know-how and the building up of a form of knowledge guided by prudence and by attention to the consequences of the action. Under this perspective, it is worth clarifying here that the term *gamification* we will be using from now on, has initial roots in the digital media industry, particularly in the context of video games. Specifically, Deterding (2014a) defined it as the use of game design elements in *non-game* contexts. Thus, the dynamic entails *gameful* elements (such as rules, competition and conflict features) executed by the users towards an end goal, which allow participants to be rewarded for specific activities and their general engagement, paving the way for a revival in “playful desire behaviours and mindsets” (Deterding et al. 2011, pp. 9-15).

Consequently, *gamification* aims at creating a common space for an enjoyable user experience, expanding his or her commitment into something conceived for more than solely entertainment purposes.

In such a perspective, democratic participation could be imagined as one of the most interesting ongoing fields of use of *gamified techniques*, not only in terms of a tool that can provide practical training and simulate the effects and impacts of procedures and power-relations, but also for promoting reflections on values and rights within a limited time-frame. If, in contrast to a Schumpeterian notion of democracy (1942), citizens – in the modernisation of politics – must be imagined as more than mere consumers (Pateman, 2012), the introduction of *gamified* elements in democracy could also count on an active role of citizens as co-developers instead of simple consumer (Gee, 2003). Thus, citizens can be imagined as co-creators of the gaming setting in which they are involved in order to better identify and help to understand which components and dimensions of *gaming* could better optimize the process of intensification of democracy through playing.

The present chapter will reflect on *gamification* in the decision-making process of citizen participation, questioning if and how games can foster or enhance the direct interaction between citizens and governmental players, alongside promoting community collaboration and direct action. In this framework, Participatory Budgeting appears as a very interesting tool, being that – since its first experiences – it contains an important element of competition for resources among participants. Therefore, it includes in its ontology a gamified dimension,
which constitutes an important attractor for its participants, provided that it does not overshadow principles of solidarity and constructive cooperation among inhabitants and with their local institutions. The text begins with an attempt at defining what *gamification* means and which declinations of the concept are more interesting when it comes to discussing participatory processes of decision-making. This part is followed by a more specific section focusing on the relation between *gamification* and democracy. The third section examines the role-playing game Empaville and other experiences that preceded and accompanied it. The fourth part analyses the version of Empaville for schools, focusing on some of the Empaville for School sessions carried out in Portugal. This constitutes a sort of “case study” for the chapter, examined through a survey and in the light of participant observation by authors. Finally, the conclusion highlights opportunities and challenges for future developments.

1. **What is gamification about?**

To better understand the meaning of the word “gamification,” an analysis of the use of such terminology in literature is due. Caillois (2001) conceptualized *gamification* in relation to two distinguishable fields: *ludus* (gaming) and *paidia* (playing), the latter of which entails the creation of a playing-space, and is more creative, open, probing and free. This general definition does not help much to go beyond an intersecting and blurred conceptualization of the *gamification* concept. Nonetheless, the reflection of gamification as complement of playfulness (Deterding et al., 2011) paved the way to depict a space for a societal approach rather than a technical one. Under this perspective, *gamification* is a multiverse, strictly related to the context and demographic of users, and should not be scrutinised as a “one size fits all” model.

What mainly interests the authors here is describing gamification as a process that increases users’ motivation and enjoyment while encouraging them to come back to (and to involve themselves more permanently into) the game. Deterding (2014a), Mahnic (2014) and Thiel (2016) defined this dynamic as “engaging experience,” which can be better perceived through *interface design patterns* such as badges, levels, or leaderboards, that play a valuable role towards communi-
ty recognition, which may also include non-game contexts. Together with the above-mentioned elements, Thiel (2016) also points out the important role played by the status that users can acquire by reaching certain levels of the game. Each achievement is recognized within the community, turning their engagement into a sort of social reward. Other elements could concur with gamification, such as feedbacks, challenges and competition among the leader boards, and such features could be framed by time constraints. The articulation between these elements drive the user to a more enjoyable and engaging experience. The success of gamification is intertwined with how much the users’ interaction can be more appealing and rewarding, i.e. how they can be more motivated to maintain their engagement.

To summarize, in a gamified experience, it is possible to recognize two sides of behavioral motivation: one intrinsic and one extrinsic. Some authors such as Manhic (2014), Sanchez-Franco (2009), Thiel (2016) and Hassan (2017) pointed out that intrinsic motivations are consequently rooted around pleasure and amusement on performing the activity. The extrinsic motivations are translated by the mechanisms/elements that are rooted in the game design through a reward-based approach. Therefore, gamification tends to be more successfully achieved when the emotional responses and its intrinsic positive effects can be balanced or completed with a utilitarian/extrinsic way of being motivated to continue to take part in the game.

2. Gamification and democracy

Given the definitions suggested above, one can ask to what extent citizens’ participation can be more enjoyable and how gamification can have a positive impact on Participatory Budgeting and, more in general, participatory democracy practices. Several authors, such as Pateman (2012), Crouch (2004) Santos (2005) and Lerner (2014) pointed out the decrease of political participation and its risks. In particular, Lerner affirmed that the democracy is “turning what once were social
processes into individualized tasks with little human interaction” (p. 8). The possibility of participation has been diminished, transforming the decision-making process into one becoming alienated from citizens, ruled and owned by elites and/or technocratic procedures. Considering this, can gamification be seen as a viable piece of a mosaic of actions which can enhance democracy by promoting participation? As argued by Lerner in his essay “Making Democracy Fun” (2014), which dedicates a central part to participatory budgeting, games are “inherently democratic”, as they invite people to participate, implying deliberation and even influencing the decision-making. The emphasis on the deliberation dimension could help to shape the concept of gamified democracy: playing together could be viewed as a first step to allow discussion and deliberation among citizens and institutions.

Thiel (2016) has categorized and analysed some e-participation platforms in order to examine to what extent deliberation can be promoted by a gamified democracy. The results pointed out a very limited and narrow deliberation dimension of the majority of participatory projects. They also underlined the prevalence of a passive approach to the promotion of citizen engagement, which tends to limit deliberation to prescriptive agendas, often previously established. Thiel (id.) remarks that even when public deliberation processes allow citizens to emphasize and give a central space to the topics they are interested in, interaction among different actors and positions remains limited, as it happens to the capacity to produce and compare alternative solutions to the same problem. Although partial (because of the specific universe of samples chosen by the author), this evaluation constitutes a seminal reference to highlight some widespread limitations within many platforms created to promote e-participation of citizens around public policies. Two appear to be the strongest common limits: (1) the reduced commitment of public officials and stakeholders to giving feedback to each other and actively “interact” in the process; (2) the limited number of citizens actively engaged in taking part in the deliberation and decision-making process through the platforms. Under this perspective, redefining gamification in a way that could largely contribute to the common good becomes pivotal to intensify participatory processes and making them more attractive to citizens. As Mahnic (2014) argued, gamification can also help the decrease of citizen alienation from politics and society in general, as – through its crowdsourcing dimension – individuals could better perceive their role within the community, “outsourcing a job to the crowd”, for the common good. Wikipedia is an illustrative example of how working for the community can provide effective involvement. As stated by Macintosh (2004), a gamified setting can allow citizens to see how they can give their contribution – according to their own knowledge and skills – to take part in a broader policy-making life cycle.
Additionally, it is worthwhile to underline that the literature on the topic of *gamification* in public participation also contains very critical accents, especially when focusing on negative effects of models which do not aim at empowering free and complex thinking, but instrumentally use elements of competition and stiff features of game settings to indoctrinate large audiences, weaken citizens’ autonomy or simply reduce participation to mere tokenism. For example, Sgueo (2018) critically approaches several games shaped and experimented on by international institutions (as NATO or the World Bank) to transmit to young generations exclusively positive visions of neoliberal mainstream doctrines. Under this perspective, Mahnic (2014) argues that *gamification* is also a “slippery terrain,” stigmatizing its impoverishing role every time it tries to reduce serious debates to the mere “*homo ludens*” component, and to promote a semblance of a democratic way of living based only on pleasure rather than on a complex articulation of satisfactions and efforts or struggles for social improvement. A similar distortion can be harmful also because it extremes a vision of social environments based on “meritocracy” more than democracy values. Under this perspective, *gamification* is a failure (in democratic terms) every time that it tends to encourage citizens to spend their energy in the games, without questioning who established the rules or criticising the real socio–political system that frames the *gamified* settings.

### 2.1 A large diversification of settings and tools

Local governance has been a fruitful field to implement new ways of citizen engagement through the use of e-participation tools and *gamification* techniques. Sgueo (2018) proves it, collecting various experiences of *gamification* implemented by institutions of different political–administrative levels, spread all over the world and which promoted games related to democracy and interactions among powers, with a diverse range of aims and strategies. Tools used to gamify interactions between inhabitants and their representative institutions can be very diverse and use multimedia devices in creative ways. In United States, for example, interesting cases are those of Santa Monica (California), where the residents can evaluate the municipal council’s proposals by a Tinder-like website, or of Boston (Massachusetts), where citizens and the Mayor’s office “share information on traffic, criminality, Wi-Fi availability and waste management” (id: 7–8). In Peru, during the COP20 climate change summit held in Lima in 2014, a program called “Gallinazo Avisa” (“Vultures Warn”) was launched, allowing citizens to “track vultures trained to seek out illegal garbage dumps via GoPro cameras and GPS devices fitted to their bodies” (id: 52). In Europe, among many experiences, it could be worth to point out the case of Dublin, where citizens “receive up to 200 euros in vouchers by helping the city council to monitor public toilets and fountains located in the city parks” or that of Madrid,
where the residents share ideas online by a dedicated platform and express “likes” to the proposals in order to give them priority in the municipal council vote (id: 8). Similar cases of so-called “continuous ideation” exist in Barcelona, Lisbon and Moscow. In the Portuguese city of Cascais, the APP “City Points” allows citizens to be rewarded (with discounts, transportation bonus and other benefits) for behaviours inspired to best practices in domains like the environment, mobility, social cohesion and active civic engagement, thus recognizing the latter as an important component of the intensification of local democracy (Dias & Duarte de Sousa, 2017). Similarly, in some Japanese cases of participatory budgeting (Matsubara, 2013), no-tax payers can take part to the voting of priorities to be funded with 1% of the municipal budget thanks to the scores they can gain and accumulate through voluntary activities in charities and NGOs which work in the socio-environmental domain. While in China, the city of Suining offers an even more impressive example: the citizens receive score-points according to their social behaviour and – based on the total score – they gain benefits, such as access to certain social services or priority in employment lists (Sgueo, 2018: 8).

As Bogost (2011) claimed, these types of tools will never offer enough to satisfy and strengthen participation if not all the contributors (organized stakeholders, citizens, civil servants, public official) wish to cooperate and actively take part in the decision-making process. Participation – conceived as an equal arena of dialogue among peers, where governments and citizens can assume a partnership of equal standing on decision making process (Macintosh, 2004; OECD 2001) – represents the most desirable space for a gamification process that could have the characteristic of a “serious game” (or applied game). This category includes games designed for a primary purpose other than pure entertainment, which can be imagined as a subgenre of serious storytelling (Lugmayr et al., 2016) and related to the way in which simulation is generally used in sectors such as aviation or medical cares, providing that “the added pedagogi-

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1 See https://www.cascais.pt/sites/default/files/anexos/gerais/new/cascais_citypoints_pt_o.pdf
cal value of fun and competition”

The current experiences of gamification for serious purposes – including those mentioned in the last paragraphs – represent a discontinuity of tools (especially for the use of internet-based devices) in a substantial continuity of goals with a tradition of use of games in educational circles that dates back to – at least – the beginning of the twentieth century (Abt, 1970; Anderson et al., 2009), and that acquired a special importance with the so-called Back to Basics teaching movement in the ‘70s. Today, the fast evolution of gamification through ICTs has transformed such field almost in a sort of complex disciplinary domain, which has tried to shape its community of learning game technologists, and its own tools for promoting and diffusing case studies and comparative analysis.

3. Gaming in PB: from “Vila Planetário” to “Empaville”

Paraphrasing what Archon Fung wrote (2011), when he imagined two differentiated macro-categories of participatory processes based on how the implementers might “interpret” their mission, we could apply a similar approach to the role of serious gamification within participatory processes. Thus, we could talk of (1) deontological and (2) consequentialist processes of gamification. The (1) deontological family would represent experiences which value games because they make democratic processes more attractive and marketable and facilitate easier relationships among citizens and between citizens and the state. Hence, they are worthwhile because they fluidify a greater citizen participation and stimulate a new image of deliberative experiments, “quite apart from any other effects that these innovations have” (Fung, 2011). This perspective tends to suggest that it is sufficient to offer citizens elements of gamification to foster a larger participation (which does not necessarily mean a deeper engagement),

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2 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serious_game, where it is explained that the “serious” adjective is generally referred to “video games used by industries like defence, education, scientific exploration, health care, emergency management, city planning, engineering, and politics”, so “outside the context of entertainment, where the narration progresses as a sequence of patterns impressive in quality...and is part of a thoughtful progress”.

3 Examples of this trend are The International Journal on Serious Games or think tanks such as the Danish Digital Learning Game Agency or Serious Games Interactive. See: http://www.seriousgames.net
without the need for wider goals. The (2) consequentialist perspective, instead, could consider game-based innovations to be valuable based on the extent to which they would secure additional values, including learning by doing, simulations aimed at building more collaborative environments, responsive to citizens’ interests and inspired to solidarity, social justice, and so on. Hence, consequentialist gamification in participatory processes focuses on translating wider and stronger objectives into actions, using specific tools to guarantee consequentiality and coherence between motivations, aims and targeted results, and evaluating them accordingly. In such a perspective, consequentialist gamified processes are, in essence, a better representative of a ‘serious games’ approach, because their additional ‘serious’ agenda (about training, empowerment and development of players and relations among them) appears clearer and more coherent.

Rather, participatory budgeting can be seen – in itself – as a “serious game” whose components of competition for resources between different ideas and groups that elaborate and support them represent an attractive “motivator” for citizens to engage in participation, having the “serious” target of incising in decision-making about policies and projects. However, the attractiveness naturally exerted by competition represents only a first level of stimuli to citizens’ engagement. It can be potentially reinforced by sharing with them opportunities of co-writing the rules of the PB process, distributing bonus and rewards for specific typologies of proposals, involving inhabitants in evaluating the feasibility (and improve the quality) of proposals, but also monitoring the implementation of the co-decided investments, and even the performance, transparency and accountability of the whole participatory process and its promoting institutions. These characteristics turn PB into a multi-level gamified process, but absolutely not into a game, being that it does not provide a risk-free environment to practice essential skills. In fact, decisions taken have real consequences on actors, governance systems, policies and the urban space. However, the risks of such a non-game application can be studied, imagined and even partially prevented through the use of games – not necessarily restricted to increase the PB learning dimensions.

Actually, the first well-known role-games related to the construction of PB models appeared around 2000–2001, when several Europe-
an grassroots organizations were trying to “import” and “emulate” participatory budgeting into the Old Continent, trying to adapt the Latin American formulas to very different socio-institutional contexts. Among the first simulation-games of a PB there was “Vila Planetário”. It was created by some members of the French-based network “Démocratiser Radicalement la Démocratie” together with the World Social Agenda of Padua, in Italy, with the goal of imagining an extreme-situation – the final co-decision about the future relocation of the inhabitants of a slum area – and stimulate decision-makers and elected official to engage with a democratic innovation that could help to face difficult urban conflicts and tense power-relations. The idea of this paper-game was mainly that of creating a safe-space to test what PB is about, especially for the sake of public officials that had shown interest in the innovation coming from Brazil, but needed to better understand and discuss if and how it could be reshaped in other environments and countries. In parallel, in 2002, another interesting role-game about PB was shaped by some English NGOs coordinated under the umbrella of the Community Pride Initiative in Manchester, and made famous by the PB-Unit created as an important space of consultancies and support for UK-based PBs (Sin-tomer & Allegretti, 2009). The new roleplay-game, freely circulating on the Internet thanks to the PB-Unit website, has been translated into several languages and adapted to different cultural/national environments, mainly for supporting inductive-approaches in order to raise awareness about participatory budgeting during training sessions. In order to visualize the possibility of PB taking its decision on the base of complex “matrixes” of problems and dimensions related to the characteristic of the places where decisions are shaped, the roleplay-game included paper-based features (such as cards imagining a diverse range of characters simulating different citizens involved in PB and cards describing the peculiarities of different neighbourhoods) and some files in Excel format that allow one to quickly calcu-
late scores and systems for voting priorities during a PB simulated-cycle.

The main goal of the first roleplay-games inspired by participatory budgeting was to unpack and demystify the complexity of its mechanisms of functioning, making clear what PB is about, and how it relies on simple ideas, beyond its apparent complexity. That is why such games were mainly used in learning environments set up to facilitate understanding and dissemination of the PB concept. A different direction was chosen in Belo Horizonte, where – in 2006 – the first Digital PB was accompanied by an online small game (organized in quality levels but without any other rewarding) called “Do you really know your city?”, directed especially to young people to self-test their knowledge about the urban territory before voting on PB priorities. The latter has been one of the first gamified elements to accompany a digital PB online, in a panorama where (as demonstrated by Nitzsche et al., 2012) even PBs mainly based on ICT platforms proved incapable of using the multiple potentials offered by the Web 2.0 revolution that after 2006 started interconnecting online tools of e-government and e-governance with the new dimension of social network explosion.

On the base of the simulation-game conceived by the Community Pride Initiative, in 2010, the Centre for Social Studies of Coimbra University re-elaborated an off-line game in collaboration with the OPTAR project, funded by the Foundation for Science and Technology of Portugal, and tested it in several schools within the “CES goes to schools” series of events, aimed at socializing research in Portuguese educational environments. Later on, in 2016, this game was transformed by the consortium that coordinated the project “EMPATIA–Enabling Multichannel Participation Through ICT Adaptations”, which structured a new role-playing game called Empaville7, imagined as a simulator to experiment with participatory systems in a safe environment. This tool was initially conceived as a sort of Beta-test for several functions (like formulating proposals, casting votes, building instant-reports of public meetings with statistics on participants, etc.) of a new web-based platform created by the EMPATIA consortium, a joint-venture between different actors coming from different disciplinary backgrounds in five different European countries8 – funded by the CAPS programme within the Horizon 2020 scheme. Therefore, it was initially conceived as a by-product for validation tests during the construction of the main deliverable of the project. Nevertheless, it gradually became an independent deliverable, gaining autonomy as a pedagogic tool. Indeed – simulating a gamified PB process in the imaginary city of Empaville

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7 See: www.empaville.org
8 See www.empatia-project.eu The countries directly involved where Portugal, Italy, Germany, Czech Republic and the UK.
– it could integrate spaces of in-person deliberation (as those existing in the role-playing game of Community Pride Initiative) with digital voting, being useful to expose participants to critical issues common to the participatory budgeting and to discuss with them the nature and specific features of the process in both methodological and practical terms.

Empaville can be described as a game that mimics the flow of a hybrid (i.e. online and offline) participatory budgeting with a particular focus on login, voting, and data visualization. Empaville is shaped as a “guided experience” that starts with small group discussion on the problems of the city, followed by project proposal and voting, to end with a collective reflection based on the voting results, facilitated by the existence of pre-prepared statistics and data visualization aimed at reflecting on the effects of demo-diversity and organizational rules on the achieved results.

The structure of the game – supported by a dedicated website linked to EMPATIA UX (User Experience) digital platform.

Such an originally unplanned product was shaped by bottom-up requests to adapt previous game to the need of testing also some ICT dimensions meanwhile acquired by real processes of participatory budgeting. During more than 35 tests in different international training environments and in several schools in partner countries, Empaville ended up as a package of training opportunities, shaped in different versions that could adapt the original simple concept to the need of the different communities which requested to make use of it. Therefore, although the game can be defined as gamification of a public participation activity and the related research focuses on that topic, it has been interacting mainly with learning environments.

During the game, the participants are requested to interpret roles, which oblige them to enter in the shoes of local inhabitants with specific characters, and are invited to discuss and elaborate project proposals for the City of Empaville. It is a fictitious city designed to simulate the typical conflicts of a modern city, such as the asymmetric distribution of equipment and infrastructures, the social polarization of different groups in the territory, and the existence of gentrified and touristic zones.

The characters-cards distributed to participants provide personal data of the character i.e. age, gender, citizenship, profession, place of residence, workplace, interests, motivations to participate and behaviour during the PB process. Each card traces the profiles that participants will have to perform throughout the game, which stimulate two gaming dynamics: 1) At the individual level, participants are motivated to empathize with social actors that have different personal and social characteristics from their own. They also are given tips on how to behave, so that shy persons can find energy in the duty of playing different characters. 2) At the collective level, the game benefits from a virtually varied group, which carries different interests that could potentially be in conflict.
In the game, a specific proportion of the public budget for civic projects will be democratically decided after project proposals have been developed on the web-platform. The number of participants can vary from a minimum of 12 to a maximum (currently) of around 60 people. Groups of players are small (from 3 to 15 persons each) in order to be more at ease during interaction, and they could have (or not have) trained facilitators for conducting the group activities (when is not possible, a written guide help to follow step-by-step the timeline of the game). Players are asked to describe the proposals and indicate their geographical location, budget range and category chosen from a predefined selection of policies. After being uploaded in the platform, the proposals are presented and voted individually. The game is designed to generate conflict within and across neighbourhoods to showcase how a participatory process deals with such conflicts. The simulation apparently ends with the announcement of the winning proposals. Then, the data analysis and debriefing take place, giving the opportunity to examine the process in detail from outside the game. This is important to highlight critical issues and discuss the process in both methodological and practical terms.

In each game session, a team of facilitators guides the activities, both at the level of plenary session, as (if possible) in the smaller groups that represent the different neighbourhoods. Facilitation focuses on the deliberative phase and digital support, with the possibility of taking confederate actions within the group, in order to encourage realistically distorted dynamics that can be analysed at the final stage. As the above-mentioned description suggests, the main goal of Empaville role-play is to promote a deeper culture of participatory budgeting dynamics, and to foster digital evolution of public participation, thus providing critical tools to the participants in order to reveal benefits and challenges on the use of technologies in public participation. For these reasons, the tools created allow positive and negative voting (so, to vote in favour or against a proposal presented) and provide a detailed disaggregation and visualization of voting results (by age group, by gender, by residence place etc.) so to improve the pedagogic potential of the game sessions.

Lastly, Empaville was conceived to address three different targets: practitioners (such as politicians, civil servants and public officers),
citizens involved or to be involved in real participatory processes, and young school-students (and their professors). For the first two groups, Empaville maintain the same structure, but – in the case of practitioners – the emphasis is put on the simulation: experiencing a participatory budgeting process as participants and not just as organizers; testing a digital platform for participation; experimenting with the dynamics of digital voting; and scrutinizing the game process and data analysis at the end of the process, focusing on topics such as safety, timing and possible distortions. For citizens and social organizations, the game serves mainly for understanding the dynamics of a participatory budgeting process; familiarizing themselves with online participation platforms; reflecting on the limits and potential of digital democracy; and empathizing with other social categories. For facilitating appraisal to the third category, a simplified version of the game for young citizens (under 15) has been developed with the name of Empaville for Schools. The authors of this chapter opted to briefly analyse the latter version as a sort of “case study” due to the interesting insights offered by the experiments carried out, particularly on advantages and disadvantages of gamification applied to public participation, in context of prevalence of young people.

4. Empaville for Schools
As a simplified version specifically designed for very young people, Empaville for School is based on deeply different group dynamics and requires less (and different) technological equipment. During the game (lasting around 90 minutes), the participants are invited to a mini-Participatory Budgeting aiming to improve a park of the imaginary city of Empaville, by discussing, elaborating and voting project proposals. The number of participants can vary from a minimum of 18 to a maximum (currently) of 90 young people.

The story-telling is developed using a video, which places the participants directly in the park and allows them to discuss its problems with a facilitator, who impersonates the mayor of the city. After this stage, the mayor declares that, considering the needs that have become evident, a specific proportion of the public budget will be allocated for projects within the park, democratically prioritized among the proposals that will be developed and presented by the partici-
The participants are asked to prepare a poster for each proposal with cropped images, writings and drawings in order to describe it by pointing out its main features (e.g. goals, targets, approximate costs etc.). The proposals are, then, photographed and uploaded online, where they can be voted through electronic ballot boxes.

The participants are divided in six different teams of Empaville citizens who frequently use the park, according to cards distributed before starting: lovers of traditional sports (football, volleyball and basketball); skaters/rollers derby (lovers of unconventional sports); dog owners (with environmental awareness); elderly residents; youngsters (who want to have fun and organize parties); park staff; and businessmen/women. Group cards are made with a layout similar to that of Facebook and provide information about the members for each group: i.e. age, gender, profession, profile friend (generally imaginary groups thematically linked to each other), like and dislike topics, and if they live near the park. The entire game is shaped around group dynamics, showcasing how a participatory process deals with conflicts within and across the groups and trying to stimulate co-design, collaboration, and co-decision. Each group is also asked to nominate one or two representatives for presenting their proposals to the plenary and to vote on behalf of the group, choosing between all the proposals. Each group can express three votes in total – two positive and one negative. The simulation ends with the announcement of the winning proposals and the awards ceremony. Afterwards, a debriefing takes place to give participants the opportunity to examine the process from outside the game. In this space, players could highlight critical issues and offer an opportunity to explain the game dynamics and to transform it into a tool for consideration.

Empaville for Schools has been mainly tested in Portugal within the activities of the CES goes to school project, coordinated by the Centre for Social Studies of Coimbra University aimed to connect research to the territory, especially dialoguing with public schools, in a framework of dissemination of (and debate on) knowledge, in the areas of Social Sciences and Humanities. The experiments – which involved almost 200 students around the country – allowed to continuously update the game, both by including

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9 The EMPATIA team has embraced this project by cooperating with several schools from the 2nd and 3rd cycles of basic and secondary education located in the central region (Caldas da Rainha, Pereira, Coimbra) and north region (Porto) of Portugal. Empaville for School sessions took place in January and February 2017, involving students up to 18 years old.
some specific contents to bridge the needs of each school and by adapting the discussion for each level of educational experience. Indeed, the research team followed a tailor-made approach, considering the differences and needs of the contexts in order to better motivate the users and personalize the game experiences. In some cases, the simulation sessions were requested by professors concerned about the obligation of applying the new national Law of Portugal that obliges schools to spend a small part of Ministerial transfers through a PB methodology, without being able to prepare before their students to the implementation of the real process.

The Portuguese experiment used different materials and online and offline tools (computers, cards, videos, flipcharts, clipboards, pencils, photos, newspaper and magazines clippings) to both facilitate the game and foster the story-telling. Rules and settings were explained by stages to avoid overwhelming the players and to stimulate curiosity and surprises. Students were encouraged to master every step of the game while the facilitators acted as dynamizers. In particular, the role of the mayor was prepared as almost a theatrical performance to project the participants into the situation. The reaction of students to these dynamics have always been very active and engagement often overcame expectations, allowing face-offs with the mayor, through contradicting him/her and developing diverse forms of counter-power. It is worth to underline that – compared with previous experiments done in the field of PB games between 2013 and 2015, Empaville for Schools appeared more stimulating for the players. The experimental nature of this process, suggested the Centre for Social Studies to conduct a small research on this gamified tool, using a multimethod approach (that could combine the analysis of surveys distributed to teachers and participant observation) inspired to David Collier’s idea of process tracing (2011).

Teachers’ feedback – although quite different depending on the class–levels involved – was profoundly positive about the efficacy of the gamification approach, stressing particularly the importance of the deliberative phase to develop different capabilities and favor a critical approach to reality. Many of the teachers pointed out that students who use to be shy or rowdy showed motivation and even exerted leadership for the first time. The government decree nº 436–A/2017 created the National School PB to commemorate the Student Day and encourage civic and democratic participation of students. See https://opescolas.pt and https://opescolas.pt/regulamento.
non-formal learning space seemed to result in a more challenging and enjoyable experience especially for the students aged 10–12. Teachers’ evaluation mainly highlighted the positive role of three elements of gamification, namely: playing roles, the time set provided for each task, and the democratic discussion and presentation of proposals among their peers, which allowed students to raise their voices in the class on equal grounds. In general, professors stated that the game captured the students’ attention and raised their motivation much more than traditional lectures. Teachers of older students (13–16) that used the Empaville for Schools game version tended to highlight that – despite the positive impacts of the deliberation phase – time constraints are too oppressive, and possibly the engagement of teenagers needs a gamification with a higher level of attractiveness and involvement that can compete with video-gaming and social networks.

Among the typical dynamics determined by gamified techniques, the participant observation conducted by some members of the organizing team underlined the following:

(a) The students exposed to Empaville for Schools showed deep levels of curiosity and attention to the activity from the beginning. Possibly, the key element was the “appeal for something new” which interrupted the normal class-dynamics, being the presence of new objects and unknown people in the school environment symbolic of such a novelty, which pushed professors in an inactive role of mere observers, to minimize their direct influence in the simulations.

(b) The behaviour of some students in terms of leadership, proactivity, and concentration differed from that described by teachers in the everyday lecture-time. Possibly, the simulation fostered new behaviours according to the concept of “projective identity” (Ramirez and Squire 2014) making it possible for students, through playing different characters, to let aside the role of “good/bad student” and feel comfortable of assuming other roles.
(c) Involved students, including the youngest, showed high levels of familiarity with the use of technological devices used for the simulation. Namely, the use of the digital platform to support the game attracted curiosity and collaboration. Apparently, the act of uploading proposals online was considered the only proof of their real existence, and a certain impatience marked the approach to technologies (which sometimes proved slow and imperfect), denoting a habit of rapidity and immediacy, possibly deriving from a typical feature of the latest digital devices and programs.

(d) Competition between groups in the game increased productivity and engagement, but only in the most active classes. However, it had little effect on less participative classes. Although there were visible differences at individual level, such dynamics proved predominantly collective. Possibly, in some cases, the initial group attitude affected the way of looking to the activity as a game, or just as a school task with the language of a game.

(e) The tasks with major levels of autonomous action requested of participants have been carried out with more difficulties and less originality. For example, finding an original and explanatory title to each project resulted much more demanding for the participants than organizers had expected. More productive results used to come when students were more guided by facilitators, which lowered the important element of autonomy.

(f) Of the two alternative forms used to introduce the initial story-telling (the projection of a video of the park and the active interaction with the mayor of the city supported by images and theatrical elements) the second – and most interactive – proved to be the most effective and engaging, becoming a part of the game itself.

(g) The final debriefing following the simulation always managed to extrapolate elements of reflection, learning, and
criticism from the experience, proving the importance of integrating gaming with other methodologies to maximize learning (Larsen McClarty et al. 2012) and link the gamified experience with the external reality and share the skills learned. Sessions where debriefing was compressed for time scarcity appeared less effective and memorable.

(h) Although many students declared of having heard about Participatory Budgeting previously, only few proved familiar with its features and methodologies. It will be important for the future to research if experiencing PB in the form of a game had favour the access of young people to this tool, preparing them to use it consciously. In a country like Portugal – where almost 40% of local authorities (and some ministries at national level) experiment with PB – such a study could be easily imaginable.

Some final remarks
A growing number of gamification techniques is being applied today to support and integrate democratic innovations for their capacities of attracting larger audiences (with a special attention to digital native citizens), enhancing motivations to participate to public arenas of decision-making, and providing different types of rewards (which are not only those related to the final outputs of the participatory processes in which they are inserted). Although a growing literature has been listing the potential positive benefits and negative constraints of a wider use of games in democratic processes, still few researchers focus on the joint-effects (and especially on mid–long term impacts) produced by the combination of on-purpose gamified features and the natural component of gaming which characterizes every participatory process, where competition and final rewarding represent structural components. The explicit and diffuse recognition of a large potential – together with the absence of clarity on real effects and impacts of gamification, especially when combined with democratic innovations – possibly explains why the use of gaming elements is still shy and disperse in the majority of participatory processes. And maybe also explains why gamification techniques are still preferred within training contexts, which precede and prepare the real participatory processes applied to policymaking. Here, in fact, their positive experimental potential tends to be maximized, in constructive settings where real consequences are limited and there is a high possibility of improving incrementally the way in which games are used to produce new effective forms of learning by doing. Indeed, it can prepare different types of actors to intervene in real participatory processes with a higher degree of awareness, efficacy and capacity to react to positive surprises and unexpected constraints.
Participatory budgeting constitutes an outstanding example of such a trend. In fact, being that it is related to a complex topic, and having traditionally stiff and articulated cycles, it can strongly benefit from pre-preparing its different organizers and participants, and motivate the latter to invest time and energies in being active part of the process. Despite this, the use of *gamification* in PB is still shy, and it is more inherent to its nature of a competitive process, which aims at reaching a larger set of outputs, than being an explicit goal for improving its fluidity and attractiveness. In this chapter, a small story of *gamified* items used to promote and consolidate the dissemination of PB as a complex device has been presented, with the aim of exemplifying it’s still unexplored potentials. Namely, we focussed on the activities carried out through the creation of the role-playing game Empaville, which proved to be a useful metaphor of some limits and challenges of *gamification* for democracy, especially in the context of education and capacity building. Nevertheless, many questions remain open, and only some of them can currently be answered, considering that *gamification* is a fast-evolving process that must still be further analysed, researched, and more critically implemented.

As properly stated by Deterding et al. (2011), *gamification* principles could not be considered inherently positive or negative, but their evaluation is strictly related to their use and consequences. So, even a well-conceived and ethical *gamification* could not constitute a proper tool for all contents and situations, and – especially if used in an educational environment – it needs to be integrated by other spaces of discussion that could play as a bridge between games and reality (Larsen McClarty et al., 2012).

As demonstrated by the observation of Empaville for School, there are always large margins for improvement and growth, even when evaluations of the game performance are substantially positive. For example, if the focus on group dynamics (considered best suited for younger age-groups) risks to partially diminishing the individual capacity in promoting autonomous action and choice-making, future experiments will have to take this into account, and rebalance the relation between collective and individual dynamics in the simulation – as already happens in the Empaville version for adults. The same is valid for the insertion of technological features in the simulation (and the quality of equipment and internet connections used for the online parts of the game). In fact, the familiarity showed by students for technologies and their creative potential, seems to require – for the future – to expand their use in the simulation games, as it is gradually happening in the real world, in many hybrid models of Participatory Budgeting.

Summarizing, as clearly proved by the case of Empaville, the main challenge for any experiences of *gamification* for democracy is – at the moment – the need
to shift from a mere evaluation of pre-set goals and organizational features to a central emphasis posed on the analysis of the performance and the results obtained by each simulation or gamified space. Unfortunately, both training and research centres as well as public authorities that try to promote gamified spaces for improving the attractiveness and functioning of their participatory innovations, seem still far from accomplishing such a widespread need of evolution. Nevertheless, we are convinced that this shift is indispensable to acquire a better capacity to evaluate the world of gamification for democracy and, potentially, to give it the credibility which it deserves.
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Economist of the National University of Colombia, Master in Human Rights and Democratization of the Externado University of Colombia – Carlos III University of Madrid. He has served as Coordinator of Benefits and Projects of the Colombian Association of Pension and Unemployment Fund Administrators – ASOFONDOS and as Analyst of the Directorate of Socioeconomic and Regulatory Studies of the District Department of Economic Development. He has been a jury member of a master's thesis on Participatory Planning and Participatory Budgeting. He is an Advisor to the Lobbying and Political Pressure Strategy of Corporación Viva la Ciudadanía and is part of the Technical Secretariat of the National Network of Local Planning and Participatory Budgeting.

**Roberto Falanga**

Postdoc Research Fellow at the Instituto de Ciências Sociais, University of Lisbon, is psychologist and Doctor of Sociology. His area of investigation concerns citizen participation in policymaking, with focus on government-led practices in budgeting, planning, and urban regeneration. His research and practice in Southern Europe is aimed to shed light on different institutional designs of citizen participation in the context of the (post)crisis.

**Robert Weymouth**

He is currently a PhD Student at the Curtin University Sustainability Policy
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**Rodrigo Rangel**

Rodrigo holds a degree in Social Sciences from Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). He is also graduated in Economics and has a Master's degree in Sociology from UFRGS. He is a public servant, occupying the position of Sociologist at the Municipality of Porto Alegre, was coordinator of ObservaPOA from 2013 to 2017. He has experience in the area of performance indicators, with emphasis in the social area, working mainly on the themes of intra-urban performance indicators and participatory democracy.

**Simon Cameron**

As Participatory Budgeting Development Manager for the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) is working to mainstream participatory budgeting into the day to day practice of all 32 local authorities. His work in Local Government has focused on improving the life opportunities and outcomes for individuals and communities by giving voice to people to help shape and deliver meaningful and effective services. Simon has been involved at national and local level in shaping policy that puts people and their needs at the centre of public services.

**Simone Júlio**

She is graduated in Economics by the University of Porto (FEP – Economics Faculty), holds a Master Degree in Tourism and urban Culture from ESGHT of the University of Algarve and a High Education Certificate in Macroeconomics from Birkbeck University of London. She has worked as a research analyst for Bloomberg LP in the London office for several years. Since she joined Associação In Loco has been working in the PB and Participatory Democracy fields for several projects (Portugal Participa, EMPATIA, National Strategy for the Promotion of Participatory Municipal Governance in Mozambique) and has
been part of the consulting team (together with Nelson Dias and Vânia Martins) for the implementation of PB in numerous municipalities in Portugal. She has also collaborated in the organization of the first edition of Hope for Democracy and in the elaboration of dissemination guides and articles.

**Sofia Antunes**

She works at the Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra. She integrated different research teams on participatory democracy, including those of the EMPATIA, Portugal Participates, OPtar and Youth in Action projects. She published about participatory budgeting and collaborated with the International Observatory on Participatory Democracy. She graduated in International Relations (Coimbra, Paris 2006) and obtained a master in Human Rights and Democratisation (Venice, Hamburg 2011).

**Stefano Stortone**

He is a civic activist, a researcher in politics and a social entrepreneur, whose main goal is to deepen democracy by reshaping it. To this end, he founded BiPart (www.bipart.it), a start-up company aimed at studying, promoting, designing and implementing innovative democratic processes in all kinds of communities, taking advantage of ICTs and strengthening social relations. He obtained a master's degree (2005) and a PhD (2010) in Politics from the Catholic University of Milan and a MA in Democratic Studies from the Leeds University (2010). From 2013 to 2018 he was a post-doc researcher at the Civic Informatics Laboratory (LIC) of the University of Milan, working for the EMPATIA project.

**Stephanie McNulty**

She is Associate Professor of Government with expertise in participatory governance, gender, decentralization, and development. She is also the Director of Faculty Diversity Initiatives at Franklin and Marshall College, where she leads efforts to diversify the faculty and promote inclusive pedagogy. McNulty also recently spent seven months in Peru observing participatory budgeting (PB) meetings to explore the issue of inclusion. Dr. McNulty has worked, lived, and conducted extensive fieldwork in Chile, Honduras, Peru, Bolivia, and Guatemala. She has a Ph.D. in Political Science from The George Washington University and a M.A. in Political Science from New York University.

**Tarson Núñez**

He was Coordinator of the Office of Planning of the City of Porto Alegre, in 2002, organization in charge of managing the PB process. He coordinated the
local team of research conducted by the World Bank to evaluate the 25 years of the PB in Porto Alegre. He was Director of the Department of Regional and Urban Development of the Secretary of Planning of the state government of Rio Grande do Sul, which had as one of its attributes to contribute in the process of construction of the PB at the state level. He is currently a researcher at the Foundation of Economics and Statistics of Rio Grande do Sul.

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He is a Senior Public Sector Specialist at the World Bank’s Governance Global Practice. Having joined the Bank in 2010, Tiago’s activities focus on working with governments to develop solutions for better public policies and services. Tiago holds a PhD and a Masters in Political Science from the European University Institute, as well as a Masters in Organized Collective Action from Sciences-Po Paris.

**Vanessa Sousa**

She holds a degree in Sociology and Planning (2000) and is Master of Planning and Evaluation of Development Processes (2007), both by ISCTE – University Institute of Lisbon. Currently is PhD student in Sociology with specialization in Cities and Urban Cultures, at the Faculty of Economics and Social Studies Centre, University of Coimbra, with the subject "Welfare City: the emerging practices in search of urban construction of social emancipation. The case of Lisbon" which seeks to examine the practices of citizen participation in response to problems encountered in the city. The professional career has been oriented to develop participatory methods on planning and evaluation of public policies. She has been consultant on different Participatory Budgeting helping to develop data bases about the processes and has been the expert responsible for the implementation of the Participatory Budgeting of Nampula (Mozambique).

**Vânia Martins**

She is a Social Educator working at In Loco Association in several projects, since 2013. In the past, she has been a researcher working to Huelva and Algarve Universities, on research themes as social identities, communities and adult education. She has been co-author of several articles and books in this issues. She has always been an enthusiastic in topics related with volunteering, youth, ethnicity and gender, and privileges non-formal education approaches. Since working in In Loco Association, she discovers Participatory Budgeting and Participatory Democracy, which strongly influenced her work. Since then, she has worked in several projects in this area, as Portugal Participa, COMPARTE and the Network of Portuguese Participatory Municipalities.
**Vladimir Vagin**
Vladimir is a Head of the National Center for Initiative Budgeting (NCIB) in the Research Institute of the Russia Ministry of Finance. NCIB is in charge of coordination of IB stakeholders and strategic support of IB practices. Vladimir is a core contributor to the official Strategy for Developing Initiative Budgeting in Russia and reports by Russia Ministry of Finance on the best practices in Budget for Citizens. He is an author of many academic publications on citizen engagement practices. Vladimir is a historian and he holds Ph.D. in Philosophy from St. Petersburg State University, Russian Federation.

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**Won No**
She is a Ph.D. candidate in the School of Public Affairs at Arizona State University. She expects to defend her dissertation, entitled “Redistribution and deliberation in mandated participatory governance: The case of participatory budgeting (PB) in Seoul, South Korea” and receive Ph.D. in Public Administration and Policy in May 2018. She will join the Department of Public Economics and Administration at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics as an assistant professor, starting from Fall 2018.

**Yves Cabannes**
He is an urban specialist, activist and scholar. For the past forty years he has been involved in housing rights issues and people-led initiatives including participatory budgeting, urban agriculture, food sovereignty, land rights, local currencies, and appropriate technologies. Since the mid 1990s, he has been involved with participatory budgeting through research, project implementation, teaching and advocacy in a large number of cities around the world. Mr. Cabannes was the Senior Advisor to the Municipality of Porto Alegre, Brazil, for the International Network on Participatory Budgeting. He became Emeritus Professor of Development Planning at University College London in 2015.
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Available for download at www.oficina.org.pt
“Hope for Democracy” is not only the title of this book, but also the translation of a state of mind infected by innovation and transformative action of many people who in different parts of the world, are engaged in the construction of more lasting and intense ways of living democracy.

The articles found within this publication are “scales” of a fascinating journey through the paths of participatory democracy, from North America to Asia, Oceania to Europe, and Latin America to Africa.

With no single directions, it is up to the readers to choose the route they want to travel, being however invited to reinforce this “democratizing wave”, encouraging the emergence of new and renewed spaces of participation in the territories where they live and work.